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SUMMARY
This study investigates the efficiency of commercial
bank lending in Nigeria against the background of the generally
held a priori assumption that there is an important role for
these institutions in the process of economic development. As
the primary aim of the study is to identify and define approaches
for improving the lending function in Nigerian banks, it was
first necessary to examine various facets of this activity.
Thus an appraisal of the banks' lending record was undertaken.
Through a series of surveys the lending attitudes and practices
of the bankers were also investigated. To obtain an independent
but complementary view on these issues, an empirical study of
the perception of bankers and their lending services by their
customers was conducted. Finally a comparative study of loan
planning and control in U.K. and Nigerian banks was undertaken
in order to draw out possible lessons for Nigerian banking
practice.
These enquiries revealed important weaknesses in the loan
management of Nigerian banks. It appeared that their lending was
neither adequate nor appropriate. Loan planning and control were
also found to be either non-existent or deficient in the banks.
Building on these findings the next stage of this research
concentrates on measures that could be taken to improve bank
lending efficiency. To test the feasibility of the hypothesis
that Nigerian banks could be more efficient and yet remain safe
and profitable, a hypothetical 'efficient' bank was created and
simulated in both normal and crisis situations. The simulation
results confirmed this hypothesis.
It is concluded that there is a need for the
government to provide essential infra-structural support
to both lenders and borrowers. The research results also
point to the view that the banks should improve their
management practices particularly in the light of the
practices in other developed and developing countries.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. BAC KGRO UND
The study of banking is as old as the industry.
Mints (1970, P. 9) suggests that "attempts in English speaking
countries to explain the operations of commercial banks began
with the inception of these institutions, that is to say, in
the second half of the seventeenth century in Great Britain and
in the 1780s in the United States." It was not until much later
and beginning with the seminal work of Schumpeter (1934) that
attention began to be focused on the relationship between
the financial system and economic growth and development. As
in most economic debates there have emerged many schools of
thought on this issue and particularly on the role of the
financial system in the process of economic growth. This almost
traditional tendency to dissent among economists has been
helped in this case by the plethora of interacting variables
that act jointly to determine the size, nature and pace of
economic growth. The most contentious point in these debates
today, however, is the weight to be assigned to the contribution
of the financial system in economic development rather than the
fact of the correlation of the two sectors (see Cameron, 1972).
Because of the greater need for rapid development in less
developed countries (LDCs), these countries have provided rich
case study materials for students in this field. Apparently in
view of the important intermediation role assigned to the
financial systems of most of these countries, these studies
have generally started off with the implicit assumption that
the financial systems have a causative role in these countries'
development efforts. The studies have gone from this base to
appraise the role of the financial systems in LDCs. To name
only a few, these include Ojo (1974) on Nigeria; Taylor (1972)
on Sierra Leone; Islam (1973) on Pakistan; Bourne (1969) on
Jamaica; and Abdi (1977) on Eastern Africa.
All of these studies have three notable features in
common. The first is that they have all been very omnibus in
nature. Some have either sought to enquire into the role of all
aspects of the financial system or systems. Others have been
less ambitious but still considerably wide in scope. Many of
these have concentrated on the role of commercial banks as
financial intermediaries, giving attention to various facets of
their activities - deposit mobilization, lending, etc. It
goes without saying that studies of this nature can hardly be
expected to probe deeply into important aspects of commercial
banking such as lending. A second feature of these studies
is that they have sought to answer the question: how are the
financial systems or institutions performing? but without
asking why? This is probably to be expected given the very
wide-ranging nature of these enquiries. Finally, to a very
great extent, these studies have relied on published aggregate
data and neglected the views of bankers and customers. Inevit-
ably they thus conducted their enquiry with the "detached view-
point usually adopted by economists in analysing the behaviour
of economic units." (Cohen and Hammer, 1966, p. 117).
One can hardly quarrel with this approach given the fact that
they were mainly concerned with the 'how' rather than the 'why'
of the operations of financial systems and institutions.
2. OBJECTIVES OF 'THIS STUDY
It is against this background that the present study is
conceived. An attempt is made to further complement these
undoubtedly significant and useful pioneering efforts; as well
as develop and improve on the insights they provide into the
working of the commercial banking system. /The primary aim of
this study is to enquire into the efficiency of commercial bank
lending in Nigeria. Put differently, the basic question this
enquiry seeks to answer is whether the commercial banks through
their lending activity are efficiently helping economic develop-
ment efforts in Nigeria. As much as data availability permits,
in answering this question special attention will be paid to
the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. This is in view of
the crucial role these sectors play in the economic growth
and development of Nigeria (see Chapter 5). The time period—of
main concern to this investigation is 1960-1979.
Like previous studies an attempt is made to examine how
banks perform their lending functions, using the records of
their operations. This is to facilitate an appreciation and
understanding of why they operate the way they do. Unlike
earlier studies, however, the focus is on one and indeed the
most important aspect of the commercial banks' operations -
lending. On a scale rarely undertaken by previous studies
of this kind in LDCs, the bankers and their customers are
involved in this enquiry. This is so that first hand information
about how and why they relate to each other the way they do,
can be obtained.
The orientation of this study is both positive and
normative. It is positive in the sense that attempts are made
to learn and analyse existing lending practices and the banker-
customer relationships in order to answer the question: "What
is?" These efforts are made to provide answers for important
questions such as: Do Nigerian commercial banks lend enough in
the aggregate? Do they link this lending to national goals?
How do banks appraise the creditworthiness of their clients?
What extra-lending services do the banks provide in a deliberate
effort to improve the creditworthiness of their customers and
increase the volume of creditworthy projects in the economy?
How do customers perceive their bankers?
It is also normative in the sense that it is policy-
oriented, that is attempting to answer the question: What ought
to be? particularly in the light of "what is". To help support
the rational suggestions about "what ought to be", this study
appropriately uses as a backdrop the 'state of the act of bank
management' in the U.K. and to a lesser extent in the countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
The aim is to see what lessons regarding loan management
techniques, rather than practices, can be learnt.
One of the big constraints of economic studies in LDCs
is data availability. The infrastructural facilities -
institutions, systems and procedures - for the generation and
dissemination of economic statistics are, to put it mildly, poor.
In addition to this problem, academic studies such as this are
very often seriously handicapped by the fact that they do not
receive the kind of financial support that will enable useful,
extensive fieldwork. Because of these constraints, this study
has had to use macro-analyses to augment the main micro-
analyses. That is to say, aggregate statistics have had to be
employed as a basis for analysing the behaviour of the
institutions in addition to the cross-sectional and other
empirical micro-level data used.
3. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY
There are many good reasons why this study focuses
on commercial banks and their lending function. The first reason
is.the politico-economic strategy of Nigeria which is based on
the often-vaguely defined philosophy of mixed economy. The
one thing that is clear about the economic arrangements in a
mixed economy is that an important role is assigned to the
private sector and by implication to the financial system, in
general, and the commercial banks, in particular.
The commercial banks have traditionally and will in the
foreseeable future, play a dominant role in the Nigerian
financial system. This is because they represent the core of
the system (see Chapter 5).
	 In 1975, for instance, the
institutions accounted for 86.6 and 85.4%, respectively, of
institutionalised savings and the banking system's credit to
theeommy (see tables 5.4& 5.5.Furthermore they account for a
significant portion of the money supply in the form of demand
deposits (see also table 5.12) and are the conduit via which
monetary policies are effected. In the light of these,
Roussakis's (1977, p. xiii) statement that "no other financial
institution contributes more markedly to-the successful
functioning of a nation's economy than does its commercial
bank" is as true for Nigeria as it could be for any other
country. Such an important sector of the economy would appear
to deserve consistent and continuous studies of this nature.
In spite of this evidently pre-eminent place of commercial
banks in the Nigerian economy, there have emerged in the last
6two decades a large number and variety of government sponsored
specialist financial institutions to fill credit gaps in the
economy. Historically, it is known that new financial
institutions are established, in the main, to meet unsatisfied
and/or inadequately satisfied credit and other needs of the
economy. Besides, the government has indigenised the banking
system more markedly during the last decade, mainly because
of the system's inability and/or unwillingness to meet the
financial intermediation needs of the economy (see Nwankwo,
1980, pp. 70-81). All these seem to raise questions about the
efficiency of the commercial banks and thus hel p to justify
the relevance of an enquiry of this kind.
The emergence and growth of new credit institutions may
not for some time to come, sufficiently fill up the gap left
by the commercial banks. Besides the commercial banks are
comparatively long established; they possess a corps of trained
personnel, and employ time-tested procedures and principles in
their business. They, therefore, have the basic capacity for
performing efficiently the financial intermediation role in the
economy. Also, in comparison with government sponsored credit
institutions, the commercial banks, in spite of indigenisation,
are still relatively non-political institutions. All these
add up to one thing: properly-oriented, these institutions
should be able to perform to the standard of efficiency expected
of them.
Of all the numerous functions of the commercial hanks,
the lending operation constitutes the focus of this study. The
most obvious reason for this is that, loans and advances are by
far the largest single item in the asset structures of Nigerian
commercial banks. Lending also deserves the special attention
offered by this kind of study because commercial banking in
Nigeria is still basically a profit making business and loans
and advances are the most profitable assets for the employment
of banks' funds. At the same time, loans and advances are the
most risky assets in a bank's portfolio. Indeed, "in no
facet of its operations can a commercial bank suffer sizeable
losses as quickly as it can on its commercial lending operation"
(Behren, 1974, p. 5). Lending is also important from a different
viewpoint. There is no better way in which banks can contribute
to the growth and development of their environments than by
providing productive investments which result in the promotion
of the welfare of the people. The practical problem of measuring
loan-deposit feedback, i.e. the new deposits created by new loans,
still looms large. Following empirical studies by, amongst
others, Robertson (1970) and Bradley and Crane (1975), no one
can seriously dispute the evidence that new loans generate new
deposits. In addition it is also true that "lending is
instrumental in creating and maintaining good deposit relation-
ships which are essential for the furthering of bank lending.
The close and continuing contact established with the borrower
is also instrumental in broadening the market for other bank
services" (Roussakis, 1977, p. 96). From these self-interest
viewpoints, lending is important to bank management as much as
it might be to the economy as a whole.
4. A NOTE ON INTEREST RATES
In most developed countries
... the range of rates that a bank may charge on
various kinds of loans will be largely determined by
forces beyond its control, that is, the level of
rates in the market and the forces of competition.
Within these limits, the individual bank retains a
significant degree of flexibility for
establishing interest rate policies that will
help to determine the volume and character of
the bank's loan portfolio and to bring about
changes therein over time."
(Crosse and Hempel, 1973 p. 195).
Given this kind of operations scenario, interest rates policies
are an endogenous and important factor in the model of the
commercial bank lending decision.
This picture, however, differs wholly from the situation
in Nigeria and many other developing countries. In Nigeria
interest rates are administered (see Falegan, 1978, pp. 15-30).
At the beginning of every financial year (formerly in April but
now in January) credit guidelines which also contain the interest
rate structure directives are sent to all banks stating that
"until further notice, the following interest rate structure
shall be in force." (Monetary Policy Circular No. 10-for 1978/79
fiscal year p. 6). This directive on interest rates specifies
the minimum and maximum borrowing and lending rates for the banks
(see table V-1). Furthermore, the methods for calculating these
rates are also specified. For instance, the 1978/79 credit
guidelines directed that "only the Reducing Balance Method shall
continue to be used to calculate interest charges on loans
payable in agreed instalments." (p. 7).
There are arguments for and against administered interest
rates in developing countries (see,for, Moore (1968), Ojo and
Adewunmi (1980a) and, against, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)).
It is not the intention of this researcher to contribute to this
debate here. What is more important to this study is the reality
of administered interest rates which Nigerian commercial banks
have always and still continue to live with. In the light of
this state of affairs, interest rates can, to all intents and
purposes, be regarded as an exogenous factor in lending decision
making in Nigeria. It is for this reason that this study has
very sparingly been concerned with the role of interest rates
in the management of loans and advances in Nigeria and other
countries in the comparative studies.
5. OUTLINE OF THE 511MY
This work is divided into 13 chapters. Chapter 2 presents
a broad, introductory picture of the methods of analysis
employed. The next two chapters. are devoted to surveys of the
literature. Whilst Chapter 3 is concerned with a review of the
literature on the role of finance in economic development,
Chapter 4 looks at the literature on lending concepts, principles
and practices. These two chapters provide the essential
analytical framework for the appraisal of commercial bank lending
operations in a developing environment.
For an appreciation of the context of this study, Chapter
5 provides a survey of the Nigerian commercial banks' lending
environment. In addition to providing a picture of the economic
and financial system within which the banks operate, this survey
also highlights the dominant role played by them in the overall
financial intermediation activities in the country. Chapter 6
follows this up with an appraisal of aggregate and sectoral
analysis of commercial bank lending during 1960-1979.
The empirical results on the liquidity preference of the
commercial bankers and the relationship of this attribute to
their lending practices are analysed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8
is a comparative study of planning and control of loans and
advances in the U.K. and Nigerian commercial banks.
The next three chapters are devoted to simulation
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exercises aimed at examining the proposition of the study.
SOFI, the simulation model used for these exercises, is
introduced in Chapter 10. The proposition that Nigerian commer-
cial banks could, without "damage", become more aggressive is
evaluated in Chapter 11, and contingency-tested in Chapter 12.
Finally, Chapter 13 concludes with a summary of the main
findings and the associated recommendations.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the methodology of the analysis
used in examining the hypotheses of this study. These
hypotheses are stated in the next section. Section 3 considers
the general concept of efficiency and its relationshi p to the
banking industry. This is of paramount importance because of
the various interpretations given to this concept. Although
the word "efficiency" is an everyday one ".... problems involving
ideas of efficiency are so many and so intimately related to
each other that it is easy to slip from one sense of the word
to another, and so to confuse issues in the discussion." (Hall
and Winsten, 1959, p. 71). Finally in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, the samples for the empirical study and the methods
of data gathering used are stated.
2, THE HYPOTHESIS OF THIS STUDY
In Chapter 1, the purpose of this study was stated as
that of encuiring into the efficiency with which Nigerian banks
perform their lending function and thus aid economic development.
The basic hypothesis of the study can thus be stated as:
That the Nigerian commercial banks are
inefficient in their lending function
and thus contribute less than they should
reasonably be expected to the country's
economic development.
The negative form of this proposition has no special significance
and is chosen only for convenience. This broad hypothesis can,
however, be broken down into a collection of more easily handled
and verifiable propositions as follows:
Hypothesis I. That the commercial banks have not sufficiently
helped in meeting on the aggregate the finance
needs of government development strategies and
plans, especially in ensuring that resources at
their disposal flow adequately into the "preferred"
sectors of the-economy.
Hypothesis II. That the commercial banks have not sufficiently
helped in making investment funds available for
the development of the strategic sectors of
agriculture and manufacturing.
Hypothesis III. That the commercial banks have not sufficiently
provided the essential lending related services
to their customers especially in the agriculture
and manufacturing sectors.
Hypothesis IV. That the commercial bankers' attitude to
development financing is orthodox and not conducive
to required and attainable levels of development.
3. THE CONCEPT OF EFFICIENCY
The need to measure the efficiency of economic systems
is important both to the academic and the policy maker. The
academic arguments and deLates on the relative efficiency of
industries and firms must be based on a well defined measurement
of the concept. The policy maker will consider as most econom-
ically rational the allocation of resources to different uses
if he can determine the relative efficiency of the beneficiary-
units. In particular
"the policy implications of studies of economic
efficiency in the banking industry extend over
both the micro and macro economic levels. If the
efficiency of different groups of banks is measured,
it is possible to determine by how much banks could
be expected to expand their services through approp-
riate reorganisation or modification of the
regulatory environment without absorbing additional
resources in the aggregate. One could also draw
policy recommendations on the desirability of one type
of banking system over another."
(Richard & Villanueva, 1980, pp. 315-316)
This concern of all managers of resources, be it on the economy,
the industry or firm level, as well as of the academics, stems
from the reality of the scarcity of productive resources. In
all, to be able to solve resource allocation problems, some
measuring rod, based on a reasonably well defined concept of
efficiency, is a prerequisite.
Important as it is from both the academic and practical
viewpoints, the concept of efficiency has remained loosely
defined in the literature (Farrel, 1957). The concept today
means different things to different people in different circum-
stances. As Lau and Yotopoulos (1971, p. 94) put it "—economic
efficiency is an elusive concept in which the economist, the
engineer and the policy maker all have great stakes." A few
examples will help make the point. The cost accountant, for
instance, uses the ratio of standard cost-to-actual cost per cent
to measure productive efficiency (see Horngren, 1972, pp. 186-
226). An engineer describes the efficiency of his machine by
the relation of output-to-theoretical capacity or output/
theoretical capacity per cent (Amey, 1970). To the economist,
the economic efficiency of a firm or industry can be broken
down into two separate components - 'price efficiency' and
'technical efficiency'. "The former measures a firm's success
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in choosing an optimal set of inputs, the latter its success
in producing maximum output from a given set of inputs." (Farrel,
1957, p. 259). However, "once the adjective 'economic' is
dropped, efficiency becomes a rather nebulous concept, meaning
only 'success in achieving planned objectives' whatever they may
be." (p. 259).
3.1 Efficiency in banking. What can be appropriately described
as the path-breaking study in this area is the work by Alhadeff
(1954) on monopoly and competition in banking. Since then,
however, there have been numerous scholarly studies considering
the different sizes and structures of banking units and systems,
and economies of scale, operating performance and efficiency
(see Heggestad, 1979, and Richard & Villanueva, 1980, for
surveys). Nearly all of these works have been carried out in
the context of developed countries. The recent studies by Ojo
(1979) and Richardand Villanueva (1980) are some of the few
exceptions, based on developing countries - Nigeria and the
Philippines, respectively.
Most of the earlier studies were preoccupied with the
estimation and evaluation of the banks' efficiency within the
framework of their operating cost functions. It was not until
recently that attention came to be focused on the profit function
as well (Mullineaux, 1978). In a recent study, Richard and
Villanueva (1980) attempted what may be considered the most
comprehensive definition of economic efficiency in banks. It is
a definition which recognises that economic efficiency in banking
.is a combination of both technical and price efficiency. They
argued that:
" ....technical efficiency relates to banks or groups of
banks which provide different quantities of services
from an identical set of measured endowments of
productive inputs. Price or allocative efficiency
recognises that different banks succeed in varying
degrees in maximizing profits i.e. in equating the
value of the marginal product of each variable input
to its price."
The interrelationships of the concepts of technical and allocative
or price efficiency were explained as follows: "Consider two banks
A and B with identical transformation function F(.) except for
a neutral displacement parameter, D
VA = DAF(X,L),
	 VB = DBF(X,L),
where V is output
X is the variable factor, and
L the fixed factor of production.
Equal technical efficiency requires DA = DE while
DAv. DB implies that bank A is more technically efficient. The
marginal conditions are D AF(X,L)/ X = KAQ,	 DBF(X,L)/ X--L. KBQ
where Q is the price of the variable factor and KA-s KB ,O. Equal
price efficiency requires KA = KB. KA,.KB implies that bank A is
more price efficient. Perfect price efficiency for both banks
requires KA = KB = 1."
Because of the serious problems of methodology and data
availability, these studies of bank operating efficiency are
smeared with the mark of "nonuniformity and inconclusiveness of
evidence." (Mullineaux, 1978, p. 259). Apparently because of
these problems too, studies of banks' operating efficiency ha47e
been restricted to those quantifiable aspects of banking except
in a very few cases (see Abdi, 1977). This is understandable
given the environments of most of these studies. But this
approach is not suitable for the evaluation of banks' operating
efficiency in developing countries, particularly if employed alone.
This study will thus try to remedy this defect in basic
methodology.
3.2 Definitional problems. Operating efficiency is a relationship
of output to input. In practice, however, the measurement problem
is complicated by two main factors. The first, which is partic-
ularly applicable to banking, is that for many services it is not
clear just what the unit of output is. Should loan output, for
example, be measured in terms of naira or number of loans? A
second problem, which is quite general and is encountered in
measuring operating efficiency of any economic unit, is to
determine a system of weights for comparing heterogenous outputs
and inputs. Even the small banks today provide several types of
credit as well as other services; thus labour and other inputs
are not homogenous. It is sometimes possible to segregate the
inputs attributable to each of several homogeneous outputs (by
means of, say, functional cost analysis) but even then, a system
of weights is needed to combine the inputs (see Guttentag and
Herman, 1967). It is worthy of note that there have been recent
attempts to by-pass some of the definitional problems.
Mullineaux (1978) has suggested the use of the concept of profit
function. "By definition the profit function expresses the maxim-
ized profit for a firm in a competitive situation as a function of
prices of output and variable factor inputs and quantities of the
fixed factors of production." (Mullineaux, 1978, p. 260).
3.3 Practical problems. There are a multitude of practical problems
as well. The first problem relates to the fact that the meaning
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of efficiency varies according to whose point of view we are
considering - the different interest units in a firm (managers,
workers, proprietors, creditors, etc.); the individual firm
or the community. The business firm, for example, will generally
be considered as efficient if good returns are earned on its
investments at the end of an accounting period. That is profit-
ability will be the measure of efficiency. But not everyone will
agree to the use of profitability as 'the' measure of efficiency.
Profitability after all, it may be argued, can be achieved at the
expense of bad labour relations, a bad maintenance programme or
an existing monopoly or monopsony situation.
Many development economists are becoming attracted to the
view that profitability does not truly measure the efficiency
of commercial banks in developing countries. They, therefore,
de-emphasise profitability in the evaluation of financial
institutions (see Abdi, 1977). The community will not conceivably
measure the efficiency of banks in terms of profitability but •
rather in terms of the contributions - tangible (i.e. real
economic growth and development) and intangible (community social
development). Indeed, this is not only true of developing
countries but of developed countries as well (see Greenberg, 1975).
Another important practical problem concerns the deter-
mination of what kind of standard to use. This is important in
view of the fact that efficiency is not an absolute term and
must be related to some standard of comparison. In particular,
"bank effectiveness is a relative concept and its evaluation
implies a comparison of actual performance against standard of
some kind." (Kane, 1975, p. 60).
In measuring the efficiency of the Nigerian commercial
banks, for instance, does one use internal standards i.e. compare
with similar financial intermediary groups or external standards
i.e. compare with banks abroad?
3.4 The measures of efficiency. One can hardly disagree with banking
practitioners when they say that
"there are no clear cut standards of 'effectiveness' by
which to judge the banks' lending record; the term is
a vague one and any overall assessment is bound to be
largely subjective ....Nevertheless, in considering
the effectiveness with which banks respond to the
demand for finance, it may be helpful to consider five
distinct questions (including):
(i) do banks lend enough in the aggregate?
(ii) do they allocate their credit appropriately
between different sectors of the economy?
(iii) are the terms on which they lend reasonable?"
(CLCB, 1977, p. 93)
Abdi (1977, p. 25) also suggests that
"the effectiveness of commercial banks and other
financial institutions in the economic growth of
developing countries can only be evaluated with a
specific objective in mind. Considering the general
scarcity of capital postulated in most developing
economies, a maximization of "productive investment"
finance subject to bank liquidity and earning
constraints will indicate effectiveness."
In the light of these, it appears clear that to undertake a
comprehensive, rigorous and realistic evaluation of the efficiency
of commercial banks involves the assessment of the quantitative
as well as the qualitative aspects of their operations. That is
to say an assessment of, not only loans and advances, deposit
mobilization, etc., but also of the provision of lending related
services such as investment advice, development of local
entrepreneurship and assistance in the generation of creditworthy
projects.
Hitherto, however, writers, management and policy makers,
in-attempting to assess the efficiency of banks, have mostly relied
entirely on quantitative measures. This is because these are
easier to produce and defend theoretically. These measures
consist largely of ratios drawn from financial statements of banks
or central bank returns of the institutions (see Haslem, 1968,
and Ojo, 1979). Because they rely on financial statements, the
quality of which is sometimes suspect (Greenball, 1971), these
measures of efficiency must, by definition, be subject to
significant weaknesses. However, so far no substitutes or
surrogates have been found and they remain generally acceptable
measures of efficiency. In view of the weaknesses of the
quantitative measures of efficiency used alone, qualitative
measures will be employed wherever possible and useful to
complement the quantitative measures in this study. For example,
whilst quantitative data on the operations of the banks are used
to assess their aggregate and sectoral lending performance and
the appropriateness of such lending, the bankers' and customers'
responses to questionnaires are used to gauge the quantity and
the quality of "the intangible but economically and psychologically
important banking service, the offering of information, advice
or guidance to business firms." (Katona, 1957, p. 7). It is thus
a broad economic efficiency criterion that will be employed here.
The aim is to find answers to the central question of this thesis:
to what extent do the commercial banks contribute financially and
otherwise to the growth and development of the Nigerian economy?
It is noteworthy that questions about the broad economic
efficiency of financial institutions have always, traditionally
and historically, been asked in a general context (see Singh, 1976,
pp. 1-63). To take a recent example, the Wilson Committee in the
U.K. was asked "to enquire into the role and functioning....of
financial institutions in the United Kingdom and their value to
the economy." Both the enquiry and response of the "clearers"
was undertaken in a broad spectrum that covered both qualitative
and quantitative aspects.
THE SAKIES
Only a broad picture of the samples selected can be
presented here. Detailed descriptions of the samples are
deferred to the appropriate places in this study i.e. the
relevant chapters where they constitute the basis of analysis.
In broad terms, there are two populations from which samples are _
drawn - the commercial banks on the one hand and the bank
customers on the other. There are two samples of banks, one each
rom the Nigerian and the U.K. financial systems. The Nigerian
sample consists of the 19 individual commercial banks, whilst the
J.K. sample consists of the big four clearing banks and Williams
and Glyns Bank. The concentration of banks' head offices and
even branches in Lagos and the availability of the aggregate and
arms-sectional data relating to these institutions at the Central
Bank of Nigeria in Lagos influenced the decision to select a
sample with the same boundary as the population. Comparability
with their Nigerian counterparts on the basis of commercial
banking activities was the reason behind the selection of the
sample of U.K. banks.
The sample of bank customers consists mainly of manufactur-
ing sector customers. This, as will be fully explained later, is
due to the fact that the attempt to select a suitable sample of
agriculture sector customers, full-time farmers with banking
connections, produced no useful results. The sample of manufactur-
ing sector customers can be broken down into two parts. The first
consists of the 44 manufaCturing firms quoted on the Nigerian
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Stock Exchange (NSE). These represent the large firms. The
second part consists of medium and small-scale manufacturing con-
cerns such as are typically located in industrial estates in
Nigeria.
5. DATA GATHERING PROCEDURE
The data on the Nigerian banks were obtained from three
main sources. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) publications - the
Economic and Financial Review and the Annual Report and Statement
of Accounts - provide the first source. Aggregate statistics on
the operations of the banks were obtained largely from these
sources. The second source consists of the Research and Bank
Examiners Departments of the CBN. This source provided the
cross-sectional data drawn from the First and Second Schedules
of the individual banks' returns. Questionnaires administered
at the branches and head offices of the commercial banks constitute
the third source of data. Three methods of information gathering
(or types of questionnaires) were used to request information from
the lending officers at the operation level. These are:
(i) Simulated Loan Request Questionnaire
(ii) Investment Preference Test, and
(iii) Structured Questionnaire (see Appendiz IV;A)
The same questionnaire was used to obtain information about
planning and control in both the U.K. and Nigerian banks (see
Appendix IV.A). These questionnaires were personally administered
at the head offices of the selected banks in the samples except
in the cases of banks with head offices outside Lagos. Addition-
ally, however, the Nigerian bank executives were requested to
respond to the Investment Preference Test questionnaire.
Although the same structured questionnaire (see Appendix
rwk-5 as used to obtain responses from manufacturing customers,
two methods were employed. The large companies were sent the
questionnaires by post with stamped, self-addressed envelopes
for replies. The smaller manufacturing organisations were visited
and the interviews conducted personally by the researcher with
their executives.
To enquire about the role and performance of the government
sponsored Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) a structured
questionnaire (see Appendix IV.6) was sent to the Director of
the Scheme and this constituted the basis of an interview with
him on an appointed date during the field work.
CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
The major aim of this study is to find out how efficiently
the Nigerian commercial banks operate their loan function and thus
contribute toward the general economic development of the country.
Implicit in this objective is the assumption that financial
systems can contribute significantly to economic development.
Not everyone will accept this assumption without question.
Views on the role of financial institutions in development can
be said to lie on a continuum, at one end of which there are
students who assert that financial institutions are neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for development; and at the
other students holding the viewpoint that financial institutions
are not only a necessary but also a sufficient basis for
economic development. In between lie moderates who assign
varying degrees of importance to financial institutions in the
process of economic development.
"In essence three main issues exist regarding
the influence of financial intermediaries: first,
their impact on the growth of savings, especially
of the household sector; second, their role in
the financialization of these savings (that is,
savings in a financial form); and third their
ability to ensure the most efficient transformation
of mobilized funds into real capital."
(Bhatia and Khatkhate, 1975, p. 133).
This chapter is divided broadly into four parts. The
next section is devoted to a review of the literature and
debate on the various aspects of the subject at hand. The
third part deals with the analysis of data to investigate the
evidence of the relationship between the monetary and real
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sectors of the Nigerian economy. Part four concludes with a
summary and the implications of the results of the analysis in
part two.
2, FINANCIAL= ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Early views
Schumpeter (1934) is generally acknowledged as the first
proponent of the view that financial institutions are a
necessary condition for, at least, the capitalist economic,
development. He asserts that for an economy to develop two
conditions are necessary and sufficient - financial institutions
and the availability of entrepreneurship. Among the more
important followers of this view, though sometimes differing in
mphasis, are Goldsmith (1969), Cameron et al. (1972) and Patrick
(1966). Goldsmith in his study of 35 developed and developing
countries calculated the financial interrelations ratio (i.e.
the ratio of financial instruments to the real wealth) for
each in an attempt to determine the relative financial develop-
ment compared to relative real development. He found that high
financial structure development defined by a high financial
interrelations ratio was also associated with high real develop-
ment implying that financial development is a prerequisite or must
go simultaneously with real development. Although Goldsmith's
measure of financial structure development - the financial
interrelations ratio - may be criticised on the basis of the
fact that not only economic but political', and cultural factors
as well influence the levels of financial structure development,
the high empirical correlation between financial structure
development and real development is suggestive.
By looking at the historical economic development of
developed as well as developing countries, Cameron et al.
were able to reach a positive conclusion on the role of
financial institutions in development. Postulating that the
functions of the banking system are (i) intermediation (ii) to
furnish part or all of the means of payments or money supply,
and (iii) the provision of entrepreneural talent and guidance
for the economy as a whole, Cameron summed up the general think-
.
ing or consensus of the team by saying that:
"The way in which banks perform these functions
may well determine the degree of success of
the development effort. As intermediaries,
they may vigorously seek out and attract reservoirs
of idle fund which will be allocated to entrepreneurs
for investment in projects with a high rate of social
return or they may listlessly exploit their quasi-
monopolistic position and fritter away investment
possibilities with unproductive loans." (p.5)
The basic Schumpetarian thesis was virtually unchallenged
until the publication of the work of Gurley in 1967. In a study
of the development process of socialist and developing countries
he reached the conclusion that financial system development is
not a necessary condition for development. His thesis rests
on the important point that there are alternatives or substitutes
for the role of financial intermediation in the process of
development. Though differing thus substantially with the
hitherto "established view", Gurley nevertheless admitted that
financial institutions might be prominent contributors to
development "when there is a decentralization of decision-making,
specialization of savings and heavy emphasis on external rather
than internal financing of investments" (p. 104) which are
features of capitalist economic systems. Gurley's conclusion is
therefore true for a particular rather than a general case. For
any of the substitute resource allocation mechanisms such as
taxation to be employed in place of financial intermediation
the eminent feature of socialist societies must be present i,e.
centrally controlled planning. This condition precedent
seems to dent the validity of his thesis. One conclusion to
be drawn from Gurley's proposition is, however, that for those
developing countries such as Nigeria that have chosen the quasi-
capitalist path of development, it will be "ideal" to take the
view of the necessity of financial institutions for development.
2.2 Some empirical evidence
These early works have kindled great interest in the
study of the relationship between financial system and institut-
ions and economic development in both developed and developing
countries. Most of the empirical studies have set out to
investigate the role financial institutions have played in
particular environments - a sort of ex-post appraisal. Not
unexpectedly, most of these studies have been done as part of
doctoral work of developing countries' students. Among these, to
name a few, are Ojo (Nigeria - 1974), Taylor (Sierra Leone - 1973),
Islam (Pakistan - 1973), Bourne (Jamaica - 1969) and Abdi (Eastern
Africa - 1977). All without exception have concluded in the same
vein as Taylor (1973, p. 308) who wrote that: "From our study
it is evident that the financial system can make a valuable
contribution to economic development if appropriate measures are
taken, given the balance of payments constraint:
(a) to mobilize more domestic resources
(b) to deal with the problem of securities for loans and the
special problem of lending to a large number of small
operators in the agricultural and small-scale industries
sectors; and
(c) to improve the quality of investment so as to increase
the productive capacity of the economy."
Given the capitalist economic development strategy adopted
in most of these countries and the pre-eminent positions of the
financial institutions coupled with the inability and the lack of
political will on the part of the government to experiment with
other options like taxation as Gurley suggests, these
conclusions can be said to be inevitable.
The developed economies have not, however, been entirely
left out. Griggs (1971) and Greenberg (1975) have also enquired
into the roles being played by financial institutions in
selected American communities.. Whilst Greenberg's study was
concerned with investigating the extent to which commercial banks
in Philadelphia carry out their traditional and developmental
functions, Griggs' work was concerned with the way selected bank
lending officers are aggressive in lending to and otherwise
assisting small scale and new businesses in Texas. Even for
their own highly developed capitalist economy, the findings of
both see an important role for their financial system in
general, and commercial banks in particular, in their community's
economic development process. Concluding for instance, Griggs
(1971, p. 11) notes that "the available information indicates that
there is a positive relationship between the ability and willing-
ness of commercial banks to lend credit and regional growth."
However, it is noteworthy that Greenberg (1975, p. 1) cautions:
"a banking system is only one of many factors that influence
economic activity l -therefore, an optimal banking system (defined
as one that allocates resources towards their most efficient uses)
may be necessary but not a sufficient condition for obtaining full
employment of a region's resources, attracting new resources
and promoting technological change." In all of these recent
studies both for developed and developing economies, one
striking point is common. Most, if not indeed all, have been
highly critical, justifiably based on the evidence revealed
by their empirical work, of the role of the financial systems
and the commercial banks in the different societies studied.
In spite of these studies, it will appear that this
debate on the role of finance and its relationships to real
development will continue for some time more. This is because the
fundamental question at the centre of the arguments remains
unanswered. Which causes or precedes the other - financial
development or economic development? These two development
processes in practice proceed simultaneously in a highly complex,
interacting, and inter-dependent fashion. This makes the
identification of any direction of causality, if indeed one is
found to exist, difficult. Happily, however, the basic point
is not in dispute; that is that "the relationship between the
real and monetary variables is undeniable." (Porter, 1966
p. 347).
2.3 Theoretical relationship
This relationship has long been recognised by economic
theorists in the growth models. The simplest and earliest known
of these theoretical growth models is the now legendary Harrod-
Domar model represented by the following equations:
K = kY
= J	 - (2)
where R = Capital Stock
Y = National Income,
J = Investment
k = dk/dt (the rate of increase of capital stock)
Equation (1) states that there exists fixed relationship
described by the capital coefficient (or capital/output ratio)
between the stock of capital and production, and equation (2)
merely expresses the theoretically expected equality between
the rate of increase of capital stock and investment given that
the two phenomena of a gestation lag and of depreciation are
assumed away. Undoubtedly this simplified model is patently
unrealistic having assumed away the influence of all factors
impacting on the level of national income other than capital.
r the sake of the present analysis, however, two important
and relevant messages of this growth function are clear. One
is the central role of capital in the production of the national
income and the second is the dependent relationship between the
two variables via the investment process (dk/dt).
12.4 The direction of causality
As noted earlier the first empirical work to reach the
conclusion of a positive relationship is that seminal study of
Goldsmith (1969). Recent attempts have gone further to try and
determine the direction of the causal relationship between the
real and monetary sectors. The current leader of the Monetarist
school is the chief proponent of the view that the causality
runs from monetary to the real sector; this being part of the
continuing debate on whether money matters in economic activities.
Beginning with his 1963 study with Schwartz, Friedman has consist-
ently held this view. By also inspecting the relationship
between money and the Industrial Production Index for US
time series data, Friedman (1969) confirmed further this
assertion, having found a high positive relationship between
these variables. Sims (1972) has advanced further than
Friedman and other Monetarists by asking and answering the
question: "Is there statistical evidence that money is
'exogenous' in some sense in the money-income relationship?"
(p. 540). The opponents of the view that the causal link
between monetary and real sectors runs from the one
to the other had argued persuasively to the effect that "money
might equally well react passively and very reliably to fluct-
uations in income" (p.540). Sims' study was aimed at clearing the
air by determining the direction of causality between these
sectors. With the aid of sophisticated regression analysis using
US time series data, Sims (1972) concluded that "the main empirical
finding is that the hypothesis that causality is unidirectional
from money to income agrees with post-war US data, whereas, the
hypothesis that causality is unidirectional from income to money
is rejected." (p. 540). This study has been replicated, for the
Canadian economy separately by the pairs of Barth and Bennett, and
Sharpe and Miller. The first two reached a contrary conclusion
after their analysis saying that "although Sims' result for the
United States supports the monetarist view of the role of money
in the economy, our finding for Canada offers no such support."
(1974, p. 310). Sharpe and Miller also using Canadian data got
results that contradict this conclusion of Bath and Bennett
and support Sims'. Thus they wrote that "contrary to Barth and
'Bennett's results, the Canadian case conforms to Sims' result for
the United States. The results are not conclusive but undirectional
causality is shown to exist between M and GNP and it runs in
the direction suggested by the modern quantity theorists." (p.290).
2.5 Patrick's demand-following and supply—leading concepts
A new and interesting dimension to the debate on the
relationship between the real and financial sector of an economy
was introduced by Patrick in his 1966 paper. This he did by
the enunciation of the concepts of demand - following and
supply - leading finance. By these Phrases he refers to the role
of financial institutions in the process of development as being
either passive and merely reacting to the demands for financial
services of the real sector (demand - following) or positively
active in devising and providing financial services for the real
sector in anticipation of demand for them (supply - leading).
Historically, Great Britain's example is generally claimed to
. epitomize the demand - following type of financial institutions
development. On the other hand Japan and Germany provide examples
of supply - leading financial development in which financial
institutions are involved in industries not only as bankers
but also as entrepreneurs. Patrick, however, did appreciate and
note the important fact that these phenomena are not likely to be
static and unchanging all through the different stages of economic
development. He thus remarks that "before sustained industrial
growth gets under way, supply - leading may be able to induce real
innovation-type investment. As the process of real growth occurs,
the supply - leading impetus gradually becomes less important and
the demand-following financial response becomes dominant." (p.177).
In a brief but incisive empirical analysis of the role of
financial institutions in the economic development of Hong Kong
Stammer (1972) (in a follow-up to Patrick's work) found and
confirmed these phenomena of demand - following and supply -
leading financial development. He, however, qualified Patrick's
generalization with regard to the need for the development of
new financial institutions to match increasing sophistication of
economic activities. He points out that for Hong Kong "changes
in the structure and operations of existing financial institutions
have been far more important than the development of new inter-
mediaries and the emergence of a complex financial market." (p. 324:
What in practice happens largely
depends on whether existing institutions are
willing and able to expand their functions to
create or respond to the demands for new financial
services; if not new institutions will spring up.
Willingness depends on perception of opportunities
and on attitudes towards risk. The ability is
constrained not only by availability of resources,
but more importantly, by the legal-institutional
structure." (p. 324).
The central theme of Patrick's analysis is not, however, in
dispute - that there is an important role for the financial
sector at a certain stage of the development process and that
this role is growth-inducing. This "positive growth-inducing
aspect of supply-leading financial development is attributed to
its allocative efficiency and to its encouragement of entrepren-
eurship." (Patrick, p. 327). More than any substance of the
debate, it is this "agreement" that is of paramount interest to
us here. This is because we envisage a role for the commercial
banks in Nigeria's eomurlic development in view of their uniclue
position in the nation's financial system.
2.6 Financial repression and the structuralist .hypotheses
Before concluding this analysis it will be instructive to
mention-two widely discussed hypotheses of the role of finance
in economic development. These are the Financial Repression
Hypothesis and the Structuralist Hypothesis. The leading
proponents of the financial repression hypothesis, unlike most
other writers on the subject, are categorical on the role financial
systems and institutions play in the development process. They
assert that it is nothing but growth-inducing except, of course,
that they are repressed. According to these apostles of the
financial repression hypothesis - Cameron et al. (1972),
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) - the sources of repression are
government legislation and policies such as legal restrictions
on activities and interest rate policies that distort the full
operation of the market mechanism in fixing prices for financial
resources. These repressions, they claim, show their effects on
the limited savings generated because of interest rate ceilings on
deposits, limited loan resources because of loan rate ceilings
and sectoral allocation guide ruled; and also on the continued
existence of rural and modern financial sectors - the so-called
"financial dualism".
These advocates of the free interplay of market forces,
undoubtedly sound convincing on theoretical grounds but on the
practicality of their argument they are less so. One reason for
this is that they all based their studies in advanced countries
and went on to interpret the result without sufficient qualific-
ations for the developing countries with entirely different
environments. The environments differ not only in variety and
volume of financial instruments and institutions but also in the
interrelations of the different subsectors and the sophistication
of activities and operators. These writers apparently think
"classical", visualising every financial environment as being
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perfectly competitive. This apparent false basis of their argument
corrupts their conclusions as the economic and financial environ-
ments in the developing countries are far from being perfectly
competitive. It is a fundamental misunderstanding and mis-
conception of the background to lending in developing countries
that can lead to the suggestion that re-aligning interest rates
alone will wipe out financial dualism.
The fact is that the rural/traditional lenders are more
flexible in their approach and this is possible because of the
excellent knowledge of their customers and of the socio-economic
factors that they possess. Similarly, re-alignment of interest
rates may not automatically induce savers in these economies to use
modern financial institutions for savings either. This is because
of the long list of inconveniences associated with such a change.
Consider a saver who has to spend one naira in transport and set
aside half-a-day or more to reach a bank to save only twenty
naira. Finally, nowhere in the Western World, known to this
writer, is there complete and unfettered use of loan resources
by the commercial banks in particular - the most capitalistic
and free economies inclusive. The reason is simple. Credit
is so central to economic activities, which in turn is potentially
politically sensitive, that no government wants to abandon its
allocation and use to the price mechanism without some sort of
intervention from time to time. In developing countries with
imperfect markets, inadequate information and painfully insuffic-
ient resources, the need to "administer" the allocation of
financial resources through interest rate structuring and credit
guidelines becomes even more compelling.
The second hypothesis - the structuralist hypothesis - is
based on the work of Gerschenkron. The kernel of Gerschenkron's
(1962) thesis is that the role (and the ability) of financial
institutions in the economic development of a country depends on
the structure of the economy at any particular time. Rather ambig-
uously he tried to classify countries at the threshold of
industrialization into a list with the very advanced countries
at the top and most backward countries at the bottom. At the top
end of this list is Britain, midway Germany, and at the bottom
is Russia, indicating down the line the degree of backwardness.
Based on his historical analysis of the role of financial
institutions at the point of industrialization in Europe, he
.argues that in highly industrialized economies like Britain the
role of financial institutions can be expected to be minimal since
great reliance was placed on internal finance by the entrepreneurs.
Germany on the other hand - the moderately backward economy - had
to rely rather heavily on the financial institutions because of
the limited resources available to enterprises and the needs of
the large scale-units of business. The unimportant role for the
financial system and the prominent role of the public sector in
the development process of Russia is perhaps inevitable from
his description of that country's eConomic and financial environ-
ment at the point of entry into the industrialization stage:
"The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no
banking system could conceivably succeed in attracting
sufficient funds to finance a large-scale industrial-
ization; the standards of honesty in business were so
disastrously low, the general distrust of the public
so great, that no bank could have hoped to attract even
such small capital funds as were available, and no
bank could have successfully engaged in long-term
credit policies in an economy where fraudulent bankruptcy
had been almost elevated to the rank of a general
business practice." (pp. 19-20).
Gerschenkron's description of Russia then can be repeated today
for many developing countries.
Although this description may fit most countries today,
unfortunately his implied prescription is irrelevant for two
major reasons. First, commercial banks in these countries
already have a substantial stranglehold on the financial
resources of the economies as the main financial intermediaries.
Second, the governments of these countries, having elected the
capitalist path of development, fashionably described as Mixed
Economy, have not now the political will to undertake the
unpalatable decision of centralising economic decision-making.
Apart from being politically explosive, the use of taxation in
•
place of financial intermediation is not humanly possible given
the abysmally low levels of income in these countries.
Gerschenkron's analysis is nevertheless useful for putting the
role of financial institutions in the general prOcess of develop-
ment in perspective and for identifying a role for the financial
system at some stage of industrialization or development. However,
we basically disagree with the implicit view that because of the
enormous problems associated with financial intermediation in
developing economies such as "business honesty", "fraudulent
bankruptcy", etc., the only option or the suitable substitute
mechanism is centralization of financial resources. Rather than
accept Gerschenkron's alternative,
in many underdeveloped countries, the establish-
ment and nurturing of financial institutions and
markets have been deliberate objects of government
policy, by widening the range of financial titles
available and by making for a more developed capital
market, it is hoped that these intermediaries will
increase the rate of saving and encourage a more
efficient distribution of investment fund. This
attitude, at the very least, allows the financial
sector more than an entirely passive role."
(Stammer, 1972, p. 318)
As noted earlier, most of the revealed historical and
empirical evidence of the relationship between the real and
monetary sectors of the economy relates to developed societies.
With particular regard to the role of commercial banks, which
institutions constitute our empirical platform in this study,
only very little has been done for either developed or developing
economies. The best known in this class is that study by Abdi
for the economies of three Eastern African countries - Tanzania,
Kenya and Somalia. Like most of its predecessors it is broad
based, that is to say, it focuses on all aspects of the wider
issue of financial intermediation and its impact on the real
sector development.
"The study concentrates on the operations of the
commercial banking systems of Eastern Africa with
a view of resolving a few key questions about
their development and performance. Other questions
include how well the banks have met some requirement,
indispensable for economic development such as
monetization of the subsistence sector and innovations
in the services provided to both the monetary and
non-monetary sectors." 	 (Abdi, 1977, p.2).
To answer these questions, he analysed the three main functions
of these institutions in these countries - savings mobilization,
lending, and the provision of banking services outside urban
areas. The effectiveness of savings mobilization was measured
by the time series analysis of the relation between bank deposits
and money supply and bank liabilities and GNP; the extent to which
the banks' loans and advances were allocated to the government's
defined priority sectors also was used to gauge their performance
and contribution to development.. Finally, the extent of rural
branching measured the banks' conscious move to eliminate
financial dualism in the economy and thus contribute to economic
development. He concluded to the effect that on all criteria
considered the commercial banks in these East African countries
performed poorly due largely to "identifiable economic
constraints" - inadequate loan demand, poor entrepreneurship and
infrastructure and suggested a concerted effort on the side of
both the institutions and the governments to eliminate these
constraints.
3. EVEDENCE FROM NIGERIA
The above analytical review of the revealed evidence of
some associational and directional relationship between the
monetary and real sectors of the economy, we think, is a useful
starting point for this study. Evidence of this association
from empirical analysis of Nigerian data will however, provide
a firmer and more authentic base. In the light of this, the
time series data in	 Table 3.1 were analysed. Since
our interest is limited to evidence of association between the
real and monetary sectors of the economy, correlation analysis
was the obvious choice. The selected important (and available)
variables in the two sectors as in the table were correlated as
follows:
Money supply and Gross Domestic Product
Loans and Advances and Gross Domestic Product
Loans and Advances and Manufacturing
The results of computer runs are presented in table 3.2. The
first analysis between Money Supply and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) produced results indicating a very high degree of
association with a correlation coefficient of .865105 (see table
3.2). Next are the analyses between loans and advances and GDP
on the one hand and Manufacturing on the other. These analyses
Table 3.1 Some Monetary and Real Sector Statistics:
Nigeria, 1960-1975
(Nmillion)
year Money Supply Ccurtercial Banks
Loans & Advances
GDP Manufacturing
1960 240.8 104.0 2,244.6 80.6
61 243.0 120.0 2,373.4 88.2
62 252.5 153.0 2,630.8 93.4
63 264.7 178.9 2,806.4 151.8
64 305.0 244.8 2,914,0 157.8
65 316.9 242.3 3,080.6 164.8
66 344.8 298.0 3,210.0 192.2
67 312.4 274.9 3,051.8 196.0
68 328.1 225.7 3,140.8 231.2
69 426.8 242.7 3,278.2 270.4
1970 608.4 351.4 3,485.8 • 311.0
71 628.9 502.0 9,442.1 475.1
72 700.5 619.5 11,177.9 460.3
73 827.1 753.4 11,993.0 570.1
74 1,178.4 938.0 13,135.5 626.5
75 2,044.1 1,427.3 14,410.7 683.9
Sources:	 (i) Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial 
Review (various issues)
(ii) Federal Office of Statistics Digestof Statistic 
(various issues)
Table 3.2	 Summary of results of correlation analysis
Variables	 Correlation	 F - value
	 D.F4
coefficient
MON GDP .865105* 41.6453 1, 14
LA ==.4PGDP .930551* 90.4199 1, 14
LA MAN .931840* 92.3225 1, 14
MON = Money Supply (142)
GDP = Gross Domestic Product
LA = Loans and Advances
MAN = Manufacturing
Significant at the 0.01 per cent level
produced correlation coefficients of .930551 for Loans and
Advances and GDP and .931840 for Loans and Advances and Manufactur-
ing. It is noteworthy that all these coefficients are significant
at the 0.01 per cent level.
4. CONCLUSION AND POLICY INPLICATIONS
Although these results are not in any way conclusive
nor do they indicate any directional causality, the high
correlation coefficients obtained are positively suggestive of
some strong association between the real and the monetary sectors
of the Nigerian economy.
The policy messages of the analysis are perhaps obvious
enough. Given the political and economic path chosen by the
country, it appears it has no choice but to assign an important
role to the financial sector in the economic development
process. It must be noted, however, that at no stage of her
development process has Gerschenkron's description of European
economies been appropriate for Nigeria. Consequently, his views
on the roles of a financial sector in . given development situations
can hardly be worthy of more than a cursory note. Given the
fact that Nigeria operates a development strategy loosely
described as 'mixed economy' - in which an important role is
assigned to the private sector - the financial system which is an
economically 'efficient' instrument for mobilizing resources in
a quasi-capitalist set-up, must be developed if the sector is to
play its. role effectively. The Nigerian financial sector is
far from depicting a perfect market situation - there is no
perfect (or adequate) information, the operators lack skill and
experience and there is near complete absence of a financial press
to inform the community. In these circumstances, financial
intermediation cannot be effective if orthodox. Unorthodox
approaches such as borrowing short and lending long, as the German
banks have successfully practised, must be employed, albeit with
caution.
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CHAPTER 4
A SURVEY OF LENDING CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
11 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the revealed evidence of
the relationship between the financial sector and economic
development was reviewed. Consideration must now be given to
a survey of lending concepts, principles and practices. These
have had and will continue to have considerable influence on
the modus operandi of the banking indusiry anywhere in the
western world. It is because of this potentiality (influence)
that the survey in this chapter is in place.
Section 2 presents an overview of the issues, whilst
section 3 is specifically concerned with a review of lending
concepts. The next two sections, too, are specific - section 4
on lending principles and section 5 on lending practices.
2. AN aounriEw
A cursory survey of the literature will reveal that
banking unlike other disciplines., still lacks a consistent
and coherent theory or set of theories. In one of the rare
attempts at banking theory development, Klein (1971, P. 205)
acknowledges this state of affairs when he wrote that:
".... in spite of the importance of commercial
banking both as a major financial intermediary
and as an important link in the monetary transmission
process, there is little consensus as to what
constitutes a workable and productive theory of the
banking firm."
Some excursion into the banking literature will also confirm
Pringle's (1973, p. 990) assertions that:
little has been done in the way of
developing theories to explain the results of
optimizing behaviour on the part of individual
banking units. Yet such theories are needed as
a basis for research in a number of areas."
From an examination of the few attempts made so far,
one can suggest some reasons for the continued absence of
a banking theory or theories. Two approaches, in the main,
have been taken by those who have attempted to develop banking
theories. One group, the mathematically-oriented, has tried to
reduce the variables involved into measurable quantities and
equations. The other group has restricted itself to pure
non-quantitative explanations. To name just a few, Klein (1971)
and Hester (1966) belong to the first group; .whilst Adam Smith
(1937) and Galbraith-(1963) belong to the second. As is
clear from the above-quoted statements by Klein and Pringle,
the first group has not achieved much to date. This is
perhaps because the most important variables in the banking
firm's behaviour equation and model are simply not sufficiently
quantifiable as yet. Such variables, for example, include
the quality of bank management and bank-customer relationship.
It has not been feasible, either, to find suitable surrogates
for these variables given the present state of knowledge. Not
surprisingly the product of this group consists of partial
explanations of the banking firm's behaviour. Even where such
exercises have been concerned with some specific aspects only
of the banking operations, the resulting models have failed
to capture the total picture of such operations (see Cohen,
Gilmore, and Singer, 1966). Generally, it can be said that the
more sophisticated these attempts have been, the more divorced
from reality the products - i.e. the models of bank behaviour.
Galbraith (1963) is the best known in the other group of
. students that employ the non-quantitative approach: His
and others' descriptive approaches have not been more successful
in producing a comprehensive and generally acceptable theory
of the banking firm. Whilst, for instance, Galbraith was able
to explain admirably the different ways a bank behaves in
isolated situations and sometimes offered the rationale behind
the decisions, on issues of credit-rationing, credit-worthiness
and credit risk, he however failed to tie all these together
to make a model of the banking firm's behaviour. That is to
say a model sufficiently describing how these interdependent
decisions can be synchronized into a predictable behaviour
pattern of the bank.
It does not appear as if any of these divergent approaches
is likely to produce the much desired banking theory and thus
fill an important academic gap for the benefit of bankers and
banking students. This is particularly so because, as *Friend
(1977, p. 117) notes: ".... much of current research in finance
seemed more likely to lead to advances in methodological
niceties than substantive knowledge." He also warned that
"methodological elegance should not be considered a substitute
for substance, and by substance I mean solution of real world
and not artificial problems." (p. 117). There is thus,
apparently, a need for a combination of the best in these two
approaches, if fruitful results are to be expected from these
efforts.
3. LENDING CONCEPTS
In the area of bank lending, there exists some conceptual-
izations-of banks' behaviour which are commonly inappropriately
labelled as theories. These concepts have evolved from the
early days of the banking industry. Although not generally of
great academic interest or preoccupation, the practical
influence of these concepts is enormous. Like folklores they
have passed from generation to generation of bankers. More
importantly, they have and still considerably influence lending
behaviour of bankers including the modern, unorthodox, management
-scientist bankers (see Roy and Lewis, 1971, pp. 17-21). The
strong influence of these concepts on generations of bankers
cam be explained by the fact that the concepts are "statement's
of basic realities of commercial bank lending." Over time the
changing circumstances of the lending environment - legal,
institutional, monetary and economic - have led bankers to
update but not discard these time-tested ideas. Thus today we
find
....many credit managers have one foot in yesterday
and the other in tomorrow. The foot planted in
yesterday is the commitment to practices that have
evolved over the years. The foot poised over
tomorrow is the awareness of changed conditions,
new techniques and new facilities that have made
many of yesterday's practices outmoded"
(Roy and Lewis, 1971, p. 17).
In a logico-historical order, the existing loan concepts
can be listed as:
The Real Bill Doctrine
The Shiftability Theory
The Anticipated Income Theory
The Liability Management Theory.
According to Mints (1970, p. 29), "the real bill doctrine was
first adequately enuciated by Adam Smith." In essence the real
bill doctrine (also known as the productive/commercial loan
theory) postulates that if the bank can restrict its assets
to real bills of exchange (i.e. bills supported by goods in
transit) this will:
(a) "Automatically limit, in the most desirable
manner, the quantity of bank liabilities."
(b) "Cause them to vary in quantity in accordance
with the needs of business."
(c) "Mean that bank assets will be of such a
nature that they can be turned into cash on
short notice and thus place the bank in a
position to meet unlooked for calls for cash."
(Mints, 1970, P. 29)
It can be appreciated from this statement that the real bill
doctrine was conceptualized to have a considerably pervading
influence not only on bank lending but also on general economic
activities. If adopted strictly, the doctrine was expected
to serve as the monetary control mechanism in the economy,
adjusting money supply to changes in aggregate economic activity.
With the passage of time, the doctrine has become restricted to
that aspect emphasising the reasonableness of bankers lending
short against short-maturity assets such as bills of exchange.
Bankers believed rather strongly, in the early days of this
doctrine, that since their resources were repayable at short
notice, such depositors' monies should be employed in correspond-
ingly short-term and self-liquidating advances, if they were
going to be able to meet calls for such deposits.
At the time this doctrine reigned supreme in the banking
industry, it is instructive to note that there did not exist
enough secondary reserve assets which could have served as a
liquidity buffer for the banks. Even existing government
securities were not readily marketable as the secondary markets
for them were either very narrow or non-existent. The banks'
main source of liquidity, apart from cash was their loan
portfolio. Understandably, therefore, banks were wary, and
wisely too, at the idea of advances that did not match, in
maturity, their liabilities.
By the 1920s, the commercial banks' attitude to lending
was beginning to deviate slightly from the prescriptions of
the real bill doctrine (1) . A few developments-led to this.
One of these was the increasing change in the structure of
their total deposits towards a greater proportion being
accounted for by the less volatile savings and time deposits (2) .
A second important factor was the gradual but steady growth in'
government's borrowing from the public. This resulted in
increases in volume and variety of securities available and
suitable as secondary reserve assets for banks. Furthermore,
markets for these gilt-edged securities developed and expanded.
All these changes led to the development of the doctrine of
asset shiftability - i.e. the shiftability theory. With readily
available "shiftable" open-market financial assets, the banks
felt that the doctrine of commercial credit need not continue
to chain them to short-term loans only. After all, they
thought, they could make good their liquidity shortages, if any,
by shifting to the market their short-term money market assets
i.e. the new govermment. securities. "Actually, the bankers view-
ed this development not so much as a violation of the productive
credit theory but as an extension of it and an improvement on it."
(Kreps Jr. and Wacht, 1972, p. 18).
(1)In the U.K. Noticeable changes came later in the early 1960s
after the publication of the Radcliffe Report in 1959.
(see CLCB, 1977, p. 76).
(2)These (savings and time deposits) being largely retail
deposits in Nigeria are less volatile.
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This doctrine has an important, though not unique,
limitation. Like the self-liquidating lodns, shiftable assets
can only be expected to generate liquidity in 'normal' times.
In money or liquidity crisis, the shortest of short-term loans
or the most shiftable of reserve assets might fail to yield
desired liquidity. This is because during a liquidity crisis,
every asset holder wants to shift his illiquidity to other
persons and institutions and no one, in the process, succeeds
in acquiring cash by shifting assets (loans or securities). The
doctrine of asset shiftability is thus valid in 'normal'
times only or in special circumstances. An important element
of the special circumstance is that there must exist a central
bank willing to act as a "lender of last resort", either
directly to the banks, or in the unique case of the U.K.,
indirectly through the discount houses, during a liquidity
crisis. Nevertheless the birth of this doctrine led to
marked changes in the lending attitude of banks, who began to
feel more safe and confident to make longer-term advances.
In 1949, Prochnow enunciated a new loan theory known as
the "Anticipated Income Theory". This concept is a product of
Prochnow's comprehensive study of banks' term loans. He found
in this study that
"....in every instance, regardless of the nature
and character of the borrower's business, the
banker planned liquidation of term loans from
anticipated earnings of the borrower. It (liquid-
ation) is not by sale of assets of the borrower
as in the commercial or traditional theory of
liquidity nor by shifting the term loan to some
other lenders as in the shiftability theory of
liquidity but by the anticipated income of the
borrower."
(see Woodworth, 1971, p. 157).
The importance of this theory is that it emphasised a future-
oriented approach to bank advances. It has enhanced what is
now popularly known as the cash flow approach to lending.
Rather than tie the repayment prospect of a loan to a one-time
event such as the importation of a particular commodity, the
sale of which repays the loan, a more general system approach is
now taken by bankers. Ever since, greater consideration has
come to be given to the potential improved income generating
ability of the borrower. Following this re-orientation in
lending, it has now
"..become more and more accepted that in addition
to the short-term, self-liquidating loans, banks
could also properly make loans which did not generate
their own repayment but were to be repaid instead
out of the borrowers' anticipated income. It was
the general adoption by bankers of this anticipated
income approach to lending that permitted banks to
safely begin making the longer maturity, non-self-
liquidating loans - term loans to business, real
estate, mortgage loans and consumer instalment loans -
that now constitute well over half of all commercial bank
lending."	 (1)(Kreps Jr. and Wacht, 1972, p. 19)
The launching in 1961 of Certificates of Deposit (CDs)
by large New York money market banks introduced a new dimension
into commercial bank lending and has indeed led to the emergence
of "The Liability Management Theory". The possibility of
raising substantial deposits by the issue of CDs now means that
another source of liquidity is opened up fol.' the banks.
Consequently, the banks need not be unduly constrained as to the
size and maturity of their advances by lack of resources.
(1) In a review discussion on this chapter, Mr Maylock, a
former Economic Adviser to the Midland Bank Limited
and a Director of the Institute of European Finance at
the University College of North Wales, Bangor, noted
that this "re-orientation" did not become generally
observable practice in the U.K. until the late 1960s.
50
"According to this doctrine, it is unnecessary to
observe traditional standards in regard to self-
liquidating loans and liquidity reserves since
reserve money can be borrowed or 'bought' in the
money market whenever a bank experiences reserve
deficiency."
(Woodworth, 1971, p. 158).
Although the emergence of CDs brought to birth the
concept of liability management, it should be appreciated that
this is not the only source of creating or acquiring liquidity
by a bank via increases in liabilities. Deposits (savings, time,
current), new capital, long-term loans, debentures, Eurodollar
markets and Bankers Unit Fund (in Nigeria) are additional sources
of liquidity. A proper liability management, the doctrine
explains, should generate enough liquid resources to a bank as and
when desired; thus eliminating the constraints of any earlier
concepts of bank lending. Once again, it should be noted, that
like all other sources of liquidity discussed so far, only
recourse to the central bank is a lender of last resort is
reliable during a liquidity crisis.
An undoubtedly important development relevant to the
foregoing analysis, worth noting, is the establishment by banks,
mostly in developed countries, of subsidiary credit institutions
and instruments. In the U.K., for example,
• • • • the clearing banks have developed merchant
banking services and medium term lending. In
the late 1950s all the banks made investments
in the finance sector; these interests were ration-
alised in the early 1970s so that most clearing banks
now have a single wholly-owned finance house subsid-
iary. Specialist subsidiaries have developed leasing
and factoring services, and all the banks are involved
in credit cards."
(CLCB, 1977, p. 20)
According to Hanson (1979) these developments came about as a
result of threats, for different reasons and from different
quarters, to the traditional functions of the banks, namely,
deposit-taking, lending and money transmission. The more
important aspect of this episode, however, is that the emergence
of these institutions and instruments has gone a long way to
change the size and the whole complexion of the loan portfolios
of commercial banking groups.
4, LENDI NG PRINCIPLES
It ought to be stated at the outset that one cannot
generalize with any measure of authenticity about lending practices
in the banking industry. This is because each bank's lending
practice is more a variant rather than a replica of the other
banks'. Indeed "two lending officers sitting side by side in the
same bank may react differently to the same loan request."
(Shapiro at al., 1969, pp. 14-37). In Nigeria, for example, one
can, therefore, expect 19 different varieties of lending practices.
For a general or global survey, this kind of variety must be
multiplied for the number of countries considered. To compound
the problem further these practices are constantly changing in
response to changes in the lending environment.
Commercial banks are uniquely multi-purpose lenders,
satisfying the needs of commerce, industry, agriculture, etc.
For their lending practices to be appropriate and useful, these
have to be tailored to fit these different functional lending
operations. This also further introduces complexities into
loan practices of banks.
Practices, in general, again depend on a number of
varying factors such as the economic environment of lending, the
experience and expertise of the banker, the 'tradition' and
'culture' of the individual bank, and the personality of the
individual engaged in the lending function.
In spite of these complexities and varieties, there
still exist some generally accepted basic principles and
practices in bank lending. An attempt will be made in the follow-
ing paragraphs to consider these points of congruency in bank
lending practices and to highlight the important differences among
countries. The relevance of-all these is that we are enabled at
the end of the day to see to what extent lending practices in
Nigeria are in line and up-to-date compared with the practice in
the industry at large. More importantly it will be possible to
compare and contrast lending principles and practices in Nigeria•
with those in other countries and to question the appropriateness of
these for a developing environment. Also by this analysis we shall
be establishing some kind of criterion for judging the efficiency
of Nigerian commercial banks on the ground of adaptiveness.
Common elements are found among banks in the_arinciples--
that guide their lending rather than in the actual practices.
The well-known 4-Cs of bank lending are basically the guiding
principles for all bankers irrespective of their experience,
environment or orientation. These principles are character,
capacity, capital and collateral in a generally agreed order of
importance to lending decision-making. Like the loan concepts,
these principles have become reliable tools in the hands of
lending bankers, young and old. Indeed these "sound principles
and standards can be likened to an anchor from which a boat swings
with wind and tide. While its position shifts in response to
changing circumstance, the boat never breaks its tie with the
ground tackle." (Mathis, 1975, p. 25).
5 . LENDING PRACTICES
Based on the above principles, bankers' analyses of loan
proposals are done from two different blk practically complementary
viewpoints. These are the "going-concern" and the "gone-concern"
bases (Mather, 1979, p. 23). A going-concern view of a business
assumes that the business has a long and even infinite future
ahead. Consequently its assets and financial capability are assess-
ed in the light of this outlook. This approach is not only forward
-looking but positive and optimistic. The gone-concern approach,
on the other hand, assumes the worst event of a liquidation and
then assesses the worth of the borrower in that "closing-down"
situation. It is a pessimistic and rather negative approach.
Bankers, however, defend any criticism of this approach by
pointing out that even the most realistic and promising
propositions can become a failure for reasons completely outside
the control of the business. This calamity may not, with a most
intelligent forecast, be foreseeable at the time of the advance.
Whilst bankers may not generally allow this pessimistic view to
influence too negatively their decisions, it has the distinct
advantage of enabling them to assess just how badly they will
come off an advance if the worst happens to the loanee. In
practice, happily enough, both approaches are used in reaching
lending decisions by most bankers, particularly in the case of
sizeable loans. Thus rather than being mutually exclusive, these
approaches are complementary, as they should be.
In the rest of this section, we shall consider the level
of delegation of authority, credit evaluation system and security
considerations, in lending practices of selected countries. This
review is done with specific reference to the observed practices
in Germany, France, Italy, Japan, U.S.A. and the U.K. Data
availability more than anything else defines the choice of these
countries as examples (see IBRO, 1978).
Banking practice with regard to the delegation of authority
is similar in all of these countries. Branch managers have
varying credit limits that are usually a function of their
experience, qualifications and responsibilities. Proposals
beyond their stated 'limits' of discretion go to higher authorit-
ies, with the Head Office at the apex of the structure as the final
arbiter. Among all these countries, the U.S.A. operates a
distinctly different system. Instead of a branch manager and
higher officers considering lending proposals in turn, the U.S.A.
makes an extensive use of the committee system at all levels of
lending decision-making. The important advantage here is that •
the system considerably enhances the lending limits of the lower
levels of management in the hierarchy of loan decision-making
process.
Except in Italy, credit evaluation in all these Countries
is based largely on the analysis of financial statements dating
back to five or a minimum of three years. This is supplemented
with cash flow analysis and the assessment of the character and
other qualities of the proprietors or management (see figure 4.1
for a general flow process of loan evaluation procedure). The
Italian exception is due to the general unavailability in the
country of reliable financial statements on which any useful
analysis can be based. This makes the banks fall back heavily on
the knowledge of their customers.
There is a considerable degree of flexibility in the
bankers' demand for securities in these countries. Invariably
secured advances constitute low proportions of total lending in
all countries except in Japan, where the secured advances
amount to as much as 40% of all loans. Italy has the lowest
proportion with only 4% of all its advances secured. Apparently
in these countries as in the U.K. "the banker's experience has
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Fig. 4.1 A Commercial Bank's Advances Information/Decision System
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taught him to make loans to people rather than upon the security
of things." (Sayers, 1967, p. 192).
In the final analysis a bank's contribution to the
development of its community must be measured in terms of the
increase in the volume and quality of the 'products' and services
it is able to provide through its financial and related services.
The bank's level of contribution is influenced by both its
relationship with the industry and government influence or control.
In theory government control of banks exists in all these countries
in varying degrees. In practice, it is least pronounced in the
U.S.A. For example, credit ceilings or similar restrictions of
credit volume and allocation are still unknown to the American
bankers. In Italy and France, government influence on the use
of credit is well pronounced. This is probably to be expected
in view of the fact that government has considerable financial
stakes in the banks in these countries. The three biggest
banks in France are owned by the government and with the govern-
ment operated refinancing facilities, it is able to exert
considerable influence on the size and allocation of aggregate
credit. Similarly in Italy, government ownership of interest in
banks is substantial; and with this goes considerable control
over credit allocation. In other countries there is little or no
government direct equity interest in banks and government control
is, at the best, only subtle. The monetary authorities in the
U.K. have resorted to credit control intermittently since 1955,
rather severely, however, between 1965 and 1971 (Blunden, G. 1975).
Competition and credit control (CCC) was introduced in 1971
giving true meaning to the concept of "perfect competition".
The free atmosphere of CCC was, however, short-lived as the CORSET -
the special supplementary deposit requirement - was introduced in
December, 1973.
With regard to lending to an individual borrower, there
is in all the countries being considered some restriction on the
maximum that can be lent. In the U.S.A., lending to a single
borrower is limited to 10% of the bank's capital fund; in
Germany, Italy and France, where central credit risk services
are organised by either the central bank or a government agency,
there are requirements for credits above specified sums (FF22,000
million in France, DM one million in Germany, and Lire 30 million
in Italy) to be reported to these institutions, although no
outright ceilings are imposed on lending to a single customer.
Though controls can significantly influence credit creation
and allocation by commercial banks, it is the nature of the
relationship of banks to industries that substantially dictates
the level of financial assistance and co-operation between the
two. Due largely to tradition, and financial and economic history,
there are to be found differences from country to country in the
ways banks relate to and assist industries via their lending and
allied services. In the U.S.A. unlike in all other countries,
banks are forbidden by legislation from taking equity interests
in non-financial businesses. The relationship is limited,
therefore, to that of banker and customer. The same formal
relationship is largely true for the U.K. and their industrial
clients even though there is no legal prohibition on banks taking
equity interest in industries. The banks, however, take equity
interests in industrial concerns, indirectly, through their
subsidiaries and participation in Finance for Industry and
similar institutions. It is worthy of note that
....there are good grounds for believing that the
traditional relationships between the clearing banks
and their industrial customers are undergoing a
permanent change. The banks are much more involved in
their customers' affairs than they were a decade ago,
and the involvement is likely to increase still
further in the next few years."
(Financial Times, June 6, 1981)
In the 1940s, the Italian government acquired interests in the
big industrial concerns of the country. With its ownership of
interests in commercial banks as well, it is natural that the
relationship between these two subsectors be a close one.
Traditionally, banks in Germany have always had close association
with the industries through their ownership of equity interests
in businesses. This close association involves the appointment
of bank personnel to the boards of the industrial concerns in
which they have financial interests. German shareholders often
appoint banks as proxies and these substantially boost the
powers of the banks, not uncommonly leading to a situation in
which they can conveniently block proposals requiring a three-
quarters majority. However"it is generally accepted that banks
have used their power to promote industrial growth and have also
come, when necessary, to the rescue of ailing companies" (IBRO,
1978, pp. 38-39).
Although Japanese banks are not as committed on a long-
term basis like their German counterparts, "semi-frozen loans are
the rule with usually no serious consideration of full repayment
of short-term loans or periodic clean-ups" (Mathis, 1975, p. 125).
The relationship between industry and the banks in France is close
for the same reasons as in Italy i.e. government ownership of
financial interests in both subsectors of the economy.
"French industrial companies rely heavily on the big
banks and the special credit institutions for
investment finance, much of which is project related.
As a result, the big banks, with the encouragement of
the authorities dnd in close co-operation with the
special institutions, have acquired detailed and in-
depth knowledge of the technical operations of their
customers. Following the example of American banks
they have set up industrial departments which
are staffed by specialists."
(Philip, 1977, p. 25). .
In sum it can be said that there is little doubt that
these relationships between banks and industries have signific-
antly influenced and enhanced the levels of the banks' contrib-
utions - financial and otherwise - to the development of their
business environment (see table 6.4).
In passing it is instructive to note that the lending
function, like other functions of commercial banks, is not now
treated in isolation. Up to the end of the 1950s banks were
pre-occupied with "asset management". The major concerns of bank
management were the maintenance of "adequate" liquidity and the
required reserve asset position; whilst the liability items were
treated somewhat as exogenous variables. With the arrival of the
CDs and the ability to 'buy' liabilities, attention was turned to
"liability management" (Komar, 1971). Because of the inter-
relationship of the assets and liabilities of the bank these
early piece-meal approaches are inadequate in handling bank
problems. Also "the computer has made it possible for banks
to evaluate multitudinous impacts that alternative decisions
have on income statement and balance sheet relationships."
(Baker Jr. 1978, p. 43). Thus today, the banks approach is a
general systems one. Particularly in advanced countries, banks of
all sizes now pay some attention to asset/liability management
rather than to any one side or function in isolation. This is
understandable because, after all, loans, investment and other
functions are subsets of the total bank and their management
policies and tactics must be incorporated into the overall asset/
liability management. The benefit of this approach to bank lending
is that it allows a general systems view of this function to
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be taken. Management is enabled to see how the loan function
affects and is affected by the other functions of the bank.
This is the basic approach taken in the simulation exercises
in Chapters 11 and 12; and hopefully, the exercises will help
make the point more clearly.
CHAPTER 5
THE NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS' LENDING ENVIRONMENT
1. unimaxnam
In this chapter the essential elements of the economic
and financial environment of bank lending in Nigeria will be
analysed. From this analysis, it is hoped the relative importance
of the commercial banking system in the financial intermediation
activities in the country will be revealed. As a consequence,-
the rationale for expecting a more dynamic approach from these
institutions will hopefully become better appreciated.
'Additionally, a review of the policies and strategies of
the government for the agricultural and manufacturing sectors
will be undertaken. This will be done in the belief that these
issues can have both deleterious and helpful effects on the
level and effectiveness of banks' financial and other assistance
to their environment.
Section 2 is concerned with an overview of the entire
politico-economic system. The Nigerian money and capital markets
are considered briefly in Section 3 for one main purpose - to
see the role of commercial banks in the savings and credit
activities in these markets. The legal framework within which
the banks operate is considered in section 4 . Sections 5 and 6
deal with government policies and strategies, respectively, for
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
2. OVERVI EW OF THE ECONOMY
2.1 Size and geography
The Federal Republic of Nigeria came into formal existence
in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern British
Protectorates. It is situated in West Africa and bounded by the
Republic of Benin to the west, the Cameroons to the east, Niger
and Chad to the north and the Gulf of Guinea to the south (see
figure 5.1.
The country lies completely in the tropics and its
vegetation stretches from dense forest in the south through
savannah to semi-desert areas in the far north. Occupying a
land area of 913,072.64 kilometers, Nigeria is the most populous
country in Africa and the fourth in the Commonwealth (after
India, Bangladesh and Pakistan). With a population estimated
a over 80 millions, Nigeria has half the population of the
sixteen West African States and one of every four black Africans
is a Nigerian.
2.2 Political structure
Nigeria was granted political independence by Britain in
1960 and becime a Republic within the Commonwealth in 1963.
Throughout the post-independence era, Nigeria's political system
has been disrupted four times - thrice in 1966 and once in 1975 -
all as a result of coup d'etats and counter-coups. Thus from
January 1966 to September 1979, Nigeria had a military government.
When the country returned to civilian rule in 1979, it adopted
a presidential system of government modelled on the lines of the
USA and in contrast to the pre-1966 Westminster type; and it
became the fourth largest democracy in the world.
The administrative structure of the country has changed
many times since 1914. In 1954, the country was divided into
the Western, Eastern and Northern Regions and a Colony of Lagos.
A fourth region, the Mid-Western, was created in 1963. The
-
military rulers restructured the country twice during their reign -
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first into twelve States in 1967 and then into the present
nineteen States in 1976 (see figure5.1).
Nigeria has three tiers of government - the national, the
state and the local government authority (LGA).
In foreign policy and relations, Nigeria is non-aligned
but it is, partly due to colonial history, transparently pro-West.
2.3 Natural resources
Nigeria is well endowed in natural resources. Among the
major mineral resources are petroleum and natural gas, tin-ore,
coal, columbite and uranium. The country is also rich in soils
and vegetation. The important forest, agricultural and allied
resources include cocoa, groundnuts, tobacco, rubber, cotton,
palm products, hides and skins, timber, ginger, beniseed and
soya beans. The main food crops are yam, rice, plantain, cassava,
mil/et and guinea corn. At present wheat and potatoes are being
increasingly grown. Tropical wild-life of all sorts also abounds
in the country's forests.
Petroleum is, however, by far the most important resource
of the country. Presently, Nigeria is the world's sixth largest
exporter of petroleum. It is estimated that petroleum alone
earns for the country about N25 million each day and accounts for
over 80% of the total foreign exchange resources. This has
turned Nigeria into Africa's wealthiest nation, with a total gross
domestic product (GDP) that is about one-third of the other 49
black African nations combined and nearly equal to that of South
Africa. The GDP has increased phenomenally in recent years. As
can be gauged from Table 3.1 (column 4), it has gone up from
N9,442.1 million in 1971 to N14,410.77 million in 1975 and nearly
doublea within the decade (1971-1980) to N18,740 million by the
end of 1980 (see also Vincent, 1980 p.14).
•2.4 The financial system
Data with which to estimate the size and appreciate the
structure of the financial system are paltry. Table 5.1 presents
available information on this subject. Total assets of the
financial system have grown from N895.5 million in 1969/70 to
N3,226.4 million in 1974/75. In the main this growth is attribut-
able to the increased monetization of oil revenues by the
government. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
the financial system's assets hovered around the 20% mark during
the same period - being 25.2% in 1969/70, 19.5% in 1971/72
and 22.4% in 1974/75.
Table 5.1 Total assets of all main institutions in the financial
system as per cent of Gross Domestic Product at
factor cost: 1969/70 - 1974/75
Year Total assets	 GDP	 Total assets
(N	 million)	 (N million)	 as per cent of
GDP
1969/70 895.47	 3,549.30	 -	 25.2
1970/71 1,304.57	 .5,290.30	 24.7
1971/72 1,303.08	 6,684.70	 19.5
1972/73 1,643.40	 7,346.90	 22.4
1973/74 1,984.88	 8,670.50	 22.9
1974/75 3,226.39	 14,410.70	 22.4
Sources: (a) Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts of the Main
Institutions in the financial system
(b) Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos
(c) Third National Development Plan, 1975-80
2.4.1 The Central Bank
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is at the apex of . the
financial system. The CBN was established in 1959 under the
Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958. It is a government-owned and
Controlled institution with the usual central banking traditional
functions. In addition the CBN has developmental functions; that
is to say, it has responsibility for the promotion of economic
development. These responsibilities - traditional and
developmental - are defined precisely by the Act as
N••, to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria; to
maintain external reserves; to safeguard the
international value of that currency, to promote
monetary stability-and sound financial structure
in Nigeria, and to act as a banker and financial
adviser to the Federal Government"
(Section 4(1) and (2))
2.4.2 Commercial banka
Commercial banks are next in importance to the CBN in
the Nigerian financial system. The commencement of banking
operations in Lagos in 1892 by the African Banking Corporation
marked the beginning of commercial banking activities in
Nigeria. The bank wound up only two years later, however, and
was taken over by the Bank of British West Africa (Fry, 1976).
As at the end of 1979, there were 19 individual banks - (11
indigenous and 8 foreign) - operating in Nigeria. With
indigenisation this dichotomy exists more in practice than in
theory.
The assets and liabilities of commercial banks have
increased phenomenally in the last two decades (see tables 5.2
and 5.3). Loans and advances, and deposits being parts of these,
have also witnessed high growth rates. More importantly, however,
the share of commercial banks in total institutionalized savings
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in the economy has remained proportionately high (see table5.4 ).
Although the figure has gone down from 91% in 1962 to 86.1%
in 1978, the lowest percentage recorded throughout this period
was 72.3% in 1967. The predominant position of the commercial
banks in savings mobilization as demonstrated by these figures
appears to be too obvious to require mentioning. The
dominance of the commercial banking sub-system in the financial
intermediation process is completed with its significant share
of the entire banking system's credit to the private sector.
As can be seen from table 5.5 the commercial banks have
contributed between 73% and 97.6% of the banking system's credit
during 1963-1978.
2.4.3 Merchant banks
Merchant banking activities were conducted in Nigeria
between 1960 and 1969 by Philip Hill (Nigeria) Limited and
Nigerian Acceptances Ltd. These two merged in 1969 and were
the first to be statutorily registered as a merchant bank under
the name of Nigerian Acceptances Limited. By 1980 there were
five merchant banks operating in the country.
The total assets of these institutions increased from
N31.3 million in 1973 to N423.9 million at the end of 1978
(Ojo and Adewunmi, 1980a,Chapter Four). The intermediation
role of the institutions has been relatively small. Though
savings in the merchant banks have risen from N7.2 million in
1971 to N109.8 million in 1978, these have represented,
respectively, only 1.5 and 4% of the total institutionalized
savings of the economy (see table 5.4).
Similarly growth in loans and advances has been remarkable
in absolute naira terms rising from a mere N14.0 million in 1973
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Table 5.5	 Banking system's credit to the private sector
(N million)
Year Total
By Commercial Banks
Amount % of total
1963 104.8 88.9 84.8
1964 121.0 118.1 97.6
1965 141.0 134.3 95.2
1966 156.8 148.5 94.7
1967 148.0 137.4 92.8
1968 148.4 112.0 75.5
1969 162.9 119.8 73.5
1970 478.0 349.0 73.0
1971 591.2 497.6 84.2
1972 750.2 609.2 81.2
1973 845.4 736.9 87.2
1974 1,070.2 919.8 86.0
1975 1,770.1 1,512.1 85.4
1976 2,417.8 1,898.8 78.5
1977 3,514.4 3,027.7 86.2
1978 4,623.9 4,093.5 88.5
Sources: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (various issues)
to N194.2 million in 1978. This peak figure in 1978, however,
represents only 0.02% of the banking system's credit to the
economy.
2.4.4 Federal Savings Bank (FSB)
Up to 1972, the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) was
operated as an arm of the Posts and Telecommunications Depart-
ment. The Federal Savings Bank Act (No. 38 of 1974) changed
its name and made it autonomous with retrospective effect. As
the Act states the "Savings Bank is established to provide a
ready means for deposit savings and so to encourage thrift."
Table 5.4 shows that the savings mobilization impact of
the bank has been small.. Worse still, it has been declining
in relative importance as a contributor to total institutionalized
savings - from a percentage share of 6.5 in 1962 to 0.3 in 1978.
The bank does not engage in commercial lending. Rather it has
always been required under the various statutory instruments
governing it, to invest its surplus resources in government
securities.
2.4.5 Development banks
There are four principal development banks in Nigeria.
These are the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB); the
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI), the Nigerian
Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB), and the Federal
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN). Except for the NIDB, where 1%
of the equity is owned by individual Nigerians, all these banks are
owned by the Federal Government.
"From its inception in January 1964 to March 1979, the
bank (NIDB) sanctioned a total of N310.2 million..." (Osha, 1979
p. 23). As at 31st March 1978 the NBCI Board had approved
investments in a total of 119 projects or enterprises since its
inception. The magnitude of approved investments totalled
approximately N146,000,000
	 (NBCI, Annual Report 1978).
The NACB in its first five years of operations approved a total
of N286.3 million for 177 projects and disbursed N124.4 million
(NACB, Annual Report 1978). Although these institutions have
sanctioned huge sums of money their intermediatory role must be
measured in terms of the actual disbursements they made. The
annual average of disbursements recorded by the institutions has
been relatively small - N9.0 million by NIDB, N26.95 million by
NACB and N12,0 million by NBCI (Adewunmi, 1980a,pp. 12-13).
As can be gauged from table 5.4, the impact of the
FMBN in savings mobilization has been relatively small - accounting
for 0.4% of total institutionalized savings in 1963 and 0.6% in
1978. The institution provided N13.3 million for housing finance
in 1972, N14.8 million in 1973 and N31.5 million in 1975 (0jo
and Adewuranit 1980a,Chapter Seven).
2.4.6 Pension funds
The National Provident Fund (NPF) a contributory pension
scheme for non-pensionable private sector employees is the
major pension/provident fund in Nigeria (Adewunmi, 1980c). The
NPF was established in 1961 under the National Provident Fund
Act of that year. It has increased its contribution to
institutionalized savings from N1.0 million (or 2.4%) in 1962
to N252.5 million (or 9.0%) in 1978. Like the Federal Savings
Bank, the NPF is statutorily obliged to invest its surplus
resources in government securities. Its direct contribution to
private sector investment is, therefore, nil.
2.4.7 Insurance companies
Insurance business was commenced in Nigeria as long ago
as 1921 when the Royal Exchange Assurance opened an office in
Lagos. But the size and impact of this sub-sector of the
financial system on financial intermediation remains small. By
1960, total assets of all insurance companies operating in
Nigeriaveze only N2.0 million; eighteen years later, at the end
of 1977, the figure stood at N532.0 million (see Ojo and
Adewunmi, 1980a,Chapter Eight). However, the long-term portion
of this sum, that is life fund, amounted to only N124.1 million.
Since the maximum long-term investment the insurance companies
can do depends largely on the size of this (life fund), the
institutions' financing role in the Nigerian economy has been
little. Indeed until 1977 when the Re-insurance Corporation of
Nigeria Act was promulgated requiring 20% of the premiums of
insurance policies to be re-insured locally, most of the insurance
companies' premiums were re-insured abroad.
2.4.8 Finance companies
Bentworth Finance is the biggest and indeed the only
officially known finance company in Nigeria. The others are so
small and insignificant that they can operate outside the frame-
work of the Hire Purchase Act 1958 (Orimalade and Adewunmi, 1979).
With assets/liabilities totalling N18.5 million in 1977,
Bentworth Finance's intermediation role in the Nigerian financial
system can be described as very small.
3, THE MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS
3.1 Money market
The money market was launched in 1960 with the first issue
Table 5.6 Money market instruments outstanding 1960-1978
(N million)
End of	 Treasury Treasury Comer-
	 Cert.of	 Bankers Eligible
year	 bills	 cert.	 cial	 deposit	 unit
	
dev.loan	 Total
papers	 fund	 stocks
1960 18.0 _ 2.3 - - - 20.3
1961 34.0 - 2.2 - - - 36.2
1962 48.0 - 6.2 - - - 54.2
1963 60.0 - 14.8 - - - 74.8
1964 68.0 - 30.1 - - - 98.1
1965 80.0 .-	 • 42.0 _ _ _ 122.0
1966 128.0 - 60.1 - - - 188.1
1967 170.0 - 34.4 - - - 204.4
1968 240.0 20.0 5.1 - - - 265.1
1969 340.0 142.0 4.5 - - - 486.5
1970 556.0 236.0 6.0 - - - 798.0
1971 616.0 256.0 11.2 - - - 883.2
1972 616.0 286.0 9.3 - - - 911.3
1973 616.0 286.0 7.9 - - - 909.0
1974 616.0 286.0 15.4 - - - 917.4
1975 616.0 228.0 32.4 2.5 40.0 918.9
1976 616.0 652.0 27.1 40.2 115.0 - 1,450.3
1977 691.0 900.0 26.3 35.9 368.6 24.7 2,046.5/
1978 816.0 1,800.0 45.7 106.8 114.2 27.3 2,910.0
Sources:	 (1) The Bullion, Vol. 2, No. 1 p.12
(2) CBN Annual Reports and Accounts, Dec. 1978
of Treasury Bills by the CBN. From that modest beginning, the
money market has grown gradually and by 1978 had six different
instruments (see table 5.6). Total value of money market
instruments has risen from the small figure of N20.3 million in
1960 to N2,910.0 million at the end of 1978. It is worthy of
note that Certificates of Deposits (CDS), which today constitute
a major as well as a growing source of deposits for American and
European banks, and which have made their loan supply functions
highly elastic, constituted a small proportion (0.04%) of total
money market instruments outstanding in Nigeria at the end of *
1978.
The CBN, commercial banks, merchant banks, State
governments, and others (including NPF, FSB and Insurance Companies)
are the principal participants in this market. As is evident from
table 5.7 the commercial banks dominate the activities on the
market accounting for 74.6% of total assets outstanding as at
December 1977.
Table 5.7 Holdings of money market assets outstanding as at
December 1977 (in N m)
Name
Central
Bank	 cial
banks
banks	 Gmits.
1. Treasury bills 160.9 295.9 26.9 23.7 183.5 690.9
2. Treasury certificates 79.6 808.7 4.8 6.9 900.0
3. Bankers' Unit Fund
eligible development
4. Loan stocks
-
-
337.1
24.7
10.3
-
aMi
21.3 368.7
24.7
5. Certificates of Deposit - 35.9 - nMO 35.9
6. Commercial papers - 23.7 2.6 CM. 26.3
TCTAL 240.5 1526.0 44.6 23.7 211.8 2046.6
PERCEMGES 11.75 74.6 2.2 1.2 10.25 100
Source: CEN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (December 1977)
Comer-
3.2 The capital market .
The Nigerian Stock Exchange was established in 1961.
The narrowness of the market can be gauged from Table 5.8
which shows the size of industrial stocks issued between 1960
and 1975; table 5.9 which shows the value of government stocks
issued between 1960 and 1979; and table 5.10 which shows the
numbers of securities issued and listed as well as of companies
quoted. From these data it will be seen that government stocks
have been dominant on this market. A total of N1,066,710 million
had been raised by government through the Development Loan Stocks
between 1960 and 1975 (CBN, 1979(a), p. 141) compared to
N99.6 million raised by private-sector companies, via the
market.
Table 5.8
	
Industrial securities issued 1960 - 1975
Year
Number of securities
quoted as at end of
rear
Cumulative number
of public issues as
at end of year
Cumulative
amount of
issues as at
end of yearEqdties Debentures & Equities Debentures &
Preference Preference OR'000)
Stock Stock •
1961 3 1 3 1 1,220
1969 8 2 9 2 7,775	 •
1970 9 2 10 3 15,675
1971 14 2 15 3 59,415
1972 21 6 22 9 69,159
1973 25 6 26 9 83,424
1974 35 6 36 9 98,174
1975 35 6 36 9 99,625
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange
Stock . Amount ofissue
(in N'000)
NbOber of Securities
listed as at 31/12
Gt.
- stocks
6
8
30
32
34
38
40
42
No. of Companies
Quobades at 31/12
Indus-
trial Total Industrials
4 10 3
8 16 7
19 49 12
24 56 18
31 65 28
34 72 28
44 84 28
44 86 38
Cunulative Number of
Issues made as at 31/12 
Govt.	 Indus-
stocks trial  Total
Year
32
3
11
12
13
5
10
26
31
38
7is
19
25
15
16
17
43
52
56
28
36
39
1961
1962
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
78
Table 5.9 Nigerian Government Development Loan Stocks, Issues,
1960-1979
Fedelation of Nigeria Eevelopment Stocks:
1st - 4th	 30,000
Federal Republic of Nigeria Development Stocks:
1st - 4th	 106,000
5th - 8th	 146,000
9th - 12th	 320,000
13th - 16th	 1,265,000
17th - 18th	 1,000,000
TOTAL
	 2,867,00)
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange
TABLE 5.10 Cbmulative distribution of issues ma, securities listed and
cbmpanies quoted, Nigeria 1960 - 1975
Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange
Overall, the relative contribution of this market to the
process of capital formation has been evidently small. A
cursory inspection of table 5.11 shows once again the important
participation of commercial banks in this market. Other than
the CBN, these banks are the most important single-group holders
of Development Loan Stocks in the economy.
. From the above analysis it appears clear that the commercial
banks are by far the most important financial intermediaries in
Nigeria. Furthermore, their contribution to money supply and
consequently to the levels of economic activities can also be
gauged from table 5.12. With so high a proportion of the savings
and advances markets in their hands, and so big a role in the
money and capital markets being played by them, it is no
exaggeration to state that the commercial banks hold the key to
the growth and development of the Nigerian economy, given the
country's politico-economic structure. In advanced countries of
the world, commercial banks are less dominant in the financial
systems (see table 5.13) and correspcndingly- less is demanded of
them. But because they are very dominant in Nigeria, as inmost
developing countries, a rather unique, pivotal role is expected
of them.
4. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
The period between 1892 and 1952 can be aptly described
as a period of unregulated banking in Nigeria. The first initiative
at controlling banking activities in Nigeria was taken in 1948
when Mr G.D. Paton was commissioned to "enquire generally into the
business of banking in Nigeria and make recommendations to the
government on the form and extent of control which should be
Table 5.11
	 Holdings of Development Loan Stocks
(in N'000)
Holder 31.12.77 31.12.78
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Central Bank 216,349 826,586
Commercial Banks 243,489 143,544
Merchant Banks 6,629 500-
Individuals 1,648 1,680
Insurance Companies 57,151 69,344
State and Local Governments 3,501 3,894
Savings-type Institutions 572,893 160 680,023 .	 160
Statutory Boards & Corporations 8,909 9,336
Other Corporations and Companies 16,474 12,380
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme - 9,092
Federal Government 30 30
Special Funds with CNN (1) 651,519 400,586
CBN Sales not Classified 36,959 40,556
TOTAL (Gross) 1,815,711 160 2,197;711 160
(1) Includes - Bankers unit Fund; Stabilization Securities and Statutory
Deposits by Insurance Companies
(a) Internal holding
(b) External holding
Source CBN Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts
(December 1978) p. 47.
Table 5.12
	
Money supp1y (1) in Nigeria: 1960 - 1978
(N million)
Year
(Dec.)
Currency
outside
Banks
Demand (2)Deposits
Money
Supply
Demand Deposits
as Percentage of
Money Supply (%)
1960 79.2 38.4 117.6 32.6
1961 79.3 39.3 118.6 33.1
1962 79.8 42.5 122.3 34.7
1963 84.5 47.1 131.6 35.8
1964 98.9 53.6 152.5 35.1
1965 100.5 58.0 158.5 36.6
1966 108.6 63.9 172.5 37.0
1967 207.4 106.0 313.4 33.8
1968 183.1 145.0 328.1 44.2
1969 252.7 174.1 426.8 40.8
1970 342.3 266.0 608.4 43.7
1971 354.5 274.4 628.9 43.6
1972 385.2 314.9 700.1 45.0
1973 435.9 391.3 827.2 47.3
1974 569.8 608.5 1,178.4 51.6
1975 1,030.7 1,013.4 2,044.1 49.6
1976 1,351.2 1,941.8 3,293.0 59.0
1977 1,940.8 2,853.6 4,794.4 59.5
1978 2,157.2 2,628.6 4,785.8 54.9
Notes: (1) Money supply is defined as currency outside banks plus demand
deposits at Commercial Banks plus domestic deposits with the
. Central Bank less Federal and State Governments' deposits
at Commercial Banks.
(2) Demand (current) deposits with the banking system not of
Government (Federal and State) deposits.
Sources:	 CBN Economic and Financial Review (various issues 1960-1978)
Table 5.13	 Market share in financial intermediation: the
.position in OECD countries and Nigeria: 1975
(in percentages)
Country Leading financial intermediaries Deposits
Loans and
advances
Uunibad Kingclan London clearing hanks 17.0 12.1
Germany Savings banks 21.5 16.1
France National banks 18.1 17.5
Italy Savings Pledge banks 18.4 11.0
The Netherlands The Big Three 15.2 16.9
Switzerland Cantonal banks 18.0 22.5
Sweden Big four commercial banks 24.4 18.4
Japan City banks 20.5 21.3
The United States Commercial banks 35.5 31.6 .
Nigeria Commercial banks 86.6 85.4
Sources: (1) IBRO "Banking Systems Abroad" (London, IBRO, 1975)
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(2) Cjo, Ade T. and Adewunmi, 94ole "Banking and Finance in
Nigeria" (Mirmx)gral*1) University of Lagos, 1980
introduced" (Paton Report, 1952, p.1). His recommendations
led to the enactment of the 1952 Banking Ordinance. In 1958, a
banking ordinance was enacted to up-date and countenance the
new dimension in Nigerian banking introduced by the birth of
the CBN. The current regulatory laws are embodied . in the
Banking Act of 1969 and the CBN Act of 1958 and their subsequent
amendments.
Like the 1952 and 1958 Ordinances which it replaced, the
1969 Banking Act contains important regulatory features concerning
bank supervision, and examination, minimum capital requirements,
licensing requirements, the observance of liquidity ratio and
the maintenance of reserves.
Before considering the system of control, it will be
useful to highlight the objectives of the controls exercised by
the CBN. These are stated as:
( i) the development of a sound banking system
(it) the protection of depositors and other creditors
of the bank
(iit) the provision of adequate banking services
in all parts of the country
(iv) the promotion of rapid economic development
throughout the country
(V) the allocation of bank credit in accordance with
government economic guidlines and priorities
such as the programme of industrialization and
indigenisation of the economy
(vi) the maintenance of internationally accepted
standards and practices in the banking industry
(Olashore, 1977)
The specific regulatory devices employed for these purposes
are Credit Guidelines (selective credit control), Liquidity Ratio,
Cash Ratio, Special Reserve Requirements, the issue of Stabiliz-
ation Securities and interest rate-structi—aring.
'Credit guidelines' has since 1964 been the major instru-
ment of monetary control employed by the CBN. This is
understandably, because all other orthodox market-oriented tools
are largely unemployable in Nigeria in view of the narrowness
and ill-integrated nature of the money and capital markets (see
Falegan, 1978, pp. 15-30). With the credit guidelines, the bank
seeks to control the aggregate volume and expansion of credits
in the economy as well as the sectoral allocation of these
credits. To ensure such loans and advances are available to
borrowers at 'affordable' prices, the commercial banks' interest
rates structure is annually prescribed by the CBN (see table V.1).
Apart from the initial minimum capital requirement, the
CBN seeks to ensure that the banks' capital base grows with
their level of operation by requiring the constant maintenance
of a capital fund to deposit ratio of 1:10. A similar ratio
is also required to be maintained between loans and advances
and capital funds.
5, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
5.1 Government agricultural policies and strategies
In terms of policy, at least, a new and considerable
attention is being given to agriculture in Nigeria today. This
is in recognition of the role this sector has played in the
past, and will inevitably play in the future in Nigeria's
economy. Between 1960 and 1970, agriculture accounted for over
50% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), recording 63.4% in
1960 and 51.3% in 1970 (see table 5.14). The sector's contrib-
ution has regrettably decreased consistently since 1971. Though
agricultural production increased in value from N1,787.4 million
in 1970 to N3,399.7 million in 1971, it had only retrogressed to
the N3,372.7 million mark by the end of 1975. It will be seen,
therefore, that whilst at first one may attribute the decreasing
percentage contribution of the agricultural sector to the
increased contribution of petroleum, the recorded value of
agricultural production in the 70s, in spite of considerable
inflation in the economy during the period, clearly demonstrates
a reduction in the sector's output. The value of agricultural
exports has also not improved significantly over the period.
With sufficient allowance for increased use, locally, of agricul-
tural produce, an increase from N282.5 million in 1960 to
N297.8 million in 1974 is obviously not a satisfactory record
particularly for a developing country. As a further confirmation
of the poor performance of the agricultural sector, it can be
noted that food imports have gone up from N57.8 million in 1970
Table 5.14 Agricultural Earnings and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in Nigeria: 1960 - 1975 (N million)
Year
GDP	 Value of Agric.
(1974/5 prices)	 Products
Agricultural
Earnings as
% of GDP
Value of Agric.
Exports
1960 2,244.6 1,423.8 63.4 282.5
1961 2,373.4 1,465.2 61.7 283.0
1962 2,630.8 1,609.6 61.2. 260.0-
1963 2,806.4 1,675.0 59.7 285.9
1964 2,914.0 1,678.0 57.6 303.9
1965 3,080.6 1,691.8 54.9 327.3
1966 3,210.0 1,784.4 55.6 292.5
1967 3,051.8 1,713.0 56.1 264.5	 -
1968 3,140.8 1,726.0 55.0 263.7
1969 3,278.2 1,743.8 . 53.2 278.7
1970 3,485.8 1,787.4 51.3 280.5
1971 9,442.1 3,399.7 36.0 265.2
1972 11,177.9 3,575.3 32.0 190.1
1973 11,993.1 3,351.8 27.9 278.4
1974 13,135.5 3,246.5 24.7 297.8
1975 14,410.7 3,372.7 23.4 267.3
Source: Olayide, S.O. "Economic Survey of Nigeria," p.26
Annual Abstract of Statistics (various issues)
Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.
to N439.4 million in 1976 and to N790.3 million in 1977 (Semowo,
1979 pp. 13-16). In spite of these displeasing performances,
it is reckoned that "the agricultural sector provides employment
for about 67% of the active population" (Olayide, 1975, p. 24)
of the country. From all these it is abundantly clear that
this sector has constituted the backbone of the economy until
only recently. Furthermore
agriculture and its related activities will
continue to be the mainstay of Nigeria's economy
in the foreseeable future. In the first place,
the sector will continue to furnish the bulk of
the nation's employment opportunities. Secondly,
with population growth rate of about 2.5 per cent
annually, urbanisation and real incomes projected
to rise sharply, the demand for more and better
staple food as well as animal products is expected
to grow at a rate of about 5 per cent and 7 per cent
per annum,respectively. Finally, agriculture will
have to meet most of the country's raw material
requirements for local industry and for export which
will continue to be an important earner of foreign
exchange."
(Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, p.8)
Between 1967 and 1970, the country was engaged in a civil
war which inevitably came first on the society's list of
priorities for the period. Understandably, in the light of
this, government gave little or no attention to the sector up
to 1970. The end of the war coincided with a great upsurge in
revenues from oil. Short-sightedly the country's authorities
thought that this new revenue source had made agriculture
unimportant. The neglect of agriculture, therefore, continued.
By 1975, however, unmanageable inflation, embarrassingly high
food import bills and a decline in oil revenue were more than
enough to show that the neglect of agriculture up till then
was unwise. The urgent need to reverse her priorities having
been realised, the government defined one of its objectives
in the sector during 1975-80 plan period as: "....evolving
appropriate institutional and administrative apparatus to
facilitate a smooth integrated development of the agricultural
potential of the economy as a whole." (Third National.
Development Plan 1975-80, P. 67).
In the revised public sector capital programmes under the
1975-80 plan, the agricultural sector was allocated a total of
N1,681.7 million out of a total projected expenditure of
$43,314.0 million. Provisions were also made for the develop-
ment of existing research institutions in the country and the
establishment of new ones to undertake comprehensive studies
into the problems associated with local crops and to devise
scientific methods of getting increased yields from crops and
livestocks. Four agricultural production parastatals have
also been established during this plan period by the federal
government (Obayan, 1977, pp. 19-22).
Another important scheme of the government worthy of note
here is the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme. Providing
finance is not the primary goal of this scheme. The aim is to
arouse the consciousness of Nigerians to the need to be self-
sufficient in food production and to point out to individual
Nigerians that they can contribute eminently toward the
achievement of that goal. The financing aspect of the programme
is concerned with the subsidizing of agricultural inputs such
as fertilizers, pesticides and improved seedlings.
The Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank has been
mentioned above as one of the development banks. But an
analysis of government's agricultural policies and strategies
can not be complete, without at least, some reference to the bank.
As we noted earlier, this bank was established as a bold
and deliberate effort of government to enhance agricultural
production and related activities by providing direct finance
to the sector. Its resources, and consequently its contributions
to agricultural finance are, however, relatively small.
There are basically two ways in which the monetary
authorities influence the flow of credit to the agricultural
sector as part of the government's development effort in the
sector. Directly and indirectly. Up to 1968, the CBN rediscounted
Marketing Board Produce Bills and gave direct loans to the Boards
as well. Since 1968, however, the CBN by virtue of the Central
Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Act 1968, had become "the sole
source of credit for Marketing Boards (Commodity Boards
from April 1977) purchases of export produce" (Section 29A).
By 1970, for instance, total CBN financial support to the Boards
amounted to N86.2 million. During 1977 and 1978, the Commodity
Boards received advances totalling N250.3 million and N426.0
million respectively from the Bank.
Indirectly the CBN has encouraged commercial banks to
lend to agriculture by prescribing in its credit guidelines the
minimum proportion of their total loans and advances that should
go to agriculture. To ensure compliance with these directives,
the Bank with effect from April 1977 decreed that where a
commercial bank's total loans and advances fall short of the
prescribdd minimum of 6%, the shortfall shall be deposited
with the CBN at no interest for as long and to the extent that
the shortfall continues. Such deposits were not to count towards
the determination of the offending bank's liquidity ratio. In
the 1979/80 guidelines, it has been stated that such shortfalls
shall not be returnable automatically as the CBN will deposit
the amount with the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative
Bank to be utilized for agricultural production and development.
As.an incentive the CBN allows commercial banks to count out
loans to agricultural sector in calculating the permissible
increase in their individual aggregate monthly increases in
loans and advances (CBN, Credit Guidelines, 1979/80).
.Even if commercial banks gave a minimum of 6% of all
their loans and advances to the agricultural sector, obviously
this would not have, most probably, been adequate. The need
to encourage the flow of more credit to the sector led to
the establishment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund.
A statutory instrument titled the "Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme Fund" states that the objective of the scheme is to
provide "guarantees in respect of loans granted for agricultural
purposes by any bank in accordance with the provisions of the
Decree" (p.1). The limit of liability of the fund in respect of
any guarantees shall apply to loans up to a maximum of N50,000
in the case of individuals and N1 4 0 million in the case of
co-operative societies or companies. The Fund's initial resources
of N100.0 million were contributed in the ratio of 60:40%
respectively by the Federal government and the CBN.
The scheme began operating on 3rd April 1978.
"A total of N17.4 million has been loaned out to
Nigerian farmers under the Agricultural Credit
Guarantee Scheme as at March this year (1979). In
all, 516 loans have been guaranteed during the first
year of operation of the scheme. Credit to the
agricultural sector of the economy increased in 1978
compared with 1977. The total amount of loans outstanding
to the sector at the end of December 1978 was N230.5
million compared with N146.2 million at the end of
December 1977 an increase of 61.6 per cent ... The
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme is expected to
have made some impact, however small it may be, on
the granting of loans to the agricultural sector
'during the year."
(ACGS Report 1978, pp. 2-3)
5.1.1 Future developments
It is the view of the architects of the Fourth National
Development Plan 1981-85 that the objectives of the Federal,
State and LGAs in this sector will focus on the promotion of:
"(a) increased production of food and other raw materials to
meet the needs of a growing population and rising
industrial production;
(b) increased production of livestock and fish to meet
domestic needs and create a surplus for export;
(c) increased proauction and processing of export crops with
a view to expanding and diversifying the country's foreign
exchange earnings; in this respect a target of seven years
is being set for the revival of our cash crops;
(d) the expansion of employment opportunities to absorb the
increasing labour force of the nation; and
(e) the evolution of appropriate institutional and
administrative apparatus to facilitate the rapid development
of the country's agricultural potential."
Broadly, the strategies of the government will be
unaltered but the instruments will be sharpened to ensure
effectiveness. Incentives such as income tax relief for pioneer
enterprises, duty free importation of farm machinery, additional
investment allowance of 10% and provision for carrying forward of
losses for tax purposes will continue to be available.
It is noteworthy that agricultural production and process-
ing has been transferred from schedule II to III of the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Act 1977 which means that foreigners can
now own 60% of the equity in an agricultural enterprise. The hope
is that this move will attract foreign private investments to this
sector and thus enhance the achievement of the set policy objectives
5.2 Government industrial policies and strategies
Organised industrial development did not really commence
until after independence. In the words of the Nigerian
Industrial Policy and Strategy (p.7) "... .economic activity
before independence was almost entirely commercial." Almost
inevitably, therefore, early efforts at industrialization were
geared towards import-substitution manufacturing.
With her resource endowments and potentialities Nigeria
is now faced with the opportunity and the challenge for signific-
ant industrial development.
"The domestic market is large and expanding and
can provide the leverage for competition in the
export market. The emerging entrepreneural group
in the country is dynamic and capable of exploiting
the potentials in both the domestic and world
markets."
(Third National Development Plan 1975-80, p.147)
Industrial development in general and manufacturing in
particular are, however, still at their infant stages in
Nigeria. As can be gauged from Table 5.15, the contribution of
manufacturing to the GDP during 1960-1975 ranged between 3.6%
in 1960 and 9.4% in 1970. The input and output structure of the
subsector also confirms the rudimentary nature of the activities.
What manufacturing that takes place in the subsector is dominated
by mere assembling. Industrial input costs, for instance, average
over 50% for the industry and are as high as 90% for motor body
building and high technology engineering. Output is dominated
by low technology light industry products such as food,
beverages and tobacco, textiles and wearing apparels which account
for over 50%. The present situation is the product of a lack of
foresight by the various governments of the country and their
92
Table 5.15 Value of Manufacturing Products and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in Nigeria: 1960 - 1975	 (N million)
GDP
	 Value of	 Manf. Products
Year	 (1974/75 prices)	 Manf. Products	 as % of GDP
1960 2,246.6 80.6 3.6
1961 2,373.4 88.2 3.7
1962 2,630.8 93.4 3.6
1963 2,806.4 151.8 5.8
1964 2,914.0 157.8 5.6
1965 3,080.6 164.8 5.6
1966 3,210.0 192.2 6.2
1967 3,051.8 196.0 6.1
1968 3,140.8 231.2 7.6
1969 3,278.2 270.4 8.6
1970 3,485.8 311.0 9.5
1971 9,442.1 475.1 5.0
1972 11,177.9 460.3 4.1
1973 11,993.1 570.1 4.8
19 4 13,135.5 626.5 4.8
1975 14,410.7 689.3 4.7
Source: Olayide, S.O. "Economic Survey of Nigeriep. 54.
unwise industrial policies (U gord, 1974, pp. 243-254).
The colonial government policies restricted industrial activities
to the processing of the primary produce of the country for
export, whilst preserving the local manufactured products'
markets for the outputs of their home industries. At independ-
ence, the indigenous government, anxious to attract investors,
adopted an ill-conceived open-door industrial palicy which cared
less about the industrial linkages effect of manufacturing
activities, whilst solving the immediate balance of payments
problems by import substitution manufactures (Ersoro, 1974,
pp. 243-254). It was only at the beginning of this decade that
the government started to enunciate dynamic industrial develop-
ment policies and to also put them into operation. Whilst the
present policy maintains the package of incentives for investors
interested in establishing in the country, it does emphasize the
need for sizeable and planned increases in the local value-added
• part of production.
The Nigerian Indigenisation programmes have on their
part the twin objectives of encouraging foreign investors with
high technology know-how into the more sophisticated industrial
activities like fertilizer, agro-allied and chemical products
manufacturing and preserving the low-technology field for the
indigenous persons, as a training ground for budding entrepreneurs.
In addition to creating a favourable atmosphere for
. industrial development governments of the country have also taken
substantial direct interest in industry. In partnership with
foreign public and private investors, governments are participat-
ing in large industrial ventures such as iron and steel complexes,
petrol-chemical plants and motor assembly. In a way this is in
recognition of the weakness of the private sector.
The gradual take over of the NIDB and the establishment
of NBCI represent important indications of the seriousness of
current industrial initiative of the government. These banks
have been established, as noted earlier, to provide not only
financial assistance to indigenous entrepreneurs but to remove
the known bottlenecks of industrial development. These bottle-
necks include the acquisition of managerial and technical
expertise, articulation of investment projects, the provision
of investment advice and guidance including post-investment
support and supervision.
Through the use of Credit Guidelines the CBN has sought
to increase commercial banks lending to the sector by prescribing
minimum percentage of their loans and advances that must be alloc-
ated to the sector. As for the agricultural loans stipulation,
any short-fall in the prescribed loan allocation to manufacturing
by a commercial bank is passed on to the NIDB for its use and no
interest is paid to the commercial bank-owner of the funds.
Finally the small-scale industries schemes (SSIS), adminis-
tered by the states and the Industrial Development Centres
established by the Federal Government are the other notable
industrial programmes of the government (see Third National
Development Plan, pp. 147-174).
5.2.1 Future developments
The overall objective of government policy with respect
to the manufacturing sector includes:
(a) the removal of identified constraints i.e. restrictive
industrial and administrative practice, shortage of
industrial manpower, and inadequate infrastructural
facilities;
(b) maximization of local value-added through utilization of
local raw materials, backward integration of industries;
(c) industrial manpower development and employment
generation;
(d) rapid development, acquisition and adaptation of
technology;
(e) promotion of export-oriented industries, and
(f) industrial dispersal.
In order to achieve these objectives the government has
adopted a strategy that seeks to promote and encourage directly
and indirectly the development of manufacturing and allied
activities. Full recognition is given to the vital role of
private enterprise and initiative.
As the principal government agency with responsibility for
the formulation and execution of the country's industrial
policies, the Federal Ministry of Industries plays two major
roles in the sector - the regulation of the pattern and
direction of industrial development and assisting the establish-
ment and expansion of manufacturing concerns. To assist
industries start and grow to maturity, the government provides
a number of incentives and gives effective protection to
manufacturers. The incentives and concessions granted to.
industries include:
(i) Pioneer Status which qualifies a firm for a tax holiday
of 3 to 5 years;
(ii) Approved Users Scheme under which manufacturing firms are
allowed to import certain raw materials either free of
import duty or at very concessionary duty rates;
(iii) Accelerated Depreciation of Capital investments;
(iv) Customs (Drawback) Regulation which allows manufacturers
to reclaim duties paid on imported raw materials used for
the manufacture of goods which are exported;
(v) Dumped and Subsidized Goods Act 1958 under which the
government can impose special duties on imported goods
to protect industries in Nigeria if it believes that:
(a) the entry of such subsidized or dumped goods will
threaten or cause material injury to
potential or existing industries, And
(b) such action will not conflict with the
country's obligations under international
Agreements to which she is a party e.g. GATT;
(vi) Graduated Excise Tax Reduction for Local Value-Added,
a scheme under which the government grants excise duty
concessions to manufacturers that achieve increased levels
of their local value-added;
(vii) Fully Integrated Agro-Based and Food Processing
Industries that can show that they utilize focal
resources to a large extent are entitled to substantial
concessions in excise duty payments; and
(viii) Research and Development expenditures are tax deductible
where justified to be relevant to the operations of the
manufacturing concern and prior permission has been
obtained if to be undertaken abroad.
CHAPTER 6
AN APPRAISAL OF AGGREGATE COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING: 1960-1979
14 INTRODUCTION
Appendix I is devoted to the statistical analysis of
the determinants of commercial banks' lending performance in
Nigeria. This analysis is useful for the understanding of the
results of the lending operations of the banks as it sheds light
on the background to these activities. A critical examination
of the lending operations of these institutions is instructive
to the extent that we are enabled to say whefher or not they have
been efficient in the terms defined.
Against this useful background we shall in this chapter
attempt a detailed examination of the results of commercial banks'
lending operations for the period 1960-1979. Admittedly, the
ultimate aim of every study is the improvement of the system or
procedure that is the object of study. Detailed evaluation of
performance is also usually a first step in this process. It
is this line of thinking that provides the rationale for the
exercise in this chapter.
As noted in Chapter 2, financial profitability measured
by net return on capital employed (ROCE), return on total assets,
or in absolute naira terms, is an inadequate basis for evaluating
the efficiency of banks in a developing environment. The
performance of Nigerian banks on the basis of these criteria
and compared to banks in other parts of the world is, undoubtedly,
good. This can be gauged from Tables VI-1 and VI-2.
Since this is not an issue of primary focus here, we shall not
spend time examining this aspect of the banks' lending activities
further. Of course, the importance of profit cannot be
entirely denied. The very continued existence of a bank, its
ability to lend	 in increasing amounts and to undertake risky
investments, depend considerably on good profits being made.
However, on its own, in a developing economy where banks
maximize their oligopolistic position to earn huge returns, profit
ought not to be and is not now generally regarded as a basis
for evaluating their efficiency (see ABDI 1977).
The data employed in the following analyses were obtained
largely from the aggregate statistics of commercial banking
operations as published periodically by the CBN i . In addition
to the time-series data from these sources for the 1960-1978
period, cross-sectional data for 1979, obtained from CBN's
Research Department, are also used. Where data availability
permits, the analyses include separate considerations of
indigenous and foreign banks. These further analyses are under-
taken in the hope that they will provide more insight into the
variations (if any) in the behaviour of these separable groups
of institutions within the system. This dichotomy is, of course,
••n•
also important in view of the shares of the loans and advances
market accounted for by these groups. All through the period
under consideration, a very large proportion of the loans and
advances activities in the commercial banking industry was
accounted for by the foreign banks (see table 6.1). By 1979,
in spite of the growth in the number of indigenous banks over
the years, the foreign banks were still in control of 64% of this
market.
See bibliographical references.
Table 6.1 Share of loans and advances granted by foreign
and indigenous commercial banks, 1963-1979 -
(in percentages)
Year end Foreign banks Indigenous banks Total
1963 73.0 27.0 100.0
1964 74.4 25.6 100.0
1965 73.9 26.1 100.0
1966 72.6 27.4 100.0
1967 74.1 25.9 100.0
1968 73.5 26.5 100.0
1969 •	 *
1970
1971 *
1972 62.8 37.2 100.0
1973 59.3 40.7 100.0
1974 58.2 41.8 100.0
1975 60.0 40.0 100.0
1976 67.6 32.4 100.0
1977 66.8 33.2 100.0
1978 (1) 66.2 33.8 100.0
1979 63.8 36.2 100.0
Note (1) October
Sources : (1) CBN, Economic and Financial Review (June 1969)
(2) Ogbe, N.E. "A Comparative Analysis of the
Structure of Commercial Bank Credit Operations
in Nigerian States: 1972-75". CBN, Economic 
and Financial Review, (December 1978) p. 53.
(3) CBN, Research Department.
Section 2 focuses on broad aggregate lending activities of
these banks. Section 3 examines these aggregate lending activities
in some depth by considering the maturity, security and repayment
patterns of loans and advances. Section 4 reports an empirical.
study of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund and
Section -5 presents the Summary and concluding remarks.
21 AGGREGATE LENDING OPERATIONS
The results of the analysis in Appendix.I.indicate some
of the determinants of bank lending performance. Before examining
the aggregate performance of these banks here it will provide a
useful background if we note the trends in the explanatory
variables of the analysis. These variables include total assets,
total deposits, capital funds and branches.
As can be gauged from table 5.2 the total assets of these
banks have grown significantly over the years. From N235.8 million
in 1960, total assets increased consistently, except for 1967,
until they reached the figure of N9,105.7 million in 1978. The
growth rate has ranged between-t.04% in 1967 to 58.6% in 1974,
with an average annual rate for the period of 24% (sae table6.2&figure6.1).
Little if any of this growth, however, is real as inflation has
proceeded at about the same pace during this time.
Total deposits of commercial banks have also increased
phenomenally - absolutely as well as a percentage of total .
liabilities - during this period. More importantly, time and
savings deposits accounted for over 50% of total deposits during
12 of the 19. years between 1960 and 1978 (see table VI-3).
From 40% in 1960, it rose to a peak of 59.4% in 1972; declined
gradually thereafter to reach 43.1% in 1977, and picked up to
49.1% in 1978.
Capital funds were 2.7% of total liabilities in 1960 (see
table VI-4). At the end of 1978, these amounted to 2.9%. In
between these years, the ratio moved as high as 10.0% in 1962 and
was as low as 2.4% in 1977.
In absolute terms the number of bank branches in Nigeria
had 307% increase over the 1960-1978 period (see table VI-5).
Annual growth rates ranged between 9.6% in 1970 and 21.6% in 1978.
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The recent high growth in bank branches, it ought to be noted,
is due partly to the Rural Banking Scheme of the CBN (see Olashore,
1979, p. 51). Under this Scheme, commercial banks are obliged
to open a certain number of branches in specified rural locations
within prescribed periods of time. As can be seen from Table VI-5
branches per bank have doubled in number between 1960 and 1978,
and the number of persons per branch has been more than halved
from 271,568 to 120,089.
All these developments, as we learnt from the analyses in
Appendix I do influence the level and efficiency of bank lending.
Having noted briefly these changes in the explanatory variables,
as a background to the performance evaluation here, an examination
of_the lending operations of the banks can now be made.
Total loans and advances have increased from N114.0 million
in 1960 to 144,114.7 million in 1978 (see table 6.3). This
phenomenal growth is also manifest in the loan penetration ratios
(i.e. total loans to population) over this period. This ratio
has increased from only 2.21 in 1960 to 50.93 in 1978 (see tAhlp6.2&figure
6.2). Put in another way, loan per capita has increased from
142.21 to 1450.93 within this period. Overall, loans and advances
increased at an annual average rate of 23.3% between 1960 and
1978. This is, however, slightly behind the 24% rate of growth of
total assets for the same period. In two years - 1967 and 1968 -
aggregate loans and advances actually declined, whilst investments
in Treasury Securities increased. It is noteworthy that the
negative growth rate in 1967 was higher for loans and advances
than for total assets. In 1968, whilst total assets increased by
24.7% loans and advances declined by -17.9%.(Selet	  6.2& ficAme 6.3).
The net result of these developments can be seen in table 6-2
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The ratio of total loans-to-total assets rose from 48.3% in 1960
to a peak of 62.5% in 1966. It .fell modestly in 1967 to 61.2%
but sharply the next year to 40.3, undoubtedly partly due to the
war situation in the country. This ratio has fluctuated between
30 and 45% ever since. (See table 6.2 and figure 6.4).
Efficiency in resource use in banking, as in all other bus-
inesses indeed, must have a lot to do with experience gained from
practice. If this is true, it would be rational' to expect year
after year an increasing proportion of commercial banks' resources
invested efficiently (i.e. in loans and advances). Unfortunately,
the above statistics of the operations of these banks do not suggest
that this is happening.-
To examine this performance in other dimensions, table 6.4
presents a comparison of the ratio of total loans-to-total assets
for five countries including Nigeria. Two of these countries -
Japan and Great Britain - are developed; the rest - Jamaica, Ghana
and Nigeria - are developing. Of all these countries, only Ghana,
a country with an ailing economy, has a set of ratios as low as
that of Nigeria for the period 1970-1977. While other members of
this group have higher ratios than Nigeria, it does appear that
the Nigerian banks are improving this position again in 1977.
Nevertheless, these admittedly sparse data do suggest room for
improvement in Nigerian banks' lending volume.
With special reference to the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, table 6.5 shows that the percentage allocations of loans
and advances have been less than desirable. Loans and advances
to agriculture declined from the peak figure of 25.3% recorded in
1965 to 1.3% in 19671 and has only been able to "crawl" back to a
1 See page 111 for an explanation of this sharp drop.
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Table 6.4	 Loans and advances as a percentage of the
assets of commercial banking systems in
selected developed and developing economies;
1970 - 1977
Country 1970 1971 1.972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Japan 65.1 63.3 62.2 61.5 61.0
Great Britain 55.0 52.0 72.5 76.0 . 77.0 70.0 71.0 71.0
Ghana 40.0 49.4 36.6 36.1 39.7 32.6 31.2 29.5
Jamaica 72.0 .	 76.3 65.4 68.8 65.8 55.6
Nigeria 30.5 39.3 43.1 42.5 33.4 35.7 33.3 36.0
Sources: Computed from:
(1) Bank of Tbkyo, Japan, Semi-annual Reports (various issues)
(2) British Banking and Other Financial Institutions (London:
HMSO, 1974)
(3) Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics 
(London: HMSO, various issues)
(4)*Bank of Ghana Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues)
(5) Bank of Jamaica Report and Statement of Accounts (various issues
(6)- Twenty Years of Central Banking in Nigeria (Lagos, Nigeria:
Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 1979) p. 12.
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5.6% level in 1978. Manufacturing sector on the other hand has,
however, received increasing percentage allocation of loans and
advances. Except for 19741) when an 0.8% allocation was recorded,
there have been steady increases in loans to this sector as
a percentage of total loans - from 4.3% in 1960 to 27.6% in 1978(2).
But how do the growth rates of loans and advances to these sectors
compare with those of total loans? The answer to this question
will be useful as an indicator of the response of the commercial
banks to CBN's "urgings" for increased resource allocations to
these sectors. Furthermore, the nature and speed of these responses
will undoubtedly measure the efficiency with which the banks
perform their lending function.
Loans to agriculture have increased over the 1960-1978
period at an annual rate of 31%; for the manufacturing sector
it is 252.2%. In both 1966 and 1967 substantial negative growth
rates were recorded for loans to agriculture. This was due to
the fact that commercial banks withdrew their advances to Marketing
Boards because of the prevailing war situation. These events
revealed that Commercial banks financed mainly the marketing end
of agricultural activities rather than the essential production
aspect. The banks' lack of interest or little faith in agriculture
can be more clearly understood if it is appreciated that these
Marketing Boards' advances were readily rediscountable at the CBN
and were therefore first class assets in .terms of liquidity and
safety. It will be true to say that these banks have not been
able to reach their 1965 level of percentage loans allocation to
(3)
the agricultural sector because they can no longer finance the
Marketing Boards (see CBN, Annual Report, 1968).
1
See note in table 6.2 for an explanation of this sharp drop.
2 See figure 6.5
3 See figure 6.6
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Loans-to-deposit ratio measures the extent to which a bank
has invested its internal resources in the most lucrative asset
available to it. Also "the loan-deposit ratio constitutes a
rather crude measure, although the best available index, of the
extent to which different types of banks ....(meet) local credit
needs" (Kohm, 1964 p. 16). In a developing country like Nigeria,
where the market for CDS is insignificant and undeveloped; this
must be much more true. The aggregate loans and advances-to-
deposit ratio of the banks has been relatively high throughout the
period, ranging from 113.8% in 1967 to 51.0% in 1976. The average
ratio for the period fs 77.7% (see table 6.2 and figure 6.7).
Given the Nigerian financial environment with its paucity
of long-term financial resources and sources, commercial banks'
loans to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, to be
effective, must be as long term as the nature. of productive
activities in these sectors. Time and savings deposit resources
will ideally be required for such advances. But to what extent do
the banks use such resources for these purposes? We can obtain
an indication of this from the ratios of agricultural plus
manufacturing loans-to-time plus savings deposits in table 6.2
The banks' performances were relatively good in the early 1960s.
During this period loans and advances to agriculture and
manufacturing sectors represented between 45% and 74.5% of time
plus savings deposits. Thereafter, in spite of the increases in
these deposits, loans to these strategic sectors have not, as will
be expected, correspondingly increased. The ratio has, during
this later period, been as low as 4.8% in 1973 and as high as
52.54% in 1978.
	 (See figure 6.8).
It has been demonstrated that the commercial banks are the
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dominant financial intermediaries in Nigeria. It was also noted
in Chapter 5 that Credit guidelines are the principal
instruments of monetary control in Nigeria. In the light of
these facts and also because the Nigerian economy is operated
within the framework of five-year plans, the "adjustments in banks'
portfolios in conformance with the development plans and
strategies will be considered indicative of their performance"
(Abdi, 1977, p. 77).
Table 6.6 shows the specified credit guidelines for the
distribution of loans and advances by the banks between 1969 and
1979. Against this expected distribution there are in table
6.5 the actual percentage allocations of loans and advances by
the banks. The net result of matching tables 6.5 and 6.6
is presented in table 6.7.- These deviations in table 6.7 can best
be appreciated against the background of the aims of the credit
guidelines. Broadly put, the principal purpose has been to
encourage the banks to inject financial resources into the most
productive (i.e. job-creating and local value-adding) sectors
(see Falegan, 1978, pp. 15-30). Thus minimum allocations have
always been specified for the "preferred" sectors - "production"
and "services". Maximum desirable allocations have also been set
by the guidelines for the "less preferred" sectors - "general
commerce" and "others". The philosophy behind all these, it may
be useful to note, derives from the recognition of the allocational
inefficiencies of the market mechanism in an economic environment
in which conditions for the ideal theoretical perfect competition
are non-existent. Rather than allow the existing Imperfect
system to misallocate available resources, countries like Nigeria
and Holland, for example, intervene directly through the instrument
of development plans. The credit guidelines to the commercial
0
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banks are thus given to ensure that credit resources are
allocated to support planned productive activities in various
sectors of the economy. It appears rational that the efficiency
of these banks be measured in terms of their compliance with these
directives'. Non-compliance of the banks is sure to frustrate and
disrupt the overall plan for the economy and no banking system,
so acting, can be adjudged efficient, however profitable.
The banking system's allocations of credit to the production
sector deviated from target throughout the 1969-79 period -
five times positively and five times negatively. Since minimum
credit allocation is set for the sector, one may be tempted to
consider the positive deviations as desirable. But the
desirability depends very much on the source of the deviations.
Real estate and construction have been a major contributor to these
deviations. More of the advances to these sectors have, however,
been in respect of government construction contracts for roads,
bridges, etc., rather than for residential accommodation. That
this is so is partially supported by the action of the CBN in its
1978/79 monetary circular. In it and in subsequent ones, the CBN
has specified that advances for residential buildings should
constitute, at least, half of the 10% for the sub-sector.
Whilst the banks have been edger to finance short-term
advances to construction firms with guaranteed payments by
governments, they have been transparently reluctant to support
the agricultural sector. The banks have failed to meet all
prescribed targets of credit allocations to this sector. Negative
deviations were as high as -74.3% and -85.5%, respectively, in
1969/70 and 1971/72. To be properly appreciated, the seemingly
small deviations between 1972 and 1977 must be related to the
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percentage allocations prescribed for the sectors. Monetary
circulars 4-6 for 1972/73 - 1974/75 directed that a minimum of
4% of all the banks' loans and advances be allocated to agriculture.
Subsequent circulars since then have asked for a minimum of 6%. It
seems an evidence of the inefficiency of these banks that these
rather low targets have not been met once. Not only that, margins
of deviations have been as wide as -3.4% and -2.2% respectively,
in 1975/76 and 1976/77.
The performance of the banks in the other subsector of
specific importance to this study (i.e. the manufacturing sector)
has been equally uninspiring. In 1970/71 and 1971/72 the banking
systcm allocated more to this subsector by 19.0 and 70.0%
respectively. In all other years the deviations have been negative.
"Services" sector and the "production" sector both make up
the "preferred" sectors of the economy. Thus minimum credit
allocations have also always been prescribed for this sector. As
can be gauged from table 6.7 the banks have given less than the
minimum required in all the years between 1969 and 1979 except for
1970/71 and 1971/72.
Of course, as may be expected, the failure of the banks in
the preferred sectors is made up in less preferred sectors. The
"others" sector has consistently had more than the prescribed
minimum credit allocation. There is, however, a desirable trend
of increasing under-allocation of credit to the "general commerce"
sector in recent years. From -2.3% in 1974/75, the decline has
gradually proceeded to reach -6.9% in 1978/79. Whilst it is
easy to see this as a sign of improvement in the allocational
efficiency of the banks, an informed observer may realise that
this development is likely to be, at least, partly due to the
continued strict control of imports by the government. The
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economically desirable activity of exporting has not, for
instance, had the expected financial assistance from the banks
as the data in table 6.7 will show. A significant proportion of
the negative deviations in credit allocations to the "general
commerce" sector has, indeed, been contributed by shortfalls in
credits to the "exports" sub-sector. It is probably against the
background of this trend and to underline the importance of the
"exports" sub-sector that it is now included in the preferred
sector of the economy (see Credit Guidelines for 1979/80).
In all, the analysis in table 6.7 shows that Nigerian banks
have deviated undesirably from credit targets set by the CBN in
conformity with the development priorities of the government. This
it should be mentioned, is in spite of the growth in their
resources and facilities. Undoubtedly this makes the growth in
aggregate and sectoral loans and advances noted earlier in this
chapter much less impressive and an indication of efficiency. To
the extent that these deviations hamper rather than help planned
economic activities, it is fair to say that the banks have been
inefficient in their lending function. In defence of this kind
of view, it is common for banks to claim that they have been
responding to the particular demand function facing them. This
can be easily countered by reference to the fruitful business
development activities of banks in Japan, Germany, America, and, to
some extent, Britain (Gaulton, 1973) 1 . The examples of these
countries demonstrate beyond doubt that banks can stimulate the
"right" kind of demand for their resources, and thus satisfactorily
alter the "undesirable" demand function they are faced with. Indeed
"there is growing evidence that progressive bank practices are
1 See also Bibliographical reference Nos.
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antecedent to a vigorous demand for credit" (Crosse and Hempel,
1973, p. 192).
3. MATURITY, SECURITY AND REPAYMENT PATTERNS
The usefulness of any advance depends on the appropriateness
of such advance. The appropriateness can be defined in terms of
the type of advance - overdraft, short-medium-or long-term; the
conditions for and the repayment programme of, the advance. An
important criterion for judging the efficiency of a lending function
is, therefore, the "appropriateness".
It is a common paradox in many financial systems of the world
to have huge unused lines of advances at the same time as
industries are acutely short of funds. For an example, the London
clearing banks were able to demonstrate, almost convincingly, in
their submission to the Wilson Committee, that they have substantial
unused advances Waiting for use by industries (CLCB, 1977, p. 89).
Unilever in their own submission to the Committee stated, inter
alia, that one of their financing problems arises from the fact
that "longer-term, fixed rate finance has not been available in
the past 5 years in adequate amounts or on acceptable terms"
(Unilever's Submission, 1977, p. 9). The company is not short of
financing offers: "As a result of our strong balance sheet, the
banks and financial institutions are keen to lend more to us than
we need to borrow" (p. 7). But such advances as are offered
are often inappropriate. 1 It is only when this kind of paradox is
resolved, when the advances demand and supply functions are
sufficiently synchronised, that the banks' lending activities can
be said to be efficient. This is why an examination of the
maturity, the security and the repayment patterns of loans and
1 Of course government policies that fostered a high interest rate environment
during this period were also relevant in this connexion.
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advances by these banks is useful here.
3.1 Maturity pattern
Table 6.8 presents the maturity pattern of the commercial
banks' loans and advances for the period 1963-1979. The first
thing to observe in these statistics is that the-maturity pattern
has hardly altered over the period.
"Although the banks have been more active in providing
finance for industry, the maturity structure of
commercial banks loans and advances has remained
virtually unaltered throughout.... They have remained
preponderantly short-term of the orthodox self-liquidating
type."
(Vincent, 1980,.p. 17).
Between 1963 and 1975, the proportion of the banks' advances maturing
within one year ranged between 86.6 and 95%. Of the remaining 20%
or less, about 17% mature in 1-5 years and the rest after 5 years.
During this period, the indigenous banks' loans and advances
maturing after one year were proportionately more than the foreign
banks. In 1963 and 1968, respectively, 17.3 and 17.6% of the
indigenous banks' loans and advances had maturity of over one year
(see table 6.9). Comparatively, the foreign banks' proportion of
loans maturing after one year was 5 and 4.7% respectively for these
years. Although both groups of banks had modestly improved on
this maturity pattern by 1979, the indigenous banks still had a
thin edge over the foreign banks. This can be seen from the cross-
sectional data in table 6.10. The average proportion of indigenous
banks' loans and advances maturing at the end of 1979 - 78.55% -
is slightly below the industry's average of 79.51%. On the other
hand, their loans maturing between 1-5 years and after 5 years are
above the industry's average. The foreign banks' performance is a
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Table 6.10 Maturity pattern of Commercial Bank's loans and advances, 1979
(in percentages)
Maturing period
Banks (1) Within	 1-5
	
After
	
Total
1 year	 years	 5 yrs
A 85.46	 7.62	 6.92
	
100
B 73.44	 22.54	 4.02	 100
C 83.08	 10.24
	 6.68	 100
D 71.29	 22.98	 5.73	 100
E 73.74	 26.26	 0.0	 100
F 78.93	 18.60	 2.47	 100
G 95.60	 4.40	 0.0
	
100
H 85.09	 13.92	 0.99	 100
I 80.26	 19.74	 0.0
	 100
J 85.18	 13.25	 1.57	 100-
K 93.17	 5.83	 1.00	 100
L 95.34	 3.82	 0.84	 100
M 91.44	 5.27	 3.29	 100
N 81.37	 14.00	 4.63
	
100
P 79.17	 12.73	 8.10	 100
Q 57.09	 41.60	 1.31	 100
R 82.51	 13.04	 4.45	 100
S 39.14	 51.57	 9.29	 100
T 79.43
	 14.10	 6.47
	
100
All banksMean 79.51	 16.92	 3.57( S.D. 13.40	 12.40	 2.96
Foreign	 Mean
banks
	 ( S.D.(A-13)
80.83
	
15.82	 3.35
7.60	 7.46	 2.71
Indigenous Mean
banks	 (
(I -T)	 S.D.
78.55	 17.72	 3.72
15.80	 14.47	 3.00
Source: Appendix Table VII-1
(1) For desirable anonymity the alphabet has been used instead
of actual names.
reverse of the indigenous banks'. Proportionately more of their
loans and advances mature within one year than the average for
the industry and less mature between 1-5 years and after 5
years.
Although international comparisons may be of limited
guidance in banks' efficiency evaluation given the considerable
differences in institutional and environmental factors, the
performance of selected OECD countries presented in table 6.11
is sufficiently indicative of the fact that the Nigerian banks'
advances maturity patterns are the exception rather than the
rule. None of the banking systems in this table has less than
40% of its loans in medium-plus long-term advances. This
figure is more than double that recorded by Nigerian banks in
their best performance year - 1979.
Table 6.11 Maturity distribution of loans and 'advances in
. selected OECD countries, December, 1975
(in percentages)
Country
Germany
	 France	 Japan	 USA	 UK
Short-term (40	 59	 26	 60	 53ktdian-term	 18	 50	 (40	 (47
Iktig-term	 60	 23	 24
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Inter-Bank Research Organisation (IBR)) Banking Systems Abroad
London 1978.
Lending to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to
be 'appropriate' must be long-term. This is so that the resources
might match the long-term productive activities in these sectors.
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As a way of assessing to what extent the banks lend 'appropriately'
to these activities, it may be helpful to relate loans and advances
maturing after one year to total loans and advances to agriculture
and manufacturing. Evidently in this way the numerator of the
resulting ratio is inflated. It'assumes that all loans maturing
after one year are made to these sectors. In reality this is
most unlikely to be true. Thus the ratios in table 6.2 are a
positive exaggeration of the banks' operating statistics. Even
discounting this exaggeration as we 6, the ratios range between
13.9 and 75.9% in the 1963-1975 period. This record does not
seem wholly commendable. Judged on the evidence here, the banks
hay not apparently provided these sectors with the appropriate
advance.
3.2 Security pattern
The second 'appropriateness' factor to be considered is
security i.e. the requirement of security for advances. This is
a very important issue in bank lending in all less developed
countries (LDCs). In LDCs the collateral standards are inevitably,
however undesirably, foreign. It has to be because these are
imported as part of the banking practices of foreign banks. It
is not the fact that the standards are foreign that makes them
unsuitable. What makes them practically and functionally
abhorrent is that they do not fit the banking and financial
environment into which they have been transplanted. Life policies,
conveyances, stocks and shares certificates and similar collateral
are usually available from the borrower when requested in
advanced countries. They are available and almost commonplace
because these financial instruments have been systematically
develop'ed by business practices and customs in these countries.
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In LDCs, however, these are a rarity. If the availability of
these collateral is a prerequisite for advances in these
countries, it will only serve to restrict aggregate credit.
In addition to insisting on rather hard collateral
standards, Nigerian commercial banks put excessive emphasis on
security for advances. This is not so even in advanced
countries where they can be furnished with relative ease. For
example in the UK "the greater part by amount of the clearing
banks' lending is advanced to customers without any security
being taken" (CLCB, 1977, p. 111). Similarly in all OECD
countries, "the large banks usually prefer good lending on an
unsecured basis to loans that need to be supported by some form
of security" (IBRO, 1978, p. 37). Contrast these statements
with the practice in Nigeria as succinctly put by a distinguished
Nigerian banker: "Our environmental constraints , have made us make
rather ingenious contribution to the world's banking practice by
our insistence on valuable security as a necessary precondition
for an advance" (Olieh, 1979 p. 47). That this is truly the
situation is borne out clearly by data in tables 6.2 and 6.12
The ratio of secured loans-to-total loans has been
increasing steadily over the last two decades. From 63.4% in
1963, it rose to 79.9% in 1975 and by 1979 was at a relatively
high level of 88.3% (table 6.2). As can be seen from table 6.12
most of these securities are in the form of real estate, plant
and equipment. Others in the "otherwise secured" category include
financial assets such as treasury securities, stocks and share
certificates.
Ideally all business practices must be adapted to suit
the operating environment. Unless this is done, the operations
are not likely to be efficient, socially or economically. This
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is just as true of banking as it is of any other business.
Consequently, Nigerian bankers must appreciate the role of
collateral in credit operations. As Crosse and Hempel (1973,
p. 202) advise: "A realistic collateral policy should serve to
improve credit-worthiness enough to enable bank management to
make economically desirable loans and should not be used to
restrict credit."
3.3 Repayment pattern
The maturity and repayment patterns of loans are undoubtedly
intricately related. The repayment schedule, as distinct from
the maturity of a loan, is an important factor of "appropriateness"
in lending. Whilst the maturity pattern may be suitable for a
borrower, the repayment schedule may not. An advance that has
a repayment schedule out of tune with the cashflow ability of a
bor ower is not likely to be very helpful to him. There is little
doubt that "companies often find it desirable to receive a term
loan with repayment schedule tailored to their cashflow"
(Mathis, 1975, p. 72).
As table 6.13 shows, a high proportion of Nigerian
commercial banks' advances are of the overdraft type. In 1972
and 1979, the percentage of advances repayable by specifically agreed
instalments were, respectively, 19.4 and 28.6%. All these leave
a very small part of total loans payable at the end of the term
of the loans in one single instalment.
The disadvantages of overdrafts have been noted in all
the major commissions of enquiry into the British economy in
recent years (Radcliffe Report, paras 941 and 942; Bolton Report,
paras 12-20 and 12-21, and Wilson Report, para. 147). In
responie to the criticisms of overdrafts as a source of finance,
133
Table 6.13 Distribution of commercial banks' loans and advances
by method of repayment 1972 and 1979
Method of repayment Arrounts(N
Percentages
1972 1979 1972 1979
I. Overdraft 463.4 3,068.61 76.6 67.8
II. Repayable by specifically agreed
instalments 11 7.5 • 1,296.75 19.4 28.6
III. Repayable byone single instal-
ment	 • 24.0 162.96 4.0 3.6
TOTAL 604.9 4,528.32 100.0 100.0
Sources (1) Cjo, J.A.T. "Financial Sector and Economic Development -
with Special Reference to the Nigerian Capital
Markets". Ph.D. 'Thesis, Uhixersity of Wales (1974).
(2) Central Bank of Nigeria, Research Department, 1980.
banks have always been eager to point out that whilst in theory
the overdrafts are short-term, repayable on call, in practice most
of them can be regarded as medium-and long-term lines of finance.
This is because "the overdraft facility of a viable firm is rarely
terminated completely and some advances run until they become in
effect medium or long-term finance, so the borrower may come to
rely on them as a permanent part of the firm's capital" (Bolton
Report, para 12.20). But in 1969, the credit squeeze revealed
"the unwisdom of allowing overdrafts to be regarded as in effect,
medium term or even permanent capital" (Bolton Report para. 12.21).
It is also noteworthy that the above statement makes it clear
that only "viable firms", in the main, can hope to use overdrafts
in this way. Yet it is the "unviable firms" that most need the
facility.
In a developing country like Nigeria, the number of "viable
firms" can nearly be counted on the fingers. More importantly,
the presently small, struggling, unviable firms, which are in
the majority, hold the key to the growth and development of
these and indeed most economies (Bolton Report para. 3.7). If
indeed as the banks claim, overdrafts are implicitly medium-to-
long-term advances, what stops them from explicitly making them so?
In the US, for example, "the development of the term loan as a
uniquely and appropriately 'bankable' loan classification can ...
be viewed mainly as a result of a more realistic approach toward
resolving a situation which already had existed" (Kreps and Wacht,
1972, p, 71). Also in the UK there has "been increasing
tendency for lending to industry to take the form of term loans
with periods of between two and seven years and sometimes longer
and with repayment geared to particular circumstances." (Wilson
Report, para 147). Table 6.14 which shows the records of the
clearing banks' lending over 1973-76 period bears testimony to
this statement. Nigerian commercial banks can emulate these
examples of development-promoting bank lending practices to great
advantage. For one, their lending will be more efficient than it
is now.
Table 6.14	 London Clearing Banks: term lending, 1973-1976
(in percentages of total loans)
Category of recipients 1973 1974 1975 1976
Contractual lending to nal-personal borrowers 26.9 27.6 36.7 40.4
Special export finance schemes 8.7 7.9 7.5 7.0
Percentage of contractual lending and
special export schemes to total lending 35.6 35.5 44.2 47.4
Source:	 CLCB p. 276.
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4, THE ROLE OF THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEME FUND (5EGS)
The Nigerian authorities employ a "stick and carrot"
•
approach to the banking system with regards to agricultural credit.
The ACGS represents the carrot which the authorities dangle
before the banks as an inducement to make credit; and the credit
guidelines and the attendant penalties for non-compliance represent
the stick. Earlier in this chapter the credit guidelines were
appraised. The role of the ACGS will be examined here. As noted
in Chapter 5 the ACGS Fund is managed by the CBN. To obtain
official view of the role of the Scheme, a structured questionnaire
was used (see Appendix IVA-3). Before analysing the interview
responses it will be instructive to consider the record of
performance of the ACGS.
Table 6.15 shows the loans guaranteed by the ACGS between
1978 and 1980. It will be noticed from the table that 'there has
been significant increases in agricultural loans, probably induced
by the Scheme. Total loans granted under the Scheme have increased
from N11.3 million in 1978 to N33.6 million in 1979; and had
recorded N20 million by the end of the first half of 1980.
Apparently, therefore, one can say the carrot is working success-
fully as a bait to entice commercial banks into a field of lending
they have always been reluctant to move into. But are these
credits reaching the real farmers?
Many studies including Oluwasanmi and Alao (1965). Galletti
et al. (1956) and Osuntogun (1980) have indicated that the scale
of production of Nigerian farmers is very small and the credit
requirements also correspondingly small. For instance, Osuntogun
(1980, p. 42) found that "the average amount of credit used per
borrower varied from N92.4 in Ondo State to N155.9 in Oyo State."
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Table 6.15 Loans guaranteed by the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme Fund by State: 1978-1980
State NO. of	 loans
Amount
(N"000)
1978 (1) 1979 (2) 1980 (3) 1978 1979 1980
Anambra 16 50 32 247.4 1,283.1 319.2
Bauchi 15 132 101 1,271.2 1,543.3 986.9
Bendel 18 96 35 558.2 6,701.3 1,641.0
Benue 3 5 3 290.5 140.5 13.0
Borno 12 21 4 178.4 739.2 53.0
Cross River 13 13 22 483.5 288.8 404.2
Gongola - 15 7 - 501.5 244.0
Imo 26 88 35 605.3 1,704.4 571.7
Kaduna 77 170 89 985.6 3,138.6 668.5
Kano 22 229 48 627.8 3,185.4 1,904.7
Kwara 44 38 18 2,043.1 814.8 307.9
Lagos 5 16 21 300.0 3,203.1 3,437.8
Niger 3 12 9 83.0 202.6 157.0
Ogun	 - 15 22 10 772.8 2,291.0 1,162.6
Ondo 1 14 9 25.0 358.9 1,546.0
Oyo 22 84 45 1,013.6 3,976.9 3,911.2
Plateau 8 41 16 688.7 854.3 1,029.0
Rivers 16 18 13 434.6 2,036.0 1,155.2
Sokoto 25 41 23 657.7 633.0 264.7
TOM, 341 1,105 540 11,284.4 33,596.7 19,773.6
; 341	 4 1,105	 540 
Average size of loan (in )I'000) 	 33.1	 30.4	 36.6
Sources: (i) ACGS Fund, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for 1978 and 1979.
(ii) Central Bank of Nigeria, Agricultural Finance Department.
Notes:	 (1) April - December
(2) January - December
(3) January - June
In contrast table 6.15 shows that the average loan under the ACGS
has ranged between N30,400 in 1979 and N36v600 in 1980. Given
the general smallness of Nigerian farmers, it can be stated with
a high degree of confidence that this Scheme has hardly touched
them. Yet this group of farmers account for over 90% of
agricultural outputs in Nigeria (see West Africa, 16 March 1981
p. 567). Two unintended consequences are likely to emerge as a
result of this trend. The Scheme may not succeed in increasing
food and other agricultural outputs as the credits are likely to -
be diverted by the absentee farmers who apparently now benefit
most from the Scheme. Even if success is attained, new economic
and social problems are likely to emerge as a result of the operation
of the Scheme. Food and other agricultural products may be aplenty
but paradoxically many will be starving at the same time. This
is because small holder farming will become uncompetitive and
unattractive. A huge proportion of the labour force currently
engaged in agriculture will be tempted to join the presently
growing migration to the cities for jobs. The unplanned nature
of the release of labour from agriculture, the size of the labour
force involved and the near suddenness of the developments will
inevitably lead to unmanageable unemployment and urban problems.
4.1 Opinion survey
Against this background let us now examine the official
view on the ACGS as put in an interview with an Assistant
Director of the Scheme during the researcher's fieldwork.
Ql. What concrete evidence exists of the nature and size of
agricultural credit gap in Nigeria?
A. (a) -Number of applications made under the Scheme so far.
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(b) Comparison of loan applications and loan approvals by the NACB.
(c) Lack of compliance, by the commercial banks, with the CBN credit
guidelines on credit to the sector.
(d) Generally agriculture being a growing sector will always need
finance.
Q2. What, do you feel, is the rationale for the choice of the
ACGS as a means of improving agricultural finance and
development?
A.	 Banks were reluctant to lend to the sector as evidenced by deviations
of loans granted from loans prescribed under the credit guidelines. So
the Fund came to guarantee and remove or minimize the risk element in
agricultural lending.
Q3. Some people feel that an agricultural credit refinance scheme
will be a better means of motivating the commercial banks to
expand credit to the agricultural credit sector. What is
your view?
A.	 "This step was taken because the CBN is sure, from the records in its
hands, that the banks are very liquid and thus the need for refinancing
does not arise. The problem is with the attitude of Nigerian bankers."
Q4. Do you think that the commercial banks are doing enough to
promote agricultural—development in Nigeria? If yes, in
what ways?
A.	 "We can answer this question by looking at the deviations in loans to
agriculture and the prescribed minima."
Agricultural credit is of the nature of development finance,
do you think commercial banks in Nigeria should be actively
involved in this kind of business?
A.	 "Yes, and loans to agriculture must be medium and long-term in nature."
Q6. In what other ways, do you think, commercial banks can be
encouraged to increase their commitments to the agricultural
sector?
A.	 (a) Establishment of agricultural insurance schemes.
(b) Increase in the interest rates, which presently are too low,
especially for the small banks.
(c) Provision of extension services to assist the farmers.
(d) Provision of infrastructural facilities - storage facilities for
produce, water, electricity, good roads and general development of
the rural areas.
139
But banks must also accelerate the training of agricultural credit
analysts to help appraise loans properly. All of these will make
lending and borrowing smoother.
(P. The provision of collateral is the moss stringent condition
of credit-worthiness small borrowers find hard to meet in
most developing countries like Nigeria. Given the financial
weakness of the average Nigerian farmer how can he raise
a loan from the bank today in spite of the Guarantee Scheme?
A. "Attempts are being made to solve some of these problems. For example,
the banks have been told that a letter or certificate from the district
or village head, a Chief Agricultural or Extension Officer could be
accepted as evidence of the right of a farmer to cultivate a particular
piece of land."
Q8. Everything considered, it appears that under the present
arrangements in the Scheme only the 'big' farmers can
benefit from the operations of the ACGS. What can be done
to extend the benefits of the Scheme more widely to cover
the large number of needy farmers who in the end hold the
key to the country's agricultural development?
A. (a) Banks must establish their presence in the rural areas by
opening branches.
(b) Farmers must form and/or be formed into viable co-operatives to
facilitate lending.
Q9. To what extent would you say the ACGS has begun to achieve
its aims?
A. "There is difference in credit to the sector as per the Fund's reports;
it has gone from 1111.3 million in 1978 to 1433.6 million in 1979."
Q10. What can you suggest as a bank aid for the development of
agriculture in Nigeria?
A. Increased credit facilities plus increased support services - advice
on finance, on agricultural projects, etc.
4.2 Observations
It appears clear from the above interview that the premise
on which the ACGS leans is neither sound nor well informed. To
be able to solve the agricultural output problem, the constraints
must be identified and well-defined. Obviously the authorities
have based their decision to establish the Fund on a number of
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'ifs'. For instance, as can be seen from the answer to question
one, one is that if the banks do not comply with the credit
guidelines then they can be induced to by a scheme such as ACGS.
Osuntogun's (1980) study has, however, shown that whilst the
agriculture sector is thirsty for credit and will absorb almost
as much as it can get, this may not necessarily lead to
increased production and availability of agricultural produce.
This, as he notes, is because some of the credits are more likely
to be used for purposes other than those aimed at increasing
agricultural production.
It is true that banks are generally reluctant to lend to
agriculture in Nigeria as in most developing countries. But
is it mainly because of the risks? Maybe not. The typical
farmer in these environments is small, and on the whole they.
number in millions requiring small credits. This is a core
administrative credit problem that is real and daunting in these
countries. It has little, if anything, to do with risks in
lending. Thus it is doubtful whether eliminating the •risks in
agricultural lending alone will do as much as dent the problem.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that banks are in business
to undertake risks. If not, there may be no justification for
their handsome profits. The banks on their part appreciate this
and have developed lending principles, procedures and practices
that enable them assess, minimize and thus profitably undertake
these risks. The banks' traditional defence of their unwillingness
to lend on term basis to agriculture and indeed to any sector
is premised on the fact that they borrow short, in the main,
and cannot thus prudently lend long. A Scheme such as the ACGS
which seeks to minimize agricultural credit risks is not likely
to solve this kind of problem. What it will appear the banks
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need is a 'window' for rediscounting portions of their term
loans' portfolios as and when the need arises. This facility
guarantees for them the desirable liquidity of their term loan
assets and consequently gives them confidence, as well as
boosts their willingness to part with their deposit resources
on a term basis. This approach has been successfully tried in
. a number of developing countries such as India (see Bhatia and
Khatkhate,. 1975), Pakistan (see Islam, 1973) and Ghana (see
Ogbe, 1975).
Another daunting credit problem is that of the credit-
worthiness of farmers. The concept of credit-worthiness, though
higily central to the process of credit appraisal, is a wide and
ill defined one in the literature (Murray, 1959, pp. 74-75).
Algebraically, it can be described as follows:
C
w 
= f(C
s
, E
c
, Al' Ma' Qc )
where:
C
w 
= credit worthiness
C
s 
= credit standard
E
c 
= economic conditions
A1 = ability to lend
M
a
 = Management attributes
c = 
Quality of credit risks"
The credit standard (C s ) is determined by conditions set for
collateral and interest; economic conditions (E c) refers to the
prevailing optimism or pessimism in the business environment;
ability to lend (A1) depends on government's credit control
and the bank's deposit base; management attributes (Ma) are
the lending officers' attitudes towards different types of credits,
their iotives and experiences. The quality of credit risks (Qc)
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is determined by the financial health of the borrower, the
prospects for revenue generation and the rating of the borrower's
character.
Provided a customer is adjudged credit-worthy, a bank may
be expected to lend willingly in the absence of 'stick and
carrot'. Thus any strategy or tactics aimed at improving credit
flows to the agriculture sector must be preoccupied with the •
solution of the credit-worthiness problem. The ACGS can help
in improving the credit-worthiness by acting on some of the
determinants i.e. C5 , E etc. For example, if the provisionc
of collateral is deliberately and prudently deemphasised and/or
steps are taken to improve the acceptability of the available
collateral, the credit standard (Cs ) will become more easily
att inable. However, the ACGS does not in any way Improve the
credit-worthiness of the borrower. Nor does it attempt to do so.
Rather it requests banks lending under the Scheme to ensure that .
all their lending criteria are satisfied by borrowers, which
condition puts more pressure on the banks and makes them more
meticulous and stringent in their assessment of the credit-
worthiness of their customers.
5. SWIMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The last two decades have seen tremendous growth in the
assets/liabilities of Nigerian .commercial banks in general. As
will be expected, and as indeed we have seen in the foregoing
analysis, there has been corresponding growth in their aggregate
loans and advances. Over the period, however, there have been
less than desirable structural changes both in the assets and
loan portfolios of the banks. For instance, compared to other
banking systems, these banks continuously allocated a lower and
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decreasing proportion of their resources to loans and advances.
An undesirably high proportion of their loans and advances
remains short-term, showing no expected correlation between
their lending experiences and the "appropriateness" of their
lending.
Whilst banks elsewhere the world over are progressively
de-emphasising security as a basis of loan approval, the
Nigerian banks are taking the reverse view of security. The
ratio of secured loans-to-total loans is continually rising.
There are two main dangers this trend poses for bank lending.
First, many economically desirable loans with good prospects for
not only financial but social returns may fail to pass their
credit evaluation test. Second, this practice may lead to over-
reliance on collateral to the neglect and detriment of other
important credit evaluation criteria such as cash flows, bank-
community relations, and loan-deposit relation. All these are
sure to injure rather than enhance the efficiency of loan
. management in these banks.
"Today's banker	 cannot serve the legitimate credit
needs of his community unless he is prepared to deal with the
many different types of loans demanded by the bank's borrowing
customers (Crosse and Hempel, 1973, p. 33). Where a bank
offers short-term advances for use in long-term resource-needing
econolac sectors such as the agricultural and the manufacturing,
the bank will not be meeting the credit needs of its customers.
In spite of a load of incontrovertible evidence of high profit-
ability, no such bank should be adjudged efficient in a developing
environment.
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CHAPTER 7
BANKERS'"LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE"AND THEIR LENDING PRACTICES
14 INTRODUCTION
An attempt was made inAppendixEla to enquire into the
'liquidity preference' of Nigerian commercial bankers. This
enquiry was carried out by subjecting the results of their
investment actions to statistical test. Through the use of
multiple regression analysis an attempt was also made in
Appendix II to identify the determinants of commercial banks'
attitude to risk. In that analysis, as in the analysis of
Appendbala only the banks' characteristics were used. Not
surprisingly the results, though positively suggestive, were
not entirely and satisfactorily definitive. One reason for this
was that some of the factors influencing bankers' propensity to
take risks were not incorporated.
A banker's decision to accept or avoid risk in lending is
a function of many factors. These include the important lending
concepts, principles and practices he has learnt and applied
(see Chapter 4). It also depends on his experience and the
information available to him. To a great extent, his psychological
make-up - his values, motives and attitudes - play an important
role. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that "in a large
measure, whether a bank will lend or not is a function of the
personality of the banker involved." (Luckett and Lages, 1964,
p. 42). In the light of these important operational facts, it
will be useful for our research to understand the level of
bankers' willingness to accept or avoid risks in personal
investments. That understanding or knowledge can provide guidance
to management to take the right steps to improve lending officers'
performances by re-orientation and/or changes in procedural
rules and the policies relatingto advances. This exercise is
important because, willy filly, riskrlending must be done in a
developing environment if there is to be growth and development.
More so that "numerous writers
	 have suggested that a loan
officer's decision to lend in uncertain, unfamiliar and marginal
situations is strongly influenced by the loan officer's personal
proclivity to accept or avoid risks." (Griggs, 1972, p. 125).
In this chapter an attempt is made to measure
this 'personal proclivity' to accept or avoid risks by Nigerian'
loan officers at all levels of management. An enquiry is also
made into the lending practices and attitudes of loan officers.
Thirdly, the level (if any) of relationships between lenders'
liquidity preference or 'personal proclivity' to accept risk
and their lending practices are examined. If indeed a significant
relationship is found to exist between these attributes of loan
officers, bank management Can better 'manage' the advances
function given the liquidity preference of their operational-
level officers. It is hoped too that the results of the
analyses here will complement and enrich the findings in Appendices
IImadIII and facilitate better understanding of the micro-level
factors influencing lending efficiency.
The measurement techniques used in these enquiries are
presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the samples and
Section 4 explains the data gathering procedures. The results of
the analyses are presented in Section 5 and Section 6, whilst
Section 7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the foregoing
and remarks on the findings.
2, MEASUREtENT TECHNIQIES
Three measurement techniques are employed:
(a)• The Investment Preference Test (IPT)
(b) Simulated Loan Request Questionnaire (SLRQ)
(c) Structured Questionnaire Interview (SQI)
The IPT was 'invented' by Litzinger (1963) and has been used
subsequently by Griggs (1972); the SLRQ was first used by
Shapiro et al. in. 1969. Because of environmental and institutional
factors, in particular, these techniques have been substantially
redeveloped for use in this enquiry. As necessary, these differ-
ences will be noted in the description-of each technique below.
The IPT was used to assess the personal risk-taking
preferences of the individual lending officers. The questionnaire
(a -opy of which is presented in Appendix IVA-2) consists of
four sets of financial assets. Although the four asset portfolios
in the questionnaire differ in the actual financial instruments
contained, they are all basically identical in structure. Each
portfolio contains five financial instruments varying from one to
five in descending order of safety, profitability and liquidity.
For an example set 1 consists of:
A 4% Treasury Bills
B 4% Commercial Bank Deposits
C 1% Federal Government Development Loan Stocks 1996
D 9% Guiness Nigeria Limited Debentures 1990
E Bata (Nigeria) Limited Ordinary Shares
Financial assets C, D, and E in all the portfolios are those
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (see Daily Official List
for 1/2/80). The private sector securities - debentures and
shares - included were among the !Blue Chips' on the Stock
Exchange at the time of this exercise.
The respondents were asked to assume that they had saved
up the sum of N100,000, and wished to invest this in financial
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assets. They were requested to indicate how they would prefer to
allocate that saving to the different assets available in each
of the portfolios considering them to be mutually exclusive.
The request for the completion of this questionnaire
assumed that the loan officers were capable of recognising and
appreciating the differing nature of each of the assets in the
portfolios. This assumption was based on the fact that the
indigenisation exercises that took place prior to this study had
generated tremendous country-wide interest in financial assets.
In addition, as many of the sales of shares were by public issues,
the commercial banks, as "collecting bankers" were centrally
involved. Because many of the buyers of shares were doing so
for the first time, they looked to their bankers for advice on
the investment of their funds in these assets. All of these
circumstances were enough to 'force' the bankers to take interest
in the subject of stocks and shares and to equip them with the
basic understanding required for dealing with this questionnaire.
Happily nothing turned up from the responses received to
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contradict this assumption or indicate it to be overestimating.
The SLRQ consists of four separate loan proposals (see
Appendix IVA-1. These proposals were prepared drawing on the
writer's working experience in the bank, particularly as an
advances clerk, and on the knowledge of the lending environment
in Nigeria. Whereas the SLRQs Of previous studies employing
this technique are the same for different applicants, the four
proposals here are significantly different i one from the other.
Four classes of borrowers and the two sectors of special concern
to this study were covered by the set of SLRQs. To highlight
an environmental peculiarity, two of the loan proposals had no
financial history.	 '
The first proposal is a request for an agriculture
advance. Mr Sanni Fasasi, the proposer, represents an"affluent"
peasant farmer in Nigeria, who should, by his financial standing,
obtain the most favoured treatment, if any peasant is to get one,
from the bank.
The next loan proposal is from a would-be industrialist.
Mr Christopher Adebiyi, the prospective loanee is at the point
of embarking on a 'vertical' expansion of his business. In
Nigeria, the big names in manufacturing today - UAC, PZ, Nigerian
Breweries - have graduated from import-wholesale-retail business.
Thus Mr Adebiyi can be seen to be following known precedents.
The important difference, however, is that he is a small operator.
The third case is another agriculture borrowing proposal.
This time it is from a farming concern, with industry-type
organisation and management. This is a rare case in Nigeria.
With recent government emphasis on large-scale agricultural
production, this class of application is most likely going to
grow.
Loan proposal iv is from an established manufacturing
company. It is typical of the aggressive entrepreneurship among
the indigenes who are anxious to participate effectively in the
growth and development of.the economy. Because of the boom in
the market for the company's products, the proprietors are
contemplating an ambitious expansion plan.
In writing up these cases, an attempt was made, deliberately,
to make the proposals as 'rosy' and acceptable as possible. If
these fail to gain the sympathy of the bankers, then the fate of
millions of undoubtedly worse cases can be imagined.
The last technique used is the SQI based on structured
questionnaire (see Appendix IVA-3). Twenty-two questions on
various issues relating to lending policies, practices and problems
were asked. The questionnaire at the end also requested for bank
branch and respondents' statistics. As most respondents were
reluctant to complete the section relating to educational back-
ground, this section was cancelled out to avoid rejection of
questionnaires:
3. THE SAMPLE
The sample can be broken down into two. The first, that
of operations - level lending officers and the second of top-
management - level lending officers. The operations-level loan
officers include branch managers, sub/assistant managers and
advances officers. The 38 respondents in the first sample come
from these main groups of lending officers who have primary
responsibilities for the analysis, assessment and either approval
or recommendation of advances proposals to top management. The
second sample consists of 28 top-management - level lending
officers.
From the profile of the first sample of respondents in
table 7.1 it can be seen that the age range is between 27 and
45 years, with mean and standard deviations being 37.4 and 4.3
years i respectively. The average number of banks they have had
working experience in is 1.7 with standard deviation of 0.7.
The banks the respondents belong to range in size from
small to big banks. The biggest amongst these had total assets
of N2,621.4 million and total loans and advances of N813.82
million at the end of 1979. At the lower end, the smallest bank
had assets worth N104.04 million and a loan portfolio of
N52.2 million.
In terms of number of staff at the branches covered, the
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sizes also range from the very big to the very small. The size
range is from 15 to 200 staff; the average being 88. Measured
in terms of the number of accounts, branch sizes vary between
those with 500 and 1300 current and savings accounts, respectively,
and those with 45,000 current and 18,000 savings accounts. Of
all current accounts, manufacturing and agriculture accounts
represent between 2-10% and 0.01-10%, respectively. On the
average, manufacturing accounts represent 6.4% .(standard deviation
3.2%) and agriculture accounts 2-7% (standard deviation 2.9%)
of current accounts.
Five states were covered in the sample. Lagos State had a
lion's share of respondents with 63.1%; Oyo State had 23.7%,
Ondo State 5.5%, and Borno and Bendel 5.3% and 2.6% respectively.
This will appear to be a fair representation of the country in
the light of the state distribution of loans and advances. As
table 7.2 shows, Lagos State alone took 39.9% of agriculture
loans and 66.5% of manufacturing loans for the whole country during
1972-1975. Together these five states in the sample accounted
for 60.3% of all agriculture loans and 75.9% of all manufacturing
loans.
The industry coverage is also significantly wide. In
terms of the number of individual institutions, 53.0% of all
banks were covered by the sample. These institutions between
them held 83.2% of total assets; 83% of total loans and advances;
and 82.9% of total deposits. (See	 table VII-1).
Finally, 50.0% of the sample banks were indigenous and the other
half foreign banks.
The mean age of the respondents of the second sample is
39.2 years (standard deviation 6.2 years) and the ages range between
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30 and 50 years (see table 7.3). It will be noticed that this
mean is higher than for the operations-level loan officers; the
age range also differs with slightly higher starting and finish-
ing points. The working experiences of these respondents in
terms of the number of banks they have worked is very similar to
what was recorded for the first group. Over 76% of the
respondents earn N20,000 and below indicating that many of these
top management loan officers are located in the lower half of the
top management hierarchy (see AppendixIVA-7). The concentration
of head offices of banks in Lagos is demonstrated by the percentage
of total response in this sample coming from Lagos State- 89.4%.
Oyo State and Kano State share the balance equally with each
accounting for 5.3% of total responses.
Table 7.3 Profile of respondents (top-level management staff)
background characteristics
Personal Environmental
00
(B)
(C)
•
Ait
Mean	 39.2
S.D.
	
6.2
Range
	 30-50
Working experience
(A) State coverage
State % of total
response
Lagos
Oyo
Kano
89.4
5.3
5.3(Number of banks)
Mean	 1.7
S .D.	 0.7
Range
	 1-3
Salary
100.0
Class	 N)	 % of respondents
0	 -- 1,500 52.9
1,500-20,000 23.5
20,000-25,000 17.6
Above	 25,000 6.0
100.0
L 1 DMrA GATHERING
. The three measurement techniques - IPT, SLRQ and SQI -
were employed in gathering the data. To these three question-
naires were attached a general letter of introduction from my
Supervisor (see Appendix IVB-1) and another letter dealing
with procedural issues relating to the questionnaires from the
researcher (see Appendix IVB-2). These documents were delivered
personally to the sample lending officers and appointments for
collections made. In a significant number of cases, particularly
among branch managers and sub/assistant managers, the question7
naires were refused on the ground that prior permission had not
been sought and obtained by the researcher at the banks' -
head offices. In consequence of these experiences, approaches
for permission were made to the banks' head offices and/or
••n•
their training schools-Isee Appendix IvB-3). Two of the training
schools and a number of head offices obliged by either providing
a letter of introduction to specifically named managers or by
sending the questionnaires directly to managers for me to follow
up (see Appendix IVB-4). These methods of delivering the
questionnaires were, of course, in addition to the personal
calls the researcher was also making at the same time on lending
officers. Given the high initial-rejection rate, and the very
low probability of getting the questionnaires completed by
respondents, no scientific sampling method could reasonably be
employed. The researcher had to knock at as many managers! .
 doors
as possible both directly and indirectly.
In only two cases did the researcher succeed in "retrieving"
the partly or fully completed questionnaires on a second visit.
Number of calls in all other cases ranged between three and six
With distribution of the number of calls highly skewed to the
right. In all about 100 questionnaires were distributed to
these operations-level lending officers. With 38 total response
received, this gives a moderately successful response rate of
38%. If, however, only the fully completed and useable question-
naires are counted, the response rate drops to 24%.
On the assumption that the top-management level lending
officers would be better disposed towards attending to research
questionnaires and given the very small size of their question-
naires (the IPT), names of the head office advances management
staff were gathered from the banks' annual reports and from
interviewees the researcher met for the completion of the
qu,..stionnaire used for the analysis in Chapter 8. The IPT
questionnaires were mailed, along with letters of introduction
and stamped addressed envelopes, to 44 of these lending officers.
In addition each of the 19 head office questionnaires (see
AppendixIVA-4 had attached to it an IPT questionnaire for the
interviewee. This was done under the assumption that the respondent
to that questionnaire will in all probability be, in some
important way, connected with advances m-anagement. Out of the
total of 63 IPT questionnaires (44 plus 19) sent to this class of
respondents, 28 were received back directly by the researcherandvia
the post. Thus the response rate for this sample was 44.4%.
51 WE RESULTS
5.1 The IPT. Twenty-six of the thirty-eight loan officers who
responded to the set of questionnaires completed useable IPT
questionnaires. Their responses are listed in table VII-2.
Table 7.4 gives a summary of these responses. Since the
assets A . and B in the IPT can properly be regarded as liquid
assets, they have been grouped together. The other assets,
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Table 7.4 Investment preference test: operations-level lending
officers' responses (summarised)
Respond-
ent
Financial Assets
A + B
1 44.5	 5.0
	 20.0 32.5
2 12.5	 12.5	 42.5 32.5
3 30.0	 10.0	 10.0 50.0
4 51.25
	 18.75	 18.75 11.25
5 77.5	 '	 6.25	 -	 7.5 8.75
6 53.75
	 8.75	 11.25 26.25
7 58.75	 18.75	 8.75 13.75
8 -	 -	 25.0 75.0
9 60.25	 10.5	 1.75 25.0
10 58.75
	 20.0	 13.75 7.5
11 22.5
	 12.5	 35.0 30.0
12 80.0	 5.0	 10.0 5.0
13 50.0
	 10.0	 20.0 20.0
14 40.0
	 6.25	 22.5 31.25
15 35.0	 .25.0
	
22.5 17.5
1S 70.0
	
7.5	 15.0 7.5
17 52.5
	 20.0	 16.25 11.25
18 75.0
	 10.0	 7.5 7.5
19 2.5
	 7.5	 62.5 27.5
20 62.5	 10.0	 21.25 6.25
21 45.0
	 16.25	 21.25 17.5
22 48.75
	 20.0	 23.75 . 7.5
23 60.0	 1.25	 17.5 21.25
24 72.5
	
7.5	 10.0 12.5
25 77.5	 6.25	 6.25 10.0
26 26.25	 32.5	 21.25 20.0
N 26	 26	 26 26
Mean 48.74	 11.85	 18.91 20.50
S.D. 22.10	 7.43	 12.38 15.32
Range 0 - 80	 0 - 32.5	 1.75 - 62.5 5 - 75
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires
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although being generally long term in nature have been left
separate because each possesses some distinctive feature with
regard to safety, maturity or profitability.
As evident from table 7.4 the respondents would prefer to
invest a substantially high proportion of their resources of
N100,000 in liquid assets such as treasury bills, treasury
certificates and commercial bank deposits. On the average they
would put nearly half (48.74%) of their savings in these liquid
assets. Suns to be invested by individual respondents range from
N0-N80,000. Table 7.5 also shows that 11 or 42.3% of the
respondents would prefer to invest up to 49% of their cash
•••
resources in liquid assets A + B; 9 respondents or 34.6% of this
sample would invest between 50 and 69% and 6 or 23.1% would invest
between 70 and 100% in A + B.
The Federal Government Development Stocks were the least
favoured financial assets. The mean allocation of resources by
the respondents was 11.85% (standard deviation 7.43%). The
unattractiveness of this asset to the respondents is also evident
from the range of individual allocations - between 0-32.5%.
Table 7.5 Investment preference test: percentage distributions
of lending officers' preferences
Allocation of funds Financial Assets
(percentage of total) Number of resrondents % of total response
C ID E A-H3
0 - 49 11 26 25 24 42.3 100 96.2 92.4
50 - 69 9 0 1 1 34.6 0 3.8 3.8
70 -100 6 0 0 1 23.1 0 0 3.8
26 26 26 26 100 100 100 100
On the average, the respondents would invest 18.91%
(standard deviation 2.38%) of their resources in debentures of
various first class companies listed in the IPT portfolios.
Individual allocations to these assets, however, vary from a low
of 1.75% and a high of 62.5%. As table 7.5 shows, 25 respondents or
96.2% of the sample would invest between 0 - 49%
in this asset whilst only one respondent or 3.8% of the total
would invest between 50 and 69 %
 of his resources.
Finally, 20.5% (standard deviation 15.32%) of the
respondents' resources would, on the average, be allocated to
private companies' shares. Amounts allotted for these assets by
individuals varied between 5.0 and 75%. Notably, a high proportion
of the respondents, as with debentures, would put less than half
of their savings in these assets. Twenty-four respondents or 92.4%
would allocate between 0 and 49% ; whilst 1 or 3.8%, each, would
allocate between SO . and 69% .-
 and between 70 and 100%, to
these assets.
Almost convincingly, these responses indicate, once again, the
"liquidity preference" of the commercial bank lending officers. It
is clear from the above analysis how, using their personal savings,
they would prefer the safe, short-term low-yielding financial
assets to high-yielding, first class, long-term private and
public securities.
5.2 The SLRQ. The simulated Loan Request Questionnaire was put
to the lending officers to obtain their reactions to specific loan
proposals. Table 7.6 gives a summary or broad picture of the
responses. Only 5.7% of the respondents would give approval to
all the advances requested; 31.4% would approve three out of the
four proposals; 42;8% two proposals, 17.1% one proposals and 3%
159
Table 7.6 Simulated loan request questionnaire; percentage
distribution of responses
Responses	 Percentage of total
4 positive responses	 5.7
3 positive responses	 31.4
2 positive responses	 42.8
1 positive response	 17.1
0 positive response 	 3.0
100. 0
would say 'no' to all the proposals.
The reasons given for these decisions could be instructive
in assessing the pattern of responses (see table 7.7). For
example, some-..of the respondents said 'yes' to the agriculture
advances with the qualification that the advances are granted
under the CBN operated Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
(ACGS) (see Chapter 6 ).	 This may be regarded as a useful
indication of the fact that the ACGS is helping to alter bankers'
attitudes to agriculture lending and may in the long-run prove
an effective 'bait'.
Various reasons were also given for the bankers 'no'
answers. One of these was the poor financial position of the
applicant. This is surprising in view of the apparent good
financial picture of the applicants painted in the proposals. It
would appear that these kinds of responses reflect the depth of
the conservatism of the bankers. One of the most intriguing
reasons given for the rejection of loan proposals was "no security
offered". This reaction can be interpreted as meaning that,
however good a proposal is on its own, it may still fail to get
bankers' sympathy just because it lacks collateral support. As
the kinds of collateral traditionally demanded by bankers are
invariably unavailable to small and growing businesses in a
developing environment, this emphasis on collateral must be
Table 7.7 Simulated loan request questionnaire: lending
officers responses
Respond-
ent
Loan	 proposals
1	 2	 3 4
No. of
positive
responses
1 No Yes Noe ' Yes 2
2 No Nod Nod •	 Yes 1
3 Yes Yes No No 2
4 No Yes No No 1
5
6
7
Yesad
Yes
Yesd
Yes
deNo d
- 
Yes
No
Yea
No
e
Yes
No
No
3
2
2
8
9
10
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Nod
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2
2
3
11 No No Ye§ Yes 2
12 Yes Yes No Yes 3
13 No Yes Yes No 2
14
15
17
No
Yesa
cNo
Yes
Yes
Yes
dNo
No
No
eNo
dNod
dYes
Ye§
No
Yes
Yes
2
2
1
3
18 No Yes No No 1
19 No Yes Yes Yes 3
20 NO Yes Yes Yes 3
21 No Yes Yes Yes 3
22 No dYes No Yes 2
23 Yes No Yes No 2
24 NO Yes' Yes Yes 3
25 Yesa No -
26 No Yes - -
27 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
28 NOf Yes Yes No 229 NO Yes No Yes 2
30 Yes Yesd Yes Yes 4
31
32
No
NO
Nod
s
dYe
No dYea
NoedYes
0
3
33 No No No •	 Yes 1
34 Yes No Yes Yes 3
35 No - No - .
36 Yes No No Yea 2
37 No No Yes Nou 1
38 Yes Yesd Yes No 3
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires (Re - Appendix.II.1)
Notes: a = Under Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
b = Poor financial position of client
.c = Client should join a co-operative society
d = Overdraft only
	
-	 f = Personal loan only
e = Excessive	 g = No security offerzd
regarded as a matter of great concern and a formidable
impediment to aggressive lending in Nigeria.
The responses of the loan officers can be understood more
with the aid of table 7.8. It can be seen from this table that
only 35% of the respondents said 'yes' to the first proposal which
required a term loan. On the other hand, 67% of the respondents
said 'yes' to the second proposal which asked for an overdraft
facility. A very similar pattern of response is repeated for
the other two proposals. Whilst 46% gave approval to the term
loan in proposal III, 68% approved of proposal IV, an overdraft'
advance.
Table 7.8 Simulated loan request questionnaire: Type of
advances granted by respondents
Proposal
—
Type of advance Percentage of responses
Positive
	 Negative	 Total
1 Term loan 35 65 100
2 Overdraft 67 33 100
3 Term loan 46 54 100
4 Overdraft 68 32 10
At the end of each loan proposal, seven identical questions
were asked to learn two main things - the conditions under which
the advances would be granted and the factors influencing the
lending officer's decision.
Irrespective of the sum applied for, respondents were asked
to indicate the maximum amount they would lend to the applicants.
For loan proposal I, 73.3% would lend the applicant the full
amount requested, 20% would offer various sums below the sum
applied for, and 6.7% would grant sums above that amount (see
table 7.9).	 As the table shows, this pattern of response is
repeated for proposals II and III. In the case of proposals IV,
however, 80% would approve the exact sum required, 8% and 12%
respectively would grant sums below and above the request. On
the average 66.3% would grant the loan amounts, 22.9% amounts
below and 10.8% amounts Above the request.
In practice it is not in all cases that customers are
able to estimate precisely their financial needs. The loan
ultimately approved on the basis of an application is usually the
result of a thorough appraisal of the customer's needs by both
the banker and the customer In collaboration. Arbitrarily higher
or lower sums than called for in the application are undesirable
from the points of view of both the banker and the customer. Apart
from this note of caution these responses cannot form the basis of
any strong inferences or conclusions.
Table 7.9 Simulated loans request questionnaire: Amount of
advance offered by respondents (in percentages)
I II
Wan Proposals
III	 IV Average
Full request 73.3 64.0 47.8 80.0 66.3
Bac/to/request 20.0 20.0 43.5 8.0 22.9
Above reguest 6.7 16.0 8.7 12.0 10.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
How appropriate were the advances offered by the
respondents? To enable one to answer this question, the respondents
were requested, in the questionnaire, to indicate the maturity,
security and repayment patterns they would call for if the
advances were granted. Table 7.10 presents the analysis of the
maturity terms the lending officers would request. The Mean
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Table	 7.10 Simulated loan request questionnaire: analysis of
maturity term required by respondents (in years)
Respond-
ent
Loan	 proposals
1	 2	 1 4
Average
maturity
1 -	 2	 2 1 1.7
2 -	 1	 1 1 1.0
3 1	 3	 - - 2.0
4 2	 - - 2.0
5 1	 1	 - 1 1.0
6 1	 0.5	 2 - 1.2
7 2	 5	 1 - 2.7
8 -	 1	 - 1 1.0
9 -	 4	 0.75 2.4
10 -	 1	 6 1 2.3
11 -	 -	 2 1 1.5
12 1.5	 1	 1 1 1.1
13 -	 2	 - - 2.0
14 -	 1.4	 - 1 1.2
15 1	 1	 - - 1.0
16 1	 1 1 1.0
17 2	 -	 2 1 1.7
18 2	 - - 2.0
19 4=1 5	 5 5 5.0
20 IM1 5	 6 1 4.0
21 -	 2	 2 1 1.7
22 -	 0.5	 - 1 0.75
23 2	 -	 3 1 2.0
24 -	 1	 1 1 1.0
25 Min nnnn
26 _	 -	 - - -
27 3	 4	 5 - 4
28 5	 3 - 4
29 1.5	 5	 - 1 2.5
30 1	 2	 4 1 2.0
31 1	 1	 - 1 1.0
32 -	 3.5	 5.25 3.8 4.2
33 -	 -	 1 2 1.5
34 2	 -	 1 1 1.3
35 4	 • -	 - - 4.0
36 1 1 1.0
37 5 5.0
38 1.5	 2	 4 2.5
N = 16	 28	 23 23
Mean 1.65	 2.32	 2.78 1.34
S.D. 0.85	 1.58	 1.83 1.00
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires
maturity period requested for loan proposal I was 1.65 years
(standard deviation 0.85 years). The maturity period ranges
from one to four years. For loan proposal II, the Mean maturity
period was 2.32 years (standard deviation 1.58 years). Loan proposal
III had the highest maturity period at 2.78 years (standard
deviation 1.83) and the last proposal had the lowest with an
average of 1.34 years (standard deviation 1.0 year). As the last
column of table 7.10 shows, the average maturity pattern specified
by respondents for proposals I-IV ranges between 1 and 5 years.
This pattern does not differ noticeablifrom what was observed
in the analysis of the banks' loan portfolios in Chapter 6 thus
confirming these bankers' preference for ihort-term advances.
The repayment pattern specified by the respondents is as
presented in table 7.11 For loan proposal I, 17.6% of the
respondents wanted repayments by way of overdraft; 64.8% by specific
instalments and 17.6% would determine repayment only on the basis
of cash flow projections. The repayment patterns for loan
proposals II and III are, as can be seen from the table, similar
to that for loan proposal I, with the majority of respondents
wanting repayments by specific instalments. In the case of loan
proposal IV, 79.2% of respondents wanted repayment by way of
overdraft; 4.2% by specific instalments and 16.6% on the basis
of cash flow.
Repayment by specific instalments can be found to be very
popular with these bankers. The danger in this, however, is that
it is too rigid an approach to loan repayment. Cash flows of
businesses, in general, do not have either the regularity or
steadiness which this pattern of repayment apparently envisages.
Specific repayment schedules are thus unlikely to fit the repayment
ability of the borrower and to this extent may be a very unsuitable
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Table	 7.11	 Simulated loan request questionnaire:
repayment terms specified by respondents
Respond-
ents 1
Loam proposals
2	 3
,
4	 '
Moratorium
specified'
1 - SI SI OD Yes
2 - OD OD OD No
3 OD SI - - Yes
4 SI - - No
5 OD OD - OD Yes
6 SI OD SI - No
7 SI SI OD - No
8 - OD - CF No
9 - SI - OD No
10 - SI SI	 . OD No
11 - - SI OD No
12 - OD OD OD No
13 - SI SI OD No
14 - SI - OD Yes
15 SI CF - - No
16 - OD OD CF No
17 CF - SI OD No
18 - SI - - No
19 -
.
SI SI - Yes
20 - SI SI OD No
21 - SI SI OD No
22 - - - OD No
23 SI - SI OD No
24 - SI - - No
25 SI SI - - No
26 - CF - - No
27 SI SI SI - Yes
28 SI SI - Yes
29 SI SI - OD No
30 CF CF CF OD No
31 OD OD - OD No
32 - SI SI SI Yes
33 - - SI CF No
34 SI - OD OD No
35 SI - - - Yes
36 SI - - CF No
37 CF - - OD No
38 SI SI SI - Yes
OD = Overdraft 17.6% 24.2% 23.8% 79.2%
SI =Specific Instalrrent 64.8% 65.5% 71.4% 4.2%
CF = Cash flow 17.6% 10.3% 4.8% 16.6%
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Moratorium specified - Yes
-No
26.3%73.7%
Source: Carputed fran collected qmstionnaires
Total 100.0
practice in lending. It is noteworthy that less than 18% of
the bankers recognised the need to tailor loan repayment to
cash flow. Ideally, however, the repayment pattern of a loan
should fit the customer's cash flow expectations. If this is
not the case, the customer is likely to find himself in a
situation in which he either has too much or too little cash
resources, thus creating a cash management problem for him and
his bankers.
All the advances requested in the loan proposals are in
connection with long-term investments. It will thus be expected
that it would take time before the increased earning ability of
the borrower, ex-post investment, is realised. Repayment
schddules should ideally, therefore, take this gestation period into
consideration. Only 26.3% of the lending officers would, however,
offer the borrowers a moratorium to enable the newly injected
inv stment funds to work through the production - sales -
collection process to generate cash for repayment. (See table 7.11).
Security for advances, as has been noted in Chapter 6
is an important issue in bank lending in developing countries.
Respondents were asked if they would request that the proposals
they approved be secured, and if so, by what kind of security?
In case of loan proposals I and IV, 11.8 and 4.2%, respectively,
would lend unsecured (see table 7.12). None of the respondents
would, however, lend unsecured to loan proposals 11 and III.
These once again reflect the near obsession of the bankers with
security.
Where advances are to be secured, an average of 17.1% of
the lending officers would want simultaneously three different
types of securities; 49.5% would want two types of securities; and
29.4% one type (see table 7.12). Types of securities include
Table 7.12	 Simulated loan request questionnaire: type of
securities called for by respondents
Respondents
1
Loan	 Proposals	 .
2	 3 4
Total NO.
of
securities
Average NO.
of
securities
1 D,A J,A D,A 6 2
2 - D D,A D,A 5 1.7
3 A D - - 2 1.0
4 - D - - 1 1.0
5 B,C D,C - H,JA 8 2.7
6 D,B F HA - 5 1.7
7 D D DA - 4 1.3
8
- A - H,C,h 4 2.0
9
- HA - H,C 4 2.0
10
- HA H,C H,C,h 2 1.0
11
- D D 2 1.012 E D C C,H 5 1.713 C H - 2 1.014 - HA
- C,H 4 2.015 D,B D - - 3 1.5
16 - 0,C,A H,C,A H,CA 9 3.017
a
D
-
-
s
DX
-
DA
-
5
1
1.7
1.019 - D D D 3 1.020
- HA E,H 0 5 1.7
21 D,CA D,C D,C 7 2.322 D,H,B HA 5 2.523 F,G 6 2.0
24 D,Cok E D,Cpk 7 2.325 E,D,1C 5 2.5
26
-
- - -
-
-
27 K 0,PA HA - 5 1.7
28 - AqH A - 3 1.5
29 ---B,D FAA - Fph 7 2.3
301 AqH H,CA J,CA A40 10 2.5
31 FA •.. •- H,C 4 2.0
32 - DA Eelph 0,Cok 8 2.7
33 - - DvA HA 4 2.0
34 E,B - J,E JA 6 2.0
35 E,D - - - 2 2.0
36 E - - H,C 3 1.5
37 - HA K 2 1.0
38 K C E - 3 1.0
Calling
for 3 securities	 5.9	 25.0	 12.5	 25.0)	 an	 17.1
" 2	 "	 52.9
	
28.6	 58.3	 58.3 )	 49.5
is 1 security	 29.4	 46.4	 29.2	 12.5 )	 =	 29.4
" 0	 •	 11.8	 0.0	 0.0	 4.2 )	 4.0
Total	 EX).0
	 1C0.0	 1C0.0	 baLo
Key:	 A = Personal guarantee of proprietors/directors
B = Personal guarantee of third parties
C = Floating change over current assets
D = Mortgage of real estate
E = Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
F = Lien on deposits
G = Lien on vehicle
H = Mortgage of fixed assets
J = Mortgage of all assets
= Unsecured
guarantees, mortgage of real estate, etc. (see table 7.12)
Finally this questionnaire asked respondents to state
the factors influencing their decisions to lend or not to
lend by assigning weights to some listed factors. The responses
of the lending officers are as summarised in table 7.13. The
financial position of the applicants is rated highest with 19.5%.
This can be interpreted to mean that the financially strong
applicant stands a better chance of obtaining advances than the
weak ones. In an environment with many nascent business units,
this approach is unlikely to help the process of constructive
lending and the growth and prosperity of business on which the
lenders ultimately thrive.
-
Table 7.13 Simulated loan request questionnaire: Factors in
lending decision (summary of responses)
Factors WeightingsMean	 Standard
deviation
(a) The applicant's financial position 19.5 8.2
(h) The applicant's management 18.8 12.1
(c) The potential growth of the industry 12.7 7.4
(d) The potential place of the applicant's
business in the community 5.8 5.8
(0 Established bank loan policies 16.3 11.0
(f) The bank's financial position 9.3 17.6
(g) Security offered 8.6 12.4
1C0.0
Source: 1711 -3
The applicants' management also rated high in the
respondents' list of considerations for advances. This undoubtedly
is a very prudent thing to do by a banker who is not only interested
in recovering other peoples' monies he lends but in helping his
clients to success. But in a situation in which management
expertise is a rare commodity, the availability of high-class
management to a growing business that can hardly afford it must
not be rated unduly high a factor in lending decisions.
The potential growth of the industry and the potential
place of the applicant's business in the community were rated
12.7 and 5.8% respectively. Ina developing business environment,
the forward-looking and aggressive banker should give much higher
weighting to such factors as these rather than the first two
factors, which demonstrate the present and not the potential
'strengths' of the borrowers. The reality of the moment is that
most of the borrowing businesses in Nigeria are 'enterprises-of-
tomorrow' and unless a banker is able to share this vision with
them and provide necessary support today, neither the bankers nor
the businesses can expect to realise their full potentials for
growth and development.
Established bank policies and the bank's financial
position were also considered as important factors. With excess
Liquidity in the banking system (see CBN Annual Report 1979) it
is not easy to see how the respondents can rate the bank's
financial position as high as nearly 10%.
Given the bankers' observed interest in security, it is a
little surprising that only 8.6% weighting was given to this
factor here. The inference probably is that having given so much
weight to the applicant's financial position and management, once
the applicant fails on those considerations the security offered
really would not make any difference to the lending decision.
5.3 The SQ1. This structured questionnaire for lending officers
at the branch level was prepared to elicit some related information
that neither the IPT nor the SLRQ could provide. Some clarifications
170
of issues could also be obtained from responses to the questions
posed here.
On the average, the respondents to the SQI had been
managers for 4 .5 years (standard deviation 3 • 4 years); the .
periods, however, range between 1 and 12 years (see table 7.14).
At the time of . the survey, the respondents had been in their
branches for between 0.4 and 3 years, and on the average 1.4
years (standard deviation 0.9 year). The average period the
managers stay in the branch is 2.6 years (standard deviation 1.0
year); but the periods could be as short as 1.5 years and as long
as 5 years. (See table 7.14).
5.3.1 Loan policies. The respondents were asked if they operate
with written loan policies, and what they thought the advantages
and disadvantages were. Thinking that the - CBN credit guidelines
are loan policy documents, most of the managers answered in the
affirmative. When asked to produce the loan policy documents,
it became clear that something other than CBN "credit guidelines"
was implied by the question. On the whole none of the respondents
operated with a written loan policy. Under the false impression
that the credit guidelines represented loan policies, some
managers noted the advantages and disadvantages which might be
useful in assessing the role of the CBN credit guidelines. The
advantages of credit guidelines include "standardization;
consistency; and objectivity of lending." Among the disadvantages
are "robs manager of his discretion; reduces flexibility; and
reduces initiative."
5.3.2 'Marketing of loan services. The bank managers' responses
to questions on this subject indicate that little is done by
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Table 7.14 Structured questionnaire interview for
Branch Managers-responses
Respondent 1
Questions
2 3
1 4.0 0.75 2.0
2 1.0 1.0 -
3 12.0 1.0 5.0
4 4.0 2.0 2.0
5 4.0 1.6 2.5
6 2.0 1.5 2.5
7 7.0 2.0 1.5
8 1.0 0.5 -
9 3.0 0.7 - 2.0
10 2.0 0.5 3.0
11 12.0 '1.25 -	 3.0
12 3.5 1.3 2.0
13 5.0 0.6 2.0
14 6.0 1.0 2.0
15 3.0 3.0 5.0
16 2.5 1.5 1n1
17 5.0 2.0 2.5
18 6.0 0.25 2.5
19 2.0 2.0 3.5
20 12.0 0.5 3.0
21 1.3 0.4 1.5
22 2.0 0.25 2.0
23 4.0 2.5 2.5
Mean 4.5 1.4 2.6
Standard Deviation 3.4 0.9 1.0
Range 1-12 0.4-3.0 1.5-5.0
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires
(Re - Appendix 11.3)
Nigerian banks to market their lending services. Advertisements
and personal calls by bank officials on clients are said to be
the major media of loan marketing. That little is done is
revealed by their answers to the question which asked them to
state their role in the marketing activity. None of the respondents
could state anything more precise than "solicitation",
"exploitation", "customer visitation" and "personal contacts".
Many of the respondents, however, are aware of the benefits of
"visitations" to customers:
"It provides banks with up-date information on clients";
"it makes the customers feel wanted"; and
"it enables bankers to advise customers e.g. on
the introduction of fertilizers to farmers."
5.3.3 Provision of information and advice to customers. Table
7.15 shows the percentage of respondents providing the different
types of itemized information to the clients. Whilst a very high
proportion indicated that they provide
	 advice and information,
only 17% provide more. Among the other types of information are
advice "about government policies" and "need to keep accounting
records." Provision of information and advice is a vital
supporting service banks in LDCs must provide. Many of the
borrowing customers simply lack the capacity to generate this
information or obtain it direct. Even in a developed society
like Britain this is considered an important aspect of bank lending
as it has been found that branch managers provide as many as 15
different types of advice to their borrowing customers (Back, 1977,
pp. 222-3).
But do customers call for the banks' advice? As many as
83.0% of the respondents said their clients often call, and 17%
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Table 7.15 Structured questionnaire interview: Information provided
to loan customers
Respondents
Type	 Not
Providing providing Total
On general econanic conditions 78 22 100
On specific industry or business 78 22 100
Advice on expansion, reconstruction, etc. 74 26 100
Advice on investment of surplus funds 69 31 100
Credit information 82 18 100
Others* 17 83 100
* Inclu2e-s (a) "about goverment policies"
(b)"need to keep accounting records"
(c)"carpany organisation"
(d)"staff natters"
(e) "marketing and on products"
(f)"general advice"
said they seldom call. One reason giyen_for_some customers'
tendencies not to call was "ignorance". This should not be
surprising however. Banks and bankers are strange elements in
Nigeria and generally in developing societies (see Pant, 1971, p.87).
That is to say that they are not part of the evolution of the socio-
economic systems. Even in advanced countries, however, customers,
particularly the small ones, shy away from their bankers. Back
(1977, p. 223), for instance, found that "just on half of the
owner/managers considered they required no advice from their bank
managers . . . . "
Only a few of the banks have business advisory units. Many,
however, employ agricultural officers who provide some advisory
services to agriculture customers. All the respondents said they
make business calls on their customers. Although the purposes of
calls were not all too clear, a distinction must be made between
ex ante and ex post investment (or credit) visits. The former
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which seeks to break new ground is more in the nature of marketing
activity. It is inspiring that most of the respondents (87.0%)
believed that bankers should act as advisers to businesses.
How do the bankers get to know their customers intimately?
'Social clubs' was the most frequently mentioned forum of meeting
and knowing customers. Given the paucity of social clubs outside
the major cities, this must be an inadequate means of contact.
Furthermore, the main users of these social clubs are known to be
government employees and employees of private big businesses
rather than the small to medium sized business- proprietors the
bankers really need to know more intimately.
5.3.4 Response to credit applications. Hooker (1970) has
sug jested that "loan applications tend to be an inverse function
of the incidence of loan rejections." In the light of this
suggestion it is instructive to know whether the respondents answer
'yes' or 'no' to loan applications from the manufacturing and
agriculture sectors. Half of the respondents answer 'yes' or 'no'
to applications for advances from these sectors; 40.0% advise on
"alternative credit facilities and institutions" and 10% send
such requests to their head offices. There was no indication in the
responses that the bankers offered help in improving the credit-
worthiness of the loan proposals. In sharp contrast, however, the
• president of an aggressive bank in the United States proudly notes
that "....everyone of our town's industries grew up here from small-
scale beginnings	 Our bank financed each one in its early stages
sometimes employing considerable ingenuity to find ways of keeping
the loan bankable." (Crosse and Hempel, 1973 p. 208).
5.3.5 -Security for advances. There was apparently a general
awareness among the respondents about the reasons for the banks'
demand for securities on making a loan. Some of the answers are:
"something to fall back on in case of default"; and
"to guard bank's position in case of adverse
developments".
A significant number (26%) of the respondents apparently see the
role of collateral rather differently. This second group believes
security is taken
"to keep the customer aware of the loan agreement"; and
"to check on customer's wanton disregard for loan
agreements".
If bankers take these kinds of view of security, they are likely
to be tempted to ask for as much collateral as they can obtain
irrespective of the value of the loan. That this supposition may
be true in practice is indicated by the data in Table 7.16.
This attitude is typical of the 'judgemental' banker identified by
Shapiro et al. in their study: "He tended to impose conditions
which assured the bank of a superior position with regard to other.
creditors in the event the company would fail." (Griggs, 1971, p.63).
This kind of attitude has very adverse effects on the
borrowing customer. Firstly, he will be denied that "excess"
part of the security mortgaged to his banker for use as
collateral support for other advances elsewhere. Secondly it will
hurt psychologically as the borrower believes that excessive coll-
ateral is taken from him because the banker has little or no
faith in him and his business. However, there is little doubt
that the banker-customer relationship must be wrapped up in
sufficient mutual trust and confidence for it to be smooth and
fruitful. After all, trust begets trust.
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Table 7.16 Structured questionnaire interview: Collateral
as a percentage of loans
Collateral percentage of loan	 Proportion of total
(%)	 respondents asking
	
50- 99	 18.2
	
100 - 150	 59.1
	
151 - 200	 4.5
Depends on prcposal	 18.2
Total	 100.0
The kinds of collateral accepted by the bankers have
been shown in the SLRQ above. Their responses to question 16
confirm their preferences as stated earlier in table 7.12.
But what kinds of collateral do they reject? These include
"house furniture", "cars", "trinkets" and "untitled land".
Judged by the traditional collateral standards, these items are
normally not acceptable to bankers. Operating on these standards,
however, will represent "arm-chair" banking. Without any doubt
these are valuable items in Nigeria. The values bestowed on
these assets go beyond the monetary to include intrinsic. As one
respondent-banker said, "the banks' best security in agricultural
lending is that while the street trader can run away tomorrow,
the last thing a dedicated farmer will do is abandon his land."
This can also be said for an 'untitled' building. It will appear
that, in these (trinkets, untitled land and buildings) there
exists a large quantity of collateral for advances in Nigeria.
It only needs to be made acceptable to lenders. This will require
that bankers change their standards, by fine-tuning rather than
lowering, to suit the business environment. There is little doubt
that government support in the form of facilitating legislation
will be forthcoming if the bankers take the initiative. It is
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noteworthy that the signs of change in this area are emerging,
however slowly. For an example, one of the respondent-bankers
is already doing the unorthodox for according to a manager:
farm crops are now accepted as collateral after inspection
by agricultural officers.'
5.3.6 Problem loan. An important aspect of lending is the
management of problem loans. With answers such as:
"erratic movement in account";
"failure to keep repayment terms"; and
"reduced turnover"
the bankers indicated that they are well aware of the signals for
identifying problem loans. Of all the respondents, however, only
4.3% would:
"invite customer, discuss and advise him".
The rest would:
"draw up a call programme"; and
"ask for repayment of advance."
It is the conservative banker, however, who tends to look at a
firm from the viewpoint of likelihood of failure - the gone-concern
approach - rather than offer the borrowing firm counsel and take
action to ensure the success of the firm. The efficient and
effective banker will not abandon his client's ship at the sight
of the weakest storm. Moreso in an environment in which most of
the borrowing firms are just going through their teething period
with consequent and inevitable fluctuations in their financial
fortunes.
Whilst it is important for the banker to identify problem
loans as early as possible, it is essential for the bankers'
experience and the benefit of their clients to know the causes,
for this is an important way of taking the effective corrective
actions aimed at attacking the problems at the roots. The causes
of lending problems identified by bankers are listed in table 7.17.
The highest percentage of respondents identified managerial
incompetence as a cause. Another 21.7% named a closely related
cause of loan problem as overtrading. These are not completely
=expected in view of the nationwide shortages of management
expertise (Fourth National Development Plan).
Table 7.17 Structured questionnaire interview: Causes of lending
problems in agriculture and manufacturing sectors
Causes Percentage of respondents+
Diversion of funds 39.1%
Managerial incaxpetence (1) 65.2%
Failure of projects( 2) 52.2%
Overtrading 21.7%
Bad faith ,., )Government action/inaction 30.4
Collateral requirerrents 17.4%
High production costs 4.3%
(1) includes lack of technical Icnow-how(2) includes poor harvests the to 'act of God' and bad iseather
(3) includes unpredictability of policy changes on imports and
infant industry protection
+ totals do not add up to 1C0 because sane respondents identified
more than one cause
Failures of projects due to 'bad harvests', 'bad weather', 'act
of God' were mentioned by over half of the respondents. The
'inertia effect' of the experiences of the 1973/74 drought must
have contributed to the high popularity of this cause among
respondents. Nevertheless, it is an important cause that demands
attention and action such as, for example, crop insurance.
'Diversion of funds' and 'bad faith', two closely related
causes were mentioned by 39.1 and 21.7% of the respondents,
respectively. These are important issues that must be noted
in the light of the suggestion that one of the reasons why no
banks could engage in long-term lending in Russia was that the
"standards of honesty in business were so disastrously low"
(Gerschenkron, 1962, pp. 19-20). In thii regard the recent
Bankruptcy Act 1979 is a step in the right direction.
Particularly for the manufacturing sector, government action
ft
and inaction were frequently mentioned by respondents as a major
cause of problem loans. In a rather directionless manner, the
government hak been known one day to shut the doors against
competing imports to give the infant industries the desirable
protection, only'to throw them wide open the next daydthus
exposing these industries to foreign competition that sometimes
takes the form of dumping.
6. CORRELATION OF LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE AND LENDING PRACTICES
The analysis of the IPT questionnaires above showed that
the lending officers involved possess a high preference for
liquidity in investing their private savings. The analysis of
the SLR() has also pointed to the lending officers' attitudes and
practices concerning such issues as security, and other terms
of lending. Two behavioural aspects of the lending officers
have been revealed. These are very instructive. But the more
important question appears to be: is there a significant relation-
ship between a lending officer's investment taste and his
propensity to lend as well as his lending practice? For example,
will the lending officers with the investment tastes revealed
by the IPT engage in the lending practices indicated by the BLRQ?
The answers.to
 these questions are attempted in this section
by correlating the liquidity preferences of the lending officers
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and their propensity to lend and also their .lending practices
(see Table VII-4).
Because the data come from a population about which
nothing is known regarding the distribution (this being a pioneer
study on the Nigerian environment) and because also the respond-
ents to both the IPT and the SLRQ 'ranked' their . answers, a
suitable statistical method for this analysis is the spearman
rank-order correlation (1) . By using this method the analysis
will benefit from the advantages order statistics have "for
data in behavioural sciences in which 'numerical' score may be
precisely numerical in appearance only", as in the case here (see
Siegel, 1956, p.3). For instance an advantage of this technique
is that it does not require "numerous or stringent assumptions
about parameters" and therefore fewer qualifications in drawing
inferences from the results. It is nevertheless an efficient
technique, however. "The efficiency of the Spearman-rank
correlation when compared with the most powerful parametric
correlation, the Pearson r, is about 91.0%" (Siegel, 1956, p.213).
Siegel (1956, p. 210) suggests that
ft	 the subjects whose scores were used in
computing rs were randomly drawn from some population
we may use those scores to determine whether the
two variables are associated in the population. That
is, we may wish to test the null hypothesis that the
two variables under study are not associated in the
population and that the observed value of rs differs
from zero only by chance."
Thus some hypotheses will be raised and examined for the purpose
of the enquiry being undertaken in this section. On the whole,
nine hypotheses are raised and tested. The first deals with the
liquidity preference and the observed propensity to lend of the
respondents. The other eight deal with the liquidity preference
and lending practices relating to maturity, security, concern
(1) The Chi-square test could also have been used but this produced
no different results.
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for the bank's financial position, etc. The t-test will be used
to examine the significance of the observed relationship. A
hypothesis will be accepted if the observed t value is significant
at the 0.05 level. Broadly the null hypotheses can be stated as:
the bankers' liquidity preference is not related to propensity to
lend; and their liquidity preference is not related to lending
practices.
The hypotheses to be tested are stated specifically as:
(1) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater his
propensity to lend.
(2) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater the
average maturity of the advances he makes.
(3) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater his
concern for the applicant's financial position.
(4) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater his
concern for the applicant's management.
(5) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer in
making personal investment decisions, the greater his concern
for the future growth of the industry of the applicant.
(6) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater his
concern for the potential place of the applicant's business
in the community.
(7) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater his
concern for established loan policies of the bank.
(9) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions the greater his
concern for the bank's financial position.
(9) The greater the liquidity preference of a lending officer
in making personal investment decisions, the greater
his concern for security for the advances he makes.-
The results of the Spearman rank-order correlation analysis
are presented in table 7.18. As can be seen from this table,
the null hypothesis is accepted in only one of the nine cases,
i.e. in the case of hypothesis 7. That is to say that this
analysis shows that there exists a significant relationship
between a lending officer's liquidity preference and the estab-
lished loan policies of his bank. All the other hypotheses are
rejected as the observed t-values of the correlated variables
are not significant at the chosen 5% level.
T ble 7.18	 Results of rank correlation analysis
Hypothesis	 Spearman rank-order	 t (1)
coefficient of correlation
1 0.1206 .570
2 0.0406 .213
3 -0.1166 .551
4 -0.1067 .503
5 0.0726 .398
6 0.0997 .565
7 -0.4020 10.550*
8 -0.1848 .882
9 0.2641 1.284
* Significant at the 5.0% level
Note (1) t = rs
,	 2V i_rs
Because these variables may be related to the liquidity
preference of bankers in off-setting or complementing ways, the
one-to-one analysis above cannot be considered final. It is useful
to consider simultaneously the effect of the nine variables on
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liquidity preference. Multiple regression analysis is one
method of doing this.
Although an overwhelming number of the hypotheses were
rejected in the light of the evidence above, the result of a
multiple linear regression indicates that there exists some
strong relationship between the liquidity preference of a lending
officer and his lending practices. Table 7.19 shows that the
multiple correlation coefficient of this relationship, R, is
0.73035. This coefficient is also significant at the 10% level.
Table 7.19 Results of multiple linear regression
Variables being hypothesised to be
	 R	 R2
related to liquidity preference
1 Propensity to-lend 0.07037 0.00495 0.1095
2 Lending practices 0.73035 0.53341 2.144*
* Significant at the 10.0% level
That is to say, it is in 10 out of 100 cases in which one may
be wrong in assuming a strong relationship between the liquidity
preference of lending officers and the totality of their lending
practices, if sathples of Nigerian bankers are randomly taken and
examined for this relationship. The coefficient of multiple
determination, R2 , which is 0.53341, also shows that 53% of the
variations in the lending practices of Nigerian lending officers
can be explained by their preferences for liquidity.
However, the relationship between the liquidity preference
of the lending officers and their propensity to lend is very
weak as demonstrated by the coefficient of this relationship,
which - is 0.07037. Apparently the rather strong presence of
requests for overdraft advances (50% of the advances proposals)
in the SLRQ must have made the lending officers more willing to
approve applications in this exercise and thus boost their
observed propensity to lend.
The direction of the relationship of the variables
hypothesised to be related can be observed from the signs of
the rank-order coefficients in table 7.18 Do the observed
relationships as indicated by the coefficients support, at
least basically, these statements of hypothesis?
Hypothesis 1. The sign of the coefficient of relationship
between the two variables is positive indicating that this
statement is basically true. In interpreting this result, however,
the influence of the presence of overdraft proposals amongst the
four applicants must be countenanced.
Hypothesis 2. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient of
relationship of the variables of this hypothesis is positive.
. A priori thinking would suggest that a lending officer with 8-
high preference for liquidity would make short maturity advances.
This result indicates the reverse to be true for the data of
this analysis.
Hypothesis 3. The statement of this hypothesis is contradicted
by the sign of the coefficient of relationship between the
variables. This relationship is also at variance with the high
rating given to the applicants' financial position in lending
decisions as observed in the analysis of SLRQ above.
Hypothesis 4. As in Hypothesis 3, the sign of the coefficient of
relationship of the variables is negative, thus indicating the
statement of the hypothesis to be untrue. This result
deviates from the observed high rating given to the applicant's
management by respondents in the SLRQ. In practice it may be that
the inability of lending officers to assess properly the
applicant's financial position and his management might lead to
his being less concerned for these issues as these results
indicate.
Hypothesis 5. The coefficient of relationship of these variables
is positive indicating that the statement is basically true.
This is unexpected however, as a lending officer with high
liquidity preference is not likely to be the futuristic kind of
banker who will give much thought to the long-term prospects of
the borrowing customer's industry. His concern will be for the
pxssent and at best the immediate rather than the future prospects.
Hypothesis 6. The concern here is again with the future potential
of the borrowing customer. The sign of the coefficient of
relationship is, however, the same as in the last hypothesis.
Thus the comments made there are equally valid here.
Hypothesis 7. The coefficient of the relationship of the variables
has a negative sign. This indicates that the more a banker is
interested in liquidity, the less concerned he is for the lending
policies of the bank. Ordinarily, however, one would expect a
lending officer with high preference for liquidity to be
conservative and to be more likely to play the lending game strict-
ly according to the rules rather than the spirit of the bank
policy.
Hypothesis 8. The coefficient of relationship between the variables
of this hypothesis has a negative sign. This means the statement
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of the hypothesis is not supported by the result of correlation
analysis. This result, however, corroborates the evidence in
Chapter 6 where it was found that a 'negative relationship
exists between the ratio of time plus savings deposits-to-
total deposits and loans and advances to agriculture
Hypothesis 9. In the light of the results of the analysis in
Chapter 6 and the analysis of the SLRQ above, the positive
relationship found to exist here between the lending officer's
liquidity preference and his security requirements is not
unexpected.
6.1 Top-I-Level Lending Officers' Responses to IPT
When a loan_proposal is above the lending limit of an
operations-level lending officer, it is passed on, with
recommendations, to higher levels of management. In Nigeria,
this higher level invariably means the head office as area and
regional offices are not often used for this purpose. To a
significant extent, therefore, the investment behaviour of these
higher level officers does influence lending. Because of this
it is useful to examine their preferences for investments as was
done for their counterparts above. The primary aim, however,
should be to answer the question: are the liquidity preference
attitudes of these top-level lending officers the same as those
of the operations-level lending officers? (1) If no significant
differences are found, in the light of the observed relationship
between liquidity preference and lending practice, it will be
(1) This obviously important question was never raised by
earlier studies employing similar IPT techniques.
reasonable to expect the lending practices of these officers to
be similar to those observed in the case of operations-level
officers above. If, however, they differ, one would expect
different lending practices and lending decisions from these
higher lending officers.
In examining the question posed above, a basic hypothesis
is subjected to empirical testing. This hypothesis is that the
Means of the distribution of cash resources to financial assets
by operations-level lending officers (Roi ) do not differ from those
of the top-level lending officers (RTi), that is Roi=
(i = A + Br Cr Dr E).
A t-test using a two-tailed test of significance was
employed in determining whether there were significant differences
bomtween these Means, that is, determining the probability of "t"
f om the ratio:
t =  20i - 2Ti 
	
9.1
CP10 + T)
where
+ T) is the estimated standard error of the
difference between the two sample means.
First, however, let us examine the distributions of cash
resources to financial assets by the top-level lending officers
and note how they differ from those of the operations-level
lending officers. Table 7.20 shows that on the average, the
top-level lending officers would allocate 39.8% (standard
deviation 27.2%) of their resources to liquid assets. Although
this is lower than was observed for the operations-level officers,
this mean allocation to assets A + B is still much bigger than
the mean allocations to either of assets Cr D or E. In other
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Table 7.20Investment preference test: Top-level lending
officers' responses (distribution of N100,000)
Respondent
A+B
Financial Assets
1 45 0 0 55.0
2 57.5 0 30.0 12.5
3 33.0 •	 36.25 21.0 9.75
4 13.75 10.0 22.5 53.75
5 14.5 14.25 . 28.75 42.5
6 0 0 0 100.0
7 0 0 25.0 75.0
8 53.75 16.25 18.75 11.25
9 0 0 100.0 0
10 25.0 25.0 37.5 12.5
11 45.0 20.0 25.0 10.0
12 92.5 0 5.0 2.5
13 72.5 0 15.0 12.5
14 40.0 0 45.0 15.0
15 60.0 8.5 15.0 16.5
16 37.5 21.25 25.0 16.25
17 40.0 15.0 32.5 12.5
18 25.0 27.5 • 25.0 22.5
19 20.0 30.0 25.0 25.0
20 83.75 5.0 6.25 5.0
21 70.0 ' 13.75 7.5 8.75
22 88.75 6.25 5.0 0
23 27.5 27.5 7.5 37.5
24 0 0 50.0 50.0
25 71.25 •	 0 27.5 1.25
26 30.0 23.75 26.25 20.0
27 27.5 21.25 30.0 21.25
28 41.25 20.0 22.5 16.25
N 28 28 28 28
Mean 39.8 12.2 24.2 23.8
S.D. 27.2 11.5 19.4 24.2
Range 0-92.5 0-36.25 0-100 0-100
Source: Table VII-5
words, both groups of lending officers possess high preference
for liquidity. The smallest share of cash resources, as with
the operations-level officers, go to Federal Government Loan
Stocks. About the same share of cash resources was allocated
here to debentures and shares of quoted companies - 24.2%
(standard deviation 19.4%) and 23.8% (standard deviation 24.2%)
respectively. These are higher than were recorded for operations-
level lending officers and make for the differences in the
groups' liquidity preferences as expressed in the resource
allocations to A+B financial assets.
On the basis of this comparative analysis, one can only
e)pect marginal differences in the investment behaviours of the
t o groups of lending officers. Are these differences statistic-
ally significant? The results of the analysis in table 7.21
p ovide the answer to this question. Using P = 0.05 and degree
of freedom n = 52, none of the t-ratios in this table is as
high as either 1.684 (for n = 40) or 1.671 (for n = 60) (see
Croxton and Cowden, 1955, pp. 750-751). Therefore we conclude
that these differences are not statistically significant and
accept the stated hypothesis.
Table 7.21 Differences of the means of responses to
investment preference test
Financial
assets
Loan
officers
Head office
management
Mean	 t-ratio
difference
(7) (2) (3) (4) (5)
48.74 39.80 8.94 1.30
(22.10) (27.20)
11.85 12.20 -0.35 -0.13
( 7.43) (11.50)
18.91 24.20 -5.29 -1.16
(12.38) (19.40)
20.50 23.80 -3.30 -0.58
(15.32) (24.20)
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It can be concluded from this result that the investment
behaviour of all levels of lending officers in Nigeria is the
same. Given that there is a correlation between lending officers'
liquidity preference and their lending practices, it can be
expected that lending officers at all levels of management in
Nigeria will make similar lending decisions. Since tables 7.4 and
7.20 indicate that these lending officers of all levels of
'management have high preference for liquidity in making personal
investment decisions, long-term loan proposals will be expected to
get a 'cold' reception from them. This is not only a rational and
logical inference, but it is a restatement of the lending
attitudes of Nigerian bankers observed in Chapter 6.
7, SLMAARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the foregoing pages of this chapter an attempt has been
made to examine the personal investment behaviour of lending
officers in Nigerian commercial banks. Employing a set of
hypothetical loan requests (the SLRQ) and a structured question-
naire (SQZ), the lending practices and attitudes of these officers
have also been examined.
The findings provided additional evidence that lending
officers at all levels of management have a high preference for
liquidity. The analyses also indicate that there exists a high
correlation (R = 0.73035) between the liquidity preference of
operations-level lending officers and their lending practices.
The individual lending practices (except 'concern for established
loan policies of the bank') and the propensity to lend were,
however, found not to be significantly related to lending officers'
preferences for liquidity .1
These findings reinforce the observations on the results of
1 See pages 183-184 for a suggestion of a reason for this result •
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the analysis in Chapter-6.
	
These pointedly suggest that
Nigerian lending officers have a high preference for liquidity
and that they engage in 'undevelopmental' lending practices.
The implications of these results for both the banks' and the
country's growth and development are far-reaching. More so
because the current Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85
places great responsibilities on the shoulders of the banks. In
the words of the Plan (West Africa, 16 March, 1981, p. 560):
• • • • banking institutions will be expected to play a more
dynamic role in the area of stimulation of investment and
channelling of such investment to priority sectors of the
economy." A fulfilment of this obligation implies that present
approaches and attitudes to development financing by the
bankers must alter significantly because investing in priority
sectors of the economy calls for unorthodox, aggressive banking.
CHAPTER 8
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LOANS AND ADVANCES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF NIGERIAN AND U.K. COMMERCIAL BANKS' PRACTICES
1. I NTRODLETI ON
In any industry or organisation, success in today's
uncertain and competitive business environment rests crucially
on planning and control. This is particularly true for banks
given their operating environment that is characterised by
"increasing competition from bank and non-bank sources; technology;
increasing scarcity and cost of deposits and capital; pressures
from employees for higher salaries and stockholders for better
market performance or higher dividends." (Conover, 1976 p.18).
It is, indeed, plausible that the rather excessive liquidity
preference as well as the less aggressive attitudes of Nigerian
bankers observed in the previous chapters of this study may be
the result of inadequate planning. Without good planning and
control, bankers, in theory at least, will tend to be over-
cautious, providing for more buffer stock of liquid resources
than can be justified by potential requirements and consequently
be reluctant to provide term loans and advances.
Relatively, in recent times the need to plan and the way
to do it have engaged the attention of both academics and
management so much that planning has been elevated to the status
of a discipline and a science (see Cohen and Hammer, 1966; Eilon
and Fowkes, 1974). Although banks have not been in the fore-
front of this "race", they have demonstrated sufficient interest
by developing and employing highly sophisticated planning and
control techniques for the management of their institutions (see
Bradley and Crane, 1975; for a brief reviw of formal bank
planning see Gardener, 1979 Chapter 5).
Although planning and control are, in practice, closely
intertwined activities, there are some fine distinctions between
them as can be gauged from table 8.1.
	
Planning is usually
divided into two parts - strategic planning and operations
planning. Strategic planning is the process by which a bank
defines its long-term objectives as well as the strategies and
tactics that will help attain them. Three distinct but related'
processes can be identified in a strategic planning activity.
The first involves the determination of the goals to be attained
during the plan period and given all the "circumstances" -
resources, and constraints - under which the bank will have to
operate. The second entails the specification (generally in
quantitative terms) of the set of actions that are envisaged to
help achieve the set goals. Finally the third step is an
attempt to realistically consider the plan and make allowances
for estimable deviations and gaps. (These processes can be seen
clearly from figure 8.1.
Whilst strategic planning is concerned with the broad
long-range prospects of a bank, the operations planning activities
are focused on the detailed annual budgets for the various
functions and variables in the bank's management model - the
sizes and structures of loans and investment portfolios, levels
of revenues, costs and profits, etc. To all intents and
purposes the operations plan is a subset of the long-range plan.
Figure 8.2 depicts a typical commercial bank's planning and
control system.
Because of the useful role the planning and control exercise
plays in the smooth and efficient management of a bank, it is
important in a study which seeks to enquire into the performance
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TABLE 8.1 CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRATEGIC PLANNING
AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL
STRATEGIC PLANNING OPERATIONAL CONTROL
1. Non-programmable decisions Programmable decisions
2. Mainly external but also some
internal information required
Internal information largely
required	
.
3.
•
Information designed for plann-
ing purposes
Information mainly for control
4.
•
Top management's responsibil-
ity
Middle and line management's
responsibility
5. Information essentially
futuristic
Information mainly historical
6. Information requirement
rarely explicitly defined
Information requirement
essentially explicitly defined
L Activity non-routine even if
•	 continuous
Activity is very routine in
nature	 .
6. Activity usually affects whole
organization and may mean
'life or death' for it
Activity usually affects
sections of the organization
and essentially not crucial
9. Types of activity: setting
marketing policies; setting
personnel policies; new
products development; analysis
of competition; strategy
development; analysis of bus-
iness opportunities; general
environmental studies; etc.
Types of activity; stock
control; recruiting; dismissal;
placements; production control;
etc.
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of a banking system to probe the level and quality of this
key organisational input. For this purpose a comparative
study of the Nigerian and U.K. commercial bank i was conducted.
The aim was that of killing two birds with one stone. First
the exercise will aid the study of the weaknesses and strengths
of the Nigerian commercial banks' practices in this field.
Secondly it will enable a comparison with the practice in an
older and more advanced banking system for whatever lessons
can be learnt therefrom.
Many things make this comparative exercise appropriate.
The traditional political and economic links between Nigeria
and ere U.K. are long and strong. In terms of training and
technology, the Nigerian banking system borrows and buys from
the U.K. Directives and central bank guidelines on the allocation
of credit resources are employed as a tool of monetary regulation
in both countries albeit with varying degrees of severity .
tsee Falegan, 1978 pp. 15-30 (for Nigeria),and Hanson, 1979
p. 5 (for the U.K.)).
Although many environmental, institutional and legal
differences exist between the two banking systems, these do not
invalidate a comparison of this nature. This is because
planning and control	 are management techniques adaptable
to suit environments that may vary widely in socio-politico-
economic elements and conditions. And after all, the essence
of planning and control is that through the exercise attempts
are made to predict, control and contain (if possible) these
environmental and other influencing factors.
In the rest of this chapter, the sample and the data
gathering procedure are discussed in section 2. The responses
of the bank executives interviewed are analysed in section 3
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and in. section 4 a short summary with concluding remarks is
presented.
2. THE SAMPLE AND DATA GATHERING PPOCIBOURE
Five of the six clearing banks in the U.K. and the 19
operating banks in Nigeria were selected as the sample. This
selection enables the closest practical comparison of like with
like i.e. typically commercial banks with country-wide branching
networks and advances organisational structures in both
countries (see figures 8.3 through 8.7).
The interviews were conducted on the basis of a structured
questionnaire (see appendix IVB). 	 The U.K. questionnaires
were administered first. A request was made to each of the
banks' head offices for an interview based on the questionnaire
sent out previously. Just as these banks did in 1976 when this
researcher contacted them for interview on a similar study
(see Adewunmi, 1977), all of the banks responded indicating
willingness to discuss the questions. Appointments were made
and, to the researcher's delight, ready and well prepared
bank executives were met each time in the 5 banks.
For the Nigerian survey the same questionnaire was used.
One each was sent to the 7 banks with head offices outside
Lagos with a request to respond by post. This was done because
there were no funds available to the researcher for the field
work. Only 3 responded eventually. The questionnaires for
the other banks, 11 in Lagos and 1 at Ibadan, were delivered
personally and interview appointments made. In half of these
cases only were interviews given on the second visit. Among
this half of 6 respondents were 3 expatriate bank executives -
French, British and	 Indian. In other cases a minimum of
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Figure 8.3 Broad structure of advances management system
in the Bank
• U.K.	 Nigeria
HEAD OFFICE
REGIONAL OFFICES
AREA OFFICES
BRANCHES
HEAD OFFICE
AREA OFFICES
BRANCHES
Figure 8.4 Structure of advances management system: Head Office
(U.K. and Nigeria)
(Strategic Planning Level)
BOard of Directors
Chief Executive
Deputy Chief Executive
Senior General Managers
Divisional General Managers
Deputy General Managers
Regional Managers
Advance's Staff
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Figure 8.5 Structure of advances management system:
Regional Office (U.K.)
(Management control level)
Executive & Non-Executive Director
Deputy Executive Director
Advances Manager
Assistant Advances Manager
Advances Staff
Figure 8.6 Structure of advances management system:
Area Office
(Management control level)
U.K.	 Nigeria
Local Directors	 Area Managers
District Managers-
	
Assistant Area Managers
Assistant District Managers	 Advances Managers
'Advances Manager	 Assistant Advances Managers
Assistant Advances Manager	 Advances Staff
Advances Staff
Figure 8.7 Structure of advances management system: Branch
(Operational control level)
U.K. and Nigeria
Manager
Sub-Manager
Accountant
Sub-Accountant
Advances Staff
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two and a maximum of four calls were required before an
interview was finally granted. On the whole, 15 banks in
Nigeria responded to the questionnaire. The remaining four,
however, do not represent a significant proportion of the'
banking system. These accounted for 3.4% of the system's
assets, 4% of the deposits and 4.2% of the loans and advances
as at the end of 1979 (see table VII-1).
3. tvA5 JALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES
The questionnaire covers the areas of advances such as
(1) planning; (72) management and control; (3) lending problems;
and (4) lending services. The analysis below is presented
under these headings and in this same sequence.
(1) Planning of advances
The overall corporate plan provides a basic framework
for loans and advances planning and control. A bank that does
not think of a total organisation plan is not likely to consider
planning for advances. If it does, the exercise is unlikely
to be very productive as piecemeal plans ignore the essential -
organisational interfaces and interdependence (Warren, 1973).
The first question was thus naturally directed at this basic
of planning.
Q. Do you operate a planning department in your bank? When
was it established and what is its existing strength?
Table 8.3	 Planning Department?
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent)	 (per cent)
Yes	 60.0	 100.0
No	 40.0
	 0.0 
	100.0
	 .100.0
All the U.K. banks and 60% of the Nigerian banks in the
sample responded affirmatively to this question. Planning
departments were established by the U.K. banks 10-11 years ago.
The first bank to do this in Nigeria started a department in
1972; and as many as 50% of the banks with a planning depart-
ment opened them between 1979 and 1980. The staff strengths
range widely in both countries - between 8 and 50 in the U.K.
banks and 2 and 40 in Nigerian banks.
Given the central bank guidelines and directives in both
countries, what is the manner and duration of loans and advances
planning in the banks? The bank executives were asked:
Q. How do you plan for your loans and advances given the
central bank directives in this regard? And for how long
ahead?
Table 8.4
	
Planning for loans and advances?
Nigeria.	 U.K.
(per cent)
	 (per cent)
Yes	 33.3	 20.0
No	 66.7
	 80.0
100.0	 100.0
only 20% of the U.K. banks' and 33.3% of the Nigerian.
&mks' executives said they plan for the levels of their
advances. Even in these cases, planning is limited to the
establishment of budget targets. The remaining large majority
of institutions in the two banking systems do not plan their
loans and advances. One or two respondents in both countries
even felt that it is impossible for them to plan because of the
volatility in the changes in the demand function they face from
time to time. Not unexpectedly only one of the respondents, a
U.K. bank executive, said his bank engages in five-year plans
that are annually rolled over; that is to say at the end of
each year, another year is added to the 'tail' of the five-
year plan. The others who plan or budget for loans and advances
do so for only one year ahead.
What is the level of employees' involvement in the planning
process? Is it in planning parlance a 'bottom-up' or 'up-
bottom' approach or both?
Q. To what extent do bank officers outside the planning
department participate in the planning exercise?
In banks where planning or budgeting are done, the particip-
ation of managers is limited to the supply of inputs in the form
of estimates of their expected levels of loans and advances in
the coming year. Standard 'returns' forms are used in a majority
of cases. On one side of this kind of form are the details of
the year's operations of the branch; and on the other are the
specified expected changes in performances in the next year. As
the managers said they do not usually have to supply the assumptions
for their estimates, all that conceivably happens is that each
year's performance figures will be simply, and many times
unrealistically, extrapolated.
The next question relates to loan policies. Policies provide
•the essential guidance for the planning exercise and credit
operations. "Credit management makes two kinds of decisions in
the process of credit granting. The first establishes the
quality of credit granting the organisation chooses to accept.
This is called a policy decision." (Roy and Lewis, 1971, p. 19).
In the light of these the bank executives were asked:
Q. Does your bank operate its loan function with a written
loan policy? Any loan policies specifically for
agricultural and manufacturing lending?
In both the U.K. and Nigeria, none of the respondents'
banks operates with a written loan policy. The CBN credit
guidelines are widely assumed to constitute enough lending policies
for the banks in Nigeria. How then do the banks provide guidance
of any kind to their loan officers? The directives of the central
banks are copied to the loan officers for their guidance. In
addition they are supplied with the 'Handbook', a bank encyclopaedia
on all issues including lending, which is occasionally supplemented
with head office circulars.
The bankers were next asked:
Q. To what extent do 'these policy guidelines aid or constrain
lending at the operational levels of management?
As they did not operate with loan policies, the answers were
obvious and predictable - no opinion.
Another important issue in planning for any operation
is the definition of the objectives (see Terleckyj, 1970). Unless
the goals of a process, a system or an operation are clearly
defined, the efforts to reach those goals may be directionless.
It is also true that "the main risk we run in incorrectly
identifying our objectives is that we may choose a wrong target
of attack." (Adewunmi, 1977 p. 78). These considerations prompted
the researcher to ask the question:
Q. What are the objectives of your bank's lending function?
Profit maximization was very frequently mentioned by the
bank executives. All the U.K. bank executives and 66.7% of their
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Table 8.5
	
Objectives of lending function
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent)	 (per cent)
Profit maximization	 66.7	 100.0
Development of the economy	 80.0	 60.0
Nigerian counterparts listed this as the important goal of their
lending functions. In nearly all of these cases, profit maximiz-
ation was said to be not only an important but aprimary objective
of the banks' lending activities. The other important objective
mentioned was the development of the economy; 60 and 80%,
respectively, of the U.K. and Nigerian bank executives mentioned
this / (see table 8.5).
( .2) Advances management and control
The basis of all planning and control , activities is
information. Without appropriate and timely information no
tangible success can be achieved in these activities. It was
then considered in place to ask:
Q. What are the main kinds of information required for your
lending function and activities of planning, control and
operations?
Table 8.6	 Sources of lending information
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent)	 (per cent)
Cashflow/feasibility reports 60.0 80.0
Business financial records 40.0 80.0
Project related information 100.0 100.0
Environmental - the economy/industry 20.0 20.0
In view of the fact that most of the banks in the U.K. and
Nigeria do not plan for their loans and advances, it was not
surprising that only 20% in either sample mentioned environmental
information. Rather they were more interested in the business
and project related information required for the management and
control of their advances. Cash flow was commonly mentioned by
the U.K. bank executives whilst the Nigerians, saying the same
thing, used the term, "feasibility reports." It is noteworthy
that in spite of the great attention currently given to cash
flow/feasibility reports, the scrutiny and analysis of business
records by bankers are still very important. Whilst 80% of the
U.K. bank executives mentioned this, however, only 40% of the
Nigerians did. The basic nature of the need for advances to
satisfy the time-honoured principles was underlined in the
bankers' responses to this question. All respondents in both
countries said they would call for information on capital,
ch racter, collateral and capacity - the 4-cs of bank lending.
Also mentioned by all respondents was information for the
verification of the purpose, the amount, and the lengths of
advance.
What are the bankers' sources for this information? ' Do they
rely entirely on their customers or do they make an effort to
obtain information by themselves?
Q. How do you presently obtain this information?
Table 8.7
	
Sources of information
	
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent)	 (per cent)
Customers
	 100.0
	
100.0
Internal sources	 26.7	 80.0
As it would probably be expected, customers were a major
source of this information as noted by all bank executives. The
other main source of information mentioned by respondents was
internal - 80% and 26.7%, respectively, of the bank executives
in the U.K. and Nigeria. These will appear to indicate the
levels to which bankers in both countries try to augment
customers' information with. internally generated information.
It is paradoxical and rather unfortunate too that it is in
Nigeria, where customers have comparatively less capacity for
generating information, that the bankers apparently rely more
on them for this.
Given the state of information supply the question was
asked:
Q. Does Zack of information ever constrain your lending
activities?
Table 8.8	 Information is a constraint in lending
Nigeria	 U.K.
per cent).	(per cent)
Yes 80.0 100.0
No 20.0 0.0
100.0 100.0
All the U.K. bank executives said that lack of information
is a constraint but added that this is from the point of view
of their customers. That is to say, problems arise only when
their customers are either unable or unwilling to supply
required information. On the other hand 80% of Nigerian bank
executives consider that lack of information is a constraint.
The other 20% were of a different opinion as they believe that
"you can always ask for more from the customers."
Can an outside organisation such as a central credit bureau
help to increase the information resource of the banking system
and of the individual banks? Specifically the question was:
Q. To what extent, do you think, a central credit bureau
would help improve the information resource of the
banking system, and in particular your bank?
Table 8.9	 Usefulness of a central credit bureau
•Nigeria
(per cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
To a great extent 66.6 0.0
To some extent 20.0 0.0
Will not help 6.7 100.0
No opinion 6.7 0.0
100.0 100.0
Noticeably, all the U.K. bank executives said it will not
be of any help. Most are satisfied with the services of private
agencies such as Dun and Bradstreet which they presently use.
Others opined that an attempt to organise a central credit bureau
will come against legal and political problems as many people will
see it as an assault on individuals' privacy.
The absence of any private or indeed any type of credit
bureau in Nigeria probably explains the responses of the bank
executives. Only 6.7% felt that it will not help; and another 6.7%
have no opinion. All the rest thought it will be useful - 66.6%
"to a great extent," and 20% "to some extent."
There is little doubt that the quantity and quality of the
information resource of the banking system and of the individual
banks can be greatly enhanced by the exchange of information among
the institutions. Do the bankers appreciate this? If they do,
to what extent do they collectively and individually work for it?
Thus the bank executives were asked:
209
Q. To what extent do commercial banks presently co-operate in
the exchange of credit information?
Table 8.10	 Co-operation in exchange of credit information
Nigeria
	 U.K.
(per cent)
	 (per cent)
To a great extent 26.7 50.0
To a little extent 53.3 50.0
Hardly 6.7 0.0
No opinion 13.3 0.0
100.0 100.0
Over half (53.3%) of Nigerian bank executives in the sample
felt the co-operation between the banks in this regard existed
only to a small extent. About 27.0%, however, felt the banks
co-operate to a great extent. Amongst these, many thought that
the co-operation worked particularly well with the big five
banks. Half of the U.K. bank executives on the other hand felt
that their banks co-operate to a great extent but the other half
thought it is only to a little extent. As for the quality of
information, all respondents with an opinion on the issue described
the information exchanged as terse and inadequate. A U.K. bank
executive succinctly put the opinions of most respondents when he
said that: "... reading the reports is an art."
TO some extent the maintenance of customer credit files
helps to build a useful data-resource on individual loan customers
of the bank. So the bank executives were asked:
Q. Does your bank maintain customer credit files? What kinds
of information are available therein?
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Table 8.11
	 Maintenance of customer credit files
Nigeria
(per cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
Yes 86.6 100.0
No 6.7 0.0
No opinion 6.7 0.0
100.0 100.0
All the U.K. bank executives and 86.6% of their Nigerian
counterparts said their banks keep customer credit files. Half
or 6.7% of the remaining Nigerian respondents said their banks
do not; whilst the other half or 6.7% had no opinion on the
issue. The files kept are said to contain general information.
relating to the advance. These include the application forms
completed for the advance, cash flaw analysis, correspondence and
all available financial records of the business and the project
against which advances are made.
An overwhelming majority of advances are processed and
administered at the branch. In the light of this the branch
managers are an important factor in lending. To be able to deal
with customers in an informed way, they need to know them
sufficiently well. So we asked the bank executives who control
the movements of these branch managers:
Q. How long, on the average, do your branch managers stay working
in a branch? Do they stay long enough, you think, to get to
know their customers?
Table 8.12	 Managers' tenure in the branches
Nigeria
(per cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
Minimum:	 2-3 years 46.7 0.0
Average:	 3-4 years 0.0 50.0
Maximum:	 4-5 20.0 0.0
Until promoted
As long as he has a good report
26.6
6.7 58:8
100.0100.0
The respondents indicated the minimum, the average and the
maximum period their branch managers stay in a branch before
being moved to another one. (See table 8.12).
	
A small number
of respondents, 6.7% among the Nigerian bank executives said
their managers remain in their branches as long as they have
good reports and until they are promoted. Each executive
believes that the practide is suitable for his bank's policies
and experiences. All the U.K. bank executives noted that in
the specific case of agriculture, their managers tend to stay
longer in their branches and eVen when moved, this movement is
within the same agricultural region as much as possible. In all
other cases too, these bank executives said that conscious
efforts are always made by their banks to develop specialist
bank managers by keeping them in specific agricultural or indus-
trial areas.
Because of the uncertainties of the business world, govern-
ment action, "act of God", the human element, etc., the best
thought-out plan may still get out of course. It is because of
this that control is necessary. In the particular case of lending,
control is essential to ensure the safety of the bank's money
and its liquidity position. Thus the bank executives were asked:
Q. How does management in your bank control the quality and the
quantity of advances? And how successfully do you think?
The banks' practices, in this area of lending in both
Nigeria and the U.K. are identical. The main means of control
of quality frequently mentioned by all respondents are manager's
discretionary limit, inspections by auditors and head office
staff. Quantity control is exercised by way of monitoring
the lending activities at the branches and providing feedback
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to managers and requesting them to keep in line with existing
credit guidelines. All consider the methods successful.
As managers' "discretionary limits" are one of the
important means of controlling the quality of advances, the
executives were asked if these are reviewed to take account of
changes within the banks' environments.
Q. How often do you review the credit limits of your credit
officers, mainly the branch managers?
Table 8.13 Review of managers' discretionary limit
Nigeria
(per cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
Annually 53.4 60.0
Between 2-4 years 13.3 20.0
As necessary 20.0 20.0
No opinion 13.3 0.0
100.0 100.0
Branch managers' discretionary limits are reviewed
annually according to 53.4 and 60%, respectively, -of the
Nigerian and U.K. bank executives. These limits are reviewed
between two and four years according to 13.3 and 20% respect-
ively, of the Nigerian and U.K. bank executives, whilst 20% of
respondents in both countries said reviews are undertaken
when considered necessary only. Factors such as inflation,
competitiveness and managers' performance are taken into
consideration in the reviews.
As part of the control of the quality of advances, banks
may want to check the use of the discretionary limits by their
branch managers. The bank executives were, therefore, asked:
Q. -Does your bank routinely review the loans and advances
granted by its loan officers? What form does this review
take?
Routine checks are made on branch managers' lending
operations in both banking systems. These are done as part of
the review of periodical returns on advances from the branches.
Bank inspectors, auditors (external and internal)and head
office advances control staff also make checks on their routine
visits to branches.
In spite of good advances planning and control, some loans
may still go bad i.e. unpaid when due. A proper loan collection
procedure not only helps loan recovery but discourages
potential defaulters. The following questions were thus put to
the bank executives in this regard:
Q. What is your bank's defaulted loan collection procedure?
How effective is this procedure in recovering defaulted
loans as well as discouraging loan default by customers?
Once again the procedures are very similar in both
countries. It is a process that usually begins with inviting
the customer to discuss his financial problems, followed by one,
two or three letters of formal demand. If these first two
steps fail, most banks' procedures require that the dossiers on
such loans be sent to the recovery/legal departments for
further action. The debt recovery department, as appropriate,
realises the securities and sues for the balance, if any. Some
banks in the U.K. and Nigeria take steps, usually at the end
of the recovery exercise, to inform 'the world' of the
defaulters' failure to make good their obligations to the banks.
In the U.K. names of defaulters are notified to the private
credit agencies and in Nigeria their names are published in the
national dailies.
A report in the form of the age analysis of loans may help
to call attention to overdue loans. This way recovery activities
are stepped up early enough to be helpful. If deemed necessary .
the loan can be declared bad so that the loan portfolio
balance can represent truly realisable assets. In view of
these, the bank executives were asked:
Q. Does the bank request its lending officers to submit a
periodical age analysis of loans? Any other periodic
reports on loan portfolib?
In neither the U.K. nor Nigeria are periodical age
analyses of loans called for by management. The 'reason given
by the bank executives is that the ages of loans are normally
noted on the various advances returns.
(1) Lending problems
One good way of solving lending or indeed any problem
is to identify it and the causes. Two questions were asked -
one to identify the problems and the other to define the causes.
As very interrelated responses were given, these two questions
are presented and analysed jointly here.
Q. What, in your view, are the causes of loan losses
particularly in the agricultural and manufacturing lending
sectors? Could you give me any idea of your respective loan
loss ratios?
Q. What are the special problems of lending to the agricultural
and manufacturing sectors? How could these problems be •
alleviated or completely eliminated and what, do you think,
should be the role of commercial banks in the exercise?
How much more could you.have lent, say, last year without
these problems.
As may be expected, some of the problems mentioned are
common to both countries and to both the agriculture and
manufacturing lending. Bad management was mentioned by all
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Table 8.14	 Lending problems
General (U.K. and Nigeria):
Bad management
Unwillingness to repay
Government policies, actions and inaction
Nigeria (Agriculture and manufacturing):
Over-diversification
Bad lending judgement
Inadequate monitoring by banks
Concentration on collateral rather than cash flow
Funds diversion
Nigeria (Agriculture only):
Crop failure
Secondary or absentee farmers
Inadequate infrastructure - storage facilities, etc.
Lack of inputs - fertilizers, animal feeds, etc.
Lack of rural branches
Demand for feasibility reports under ACGs
respondents in both countries. Another problem mentioned by all
respondents is government policies, actions and inaction
which result in interest rate changes, inflation and wide fluct-
uations in demands and prices. Lastly in both countries, about
one-quarter of respondents talked of the unwillingness of
customers to repay their loans.
In addition to these common problems, the Nigerian bank
executives highlighted other problems. Those which apply to
both the agriculture and manufacturing sectors include over-
diversification and funds diversion. Encouragingly enough the
banks' executives were able to note the faults in themselves that
are part of the causes of the overall lending problems. Concen-
tration on collateral to the detriment of cash flow was one of
these faults in the banks' lending practice. The others are
bad lending judgement and inadequate monitoring of loan use by
customers.
Six categories of problems were mentioned by the
Nigerian bank executives with particular reference to agriculture.
Crop failure and secondary or absentee farmers were most frequently
mentioned by respondents. Other important problems are lack of
rural branches, inadequate infrastructural facilities such as
roads for transporting farm produce to markets, and storage
facilities; lack of inputs such as fertilizers and animal feeds;
and the request for feasibility reports for lending under ACGS
which leads almost inevitably to the production of many bad and
substandard reports even when farmers are able to produce one.
Having diagnosed the problems, the bank executives also
. offered some 'prescriptions' that could helpcuse some of these
ills of bank lending. There are two principal ways in which the
.Table 8.15 Solutions to bank lending problems
U.K.:	 Better marketing of bank services
Banks to set aside funds to help small
businesses
Nigeria: Education of entrepreneurs in business
management
Closer contacts between banks and customers
Provision of more advice and assistance by
the banks
Farmers to form co-operatives to enable banks
lend to them in bulk
U.K. bank executives view the solution to these problems. One
is the better marketing of bank services. Half of the respondents
also suggested that the banks, in lieu of increased long-term
lending to the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, should
• create a special fund out of profits and reserves for lending
to small businesses. (See table 8.15).
The Nigerian bank executives suggested that there is need
to educate the entrepreneurs in general business management.
Closer contacts with their customers and the provision of more
advice and technical assistance were also mentioned. A very
important suggestion made by a large number of the bank executives
was put by a representative respondent as: "farmers to form
co-operative societies to enable banks to lend to them in bulk.°
Given the small size of the average Nigerian farmer this
suggestion is not surprising but more importantly, it should be
well considered by the authorities.
All respondent bank executives in Nigeria and the U.K.
were very reluctant to talk about their loan loss ratios for
the agriculture and the manufacturing sectors. The truth probably
is that the banks do not prepare this kind of statistics. Never-
th less, the U.K. bank executives were absolutely certain that
the loss ratio for the agriculture sector is lower than for the
manufacturing sector and in most cases negligible. This is
because of the various governments' guarantees and 'supports'
(see Ministry of Agriculturelrn).Thereverse was the case in
Nigeria, where the agriculture loan loss ratio is said, by all of
the bank executives, to be many times higher than in manufacturing.
None of the bank executives in both countries could give
an idea of the level of loans and advances that could have been
achieved had the problems mentioned above not existed. This is
undoubtedly due to the fact that the banks do not plan for their
loans and advances. To get a general impression of the difference
between the potential and actual aggregate loans and advances to
these sectors for Nigeria the permissible level of loans and
advances can be compared to the actual loans and advances reported
by the banks. When this is done it will be found that the
Nigerian commercial banks could have lent N141.0 million and
N10.8 million more, respectively t to the manufacturing and
agriculture sectors 1 .
(4) Lending related services
The success of lending operations may be enhanced
considerably by the quantity and quality of lending-related
services provided by the banks. If banks lend and provide
financial and management advice in addition the chances of the
success of such borrowers are better than without such help
especially in an environment where alternatives in this regard
are hard to come by. Several key questions were therefore
raised to enquire about banks' efforts in this field. .
Q What kinds of Zending-related services do you offer
your customers?
All the U.K. bank executives and 60% of Nigeria's said
their banks provide some lending related services. In the U.K.,
however, use is made rather extensively of the specialist units -
1. Tbtal loans and advances, Dec.1977
CEN credit guidelines permissible increase as at
Dec. 1978 = 30% of N3,074,578,000
=
=
N3,074,578,000
922,373,400
Permissible aggregate Loans & advances Dec. 1978 = N3,996,951,400
CBN credit guidelines prescribed allocation of
credit to the manufacturing sector, Dec. 1978
32% of N3,996,951,400 = 1,279,024,400
Actual ccmmexcial banks recorded loans and
advances, Dec. 1978 1,137,987,000
Shortfall in loans and advances to manufacturing 141,037,4C0
CBN credit guidelines prescribed allocation of
credit to the agriculture sector, Dec. 1978
6% of N3,996,951,400 239,817,140
Actual commercial banks recorded loans and
advances, Dec. 1978 228,990,000
Shortfall in loans and advances to agriculture 10,827,140
departments and/or subsidiary companies (see also Hanson, 1979).
The sort of services offered were broadly defined as pre- and post
-investment advice by agriculture officers and other specialist
staffs. In Nigeria the provision of information on foreign
partners was very frequently mentioned. Money management advice
especially to the small and medium sized businesses was said
to be an important service by bank executives of both countries.
The reasons given by the 40% bank executives in Nigeria who
said their banks offer no lending related services include:
we are in a seller's_market"
"we have no business advisory unit"
"because we are a small bank".
Do banks have an organisational unit for the provision
of these services? The question asked was:
Q. Do you have a business advisory services unit? When was
it established and what is the staff strength?
Table 8.16
	
Business advisory services unit
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent) (per cent)
Yes	 20	 80
No	 80	 20 
100.0	 100.0
Only 20% of the Nigerian bank executives said their banks
have a business advisory services unit. These units are manned
by between four and ten senior staff and have been in existence
between one and seven years. A large majority of banks in this
sample - 80% - however, have no business advisory service units.
The reverse is the.case in the U.K. where 80% of the respondents
answered this question in the affirmative. Many of these units
are relatively long established with the earliest being
12 years ago and the latest three years. Comparatively these
units are also better staffed than their Nigerian counterparts.
It is the practice amongst these banks to have, at least, one
advisory service officer in every regional or area office.
In banks where there exist business advisory units, what
help do they give to the branches?
Q. What kinds of support services are provided by the bank's
advisory services unit to the branch managers?
Both in Nigeria and in the U.K., these units help branch
managers' and customers' relationships. Where new customers are
going in to a manager's district, for instance, advance
ilformation on this is provided to the manager concerned by the
unit. Also the officers of the unit visit old customers and
provide written reports on their businesses to the branch
managers concerned.
Apart from the business advisory services unit, is there any
'task force' with specific respondibility for acquiring new •
clientele?
Q. Do your bank's business promotion officers (if any) make
business calls on new and old customers? Of what benefit,
do you think, are these calls to the bank as well as to the
customers?
None of the Nigerian respondents' banks have business
promotion officers. In the U.K. 60% have, whilst 40% rely on
their branch managers, area and regional offices' management
staff for their business promotion. The primary responsibility
of these promotion officers is to engage in "cold calls to
establish relationships" between the banks and new customers.
As an alternative or in addition to banks' initiative in
offering advice to old and new customers, do these customers ask
the banks for advice?
Q. Do customers call on your bank for advice? If
yes, what types of advice?
Table 8.17 Types of advice customers call for
Nigeria
(per cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
Reliability of intending partners/suppliers 26.7 0.0
Advice on government regulations - imports
etc. 6.7 0.0
Financial advice e.g. loan or overdraft 53.3 100.0
Investment advice e.g. use of surplus
cash	 - 53.3 100.0
T chnical viability of projects 26.7 20.0
Market conditions for products 6.7 20.0
Administration of their business 20.0 .20.0
Legal advice 6.7 0.0
Accounting 6.7 20.0
Taxation 0.0 100.0
Insurance 0.0 100.0
Debt recovery 0.0 20.0
All respondents in both countries answered this question
in the affirmative. The lists of advice offered by the banks
are similar to a large extent. Financial and investment advices
are usually called for by customers in both countries as can be
seen from the percentage of respondents mentioning these - 53.3%
in Nigeria and 100% in the U.K. The offer by U.K. banks of
taxation and insurance services accounts for the fact that all
the U.K. respondents said their customers call on them for advice
on these services.
Except during a liquidity squeeze, banks are always able
and willing to support bankable projects. In all economies, the
problem is usually that of lack of enough creditworthy projects.
This explains why banks, today, engage in business advisory
services and the marketing of their loans and advances. 'What
do the U.K. and Nigerian banks do in this regard?
Q. In what positive and concrete ways do you feel your bank
helps to increase the volume of creditworthy projects
in the economy?
Less than 25% of respondents in both countries provide any help
towards increasing the volume of creditworthy projects. Those
who help in Nigeria, for example, responded thus:
"we assist in reformulating projects"
"by reshaping projects and making them bankable".
In the U.K. the responses were sometimes less positive and varied
widely too. For instance, one respondent said:
a good proposal is given careful attention
and moulded into a better one"
and another said:
"we only help projects with over 50-50
per cent chance of doing well."
The other respondents said their banks provide no help aimed
directly at increasing creditworthy projects. Some Nigerian
respondents in this group said:
"customers have to meet our requirements
or we throw the proposals back to them"
"we don't advise on viability, we ask
them to see consultants."
In the same vein a representative U.K. bank executive said that:
"we are not involved in new projects, we wait
for on-going ones to come along."
A similar question was asked in relation to the creditworthiness
of bank customers.
Q. In what ways does your bank help to improve the
•creditworthiness of your clients?
The U.K. banks, according to the respondents, try to
help but this is largely by way of referring customers to the
banks' subsidiary companies and the advisory services units. In
Nigeria where these specialist units are uncommon, branch manag-
ers are expected to provide as much help as they can.
Noticeably, in all, there was no specific mention of a way
in which banks help improve their customers' creditworthiness.
Do the banks engage in marketing activities and in
particular with regard to the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors?
Q. How does your bank positively market its loans and
advances services especially to the important agricultural
and manufacturing sectors?
Between 60 and 70% of respondents in both countries said
•
their banks engage in the marketing of the loans and advances
services. In both countries, from the bank executives' responses,
it is clear that the banks engage mainly in image building
advertisements. However, in addition, about 20% of U.K. banks
hold seminars for farmers.
The other 30 to 40% of bank executives said their banks
do not engage in the marketing of loans and advances. The
reasons for this include:
"no need because demand exceeds supply"
"a bank markets its loans only when it is
over-liquid."
Given the obvious fact that the agriculture and
manufacturing sectors are the backbone of any economy, do the
banks consider they have a part to play in financing development
in these sectors?
Q. What, do you think, should be the role of commercial.
banks in development financing?
Table 8.18 Role of banks in development financing
Nigeria
(per	 cent)
U.K.
(per cent)
Positive 40.0 40.0
Passive 40.0 60.0
No opinion 20.0 0.0
100.0 100.0
Two out of every five of the bank executives in the
samples consider that the banks have a positive role to play.
One Nigerian bank executive described this as a "leading role" •
and a U.K. respondent went further by saying that the obligation
is "crucial to banks' survival today."
A significant number of the U.K. bank executives - 60% -
and 40% of their Nigerian counterparts said that the banks should
have no part in development financing. In the words of a U.K.
bank executive:
"development should be a major concern
of the government."
But would any incentives make the banks change their
attitudes to development financing?
Q. Would more incentives from the government induce your bank
to lend more to the strategic sectors of agriculture and
manufacturing? If yes, what kinds of incentives do you
have in mind?
Table 8.19
	 Incentives will induce more lending?
Nigeria	 U.K.
(per cent) (per cent)
Yes 80.0 60.0
No 20.0 .	 40.0
100.0 100.0
Table	 8.20
Nigeria
Types of incentives
U.K.
Tax incentives 33.3 Refinancing 33.3.
Increase in interest ECGD-type
rates 20.0 guarantees 66.7
Increase ACC'S to 100%
& extend to mfg 33.3
Rediscount facilities 6.7
A majority of respondents in both countries thought
some incentives from the government might induCe bankers to
undertake more development financing. This was the view of
80 and 60%, respectively, of the Nigerian and U.K. bank
executives. The types of incentives called for are as in
table 8.20.	 The Nigerian bank executives will want more tax
incentives such as accelerated write-off of losses on rural
branches, increase in lending rates, increase in ACGS and
extension of it to cover the manufacturing sector and rediscount
facilities. Guarantees such as are offered by the ECGD and
refinancing facilities are the main incentives the U.K. bank
executives thought might encourage increase in development
financing.
4. SLUMMY AND CONCLUDING mENIUKS
A number of important issues are raised in the above
comparative analysis of the practices of commercial banks in
the U.K. and Nigeria with regards to planning and control of
advances. Although it can be said that the U.K. commercial
banking system as portrayed in this analysis is far from the
•-•
'ideal' (if indeed the 'ideal' exists) some useful lessons
can, however, be learnt by the Nigerian commercial banking system
from it.
In both countries, planning specifically for the levels
of advances is rarely done. In the U.K., however, corporate
planning as a part of the overall management of the banks is
undertaken more widely than in Nigeria. This is clear from the
existence of planning departments that are well staffed with
specialists.
With regard to the provision of information, it appears
evident that the U.K. banks make greater efforts to generate
more internally. On the other hand the Nigerian banker would
rather lean harder on the customer to obtain the quantity of
information required for advances. In the two banking systems,
however, it will appear that more can still be done to improve
their information resources by intensively tapping the
numerous available sources as identified in figure 8.8.
As the Nigerian bank executives noted there is great
need for a central credit bureau in the financial system
particularly because of the absence of private agencies such
as Dun and Bradstreet in the U.K. The level of co-operation
in the exchange of information amongst the Nigerian banks leaves
a lot to be desired. For example, an enquiry into three sister
banks in 1976 revealed that a large number of customers borrowed
simultaneously from more than one of these banks without one
bank knowing of their customer's relationship with the others.
The basic methods for the control of the quality and the
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quantity of advances in both countries are identical. With
the extensive use of computers in the U.K. banks, it has been
possible to control the quantity of advances satisfactorily.
The weakness in the system of quantity control employed shows
up clearly in the Nigerian case. Because it is an after-the-
event type of control, the banks have found their advances out
of control many times as can be seen from table 8.21. Without
computers capable of providing daily balances for loans and
advances for the banking units as in the U.K., there is greater
need in Nigeria to engage in planning, which is an effective
control-in-the-future.
The U.K. commercial banks recognise the peculiar
nature and requirements of each area of the country with the
predominance of industry, agriculture, mining or manufacturing.
This is shown in their conscious efforts to develop and use
specialist managers who by virtue of their long and continuous
stay in an area become adept in dealing with the typical lending
problems of the areas. This apparently good idea has not yet
gained recognition and acceptance among the Nigerian bank
executives for managers are very frequently transferred from
one corner of the country to another.
Unlike in the U.K., only a few banks in Nigeria have a
business advisory unit. None of the banks engages business
promotion officers either. Although many claim to have marketing
departments, little marketing beyond corporate image building
is being done. The generally held view that banks market their
services when supply exceeds demand is patently erroneous. The
marketing of services differs from that of physical products.
Whilst the marketing of physical products encourages you to buy
Table 8.21	 Commercial banks' lending-related infringements
of bank regulations (throughout the lives of
individual banks)
Bank Nunber of years
of existence Liquidity ratio Loans in excess Increase in(range) deficiency 	 of statutory	 advances during
maximum	 liquidity ratio
deficiency
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
A	 over 30	 43	 9	 39
B 10-20	 5	 -	 3
C	 1Q-20	 56	 41	 42
D over 30	 -	 1
E 20-30	 2	 2	 1
F	 20-30	 4	 1	 3
G 1-10	 1	 -	 1
H 1-10	 -	 -
I	 1-20	 10	 -	 7
J over 30	 16	 -	 3
K 10-20	 6	 3	 5
L 1-20	 1	 1	 1
M	 1-20	 22	 -	 16
N 20-30	 11	 4	 6
o 1-20	 11	 -	 lo
P over 3D	 6	 4	 5
Q	 over 30	 6	 -
R	 over 30	 3	 18
Source: Classified information - (columns 3, 4 and 5) -
not to be referenced.
and will be deemed successful if demand increases
significantly as a result, the marketing of bank lending
• ervices does not only inform and encourage customers to demand
the services but it also assists in their proper and efficient
use, thus increasing the product quality. The difference arises
from the fact that the former subject of marketing is an end
product whilst the latter is an input factor.
It is gratifying that bank executives in both countries
noted the fact that the methods of their operations may cause
some of the problems in lending. It can be expected that the
solutions suggested may help in the amelioration of the
problems. The success of the efforts to solve lending problems,
however, will depend largely on the bankers' willingness to
change their attitudes to development financing. At the
present a large number of bank executives in the samples for
this enquiry appear to see only a passive role for the banks in
development financing. Given the experiences of India (see
Adewunmi, 1981a)and Ghana (Ogbe, 1975), there is little doubt
that the introduction of refinancing and guarantee schemes
will go a long way to alter the bankers' view and attitudes
to development financing.
The Nigerian bank executives have suggested that farmers
should form co-operatives so that they can be enabled to lend
to them in bulk. This suggestion is not novel for it has been
put forward by conferences and seminars in the recent past in
Nigeria (see here and Osuntogun, 1981). The small size of
business units in both the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors in Nigeria justifies this repeated emphasis. Given
that situation, it will be near impossible for banks to
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increase their lending significantly to these sectors
except this important step is first taken. Thus the
governments of the country must now give greater-attention
to the co-operative sector to enable it organise into
viable and creditworthy units.
CHAPTER 9
THE PERCEPTION OF NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS' LENDING
FUNCTION BY INDUSTRY
1. INTRODUCTION
So far this study has focused on one side of the opinions
and picture of the lending function - the bankers' side. The
statistics of bankers' operations and their response to
questionnaires have been analysed and interpreted. To obtain an
independent opinion of the efficiency of their lending, it
seems only appropriate to ask the recipients of these services..
In this way a balanced view of the lending operations of the
banks should be obtained. As the researcher is an outsider
to the banker-customer relationship, it is hoped that many of
the candid opinions that customers will hesitate to put to their
bankers can be expressed in response to his questionnaire.
Hopefully these views of the customers so obtained might provide
a basis for self-examination for the banks and lead to desirable
improvements in their operations.
The sample of respondents and the data gathering procedure
are discussed in sections 2 and 3, respectively. In section 4
the responses obtained are analysed and a summary plus concluding
remarks are given in section 5.
2. mesnItE
••
	
All the organisations interviewed, it ought to be noted,
belong to the manufacturing sector. This is because farming,
organised in the same way as industries, is still a rarity in
Nigeria. A few responses were obtained from people who
described their businesses as "farming and civil engineering",
"produce-buying, trading and farming" and "import-export and
farming". The fact is that many of the sizeable private farming
activities in Nigeria today are carried on by, in the words of
a banker, "absentee farmers". Most of these farmers see
agriculture as no more than a hobby. Many are taking advantage
of and abusing the intentions of the government in encouraging
banks to lend to the agriculture sector without however doing
any serious farming (see West Africa, 18th May 1981 p. 1077).
Otherwise, how can one explain the 40% share of agricultural
loans being accounted for by Lagos State which has little or no
farm landf in which (from personal knowledge and experience of 25
years) little farming is done. Undoubtedly, responses by these
types of "farmers" are most likely to be 'distorted' because
their relationships with the banks are not based on their
agriculture business. (See Appendix IX-A, a sample of responses
ob ained).
The real farmers in Nigeria are the smallholder, peasant
farmers (see Agboola, 1979). As a son of one of these farmers
and coming from the most typically agricultural state of the
country, the writer knows that nearly all of these farmers are
illiterate and too poor to have a customer relationship with the
banks. In the words of Oluwasanmi and Alao (1965, p.35): "African
farmers are, in the main, small state operators who live in remote
villages in the countryside and are too poor to operate bank accounts
or own assets that are readily acceptable to bankers as security."
An interview survey of 5 towns and villages - Ikare, Arigidi,
Okeagbe, Irun and Afin-in Akoko North Division of Ondo State
reaffirmed this view. It is for these reasons that studies of
Nigerian farmers have always been within the context of the .
co-operative movement (see Osuntogun, 1980). In the light of
these circumstances, the farmers could not serve as appropriate
respondents to the questionnaire used here.
There are, of .course, a few large-scale farming
organisations in Nigeria. These are either government farm
settlements, government sponsored co-operative farming groups,
or farm settlements financed by institutions such as the
International Development Association, an affiliate of the
World Bank, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. Because
of the nature of the sponsorship of these farming organisations,
they do not have the kind of banker-customer relationship that
will make them fit into the framework of this study.
Table 9 .1 presents the overall picture of the sample
and table 9 .2 gives details of the profile of respondent
organisations. The sample of the large organisations consists
of all the manufacturing businesses listed on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange as at 1.2.80. Of the 81 small businesses selected,
77 were taken from the 1980 Directory of the Manufacturers
Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the other four randomly during
fieldwork. As most of Nigeria's manufacturing concerns situate
in planned industrial estates, a majority of these sample firms
were conveniently clustered in the estates. Thus 211companies
were listed from the Ilupeju Industrial Estate; 18 from the
Apapa-Iganmu Industrial Estate, 7 from Oluyole Industrial
Estate in Ibadan. Only 8 of the small firms and 16 of the
large firms were ultimately interviewed.
94% of the large firms are foreign and the rest indigenous.
On the other hand, only 25% of the small firms are foreign; 75%
indigenous.
It is common practice for firms to have more than one
banker. This provides an advantage to this kind of study as the
respondents' views are made more 'global'. Among the large firms,
37.5% have one or two bankers, 31.25% three or four bankers;
235
Table 9.1	 The sample
Large Small Total
Number of firms selected	 44	 81	 125
Number of firms interviewed	 16	 8	 24
Percentage of responses (%) 	 36.4 10	 19.2
Table 9.2	 Profile of respondents
(a)Size	 Large-	 Small
Total Assets - range	 N3.0-N161.0 milLion
	 million
(b)Distribution
Foreign firms
Indigenous firms
(c) Number of bankers
1 or 2
93.75
6.25
25.00
75.00
100.00 100.00
37.50 75.00
3 or 4 31.25 12.50
5 or 6 31.25 12.50
100.00 100.00
(d) Average relationship with bankers
0- 9 years 18.75 50.00
10-19 years 56.25 37.50
20-30 years 25.00 12.50
(e) Industry coverage (by
products)
100.00 100.00
Textiles and thread 18.75
Food and drinks 31.25 -
Chemicals, paints &
pharmaceuticals 18.75
Metal and wire 12.50 25.00
Rubber and foam 12.50 12.50
Stationery 25.00
Miscellaneous 6.25 37.50
100.00 100.00
and another 31.25% five or six bankers. Being small, the other
group of firms could not possibly match this widespread use of
banks by large firms. Thus 75% of the small firms have one or
two bankers, 12.5% three or four bankers and the last 12.5% five
or six bankers.
The views of the respondents will, most expectedly, be
.influenced by the length of their relationship with their
bankers. The longer such relationships the better is likely to
be any assessment by the customers. Among the large firms; 18.75%
have had relationships of between 0-9 years; 56.25% between
10-19 years and 25% of between 20-30 years. Fifty per cent of
tie small firms have had relationships with their bankers of
bPtween 0-9 years; 37.5% between 10-19 years and 12.5% between
20-30 years.
The companies interviewed in both the small and large
classes vary in size. In the large class, for instance, the
firms vary in assets size from N3.0 to N161.0 million. In the
small firms class, the range is between N65,000 and N1.8 million.
The industry coverage is considerably wide as can be seen
from table 9.2. In the large firms class, a big majority of
the companies are engaged in food and drinks manufacturing. Half
of the small firms are engaged in metal and wire (25%) and books
and stationery (25%) manufacturing.
3. DATA WIER I NG IMMURE
A structured questionnaire was employed for the data
gathering (see Appendix IVA-3) . The questionnaires with two
covering letters (one each from the supervisor and the
researcher) (sae Appendices IVB-1 and IV-2),	 and a stamped self-
addressed envelope were sent to each of the 44 quoted manufacturing
companies of the large class of the sample. Only two of these
came back, as requested, via the post duly completed. One was
returned through post with the comment "Mr Adewunmi, Sorry no
time." With this discouraging response, two months after the
date of dispatch of the questionnaires, the researcher proceeded
on a door to door collection of the questionnaires. After two
or three visits a-piece within a period of 3 months, another
14 questionnaires were "retrieved".
The questionnaires for the small firms were delivered
personally to each firm, and after, at least, two additional
visits, only 8 completed questionnaires were collected. In
about half of the cases, the questionnaires were returned to the
researcher with no explanation for non-completion; in another
25% of the cases, specific requests were made to the researcher
not to bother to call back as the questionnaires would be
mailed directly to him! Although these experiences are .
unpleasant, they are not entirely unusual particularly with
studies involving small businesses and banker-customer relation-
ships. For instance, of the two questionnaires sent by the
Bolton Committee to small businesses one had a response rate of
22%, the other 13% (Bolton Report p. 5 fn 2). Katona's (1957,
p. 11) experience in a United States study is also demonstrative
of this general apathy:
"There were very few instances of outright refusal
consisting of requests by the selected firms
that they should not be interviewed. Most of the
few cases were among the smaller firms in the
sample. In somewhat more firms, however, executives
asked for delays or postponements of interviewing.
In this respect again difficulties with small firms
were more frequent than with large firms."
In Professor Sayers' (1940, pp. 23-31) study of "businessmen
and their terms of borrowing" only "about 25% of the businessmen
gave some answer to the questionnaire." He suggested four
reasons why the "other 75% throw the questionnaire into the
waste-paper basket," which are very illustrative of the
attitudes of businessmen to academic studies such as this.
These are:
(1) that the firms just couldn't be bothered
with more forms than the government
compels it to complete;
(2) that the answers might be used for some
ulterior purpose;
(3) that the whole business was just a toy
of "word-spinning theorists"; and -
(4) that the terms of borrowing had never
affected the firm.
(p. 23) -
I is worthy of note that this was in spite of the fact that
the covering letter to the questionnaire was "designed to
overcome such objections as these" (p 23).. The Nigerian
situation is made more difficult by a lack of understanding of
and appreciation for research. Because of these there is an
element of resentment, bordering on hostility at times, in the
reception accorded to researchers. Some of these are also
based on the erroneous beliefs that researches. are invariably
undertaken on behalf of competing firms. The latter was very
frequently mentioned to this researcher.
4. THE RESULTS
The responses of the interviewees (the firms' executives)
concerning their relationship with the banks are analysed in
this section. The responses are presented in four sub-sections
each dealing, sequentially, with the respondents' ( a) general
perception of their bankers; (b) of differences among banks;
(c) of bank lending related services; cuL (d) of banks' credit
facilities.
4.1 General view of banks
Particularly for the banks, views on how business
executives elect and change their bankers can be useful and
guiding. As this is the start ofanybanker—customer relationship,
the questionnaire focuses on these issues first and foremost.
Q. How do you evaluate, originally., the banks with which you -
want to do business?
Table 9.3
	
Factors in initial evaluation of bankers
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Efficient services 50.0 12.5
International network 25.0 0.0
Financing facilities 18.75 25.0
Location 12.50 12.5
Parent company's/friends' recommendation 6.25 12.5
Image 6.25 12.5
No opinion 18.75 12.5
Six principal factors were named as influencing the respondents'
choice of bankers. As many of the big firms have international
business connections, it was not surprising that 'international
networks' was named as an important factor by 25.5% of the
respondents, whilst on the other hand none of the small firms
mentioned this factor. 'Efficient services' was mentioned by
half of the big firms and by 12.5% of the small ones. Financing
facilities were thought important by 25% of the small firms but
only 18.75% of the large firms' group mentioned these. Location,
parent company's/friends' recommendation and image are the other
factors mentioned by a few of the respondents of both the large
and the small groups.
Having chosen a bank, a customer sometimes decides to
change to another bank. What factors do these executives take
into account in deciding on such a change? All the respondents
consider operating services and credit facilities as very
important factors. No less than 87.5% of respondents in both
groups consider these factors important (see table 9.4).
Q What considerations influence your choice of or decision
to change to a bank?
Table 9.4	 Considerations in decision to change bankers
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
0 erating services 100 87.5
C edit facilities 93.75 87.5
Advice received 56.25 37.5
Personal friendship 43.75 50.0
Over half of the respondents in the large firm class consider
advice received to be important whilst 37.5% of the small
firms do so. Personal friendship and relationship play a part
as mentioned by 43.75% of respondents in the large firms' group
and 50% of the small firms.
In fairly general terms, how do the executives see their
bankers? They were asked:
Q. Some bank users feel that Nigerian banks are too conservative
and safety minded, whilst others feel that the banks try
to encourage expansion and innovation in enterprises. What
do you think?
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Table 9.5	 General view of bankers
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Too conservative and safety-minded 75.00 75.00
Encourage expansion and innovation 6.25 25.00
Partly both 12.50. 0.00
No opinion 6.25 0.00
100.00 100.00
Three-quarters of all respondents consider their bankers to be
"too conservative and safety minded." Only 6.25% of the large
firms' executives believe they encourage expansion and
innovation, and 12.5% think they do a bit of both. Among the
small firms 25% are of the view that the bankers encourage
expansion and innovation but some of these, however, think this
would happen "only if headed by a white man."
4.2 Differences in banks
Do the executives perceive differences among banks? If
yes, in what ways? The questions asked were:
Q. Would you say that Nigerian banks are more or liess
alike so that it does not really matter which one
deals with or that there are great differences among
banks?
Table 9.6
	 Perception of differences among banks
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
Banks differ	 87.5	 75.0
Banks are rather the same 	 12.5	 25.0
100.0	 100.0
Q.' What do you have in mind?
Table 9.7	 Perceived ways in which banks differ
Services offered
Large
(per cent)
37.50
Small
(per cent)
62.50
Efficiency 31.25 6.25.
Credit policies and facilities 12.50 0.00
Whether foreign or indigenous 0.00 6.25
No opinion 18.75 25.00
100.00 100.00
A significant majority of the respondents consider that there
are differences among banks - 87.5% of the large firms and 75.%
of the small firms. The rest in both groups consider the banks
to be the same, for in the opinion of some executives they
are "in a seller's market" and can afford to be equally slip-
shod in their operations.
The types and quality of services offered and their
efficiency are the distinguishing features of banks as perceived
by the industries' executives. It is noteworthy that only a
small proportion of respondents consider that banks differ
with regard to credit policies and facilities - 12.5% of large
firms and none of the small firms. This might be because these
banks have no written lending policies and operate uniformly
within the broad framework of the Central Bank's credit guide-
lines. It is also worth noting that only one respondent holds
the view that there are differences between banks on the basis
only of the indigenous-foreign banks dichotomy.
Ceteris paribus the more competitive a business
environment is, the more efficient the participants. In the
light of these the market-economist will argue that competition
is desirable. The question was then asked:
Q. Would you say there is much competition or rivalry among
banks in trying to get new business?
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Table 9.8
	
Opinion of competition among banks
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
There is competition 56.25 75.00
There is no competition 43.75 25.00
100.00 100.00
Most of the small firms' (75%) and over half of the
big firms' (56.25%) executives consider that there exists
much competition among the banks. Others, however, think other-
wise and their reasons are revealing:
"there is ready business"
"seller's market"
"businesses chase bankers not bankers chase
businesses"	 -
"have more business than they want"
"couldn't care less attitude prevails".
4 3 Lending-related services
Given the fact that clients seek various services from
their bankers a more general introductory question was first
posed:
Q. Would you say that the Nigerian commercial banks, as they
now operate, satisfactorily provide all services business
firms can expect from them? Or can you suggest some areas
that are not fully satisfactory?
Table 949a
	 General satisfaction with services
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Everything satisfactory 12.50 0.00
Satisfactory with some reservations 25.00 12.50
Some banks more satisfactory than others 6.25 0.00
Unsatisfactory 50.00 75.00
No opinion 6.25 12.50
100.00 100.00
As many as 50% of the respondents in the large firms
and 75% in the small firms' group feel the services they get
from their bankers are unsatisfactory. On the other hand, 12.5%
of the large firms and none of the small firms' respondents agree
that everything is satisfactory. One-quarter of the executives
in the large firms sample and one-eighth in the small firms
sample consider all.the banks' services satisfactory with some
reservations. One area of services frequently mentioned as
unsatisfactory is lending. 'Loans and overdrafts', 'credit
policies' and 'credit facilities' were specifically named. Some
respondents who cared to express their dissatisfaction rather -
strongly did so in this vein: "A lot treat customers as if they
are at their mercy."
More specifically, what kinds of services do these
executives seek from their bankers? The question put was:
Q. What kinds of services do you seek. from your bank(s)?
Table 9.9	 Types of services sought from banks
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Information on general economic conditions 31.25 50.00
Information on specific industry or
business 37.50 12.50
Advice on foreign business 31.25 12.50
Credit information 75.00 87.50
Advice on investments 43.75 37.50
Others 18.75 0.00
About one-third of the large firms seek information on
general economic conditions, on specific industry and on foreign
business (see table 9.9). In both groups of respondents,
assistance is very commonly sought on credit information - 75%
of the large firms and 87.5% of the small firms do this. A
significant proportion also ask for advice on investment.
"Forecast of possible changes in government policy", "financing
arrangements" and "bank rate" are the other types of information
sought from banks by 18.75% of the respondents in the large
firms sample.
Logically the next question asked was:
Q. Do you get all the services and advices you would like to.
have from your bank(s)?
Table 9.10	 Are the services sought provided?
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Yes 75.0 12.50
No 18.75 87.50
No opinion 6.25 0.00
100.00 100.00
Three-quarters of the large firms' executives answered
this question affirmatively but only 12.5% of the small firms'
did so. In contrast 87.5% of the small firms' executives said
they do not get these services. It is instructive that advances
were again frequently mentioned, specifically as an area of
services not satisfactorily provided. A significant few among
the respondents of the two groups who answered the question in
the affirmative added the phrase: "but slow in coming."
As the most accessible financial experts and advisers to
clients, it is common for bankers to be consulted by their
customers on financial matters. Is it the practice with Nigerian
bank customers? Specifically the question put was:
Q. Before deciding on important financial matters, do you turn.
to your bankers for advice?
Table 9.11	 Request for financial advice
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Yes 43.75 50.00
No 50.00 50.00
No opinion 6.25 0.00
100.00 100.00
Q. If yes, do you get a satisfactory response on such a request?
Table 9.12	 Responses satisfactory?
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Yes 42.80 25.00
No 14.30 0.00
Occasionally satisfactory 14.30 25.00
No opinion 28.60 50.00
100.00 100.00
Q. If no, why?
Table 9.13	 Reasons for not requesting for financial advice
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Company's policy 25.00 0.00
Company is capable 25.00 25.00
Overseas partners used 12.50 0.00
Banks are incompetent 0.00 25.00
No opinion 37.50 50.00
100.00 100.00
Half of the small firms' and 43.75% of the large firms'
executives said they consult their bankers routinely for
financial advice (see table 9.11): Only 42.8% of the large
firms and 25% of the small firms' respondents, however, get
satisfactory responses (see table 9.12)	 "Company's policy",
"company is capable" are some of the reasons given for not
consulting with bankers on financial matters. (See table 9.13)
Row do the respondents consider the provision of
information and advice as a function of the banks?
The respondents were asked:
Q. In your opinion, is giving information and advice to
business firms and individual customers an important
function of the banks?
Table 9.14	 Provision of information as an important function
of the banks
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
Yes 81.25 100.00
No 12.50 0.00
No opinion 6.25 0.00
100.00 100.00
All the respondents in the small firms' sample and
81.25% of the large firms' sample consider the provision of
information and advice as an important function for banks to
perform. Ordinarily therefore, these respondents will in their
relationships with their bankers expect these services. The
great lack of alternative sources of supply for these services,
undoubtedly, is responsible for this implicit demand being made
on banks.
Business promotion visits by bankers are an important
marketing strategy and customer service in the banking industry
today in many advanced countries of the world. Nigerian bankers,
going by their responses noted in Chapter 7, appreciate the
benefits to the bank and the customer of business calls. Does
this appreciation exist only in theory or is it translated into
practice? These executives were,therefore,asked:
Q. Have you ever had business prbmotion visits from your
bankers and/or other bankers soliciting business?
Table 9.15
	 Have had business promotion visits by bankers?
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Yes 37.50 25.00
Routine visits only 18.75 0.00
No visits at all 37.50 75.00
Only some bankers 6.25 0.00
100.00 100.00
Three-quarters of the small firms' executives claimed
they never had business promotion visits from their banks, the
same goes for 37.5% of the executives of the large firms' sample.
One-quarter of the small firms' respondents and 37.5% of the large
firms' have had business calls from their bankers. A small
proportion of the big firms' executives (18.75%) consider calls
by their bankers as routine only.
How do the executives consider such calls? They were
asked:
Q. How beneficial to your firm are business calls by
commercial banks?
All respondents consider the calls beneficial but their
views vary from "very beneficial" to "not very important."
Benefits specifically mentioned include:
"Smoothens relations"
"Quick ways to resolve problems"
"Opportunity for banks to offer advice"
"Opportunity for communication of unsatisfactory
aspects of bank services"
4.4 Credit facilities.
Do respondents' companies borrow regularly from the banks?
This question is basic here because only borrowing customers can
better appreciate and assess banks' attitudes and the quality of
their services in the field of advances. Thus the first question
was:
Q. Does your business regularly or usually borrow money from
the commercial banks? If not why not? If yes for what
purpose and maturity?
Table 9.16
	 Uses of funds borrowed from banks
Large
	
Small
(per cent) (per cent)
Purchase/import of raw materials	 18.75	 . 0.00
Capital expenditure	 43.75
	
37.50
Working capital	 62.50	 50.00
No opinion	 12.50	 12.50
A high proportion of all respondents in both classes of
firms (87.5%) borrow regularly from the banks. This is assuring
as it is clear from this that the respondents are those who
regularly experience the treatment of the banks with regard to
advances. The others do not borrow, however, because of such
reasons that "the company is liquid" and "the company requires
long-term funds." As the banks, apparently, would not entertain
requests for long-term advances, some firms have come to disregard
them as a source for these kinds of funds. This is usually the
damaging, though unintended, consequence of loan rejections
(Hooker, Jr. 1970).
Considering the different lending facilities of the
banks, do they differ as perceived by the responding executives?
On the basis of a list, respondents were asked:
Q. Would you say there is much difference in the lending
facilities of the various banks with particular regard
to:
Table 9.17 Perception of differences in lending facilities
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Access to credit	 - 81.25 62.50
Dura tion of credit 62.50 37.50*
Charges for loan 75.00 12.50
Security required 75.00 37.50
Time to negotiate 75.00 62.50
Compensatory balance 56.25 37.50
Over 56% of the large firms consider that banks differ
in all aspects of their lending services. "Access to credit"
and "time to negotiate" are noticeably the two areas in which
* a large proportion of the small firms' respondents (about 60%)
perceive differences among banks.
What are the judgements of the respondents of their
banks with regard.to specific lending issues? The industry
executives were asked, given a list:
Q. How does your bank rate in your view, on the following
factors in bank lending?
Table 9.18	 Perception of respondents' banks lending practice
Large	 Small
(per cent)	 (per cent)
(i) Access to credit: Liberal 56.25 0.00
Restrictive 43.75 87.50
No opinion 0.00 12.50
100.00 100.00
(ii) Duration.	 of credit: Long enough 75.00 50.00
Too short 18.75 37.50
No opinion 6.25 12.50
(iii ) Charges for loan:Cbrvalmtilmay
inexpensiNe
100.00 100.00
50.00 50.00
n expemsive 50.00 37.50
Noopcal 0.00 12.50
100.00 100.00
(iv) Security required: 	 Excessive 37.50 50.00
Inexcessive 62.50 25.00
No opinion 0.00 25.00
100.00 100.00
(v) Time to negotiate: 	 Long 50.00 62.50
Short 43.75 0.00
No opinion 6.25 37.50
100.00 100.00
(vi) Compensatory balance: Liberal 62.50 25.00
Restrictive 18.75 25.00
No opinion 18.75 50.00
100.00 100.00
About 56% of the large firms' executives, but none of
the small firms' consider access to credit in their banks
liberal. A significantly high proportion of the small firms
(87.5%), but only two-fifths of the large firms' executives
reckon access to credit in their banks is restrictive. Rather
surprisingly, many respondents in both groups consider the
maturity of credit long enough - 75% of the large firms' and
50% of the small firms' respondents. ' Half of all respondents
consider charges for loans to be inexpensive comparatively. The
other 50% of the large firms' executives and 37.5% of the small
firms' feel the charges for loans made by their bankers are
comparatively expensive.
Significantly, half of the small firms' respondents
and 37.5% of the large firms' consider the security required by
their banks as excessive. In view of the fact that the large
firms are more likely to own the kinds of assets the banks would
require, it is noticeable that they still consider their bankers'
demands for securities as excessive.
Like justice, advances delayed are as good as advances
denied. It thus becomes significant that half of the large
firms' respondents and 62.5% of the small firms' said that the
time to negotiate advances with their bankers is too long. .
Whilst 43.75% of the large firms' respondents feel that the
time to negotiate advances is short enough, none of the small
firms' executives thinks so.
With regard to compensatory balance, as many as half of
the small firms' respondents had no opinion. This was probably
because, given their thin resource bases, they are hardly asked
to provide compensatory balance for advances. Among the large
firms' respondents, 62.5% consider the compensatory balance terms
of their bankers as liberal; 25% of the small firms' respondents
also feel the same. On the whole, only a small proportion of all
respondents - 18.75% of the large firms' and 25% of the small
firms' - think their bankers' compensatory balance terms are
restfictive.
What effects do these commercial banks' lending conditions
have on the industry's consideration of source of funds? First
they were asked:
Q. Have you ever obtained funds from sources other than
commercial banks such as through issues of additional share •
capital or insurance company?
Table 9.19
	
Respondents' use of sources of funds other than
the banks
Yes
No
No opinion
Large
(per cent)
75.00
18.75
6.25
100.00
Small
(per cent)
50.00
• 50.00
0.00
100.00
Q. Why were these other sources chosen?
Table 9.20	 Reasons for using other sources of funds
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
Indigenisation	 31.25
	
25.00
Size of funds	 12.50	 25.00
Others	 56.25
	
50.00
100.00	 100.00
In both the large and the small firms samples, at least
half use other sources of funds. Among the large firms,
indigenisation was the main reason for using other sources of
funds. The size of funds was mentioned by 12.5% and 25% of the
large firms' and small firms' executives, respectively. The
mention of the size of funds by the executives appears indicative
of the fact that the banks do not seem to engage in loan
syndication as a way of getting round the loan size problem.
In any given business situation financing is always a
problem faced by management. That is, questions about when,
where from and how. But finance as an input, should not be a
constraint on a company's growth. Unfortunately, however,
this is often the case in many poor developing countries.
Given the resources at the command of the Nigerian
commercial banks, finance should not, all things being equal,
constrain the growth of Nigerian industries. The executives
were, therefore, asked:
Q. Is credit unavailability a constraint on your enterprise's .
development and growth?
Table 9.21
	
Credit a constraint on business development?
Yes
No
No opinion
Large
(per cent)
43.75
50.00
6.25
100.00
Small
(per cent)
75.00
25.00
0.00
100.00
An overwhelming proportion of the small firms' respondents
(75%) and 43.75% of the large firms answered this question in the
affirmative. Half of the large firms and one-quarter of the
small firms' respondents think finance is not a constraint. Some
of the large firms' respondents commented thus: "Afterall we
are a Blue-chip company and banks are always willing to oblige
with funds."
The conditions for obtaining credit are perhaps just as
important as credit availability. Unless the conditions are
right, credit availability may not by itself ease finance
problems. So the question was put to the executives:
Q. What are the usual conditions under which your enterprise
obtains loans and advances from the bank e.g. rate of interest,
'guarantee, compensating balances etc.? Which of these do
you find most difficult to meet or even repugnant?
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Table 9.22	 Difficult conditions for obtaining credit
Large	 Small
(per cent) (per cent)
Excess collateral 37.50 62.50
None 62.50 37.50
100.00 100.00
The usual conditions for obtaining credits such as
security, guarantee, interest rate etc., were frequently
mentioned by all respondents. Excess collateral was, however,
the most commonly mentioned by the small firms' respondents. It
is significant enough that 37.5% of the big firms' executives
also talked of excess collateral in their answers to this
qu-stion.
To what extent has this difficult condition hurt? In
order to find out, these questions were asked:
Q. Have you ever failed to get a loan because of a lack of
the right quality and/or quantity of collateral? What kinds
of securities do you have to offer for a loan but which are
unacceptable to the bank? What amount of loan and for what
purposes?
Table 9.23
	 Collateral is a cause of failure to obtain loans?
Large
(per cent)
Small
(per cent)
Yes 0.00 25.00
No 81.25 62.50
No opinion 18.75 12.50
100.00 100.00
None of the large firms' executives had failed to obtain
an advance because of lack of collateral but 25% of the small
firms' executives had. In some of these failure cases "titled
land" had been rejected by the banks. It is also noteworthy
that these rejections were experienced according to a respondent
"in the early stages of the firm's development and only
N100,000 was required."
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Of all the points made by respondent executives the most
important appears to be that a high proportion of them could easily
describe their bankers as "too conservative and safety-minded."
Although a large number of the respondents feel there are
differences between the banks, they do not think that efficiency
is the basis of these differences. This can, perhaps, be
explained by the fact that, (and as the respondents also feel),
there appears to be little or no competition among the banks.
Overall, the above analysis seems to indicate that the
banks' customers are less than fully satisfied with the quantity
and quality of the services they receive. 'Credit services were
very frequently mentioned as areas of dissatisfaction. It is
little wonder that half of the executives do not care to consult
their bankers for financial advice.
Although both bankers and clients appear to appreciate
the benefits of business promotion calls, the impression from
the responses of these executives is that this is neither
adequately nor efficiently done. This is sad particularly as
management expertise required for project articulation and
development is not easy to obtain, in Nigeria, making it almost
obligatory for banks to fill in the gap as much as feasible for
the mutual benefit of banks and customers.
Many of the respondents consider that there are differences
among banks as regards their lending facilities. Bank lending
practices with regard 'to duration of credit', 'access to credit',
'charges for loans', 'security' and 'time to negotiate' are
considered by a significant proportion of respondents, particularly
in the small firms' sample, to be restrictive. Obviously this is
'undevelopmental' banking and patently undesirable. The
undesirability of these, however, was not the main reason for
obtaining funds from other sources. Indigenisation, for
example, was the main reason for the big firms. Given the paucity
of alternatives in Nigeria, it should not be surprising that many
respondents have not used other sources of funds in. spiteof the
difficulties encountered with their bankers. It is important
from the point of view of economic development that a large
majority of small firms' respondents and a significant number of
th large firms' consider finance as a constraint on their firms'
growth and development. This is also highly intriguing given
the continual liquidity position of the banks.
There is a clear message here for the banks as this will
appear to represent the perception of their most important
function - lending - by their most important customers - the
industry. In a developing environment like Nigeria, a more aggress-
ive, forward-looking and unorthodox banking approach is called
for. Like in all LDCs, most of the business customers are,
perhaps, inevitably young, and struggling enterprises. In recent
times and in all parts of the world, the authorities have begun
to come to grips with the fact that these nascent businesses hold
the key to their economies' growth and even development (Wilson
Report, paras 2.7-2.10). Partly as a matter of self interest,
since their growth depends on the growth of their environment,
the banks must aid industry with the appropriate form of finance
- term loans. They also need to do more than this. Like the
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traditional development banks, the banks must additionally
provide supportive services in the form of post-investment
advice and supervision, and guidance to businesses on the
acquisition, management and control of factors of production.
Given the dominance of the commercial banks in the Nigerian
financial system, it will be substantially true to say that
unless the banks are able to 'make, oil and grease' the
industry satisfactorily, they will not be deemed efficient.
More importantly, the economy will neither be able to grow nor
develop to its full potential and as an inevitable consequence
the banks' growth, if any indeed, will be stunted.
CHAPTER 10
SIMULATION EXERCISES: INTRODUCTION TO SOFI
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters of this study historical and
empirical data have been analysed to test the hypothesis that
Nigerian commercial banks are not sufficiently efficient in
their lending operations and thus do not contribute enough to
the economic development of the country. The analyses point
to, among other things, the fact that the bankers have a
high preference for liquidity. In practical terms, that is,
they prefer short-term to long-term advances, and gilt-edged
securities to loans and advances. This study contends that in
the general circumstances of Nigerian commercial banks (i.e.
their deposit resources and mix, and the regulatory and overall .
economic environment) they could have been more aggressive and
yet still remain safe at the same time. To test this hypothesis
empirically requires a bank or the banking system accepting the
proposition and accordingly restructuring its assets' portfolios-
for a test-period and observing the results. Thii kind of
approach to hypothesis testing is hardly ever feasible because
the "guinea-pig" of the required experiment is not easily
available! The usual exception, however, is when a consultant
is invited by a firm or an institution to study and solve a
problem. In such a situation more detailed information is at the
disposal of the investigating team; and because the staff of the
firm participate in the work leading to the recommendations, the
willingness to experiment may be more easily obtained. Even in
this kind of situation, full experimentation is preceded by trial
runs and simulation exercises. In all other cases, including such
as in this study, researchers have to rely on simulation tech-
niques to test their preconceptions about, and recommendations on
the working of, systems. These provide the rationale for the
exercise in the next two chapters. First, however, in the
present chapter, the theoretical background is prepared for those
exercises.
2. SIMULATION
Simulation is a tool . of analysis. It is a symbolic or
numerical abstraction of thd system under study. This abstraction
is necessary because it is usually not feasible or indeed desirable,
at times, to undertake life experiments. For example, the experi-
ment may be too costly; it may be 'dangerous' (such as if it leads
to the collapse of the banking system); and sufficient time and
money may not be available for the tests.
However:
"stimulation models are significantly useful in a
number of ways. They are useful in formulating and
testing hypothesis about the behaviour of a business
firm. They can be used to formulate propositions about
the effects upon the behaviour of the firm of the
changes in some important and influencing variables
of the model under study. Secondly we can use
simulation to test propositions about business
organisations, conceptually and theoretically advanced
about such organisations in the literature."
(Adewunmi, 1981b,p.16)
It is noteworthy that the simulation model could not be used to
disprove or confirm these propositions but to add some measure of
confirmation to, or a shadow of doubt on, them. And this is the
objective of the exercise in this part of the study.
In carrying out a simulation exercise, the essential steps
that need to be taken can be listed as follows: (Adewunmi, 1981b,
pp. 17-18):
" (1) Problem formulation. This is the process of identifying,
defining and specifying the problem to be studied.
(2) Data collection. After specifying the problem, the
essential data to be used for the exercise will be
defined and specified and collected.
(3) Model formulation. A suitable model for the simulation
exercise is formulated. It will usually be as complex
or as simple as the problem and the system under study
is. It should be noted, though, that complexity is not
a measure of the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a model.
A good model is the one that contains the important
and relevant variables and is free of all irrelevant
factors and variables that may distort the result.
(4) Evaluation of the model. Before putting the model to
use a reassessment of the formulation is usually helpful
in making sure that it is a tolerable representation of
the system under study.
(5) When the computer is to be used, a computer programme
is formulated as a fifth step.
(6) Report generation and analysis of results. The reports
that are generated by simulation runs are analysed.
(7) Validation. First of all there are two important points
to note regarding validation. The objective of the
exercise is to validate a specific set of insights not
necessarily the mechanism generating the insights.
Secondly, there is no such thing as the appropriate valid-
ation procedure. The procedure varies according to the
problem under study; it is problem dependent. The
validation process could be:
(a)Construct a set of hypothesis and postulates for the
process using all available information, observations,
general knowledge, relevant theory and intuition.
(b) Attempt to verify the assumptions of the model by
subjecting them to empirical testing.
(c) Compare the input-output transformations generated
by the model.to those generated by actual system
performance.
(8) Implementation. If the results predict desirable changes
then those (results) may be implemented. Since a
simulation model can only approximate reality, it must
be evaluated by its power to test propositions and
hypotheses and to analyse the specific means to achieve
the ends."
31 SOFT (SIMULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
This is the particular model to be employed here and it
isr therefore, instructive to analyse its features, its structure
and its capabilities, albeit briefly. "SOFI is a general purpose
computer simulation model of financial institutions that has
been developed by the Institute of European Finance, supported
by a grant from the Social Science Research Council."
(Galitz, 1979, p. 1-1). With this model a user can conveniently
simulate the behaviour of many types of financial institutions
(including banks and insurance firms) and observe that behaviour
through a number of sets of economic scenarios and/or management
strategies.
3,1 Features of SOFI
SOFI is a descriptive rather than an optimizing model.
That is to say that it helps to describe the behaviour of the
system under study, given the basic position of the system, a
set of assumptions about its environment, and, where necessary,
a set of decisions desired by the user. Unlike an optimizing
model, therefore, SOFI does not provide the user with a strategy
rather it enables him to make decisions relating to those
variables under his control and, more importantly, alter them
in reaction to the behaviour of the system.
SOFI is a deterministic and not a stochastic model. This
means that it does not incorporate uncertainty. Its predictions
are specific to the assumptions input by the user. It does,
however, make up for this 'deficiency' in that the user can
learn how the system reacts to different situations by re-
running the simulations with changed sets of assumptions.
An important feature of SOFI is that it is an interactive
model. During the simulation process, a user is enabled to
communicate, in a'conversational' manner, with the computer,
this model serving as an interface. A bank or an insurance
executive, for instance, can in the convenience of his office,
input data, assumptions and decision alternatives into the
computer and almost instantaneously obtain detailed analysis
reports on the whole organisation or on its sub-system. In
the alternative approach - the batch mode - the computer receives
the data, runs them and outputs results. If the user desires
to effect changes in any of the input data, the whole batch
must be re-entered into the computer. This makes the "turn-
round" time in the batch mode many times longer than in the
interactive mode. Consequently, it makes the batch mode less -
convenient and attractive particularly to practitioners in the
financial industry in general and in banks in particular where,
for instance, money market investment or disinvestment decisions
may need to be taken within a very short space of time.
Simulation models may be either top-down or bottom-up.
A top-down model deals with the aggregates in the simulated
system, whereas the bottom-up model will be concerned with its
sub-systems individually. A bottom-up model of a bank will,
for instance, consist of sub-models of the lending function, the
planning function, the foreign exchange function, etc. SOFI
is a top-down model. It, however, has capacity for enabling
the user to input assumptions data that would have been produced
by subsystems of the model, had it been bottom-up in nature.
Because SOFI has been designed for multi-purpose use (i.e.
for various types of financial institutions) it is rather
inevitably sophisticated. To enable non-computing experts to
benefit from its tremendous potentials, the architects of this
model have designed it to be easy to use. It is in this regard
that the importance of the interactive nature of SOFI comes to
the fore. This feature enables the user to respond instantly
and positively to the questions and answers from the model.
Although this kind of model may be less exciting to the
mathematician, they are known to have proved much more
intelligible to management. More importantly, they have been
found to be capable of Validation against actual operations
(see Gardener, 1979).
3.2 The structure of SOFI
The "User's SOFI Data File Library" is at the centre of
the overall structure of SOFI (see figure1.0.1). This File
Library contains four main subsections, namely:
(1) a Balance Sheet*(BAL) file
- (2) a Constant Assumption (CON) file
(3) a Variable Assumption onuo file, and
(4) a Decisions (DEC) file.
The BAL file provides the basis for executing all simulat-
ions. In essence the file consists of a listing of specified
balance sheet items (see Table X-1)	 as well as other
details of the starting financial position of the financial
institution to be simulated (e.g. investment portfolio array).
The CON and VAR files contain the parameters that "make up"
the environment, the scenario, of the institution being
simulated. As the name implies, the constant assumptions remain
unchanged over a simulation time, whereas the variable assumptions
change, if desired, with each decision period. Examples of
constant assumptions include taxation and depreciation rates,
and loan turnover rates. Variable assumptions include forecast
loans and deposits levels, and loan loss rates.
As can be seen from Figure 10-1, the SOFI model is made up
of nine major modes. These are sub-divided into four groups,
viz:
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(a) Data accepting modes (IMODE, AMODE and DMODE)
(b) Simulation mode (SMODE)
(c)Data presentation modes (QMODE. LMODE and GMODE)
(d)The utility modes (FMODE, UMODE)
All these modes perform different tasks associated with a
simulation exercise and related functions.
(a)Data accepting modes. IMODE is used for initiating SOFI
exercises as it enables the user to build the first important
file - the BAL file (for a typical process through IMODE see
figure 10.2). Thereafter the user must move out of IMODE and
into ANODE to build up the required CON and VAR files. Where
ne essary, the user enters next into the DMODE to build up a DEC
file as well. DEC files are more usually built up during a
simulation experiment in SOFI as the experimenter steers the
financial institution through the scenario. As can be seen in
figure 10.2 a user can also enter data accepting modes to modify
or copy an existing data file in SOFI.
(b) Simulation mode. Once these basics have been settled, the
user is ready to perform a simulation exercise. Thus he enters
the SMODE. At his command, this mode runs the bank through the
simulation period from one decision point to another. On request
the user can obtain at each decision point a whole range of output
including a series of balance sheets, maturity profiles for
portfolios assets and liabilities, ratios report and performance
analyses. Figure10.3 depicts the available cycle of operations
in SMODE.
(c) Data presentation modes. The first of these, the
queries moae (QMODE) is employed for the purpose of finding
out the contents of the user's SOFI file library; redundant files
(2)
Mbdify existing
BAL file
(1)
Create and nare
new 13AL file
End: Exit frau 'MODE
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Figure 10.2
	
The typical flow of a data-accepting mode
Sour: Gardener (1979, Ell 7-22, figure 7.4).
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Figure 10.3	 A detailed overview of SMODE
ANA FIA POR:
:BAL 1ST MI
EAR
BAL 1=1
MI ID	
discard BALBUFD
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6-2.0
discard SIMBUF
NEW BAL FILE
ORIMIAL PAL FILE
ORIGINAL DEC FILE
NEW DEC FIIE
NEW SIM FIIE
ANA
ADV
I3AL
CAL
DEC
EAR
FLO
INI'
analysis report
advance to next period
balance sheet report
calculator package
specify decisions
earnings report
cash flag report
interrupt simulation
jirrpt to future period
list current priod's decisions
maturity profile of portfolio
draw graphics picture
list portfolio
ratios report
current buy/sell yields
abort SMXE
JMP
1ST
/vIAT
PIC
POR
RAT
YLD
END
Source: SOFI (1979, p. 42, figure 4.1)
can also be deleted when in this mode. If there is need to
list data files or library catalogues on line printers, LMODE
is used. Lastly the GMODE enables the user to output in
graphical form some of the data used for the simulation work
(see figures X-1 and X-2 for examples of data presentation by
this mode).
(d) The utility modes. FMODE is used for recording any faults
detected in the SOFI model during use and/or comments for the
attention of SOFI system administrators. UMODE on the other
hand is used in obtaining up-to-date information on the latest
developments in SOFI. There is a tenth mode (not shown in
figure 10.1) called the TMODE. This mode enables user to
transfer files between the central SOFI library and his own
library (see table X-2 for a full list of modes available in SOFI).
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CHAPTER 11
SIMULATION EXERCISES: AN EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSITION
OF THE STUDY
18 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the exercises in this chapter is to test
whether Nigerian banks can be more aggressive than they presently
are and still remain safe and profitable. That is to say an
attempt is made to answer the question: will it be both prudent
and safe for Nigerian banks to alter their observed high liquidity
preference in lending? Although it has been vigorously argued
in the previous chapters that the suggestions made in this
study with regard to the aggressiveness of Nigerian banks have
been successfully tried elsewhere, efforts will additionally be
made here to provide further concrete support for the feasibility
and prudence of the propositions. As noted earlier, a simulation
exercise is not aimed at proving or disproving any theory or
hypothesis; it can only, and ideally, add support to or cast a
shadow of doubt on them.
1.1 The approach
In order to achieve the Above aim, a typical (though
hypothetical) Nigerian commercial bank was first "created" for
-
use as the test-bed. This is usually the option available to
most researchers in this field in view of the fact that banks
will hardly ever make all the relevant data required for this
kind of exercise available (Gardener, 1979 pp. 12.2 to 12.3), nor
will they agree to serve as the "guinea-pig" of the experiment.
In the next stage of the experiment, this bank was "made" more
aggressive (less liquid), first by increasing its loans-to-deposit
ratio and second, by lengthening its term loans maturity pattern.
A comparison between the "aggressive" bank and its predecessor
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(the typical bank) may then provide details of the benefits and
the disadvantages of the hypothetical bank's aggressiveness. To
further test the prudence of the aggressive thrust of the test-
bank, loan losses were increased simultaneously with the increased
loan portfolio and the lengthening of the maturity of term
loans. This consequence (i.e. increased loan losses) is to be
expected in such circumstances in real life and will thus,
hopefully, strengthen the reality of this exercise.
2. THE DATA OF THE ANALYS I S
The test-banks employed for this exercise have been
labelled Bank 1 and Bank 1(A). Bank 1 is, given the information,
the nearest approximation to a Nigerian commercial bank. Bank
1(A) is this typical Nigerian bank "made" more aggressive.-
The primary bank, Bank 1, has been carefully and realistic-
ally "built-up" to approximate-as much as possible a real bank.
To construct this bank, detailed historical financial information
on a number of banks (both from published and the banks' sources)
were obtained and combined for use (1) . Because existing banks'
data were used, with alterations to the figures rather than the
essential features, this bank conforms to a typical Nigerian bank
in most respects. For example, a comparison of the balance sheet
structure and the maturity patterns of its term loans and
investments portfolios with similar features of Nigerian banks
observed in Chapter 6 will reveal how atypical the test-bank is.
It may be worth noting that there is some evidence in Appendix III
(1) For desirable anonymity, the method of construction will not
be discussed here.
which points to the fact that there appears to be no
significant variations in the balance sheet and portfolio
structures of Nigerian banks, over time and among banks of
different classifications.
Guesstimates have been used as the basis of computing
the loan loss rates. This became necessary in view of the fact
that these rates are neither published nor willingly revealed by
bankers. However, the researcher has been aided greatly in this
by the information obtained during field work. Although the
bankers were less than specific in their responses to the question
on loan loss ratios, they nevertheless revealed enough to
provide a basis for an informed estimation.
Bank 1 is a commercial bank whose main business is retail
banking. As it is also a "licensed" bank, it is subject to all
the existing Nigerian banking and financial legislations including
the Banking Act of 1969 (as amended) and the Central Bank of
Nigeria Act of 1958 (as amended). It is also subject to all the
directives, controls, and supervision of the CBN. In the exercises,
as in real life, Bank 1 is subject to the ruling 25% liquidity
ratio specified by the CBN. This ratio is computed on the basis
• of the bank's cash and primary reserve asset balances (i.e.
'eligible' assets).
The time structure and the horizon of the proposed
simulation are sketched out in figure 11.1 and table 11.1
respectively. There are three decision periods of 1, 2, 2
year durations, over a total time horizon of 5 years.
2.1 The opening balance sheet
Table 11.2 presents the opening balance sheet of the test
bank. To enable one to co-relate this presentation with outputs
from the SOFI model, the structure of the balance sheet has been
made to conform as closely as possible to that within SOFI (see
Table X-l).	 Because this balance sheet is the basis of all
the simulation works that follow hereafter, it will be useful to
consider (albeit briefly) its structure and related issues.
2.1.1 Assets
(a) The test bank proposes to maintain its holdings of liquid
assets (i.e. cash and primary reserve Leligible/ assets) at
precisely 25% as required by the CBN.
(b) 'Other investments' is an account used to accommodate all .
investments that may be required to meet increases/decreases in
liquidity and/or loan demands. The structure of this portfolio,
as noted earlier, is atypical. It may also be instructive to note
that the Federal Development Loan Stocks with three years to
maturity are eligible for favourable. rediscounting at the CBN and
can be used to meet the liquidity ratio requirement.
(c) The size of the term loans in relation to other assets as
well as to overdrafts reflect the pattern observable in the
industry. The maturity structure of this portfolio is computed
on the basis of the maturity trend for the banking system (see
Chapter 6).
(d) Overdrafts. These are advances that are not for a fixed
term. Although overdrafts may be renewable many times and thus
take on the complexion of term loans, the fact that this is not
automatic distinguishes them from fixed period loans'.
(e) Fixed assets. These are assumed to be net of any depreciation.
Starting
position
Simulation
horizon
A decision
point	 A decision
period --1
1r
1975 '	 1976	 1978	 1980
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Figure 11.1	 The time structure of the simulation
	 Total simulation tine	
Table 11.1
	
Decision periods for the analysis
Period No. Period length Cumulative time
1 1 year 1 year
2 2 years 3 years
3 2 years 5 years
Total 919.8
82
249
17
275
Table 11.2 Bank 1: Cpening balance sheet position
Liabilities Assets
Issued and paid-up share Cash (a) 20
capital 15.0
Primary reserve
Capital reserves 10.0 assets( a ) 211
Revenue reserves 8.4 Other investments: (b)
Provisions") 0.0 Maturity
	 Amount
Taxation 6.9 1	 102
Deposits (g) 3	 170
Demand deposits (h) 548.3 10	 68 340
Time deposits") 110.6
Term loans (c)
Savings deposits (k) 220.6
Maturity
	 Amount
1	 65.60
3	 13.94
5	 2.46
Overdrafts (d)
Fixed assets (e)
Total
	 919.8
2.1.2 Liabilities
(f)Provisions. In SOFI this account records the cumulative loan
losses charged in the income statement to date during the simulation
exercise. In view of this, it was considered desirable to set
this account at zero in the opening balance sheet. All general
(non-tax deductible) provisions for loan losses are assumed to
be grouped under SOFI revenue reserve category (RBES).
(g) Deposits. The structure of deposits (i.e. the size
relationships of demand, time and savings deposits reflect the
actual for the operating banks whose data form the basis of the
test bank.
00 Demand Deposits. As a member of the Clearing House System
in Nigeria, Bank 1 has adequate facilities to enable it to offer
competitive current account services. Customers (existing and
prospective) are encouraged to operate interest free current
accounts for the benefits of banking and related services offered
by the bank.
(j) Time deposits. These are mainly fixed term deposits. In
Nigeria, where the big business sector is yet developing, the
retail portion of these deposits is significant.
00 Savings deposits. These are 7-day deposits collected mainly
from the retail sector. A savings account is generally regarded
as a "small man's" account in Nigeria and so the corporate sector
portion (if any) of this account must be very small.
2.2 The operating environment of Bank 1.
The operating period of primary concern in this exercise is
that Starting at the end of 1975 and terminating at the end of 1980.
This period has no particular empirical significance although
it was selected on the basis of data availability and the fact
that it closely reflects the current position in Nigeria.
The major characteristics and operating parameters of the test
bank for this period of analysis are summarised in table 11.3
The fact that this period was characterised by steady rises
in interest rates can be seen from that table. It was also a
period of high balance sheet growth with the balance sheet footings
rising from N1,354.8 million in 1976 to nearly twice as big at
N2389.6 million in 1980.
As may be expected in a modern free market economy this
growth in both assets/liabilities and interest rates is
ac ompanied by a steady growth in incomes and expenditures (see
ta le 11.3.
Almost inevitably, lending activities give rise to loan
losses. The loan loss rates for this operating period are as
specified in table 11.3. The dip in 1978 can probably be
explained by the coming into existence of the ACGS Fund (see
Chapter 5) which guarantees losses on loans to the agricultural
sector.
3. THE INITIALSIMUJOION MERU
3.1 The balance sheet
Table 11.4 gives the summarised time-series balance sheets
resulting from the initial simulation using the starting balance
sheet position in table 11.2 (stored in the respective SOFI SAL
file) and data on the environment in table 11.3 (stored in SOFI
CON and VAR files).
The test bank (of table 11.2) was simulated through the
scenario (of table 11.3 and the experimenter made appropriate
Table 11.3	 Basic assumptions of the
1	 Variable Assumption
analysis
1976 1978	 1980(1),,.1.1	 Interest rate structure	 ti)
Investments
.
Maturity:	 1 year 3 4.5
	 5.5
3 years 3.125 4.625
	 6.0
10 years 4.0 5.25	 6.25
30 years 5.875 7.0	 8.0
1.2	 Other rates
Short-term securities (Treasury Bills) 3.125 4.5
	 5.75
Overdrafts 9.0 10.0	 10.5
Time deposits 5.0 -	 5.5	 6.0
Savings deposits 4.0 5.0	 5.0
1.3	 Income/expenses levels (in Nm)
Operating expenses 24.6 41.9
	 67.9
Miscellaneous expenses 2.4 10.2	 13.4
Miscellaneous income 18.0 23.5	 52.0
1.4	 Balance sheet items (in Nm)
Overdrafts 352.2 550.1	 778;2
Demand deposits 690.3 881.1 1,196.7
Time deposits 228.0 167.4	 484.2
Savings deposits 365.6 331.2	 432.0
Fixed assets 20.0 25.1	 30.2
Balance sheet footings 1,354.8 1,539.9	 2,389.6
1.5	 Loan loss rates (2) (% per annum)
Term loans 3.5 3.0	 3.0
Overdrafts -2.0 1.5	 2.0
2. Constant assumptions 
2.1 Taxation rates 
Company tax = 50%
Capital gains tax = 50%
2.2 Turn-over rates (% per annum)
Savings deposits = 30.25%
Notes: (1) It is assumed that all interest rates are paid semi-
annually
(2) These were computed on the basis of information
obtained during the researchers field work reported
in earlier chapters.
Table 11.4 Bank 1: Summarised balance sheet positions(in N million)
Liabilities 1975 1976 1978 1980
Issuad and paid-up Share capital 15.0 20.3 35.2 45.3
Capital reserves 10.0 14.3 32.0 52.0
Revenue reserves 8.4 13.0 24.2 41.5
Provisions 0.0 7.4 24.1 55:8
Taxation 6.9 15.8 44.7 82.0
Demand deposits 548.3 690.3 881.1 1196.7
Time deposits 110.6 228.0 167.4 484.2
Savings deposits 220.6 365.0 331.2 432.0
Totals 919.8 1,354.8 1,539.9 2,389.6
Assets
Cash 20.0 109.0 154.9 188.0
Primary reserve assets 211.0 230.0 230.0 410.0
Oder investments 340.0 543.2 433.5 688.9
Term loans 82.0 1C0.4 146.3 294.3
Overdrafts 249.8 352.2 550.1 778.2
Mod assets 17.0 20.0 25.1 30.2
Totals 919.8 1,354.8 1,539.9 2,389.6
decisions in SOFI at each decision point to ensure that the
required Central Bank liquidity ratio of 25% was maintained.
The maturity structure of the loan and investment port-
folios are as presented in tables 11.5 and 11.6 respectively.
Table 11.5	 Bank 1:	 Term loans portfolio-maturity distribution
(summary)	 (in percentages)
Maturity
(in years) 1975 1976 1978 1980
-2 80.0 85.0 82.5. .	 79.8
2-3 0.0 9.6 0.8 0.0
-4 17.0 1.9 15.7 18.0
4-5 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
over 5 3.0 1.5 1.0 2.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 11.6	 Bank 1:	 Investments portfolio-maturity
distribution (summary)	 (in percentages)
Maturity
(in years) 1975 1976 1978 1980
1-2 30.0 29.5 29.4 29.9
2-3 0.0 31.3 0.0 0.0
3-4 50.0 19.5 43.4 46.5
4-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
over 5 20.0 19.7 27.2 23.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOFI, however, produces more detailed breakdowns of these
portfolios, than these summaries show (see tables XI-1 and XI-2).
It will be noticed (as has been observed many times in this study)
that the maturity pattern of this hypothetical bank remains
virtually the same over the simulation period. About 80% of its
term loans are short-term; between one and three per. cent over
5 years and the balance medium-term. On.the average about one-
third of its investments are short-term, another 20% maturing
over 5 years and the balance (50%) medium-term. As can be gauged
from table 11.4 overall, there was a steady growth in the
individual balance sheet items. This trend mirrors the actual
Nigerian banking environment of this period.
3.2 The performance reports
SOFI is capable of producing a large number of key
performance and condition indices which are output instantaneously
on demand by the user. However, the ratios to be tracked during
the simulation will need to be defined and pre-specified and
this is done in the respective SOFI BAL file (see table XI-3
which
	
shows the ratios pre-specified for these simulation
exercises). Table x1-4 shows the detailed ratios report for
Bank 1 simulation. The performance indices in table 11.7 are
obtained from the Analysis Report and the Ratios Report produced
by SOFI, on request.	 These indices were selected among those
Table
	 11.7
	
Bank 1 - Performance indices
Index (1) 1976 1978 1980
tetinome/equity (%) 26.7 30.3 20.4
Net incare/assets (%) 0.7 0.9 0.8
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 6.6 6.6
Earnings per share (EPS) 59K 71K 53K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.3 50.5 50.8
Assets/equity 28.5 16.9 17.2
Loam/assets (%) 33.4 45.2 44.9
Term loans/deposits (%) 7.8 10.6 13.9
Term loans/term deposits (%) 16.9 29.3 32.1
(1) All the ratios are annualized
produced on the basis of their relevance for evaluating the
efficiency of commercial banks in Nigeria (as defined in this
study) as well as their safety.
The profitability ratios - net income-to-equity and net
iracome-to-assets - lie within the range observed for the banking
system in table VI-1
	
(a third profitability index, the EPS is also
tracked). These, however, though enormously important for the
continued stability and growth of the banks, are not of primary
concern in this study. Rather this study focuses more on the
efficiency ratios i.e. the ratios of loans-to-deposits, loans-to-
assets, and term loans-to-term deposits. These ratios for Bank I
are similar to the ones for the Nigerian banking system over
the test period (1975-80). (See table 6.2).
Two additional indices - the equity-to-deposits and assets-
to-equity ratios - have been monitored for the purpose of
. evaluating the resilience, or prudential strength, of the bank
through the simulation.
3.3 Bank 1 vs Bank 1(70
Bank 1 has been successfully 'created' and simulated
over a pre-specified operating horizon. This bank, in most
important respects, is a replica of a typical Nigerian commercial
bank. Because it conforms in operational performance and in
attributes to banks in Nigeria, this thesis argues that this is also
an excessively conservative bank. Having made the point that it
is desirable that Nigerian commercial banks should change their
moduli operandi, (particularly in the area of lending) and become
more aggressive, an attempt will be made here to test the general
reasonableness and prudence of this argument. Thus Bank 1 is "made"
more agqressive and the results of this action appraised. For
ease of identification, the aggressive Bank 1 is to be known
as Bank 1(A).
To simulate Bank 1(A), desirable changes are made to the
data (the assumptions) of Bank 1 and the earlier simulation
simply re-run. For these tests, three assumptions of the Bank 1
analysis shall be altered; the first two aimed at making Bank 1
more aggressive and the third to test its resilience in the new
aggressive posture it assumes. In three successive steps and
separate re-ivms of the model, alterations will be made to the
loans-to-deposit ratio of Bank 1 (the first definition of
aggressiveness); to the maturity pattern of its term loans (the
second definition of aggressiveness), and the loan loss rates (a
kind of sensitivity test).
3.3 1 What if the loans-to-deposit ratio increases to 60%?
labia XI-5 shows the balance sheet positions of Bank 1(A)
i.e. Bank 1 with a loans-to-deposits ratio of 60%. This increase
is assumed to be distributed, in the existing proportion, to
term loans and overdrafts; and all other things the BAL, the
CON, the VAR and the DEC files.
 - remain the same.
Bank 1(A)'s ratios report in table XI-6 shows the changes that
result from this action. 	 Table 11.8 compares these with Bank l's.
It can be seen that ratios 3, 4, 5 and 6 have increased
significantly, demonstrating improved operational efficiency.
Table XI-7 shows the performance indices of Bank 1(A) and table
11.9 compares these with corresponding indices for Bank 1. By
these indices, Bank 1(A) has performed better than Bank 1. This
is true considering the traditional indices of efficiency - the
profitability ratios and EPS; measures of stability - equity-to-
deposits and assets-to-equity ratios - and the primary measures of
Table 11.8 Bank 1 vs Bank 1(A): Comparative ratios report
1976 1978 1980
Bank 1 Bank 1(A) Bank 1
	 Bank 1(A) Bank 1 Bank 1(A)
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 35.3 60.0 50.5 60.0 50.8 60.0
Ratio 3 33.4 56.1 45.2 52.5 44.9 51.9
Ratio 4 7.8 13.3 10.6 12.6 13.9 16.5
Ratio 5 7.4 12.4 9.5 11.1 12.3 ' 14.3
Ratio 6 16.9 28.8 29.3 35.0 32.1 38.1
Ratio 7 46.2 46.2 36.1 36.1 43.4 43.4
Ratio 8 3.7 4.2 6.6 7.7 *6.6 7.6
-	 .
Table 11.9 Bank 1 vs Bank 1(A): Comparative performance indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank).	 Bank 1(A) Bank 1 Bank 1(A) Bank 1 Bank 1(A)
.
Net Inccme/equity NJ 26.7 46.1 30.3 34.0 20.4 20.8
Net income/assets (%) 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.9
EquitY/dePosits (%) 3.7 4.2 6.6 7.7 6.6 7.6
Earnings per share
/JVIV 59K lifl.C2K 71K 90K 53K 62K
Loans/eeposits (%) 35.3 60.0 50.5 60.0 50.8 60.0
Assets/equity 28.5 25.4 16.9 14.9 17.2 15.3
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 56.1 45.2 52.5 44.9 51.9
l'eJorm loans/assets (%) 7.8 13.3 10.6 12.6 13.9 16.5
Dmaloans/term
deposits (%) 16.9 28.8 29.3 35.0 32.1 38.1
efficiency defined for this study - the loans-to-deposits, loans-
to-assets, term loans-to-assets, term loans-to-term deposits ratios.
It may be useful to note that the ratio of assets-to-equity
declined systematically over the three periods. This is as it
should be as it indicates bigger growth in the denominator than the
numerator and corresponding potential improvement in the ability of
the bank to withstand stressful situations - that is, a
potential improvement in the bank's underlying prudential
strength, a financial resiliency;
3.3.2 What if term loans' maturities lengthen?
Next one may consider as a further increase in the
aggressiveness of Bank 1(A), a lengthening of the maturity
pattern of its term loans. This is a particularly useful test
because one of the major criticisms of the loans and advances of
Nlgerian commercial banks is that they are generally too short-
term to be of optimum use, especially in the agricultural and
manufacturing industries. Bank 1(A), in this simulation,
continues to retain a minimum loans-to-deposits ratio of 60%
established in the previous run. Apart from a lengthening of
the maturity pattern of the term loans, indeed, no other parameter
of the last set of simulations is altered. Again for the purposes
of easy identification, Bank 1(A) with a lengthened term loan
maturity pattern becomes Bank 1(A)-1.
Table 11.10 shows the new maturity pattern of this bank's
term loans. This indicates a considerable shift toward longer
Table 11.10 Bank 1(A)-1: Term loans portfolio: maturity
distribution (in percentages)
Maturity
(in years) 1975 1976 1978 1980
1-2 80.0 54.6 52.6 55.2
2-3 0.0 5.6 7.9 0.0
3-4 17.0 10.0 9.9 14.8
4-5 0.0 14.9 0.0 0.0
over 5 3.0 14.9 29.6 30.0
Total . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
maturity loans. For example, loans maturing over 5 years have
increased from 3% of all term loans in 1975 to 14.9% in 1976;
29.6% in 1978; and 30% in 1980. Whilst the proportion of medium
term loans have not altered radically, the increases in long-term
loans have been compensated for by decreases in short-term loans.
How does the more aggressive Bank 1(A)-1 perform
compared to Bank 1? Table XI-8 presents theperformance indices
of Bank 1(A)-1 and table 11.11 compares these to similar indices
for Bank 1. By lengthening the maturity pattern of its term
loans, the new bank has performed better compared to Bank 1
rather than worse. All the indices of performance, as can be
seen from table 11.11 have shown improvements. Bank 1(A) also
improves on itself after lengthening its loan maturity and
becoming Bank 1(A)-1. This can be observed from the comparative
performance indices presented in table 11.12.
3.3.3 What if loan loss rates increase?
It will appear reasonable and prudent in banking to
assame that taking up a more aggressive stance as Bank 1 has
done in two successive stages above necessarily involves some
elements of risk. Indeed actual losses can be incurred, at
least, over the short run. It is in the light of this that
this analysis proceeds to examine a situation in which the loan
loss rates of the hypothetical bank are increased.
Thus we substituted the loan loss rates in table 11.13
for those in table 11.3. All other things remain unchanged.
The 'new' bank - Bank 1(A)-2 - is,therefore, Bank 1 with a 60%
loans-to-deposits ratio, .a lengthened term loans maturity
pattern, and increased loan loss rates. With these alterations
to the structure and operations of Bank 1, will it still be
Table 11.11 Bank 1 vs Bank 1(A)-1: Comparative performance
indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank 1 Bank 1(A) -1 Bank 1 Bank 1(A) -I Bank 1. Bank 1(A) -1
Net incxme/equity (%) 26.7 46.1 30.3 35.8 20.4 21.8
Mt incare/assets (%) 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 1.0
EquitYgePosite (%) 3.7 4.2 ' 6.6 7.8 6.6 7.8
Earnings per share
OM 59K 1.02K 71K 95K 53K 66K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.3 60..1 50.5 60.2 50.8 60.0
Assets/equity 28.5 25.4 16.9 14.7	 . 17.2 14.9
Loans/assets (%)
	 . 33.4 56.2 45.2 52.4 44.9 51.5
Table 11.12 Bank 1(A) . vs Bank 1 (A) -1: Comparative performance
indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank
1(A) *Bank1(A)-1 Bank1(A) Bank1(A) -1 Bank1(A) Bank1(A)-1
Net income/equity (%) 46.1 46.1 34.0 35.8 20.8 21.8
Net income/assets (%) 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.0
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 4.2 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.8
Earnings per share
(EPS) N 1.02K 1.02K 90K 95K 52K 66K
Loans/posits (%) 60.0 60.1 60.0 60.2 60.0 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 25.4 14.9 14.7 15.3 14.9
Loans/assets (%) 56.1 56.2 52.5 52.4 51.9 51.5
Table 11.13 Bank 1(A)-2:	 Loan loss rates (per cent per annum)
Type of advance 1976 1978 1980
Term loans
Overdrafts
4
3
4
2
4
3
safe and profitable? The performance indicesfor the simulation
run for this 'new' bank are as in table XI-9; For comparative
purposes these are matched with Bank 1 indices in table 11.14
and with Bank 1(A)-I indices in table 11.15. It can be seen
from table 11.14 that the increased loan losses experienced by
Bank 1(A)-2 still do not appear to make it unsafe and unprofitable.
Neither is it comparatively worse off in this position than Bank 1
is. Indeed, on the contrary, it appears to be more efficient, more
resilient and more profitable than Bank 1 on the basis of the
comparative data in table 11.14.
When increased loan losses are allowed to accompany the
aggressiveness of Bank 1(A)-1, how does it withstand the stress?
Rather'well, as table 11.15 will appear to show. The levels of
performance marked by the seven indices have depreciated slightly
but not significantly. More importantly, however, this has
occurred without any appreciable damage to the efficiency,
resiliency and profitability of the bank.
4. VIPARYANDCONaUMNG EMIG
In the circumstances of these analyses, and indeed in
most research-oriented simulation exercises, no attempt can
defensibly be made to 'prove' anything. The above analyses,
however, appear to have strengthened the belief expressed
throughout this study that it will be prudent, safe and above all
in the best self-interest of commercial banks to become more
aggressive. It also leads to greater efficiency; i.e. efficiency
as broadly defined in this study.
The results of these analyses obviously do not provide a
"working paper" for commercial bank loan management. They do, it
is hoped, provide a useful indicator on the possible consequences
Table 11.14 Bank 1 vs Bank 1(A)-2: Comparative performance=
indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank
1
Bank
1 (A) -2
Bank
1
Bank
1(A) -2
Bank
1
Bank
1(A) -2
Net incane/equity (%) 26.7 37.0 30.3 34.4 20.4 18.5
Net incane/assets (%) 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 4.0 6.6 7.3 6.6 7.0
Earnings per share (EPS) 59K 82K 71K 86K 53K 52:K
Loans/posits (%) . 35.3 60.1 50.5 60.2 50.8 60.0
Assets/equity 28.5 26.9 16.9 15.7 17.2 16.6
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 56.2 45.2 52.4 44.9 51.5
Table 11.15	 Bank 1(A)-1 vs Bank 1(A)-2: Comparative performance
indices
1976 1978
_
1980
Bank
1(A)-1
Bank
1(A)-2
Bank
1(A)-1
Bank
1(A)-2
Bank
1(A)-1
Bank
1(A)-2
Net incane/equity (%) 46.1 37.0 35.8 34.4 21.8 18.5
Net imcane/assets (%) 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8	 -
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 4.0 7.8 7.3 7.8	 - 7.0
Earnings per share (EM N 1.02K 82K 95K 86K 66K 52K
Wans/deposits (%) 60.1 60.1 60.2 60.2 60.0 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 26.9 14.7 15.7 14.9 16.6
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 56.2 52.4 52.4 51.5 51.5
of altering Nigerian bank lending strategies in the areas tested.
Another side effect, or "spin off", of these exercises could be
to suggest the potentials of a SOFI-type tool in Nigerian bank
planning and balance sheet management.
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CHAPTER 12
SIMULATION EXERCISES: CONTINGENCY TESTING OF
THE PROPOSITION OF THE STUDY
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous. chapter an attempt was made to question
the feasibility and prudence of this study's assertion that
Nigerian commercial banks can be more aggressive and still remain
safe and profitable. A typical, though hypothetical, Nigerian
commercial bank operating under the economic and financial circum-
stances of 1975-1980 was created as a test bed. With the aid of
SOFI this 'bank' was subjected to various tests of aggressiveness.
The results of the simulation exercises appear to indicate
positively that the bank can stand these tests and come off not
only unscathed but more efficient, more resilient and more
profitable.
Banks today, like all businesses, operate in a highly
volatile and uncertain environment, with potentially severe
pressures such as high inflation rates and violent alterations
to the interest rates structure. In recent years even big banks
have collapsed under these kinds of pressures. There are also
less tragic cases in which banks and banking systems have
suffered hiccups sufficiently strong enough to shake their very
foundation and call for panic, rescue actions (see Gardener 1979,
Chapter 9).
It is true to say that in a banking and financial system like
Nigeria's, where the commercial banks are so dominant, it is
inconceivable that the Monetary Authorities will fold their arms
whilst banks collapse under stress. Nevertheless, it is prudent
and reaslistic to appreciate the probabilities and devise
strategies and tactics to overcome or ameliorate their effects.
After all, planning is nothing if it cannot help identify possible
problems and gaps so that efforts can be made in advance to
eliminate or plug them. It is, indeed, only then that it
(planning) can truly be said to be "control-in-the-future".
Thus it is considered instructive to subject the test-
banks of these analyses to reasonable and realistic pressures and
examine how they perform - collapse or survive. The banks that
will be tested are Bank 1, the typically "unaggressive" bank and
Bank 1(A)-1, the "aggressive" Bank 1 with a 60% loans-to-deposit
ratio and a lengthened term loans maturity pattern.
Another key motive for appraising more rigorously the
prudential capabilities of our test banks (especially the more
aggressive test bank) is that ratios by themselves may be
unsatisfactory measures of a bank's real or underlying prudential
strength. In the previous chapter it was shown that our more
aggressive bank appeared to be prudentially stronger than the
"typical Nigerian bank" (Bank 1), using conventional balance sheet
ratios like capital ratios. This result, however, may be
misleading if prudential ratios alone are themselves sometimes
misleading guidei to bank prudential soundness. As a result the
following contingency tests (stress situations) will avoid this
possible weakness in our Chapter 11 results by analysing our test
bank's prudential soundness in a more realistic and rigorous
system framework using SOFI.
Three stress situations will be 'created' for these banks.
These include the one in which
(a) loan loss rates are doubled;
(b) inflation rates jump by 20%; and
(c) liquidity crisis occurs as the result of a 10%
run off on all deposits in 1978.
2, CONTI NGENCY TESTING
The method of analysis to be employed for these exercises
is known as 'contingency testing'. Contingency tests are defined
as 'a collection of financial shocks applied to a bank's planned
financial positions" (Gardener, 1979 p. 8-1). Although these
shocks may be subjective in nature, they help to satisfy the
primary purpose of contingency testing which is that of an
early warning system, identifying in advance, gaps and weaknesses
in the planned financial positions of the bank. It is undoubtedly
a reliable means of avoiding'management by crisis' in that it
helps the setting up of a number of relevant and relatively
severe "what if..." tests. Where alternatives are available to
management, contingency tests can also help their evaluation and
thus aid them in reaching rational decisions; In the particular •
area of lending function, this kind of exercise is helpful in
identifying possible and/or potential excessive mismatching in the
balance sheet. With the aid of an advanced computer simulation model
such as SOFI, management is enabled to contingency test and
appraise their bank's financial plans for resilience, prudence
and profitability.
Broadly, a system of contingency testing a bank's financial
position will involve the following processes (Gardener, 1979,
pp. 8-15 and 8-16):
(a) Generation of the contingency test programme to be simulated
on the plan. A contingency test programme refers to the
collection of contingency tests set up specifically to test
the banks' strengths and weaknesses. (In these exercises,
the contingency tests are, as noted in (a), (b) and (c) in
section 1 above).
(b) Explicit identification of the constraints, like ratios
and performance measures, that are to be met under each
single contingency test run for the plan under analysis.
In this analysis, one ratio that must be met for both
banks is the liquidity ratio of 25%. Additionally for
Bank 1(A)-1 to possess the desired aggressive posture, it
must maintain a minimum loans-to-deposit ratio of 50%
and the maturity pattern of the term loans established in
Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 11. With regard to operating
performances, the point of interest to be carefully
observed is whether the contingency tests produce
performance indices that deviate significantly and
precariously from those recorded prior to simulation.
(c) The simulation of each contingency test in turn on the
plan. As these exercises involve the comparison of an
'aggressive' and an 'unaggressive' bank, there will be
three separate contingency test runs for each of the banks,
-
making a total of six separate runs.
(d) Evaluation of the simulation results obtained for each
test run. Sometimes these results may dictate the need to
reformulate parts of the plan being tested once the complete
contingency test programme has been run and evaluated. The
profit targets set may for instance be too ambitious given
the resources (both existing and potential) available to
the bank or alternatively because the estimate of the revenues
and provisions for losses, too conservative.
e) When the bank is generally satisfied with the financial plan,
the assignment of a suitable quantitative measure that
reflects management's assessment.
2.1 Contingency test 1 - (doubled loan loss rates)
One of the probable pressures that a Nigerian bank may be
faced with is a sudden doubling of its loan loss rates. This can
arise, for example, as a result of natural disaster caused by
drought such as occurred during 1973/74. The fact that banks are
likely to increase their credits to the agricultural sector and
also that there may be a repeat of that drought (since little has
been done to stop the Sahara desert shifting south or in form of
dams and irrigations to counter its effect) make the probability
more real.
Loan loss rates could also be doubled as a result of the
exposure of the country's nascent manufacturing industries to
international competition. On occasions in the recent past
when the government has adopted open-door import policies, many
local factories have been forced to close down or reduce
production - both with consequent likelihood of firms defaulting
in their loan obligations to the banks. It is thus most probably
a reasonable assumption that loan lo gs rates could be doubled for
a Nigerian bank. If this probability turns into a reality, the
question is, what will be the consequences for the operating
performances and/or safety of Bank 1 and Bank 1(A)-1? (The
assumed loan loss rates are as in table 12.1).
Since all other things are unchanged, the balance sheet and
the ratios report for these banks remain the same as they were
pre-contingency testing. Changes in loan loss rates will affect,
among other things, the performance indices. The post-contingency
testing performance indices for Bank 1 and for Bank 1(A)-1 are as
presented in tables XII-1 and XII-2 respectively. There are two
distinct but complementary ways in which one can evaluate the
observed changes in these indices. One is to compare these indices
with those for the respective banks before contingency testing,
and the other to compare one bank to the other post-contingency
testing.
Table 12.1
	 Contingency tests (1): Loan loss rates
(per cent per annum)
Type of advance 1976 1978 1980
Term loans
Overdrafts
7
4
6
3
6
4
In tables 12.2 and 12.3 it will be observed that two
important indices of lending efficiency were highlighted in
this study i.e. loans-to-deposits and loans-to-assets ratios
have been virtually unaffected all through the horizon of this
simulation. As will be expected all the indices of profitability
performance have been adversely, though not damagingly, affected.
In the worst cases, the profitability ratios and the EPS have
been nearly halved to their pre-contingency testing levels. It
is worthy of note, however, that the obtained profitability
. ratios for both banks, post-contingency testing, still compare'
favourably with those for banks outside Nigeria (see table VI-1)
and are, therefore, acceptable. Because the profits have
diminished due to higher loan losses, the shareholders' funds
lave been correspondingly affected. This has led to potential
adverse effects on the resiliency of the banks as measured by
the ratios of equity-to-deposits and assets-to-equity. These
ratios have not been significantly altered, however, as the
maximum reduction in either bank is less than five percentage
points.
It can thus be concluded that neither bank has been too
severely affected by even a doubling of loan loss rates in this
contingency test. The levels of their performances, post-
contingency testing, appear to remain acceptable. But an
important question that could be asked is: Which of the two
banks performs better under this kind of pressure - the "aggressive"
or the "unaggressive" one? The answer to this question can be
found in table 12.4 where the banks' performance indices, post-
contingency testing, are compared. As can be gauged from this
table (considering the criteria of efficiency, safety and probab-
ility -as defined in these analyses), Bank 1(A)-1, the "aggressive"
Table 12.2 Contingency test (1): Comparative performance indices
for Bank 1
1976 1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT,
Net income/equity (%) 26.7 15.6 30.3 23.4 20.4 13.5
Net income/assets (%) 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.4
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 3.4 6.6 5.8 6.6 5.3
Earnings per share (EPS) 59K 34K 71K 50K 53K 30K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.3 35.3 50.5 50.5 50.8 50.8
Assets/equity 28.5 30.9 16.9 19.4 17.2 21.5
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 33.4 45.2 45.2 44.9 44.9
,
Notes: (1) BCT = Before contingency testing
(2) ACT = After contingency testing
Table 12.3 Contingency test (1): Comparative performance indices
for Bank 1(A)-1
1976
,
1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT
Net income/equity (%) 46.1 27.5 35.8 28.0 21.8 14.1
Net income/assets (%) 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.5
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 37 7.8 6.5 7.8 5.9
Earnings per share (EPS) 1.02 61K 95K 66K 66K 35K
Loans/deposits (%) 60.1 60.0 60.2 60.0 60.0 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 28.67 14.7 17.6 14.9 19.58
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 56.1 52.4 52.5 51.5 51.9
Notes: (1) BCT = Before contingency testing
(2) ACT = After contingency testing
Table 12.4 Contingency test (1) - Comparative performance indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank Bank Bank	 Bank Bank	 Bank
1 1(A)-1 1 1(A)-1 1 1 (A) -1
Net income/equity (%) .15.6 27.5 23.4 28.0 13.5 14.1
Net incite/assets (%) 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.5
Equity/deposits (%) 3.4 3.7 5.8 6.5 5.3 5.9
Earnings per Share (EPS) 34K 61K SOK 66K 33K 35K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.1 60.0 50.5 60.2 50.8 60.0
Assets/equity 30.9 28.67 19.4 17.6 21.5 19.58
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 56.1 45.2 52.5 44.9 51.9
one, performs better than Bank 1.
-2-.2 Contingency test 2 - (a 20% jump In inflation rate)
In contingency test 2, it is assumed that there is a
sudden 20% rise in the rate of inflation. The major source of
inflation in Nigeria is government's monetization of oil
revenues. A very large proportion of government revenue comes
from taxes and royalties on petroleum and is earned in foreign
currencies.
"The rapid monetization of such inflow of funds to
finance an unsustainable level of government expend-
iture has posed the greatest threat to monetary
stability in the nineteen-seventies."
(CBN, Twenty Years of Central Banking in Nigeria,
1979, p. 125)
Thus if the government decides to engage in substantially
increased expenditure, this can very rapidly lead to a rise in
inflation rate of the magnitude being suggested here. In
Nigeria, therefore, this assumption will appear to be both
reasonahTe and plausible.
If this assumption is accepted, the immediate effect on
the binks is the inflation of their balance sheet footings.
For Bank 1 and Bank 1(A)-1, the new balance sheet series will
appear as presented in tables XII-3 and XII-4, respectively.
It may be true that in the real world of business there
does not exist a one-to-one relationship between the size of a
firm on the one hand and the costs and revenues on the other.
For convenience of analysis, however, it is being assumed here
that a linear relationship exists between these variables for
ee test-banks. Operating income, operating expenses and
miscellaneous income are thus supposed to rise proportionately
with inflation to the levels in table XII-5. When one considers
the fact that the major sources of income and expenditure of
banks are, respectively, loans and deposits and that with
interest rates and loan losses unchanged, these (income and
expenditure) will move proportionately with the size of these
portfolios (loans and aeposits), the above assumption will seem
to approximate reality.
The major effects of this kind of change in inflation
rate of concern to management will be those on operating
performance indices. As before interest is focused on the
transformations that have occurred in these indices - pre-and
post-contingency testing situations compared for the banks
(see tables XII-6 and XII-7). The comparison of Bank 1 and
BankI(A)-1, from this point of view, is also of interest as it
enables the evaluation of their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Using the ratios of equity-to-deposits and assets-to-
equity as measures of the strength of the banks to withstand
adversities, the changes observable in tables 12.5 and 12.6
Table 12.5 Contingency test (2): Comparative performance indices
for Bank 1
1976 1978 . 1980
- scr (1) 	 2) BCT Per Per ACT
Net incare/equity (%) 26.7 24.1 30.3 43.5 20.4 25.8
Net Inccme/assets (%) 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.9
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 3.0 6.6 6.1 6.6 6.4
Eamings per share (EFS) 59K 53K 71K 1COK 53K 75K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.3 42.2 50.5 55.0 50.8 55.3
Assets/equity 28.5 34.8 16.9 18.4 17.2 17.8
Loans/assets(%) 33.4 40.3 45.2 49.4 44.9 48.7
Notes (1) BCT 1111 Before caitingency testing
(2) ACT = After contingency testing
'Table 12.6	 Contingency test (2): Comparative performance
indices for Bank 1(A) -1
1976 1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT
Net income/equity (%)	 . 46.1 40.8 35.8 50.6 21.8 27.1
Net income/assets (%) 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.0 '1.1
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 3.4 7.8 7.1 7.8 7.5
Earnings per share (EPS) 1.02 90K 95K 1.30K 66K 92K
Loans/deposits (%) 60.1 62.6 60.2 62.9 60.0 63.2
Assets/equity 25.4 31.48 14.7 16.09 14.9 15.52
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 59.3 52.4 55.2 51.5 54.3
Notes (1) BCT = Before axitingency testing
(2) Per . After axitingency testing
indicate a deterioration. The reductions in these ratios,
however, are small and insignificant. The profitability of
the two banks dipped in 1976. This is because the expenses
increased immediately they were assumed to but incomes from
term loans and term investments take time to materialise and
match the expenses. The situation was reversed (as can be seen
from the tables) in the next two simulation periods, with
profitability after contingency testing being higher than
before it. The lending efficiency of both banks was also
improved upon as their loans-to-deposits and loans-to-assets
ratios increased post-contingency testing.
Turning to table 12.7 one finds that Bank 1(A)-1 performs
better than Bank 1 after this contingency test, just as before
it. This is shown through considering all the measures of
efficiency, resiliency and profitability.
Table 12.7 Contingency test (2): Comparative performance indices
1976 1978 1980	 .
Bank
1
Bank
1(A) -1
Bank
1
Bank
1(A) -1
Bank
1
Bank
(1(A) -1
kbt inoome/equity (%) 24.1 40.8 43.5 50.6 25.8 27.1
Mt inoane/assets (%) 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.1
Equity/deposits (%) 3.0 3.4 6.1 7.1 6.4 7.5
Earnings per share (EPS) 53K 90E 100K 1.30K 75K 92K
Loans/deposits (%) 42.2 62.6 55.0 62.9 55.3 63.2
Assets/equity 34.8 31.48 18.4 16.09 17.8 15.52
Loans/assets (%) 40.3 59.3 49.4 55.2 48.7 54.3
2.3 Contingency test 3 - (liquidity crisis)
The final stress situation that is "created" for testing
the hypothetical banks is one in which there is a sudden deposit
run-off amounting to 10% of all deposits in 1978. It is assumed
that all deposits are equally affected. It might be argued
that the deposits that will be most affected in this kind of
situation are current deposits. Empirical evidence, however,
points to the fact that all deposits are nearly equally vulnerable
during depressions (Morrison and Belden, 1965). It will thus
appear that the assumption of this contingency test is a valid
one to make.
If there is a deposit run-off on these banks, it is
suggested that their adjusted balance sheet series will appear as
in tables XII-8 and XII-9. -The changes in the structure of these
balance sheets can be gauged from the separate ratios report for
Bank 1 and Bank 1(A)-1 in tables XII-10 and XII-11. For
comparative purposes these ratios are matched in tables 12.8 and
12 9 with the pre-contingency testing ratios obtained for the
banks. These tables show that in 1978 when the liquidity crisis
occurred, all the lending efficiency ratios (i.e. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5
and 6) were improved upon after contingency testing for both banks.
The comparative ratios report (one bank with the other) in table
12.10 shows that Bank 1(A)-1, as in earlier cases, performs
better than Bank 1 throughout the simulation periods inclusive
of 1978, the year of the assumed liquidity crisis.
Tables XII-12 and XII-13 show the performance indices for
Bank 1 and Bank 1(A)-1 I respectively. Tables 12.11 and 12.12,
however, look at the comparative indices for the respective banks.
All through the periods of simulation these banks recorded better
performance indices after contingency testing. Considering 1978,
in particular, it will be found that both banks performed
relatively better after the liquidity crisis than before it. This
may appear paradoxical at first. The reason for this is not very
obscure, however. It is due to the way in which these banks
Table 12.8 Contingency test (3): Comparative ratios report for
Bank 1
1976 1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT(1) BCT ACT BCT ACT
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 35.3 35.3 50.5 56.1 50.8 50.8
Ratio 3 33.4 33.4 45.2 49.6 44.9 45.0
Ratio 4 7.8 7.8 10.6 11.8 13.9 13.9
Ratio 5 7.4 7.4 9.5 10.4 12.3 12.3
Ratio 6 16.9 16.9 29.3 32.6 32.1 32.1
Ratio 7 46.2 46.2 36.1 36.1 43.4 43.4
Ratio 8 3.7 3.7 6.6 7.5 6.6 6.5.
Notes (1) EICT 111 adore contingency testing
After comt.ingency testing
Table 12.9 Contingency test (3): Comparative ratios report for
Bank 1(A)-1
1976 1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT	 •
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 60.1 60.1 60.2 . 66.8 60.0 60.0
Ratio 3 56.2 56.2 52.4 57.4 51.5 51.6
Ratio 4 13.4 13.4 12.8 14.2 16.4 16.4
Ratio 5 12.5 12.5 11.1 12.2 14.1 14.1
Ratio 6 28.9 28.9 35.3 39.2 37.9 37.9
Ratio 7 46.2 46.2 36.1 36.1 43.4 43.4
Ratio 8 4.2 . 4.2 7.8 8.8 7.8 7.7
Notes (1) Ed' adore caitingency testing
(2) Acr After caitingency testing
Wile 12.10 Contingency test (3): Comparative ratios report
1976 1978 1980
Bank
1
Bank
1(A)--1 Bank1 Bank1(A) -1 Bank1 Bank1(A) -1
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 35.3 60.1 56.1 66.8 50.8 60.0
Ratio 3 33.4 56.2 49.6 57.4	 _ 45.0 51.6 -
Ratio 4 7.8 13.4 11.8 14.2 13.9 16.4
Ratio 5 7.4 12.5 10.4 12.2 12.3 14.1
Ratio 6 16.9 28.9 32.6 39.2 32.1 37.9
Ratio 7 46.2 46.2 36.1 36.1 43.4 43.4
Ratio 8 3.7 4.2 7.5 8.8 6.5 7.7
Table 12.11 Contingency test (3): Comparative performance indices
for Bank 1
•
1976 1978 1980
BCT (1) ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT
It incare/equity (%)
Net incane/assets (%)
Equity/deposits (%)
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Loans/ceposits (%)
Assets/equity
Loans/assets (%)
•
26.7
0.7
3.7
59K
35.3
28.5
33.4
26.7
0.7
3.7
59K
35.3
28.45
33.4
30.3
0.9
6.6
71K
50.5
16.9
45.2
.
31.6
1.1
7.5
74K
56.1
15.16
49.6
.
20.4
0.8
6.6
53K
50.8
17.2
44.9
18.3
0.7	 .
6.5
48K
50.8
17.45
45.0
Notes (1) KT = Before contingency testing
(2) ACT = After contingency testing
TAble 12.12 Contingency test (3): Comparative performance indices
for Bank 1(A)-1
1976 1978 1980
..'	 (1)BCT ACT (2) BCT ACT BCT ACT
Net incameAaquity (%) 46.1 46.1 35.8 37.0 21.8 19.9
Net income/assets (%) 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.9
Earnings per Share (Es) 4.2 4.2 7.8 8.8 7.8 7.7
Loans/deposits (%) 1.02K 1.02K 95K 98K 66K 61K
Assets/deposits (%) 60.1 60.1 60:2 66.8 60.0 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 25.4 14.7 13.3 14.9 15.1
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 56.2 52.4 57.4 51.5 51.6
•
-
responded to the reductions in their deposit resources. These
ban's met the increased demands for liquidity occasioned by
this crisis by selling off some of their investments. In the
process capital gains were made. Also because loans were not
called-in the banks' lending efficiency measured by ratios 2,3,5
and 6 was enhanced. As returns on loans are higher than those
on investments, the banks' relative profitability would be
enhanced after-contingency testing i.e. during the years after
1978. Stretched further this enhanced profitability will boost
the shareholders' funds and make the banks financially stronger,
with proportionately more capital funds now supporting less
deposits and less of total assets, in the year of crisis.
It appears clear from the comparative performance indices
for Bank 1 and Bank 1(A)-1 in table 12.13 that the latter retains
its comparative superiority after this contingency test. This
is not only true for all the performance indices in 1978 but for
all the simulation period.
Table 12.13 Contingency test (3): Comparative perfOrmance indices
1976 1978 1980
Bank
1
Bank
1(A)-1
Bank
1
Bank
1(A)-1
Bank
.	 1
Bank
1(A)-1
Net incane/equity (%)	 . 26.7 46.1 31.6 37.0 18.3 19.9
Net incare/assets (%) 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.4 0.7 0.9
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 4.2 7.5 8.8 6.5 7.7
Earnings per share (MO 59K 1.02K 74K 98K 48K 61K
Warm/deposits (%) 35.3 60.1 56.1 66.8 50.8 60.0
Assets/equity 28.45 25.4 15.16 13.3 17.45 15.1
Wars/assets (%) 33.4 56.2 49.6 57.4 45.0 51.6
.
.
_
3. S1et1ARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
With the aid of contingency-testing technique, Bank 1 and
Bank 1(A)-1 have been subjected to relatively severe pressures and
evaluated. Loan loss rates were 'doubled', inflation rate was
'raised' by 20%, and deposits were 'made' to shrink by 10% in
1978. In all these stressful situations, both banks appeared to
survive satisfactorily. The more important point to emerge,
however, is that the more 'aggressive' bank - Bank 1(A)-1 - which
incidentally has been found to be safer, more efficient and more
profitable in the previous chapter, came through all these stresses
just as well as the 'unaggressive', safety and profit conscious
Sank 1. It does appear that on the basis of this, albeit restricted
investigation, one can safely state that more aggressive
bank lending does not necessarily lead to adverse repercussions for
the efficiency, strength, and profitability of a commercial bank.
Since aggressiveness in lending enhances these (i.e. efficiency,
strength and profitability) and will commend a bank to its
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community, there is thus more to be gained in turning prudently
•
aggressive in this (lending) function. Aggressive commercial
bank lending also has a multiplier effect: it enhances the
success of the bank's customers i enabling them to provide the
bank with greater deposit resources for more aggressive lending.
In conclusion, therefore, all of the foregoing simulation
experiments have added further, strong support for our hypothesis
that Nigerian commercial banks are generally too conservative
in their lending and that they may become more aggressive
without excessive sacrifices of profit and prudence. We have not
identified how much more aggressive Nigerian banks could be and
this is not necessary for present purposes. Nevertheless the
essential point has been made that Nigerian commercial banks
may move toward significantly more aggressive lending stances
and still retain competitiveness, profitability and resiliency.
CHAPTER 13
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
L SU1MARY
This study has attempted to enquire into the efficiency
of commercial bank lending in Nigeria, given the basic a priori
reasoning that there is-an important role for the institutions
in the process of the country's growth and development. As
the review of literature reveals there is considerable and
•
growing consensus among development economists that money
matters, even in an important way, in development. This view
is supported strongly by the analysis of the relationship
between the real and monetary sectors of the Nigerian economy
(Chapter 3).
The important place of commercial banks in the Nigerian
financial and economic system appears clear from the brief
description of the lending environment in Chapter 5. In the
light of this, it is most improbable that society will not expect
the institutions to play a leading role in financial intermediation
in the economy.
The principles and practices of bank lending have been
shown to be changing rapidly in developed countries. This trend
has helped the relationships between banks and their customers
and more importantly, the contributions of banks to their
communities. Also the growing awareness among consumers and
governments of the importance of banks and their potential capacity
to influence economic activities, has led to questions being
raised about their efficiency. These have in turn led to efforts
directed it defining the measures of the efficiency of banks.
It is against this background that the analyses in
Chapters 6 through 12 have been undertaken. A statistical
--]
analysis of the determinants of bank lending performance in
Nigeria (in Appendix 1) 	 indicates total assets, deposit mix,
capital funds, interest paid on deposits and number of branches
as important explanatory variables. Although the evidence was
not wholly conclusive, it was sufficiently suggestive.
Equipped with This knowledge of some of the factors
influencing lending performance it was easier to proceed to an
evaluation of the aggregate lending operations of the banks in
Chapter 6. Although there had been phenomenal growth in the
total assets and Other variable	 ountin for efficienc in
!!!!!!2.11122511c_kgrlding_during the last two decades, there were
no corresponding improvements in their lending operations. For
example, the structure of their loans and advances portfolio 
did not change significantly, remaining mainly dominated by short-
term assets. There was also clear evidence that the banks did not
lend enough to the important economic sectors particularly the
agriculture and the manufacturing. These being areas of high
priority in the development strategy of the government, the
banks have, at least, to the extent of their deviations from the
CBN credit guidelines targets, been less than helpful and 
demopstrably sympathetic to the development goals of the economy.
From many points of view, even the loans granted have been
inappropriate. The repayment, the security and the maturity
patterns have been undesirable, reflecting neither the needs nor
the capacities of the borrowers.
In order to appreciate 'the why' of commercial bankers'
lending behaviour, it is both useful and instructive to understand
the determinants of their attitude to risk taking. Statistical
analysis was employed for this purpose in Appendix II. The
analysis shows that the selected explanatory variables are
highly correlated to the dependent variables. However, the
former were unable td provide large proportions of the explan-
ations for changes in the latter. Be that as it may, some useful'
insight was gained into the background to bankers' risk decision
thought process. AppendixIMprovides compelling evidence
indicating that the Nigerian bankers have over time become more
and more liquidity-oriented. With the growth in their total
resources, capital funds and other confidence and capacity
boosting factors, they have become more risk-shy. Consequently,
they have put decreasing proportions of their total resources
in loans and advances. TO the extent that investments in assets
otker than loans yield and contribute less to the development of
the economy, the banks' allocative efficiency has been below
expectation.
Using three types of questionnaires, an attempt was
made, empirically, to enquire into the 'liquidity preference' and
lending practices of the commercial bankers. The analyses in
Chapter 7 indicate that Nigerian commercial bank lending officers,
at all levels of management,possess a high preference for
liquidity. On a one-to-one basis, the statistical analysis shows
that there exists a significant relationship between only one of
the lending practices and the bankers' liquidity preference.
However, the multiple linear regression analysis results in a
high degree of correlation between the lending practices on the
one hand and the liquidity preference variable on the other. This
leads one to expect that these bankers will favour short-term
loans and decline long-term loans given their high preference for
liquidity. This is, however, not likely to serve appropriately
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the development needs of strategic sectors of the economy,
namely, the  agriculture and the manufacturing.
The limited and inadequate extent to which the banks
provide lending-related services; market their loans and
advances; and generally assist their customers is also evident
from* the analyses in Chapter 7.
The management and control of the banks' lending function
.	 .
was found to leave a lot to be desired. In general they do not
have an organised and systematic approach to corporate planning
and control. Not surprisingly, none of the banks operates with a
written loan policy.
The general scarcity of relevant and reliable information,
which is a feature of most developing countries, coupled with
an unwillingness to co-operate on the exchange of credit
information among the banks, apparently makes them undertake
greater risks and suffer more losses than are warranted. In sum
the banks are in a situation in which they are able to control
neither the quantity nor the quality of their advances.
Unlike the situation in the U.K. only a few banks in
Nigeria have a business advisory services unit. Marketing of
bank lending services is limited to advertisements aimed at image
building. Because of these they are not in a position to provide
the lending related services their customers ordinarily expect to
get.
The views or perception of the bank customers as presented
in Chapter 9 confirm the observed attitudes and lending practices
of the bankers. The customers neither get the quantity nor the
quality of lending services they need and ask for from the banks.
It is for this reason that a significant proportion of bank users
interviewed consider their banks "too conservative and safety
minded."
Given the foregoing analyses, it was thought desirable
to examine the feasibility of Nigerian commercial banks becoming
more aggressive in their lending function. SOFI, the simulation
model employed in the exercises was introduced in Chapter 10.
In Chapter 11 the aggressive stance of our hypothetical bank was
improved (rather significantly) by increasing its loan deposit
ratio and by lengthening its loan maturity pattern. This bank
was examined under stress conditions by contingency testing in
Chapter 12. The main finding of these exercises was that Nigerian
commercial banks would not necessarily become less safe, profit-
able or resilient because of being more aggressive in their
lending operations.
2. CONCLUSIONS
The analyses in Chapter 6, in sum, indicate that the banks
• have not lent enough in aggregate, that they have not lent enough 
to the important sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, and that
their lending has also been 'inappropriate'. In the light of
these, there thus appears to be sufficient premise for the
acceptance of the hypotheses I and II of this study.
In the analysis of lending practices in Chapter 7 and of
the planning and control activities in Chapter 8, there is
empirical evidence coming from the banking practitioners that
they do not provide enough supporting services along with their
••n
lending operations. This is further confirmed by the evidence
from the analysis of the responses of bank users in Chapter 9.
	
On
the basis of these it will appear reasonable to accept the
hypothesis III of this study. 	
•
From the results of the statistical analysis in Appendices
I F = andlII .,the analyses of empirical evidence of lending
practices, and lending planning and control, respectively, in
Chapters 7 and 8, and of the responses of bank customers in
Chapter 9, it appears clear that the lending attitudes of
Nigerian bankers are orthodox and conservative. That is to say,
that the bankers are not clearly development-oriented and
sufficiently sympathetic to the aspirations of the economy. This
being so, hypothesis IV appears to find sufficient support from
our research.
Finally, the results of the simulation exercises in
Chapters 11 and 12 appear to bear testimony to the implicit
assumption of the hypotheses of this study - that the Nigerian
commercial banks could be more 'efficient' in their lending
furction; and without deviating from prudent banking too.
3. REcomvecATIONS
All of the foregoing appears to show that the Nigerian
commercial banks are inefficient in their lending function and
thus contribute less than they can to the country's economic
development and growth. The logical question at this point appears
to be obvious: what can be done to improve the efficiency of these
institutions and ensure they contribute to economic development
to the maximum of their ability? It will be unrealistic to think thai
once the management techniques and tools have been well sharpened
and intelligently applied, all the lending problems will disappear.
In advanced countries where the banking environments possess, at
least, most of the essential elements such as infrastructural
facilities, skilled manpower, efficient and well integrated
financial systems, this may be so. This is not true of Nigeria like
most developing countries, however. Because these environmental
a bold and ingenous programme of technical services • •ort forSU
factors influence the level of efficiency attained by banks, it
will be necessary to consider improvements in these areas. It
will also be necessary to take cognisance of and attend to some
of the customer-attitude related problems such as unwillingnesi
to pay and diversion of funds.
3.1 Macro-level efforts
3.1.1 Government infrastructural support. 'Lack of know-how',
'bad management' and similar terms were frequently used in the
interviews by both the bankers and their customers to describe a
major problem of bank lending in Nigeria. It goes without saying
that lending cannot be efficient unless the right technical
ab lity exists in the borrowing firms to make effective use of the
financial resources; or alternatively, unless technical services
support is provided by the banker or a third party such as the
government. For this reason the government must come out with
the budding entrepreneurs in the country. There are many ways in
which government can do this. Effective dissemination of
technical know-how and technical services information, good use
of foreign aid assistance, feasibility studies, projects
identification and articulation can all play a part. "In some
countries (India, for instance) the achievement of such objectives
is sought through 'lead bank' schemes under which lending policies
are accompanied by technical services to the borrowers' (Bhatia
and Khatkhate, 1975, p. 138).
With particular reference to agriculture, where because
of the smallholder nature of production units and the level of
literacy of the farmers, the need for technical support is
crucial, the provision of extension workers must be substantially
increased. The level of provision at present is grossly inadepate.
Whilst in India the ratio of extension worker to farmer is 1:200;
and in Kenya it is 1:250; the ratio in Nigeria is a poor 1:2,500.
The extension workers can help with technical services to improve
the cropping techniques of the farmers, their farm management
and produce marketing. These will undoubtedly help to make
farming more efficient and consequently, the farmers become more
credit-worthy to the bankers.
Happily the basic ingredients for success are available
in the economic system as the World Bank experience suggests:
small farmer receptivity as such does not
tend to present a constraint to project success.
Where a well-tested, low-risk package of technical
recommendations is available at the outset and
continues to be profitable during implementation,
small farmers are responding quickly and positively."
(Pickering, 1981, p. 59).
Similarly with regard to the other major sector of the economy,
Kilby (1971, p. 354) asserts that "Nigerians have responded
quite promptly to profitable opportunities in. industry they have
the capability to exploit."
3.1.2 Loans rediscount/refinance facilities. In addition to the
foregoing indirect approaches to enhancing the credit-worthiness
of projects and customers, the government can also help directly.
This is by way of establishing facilities for rediscounting/
refinancing the term loans of the commercial banks. Bankers have
traditionally talked of the unwisdom of lending on a long-term
basis the funds they have borrowed on short-term. In general
they do not, therefore, want to lend long. When they do lend
long, they tend to raise their standard of credit worthiness
to ration the available resources for this class of loans
(Luckett, 1970, pp. 420-34 and Scott, 1957, pp. 41-8). If
refinancing facilities are available, the banks are likely to
become more confident to hold a higher proportion of their loan
portfolio in term loans. The present guarantee scheme - the
ACGS - does not meet either the needs of banks or those of the
customers adequately. It is .worth remarking here that rediscount/
refinancing schemes have enhanced lending to the priority sectors
of the economy in developing countries with similar problems,
such as India (Joshi, 1972), Pakistan (Islam, 1973) and Ghana
(Ogbe, 1975).
3.2 Micro-level efforts
3.2.1 Planning. The Nigerian commercial banks even in today's
uncertain business environment do not engage seriously in
corporate planning. As a result, they can only respond impulsively
and spasmodically to emerging opportunities and problems. This
will not lead to efficient operations.
The banks as a first step to efficient loan management
must begin to plan for their organisations as these corporate
plans provide the framework for the functional plans. Next,
within the framework of the CBN credit guidelines, the banks must
plan aggregate and inter-sector and intra-country distribution of
their loans and advances. An important part of this exercise
will involve drawing up and communicating in writing the lending
policies of the banks.
3.2.2. Management and control of advances. For several reasons
noted in the study the advances management and control of the
banks leave much to be desired. Improvements will thus be
required in key areas. First the banks must make greater efforts
to co-operate in the exchange of information. In this way
a customer cannot dupe two banksi one after the otheribecause
he will be exposed by the first bank to suffer. Secondly all
banks must begin to maintain comprehensive customer credit files.
This can yield a lot of dividends in terms of available inform-
ation on customers. A new lending officer will, for instance, be
enabled to assess and take decisions on credit customers on the
basis of a well kept credit file and in this way changes in
lending officers can be as painless as possible both for the
banks and their customers.
In the U.K. banks engage in the custom of including on
their boards as non-executive directors, experienced individuals
from commerce and industry. The big advantage of this is that
they bring their wealth of experience to enrich the policy
decision thought process. They also serve as (informal) links
between the banks and the community. This appears a useful way in
which Nigerian banks can make an 'intensive' use of the available
entrepreneural resources in the economy as well as get closer to
their customers.
In order to be able to offer the appropriate lending
facilities to their customers, Nigerian commercial banks must
engage in more vigorous marketing strategies and tactics. To
this end they must develop their business advisory services and/
or marketing departments; define their objectives and the operat-
ional means of achieving such objectives.
Because of the limited use to which computers are put in
the few banks that own one, the supply of basic lending
information such as outstanding balances, age of loans, value of
collaterals for loans, etc., covering the whole operations of
individual banks are not output from the computers. In the
light of this, no controls can be exercised over lending as
quickly as desirable. There are enormous benefits to be
gained from automating loan information systems in the banks
(see Carr and Duffy, 1970; Geisco, 1980; Hasley, 1971; Sangster
and Raguso Jr., 1973; and Popadic, 1973).
3.3 Joint efforts
3.3.1 Training. The area of manpower training is one in which
both the commercial banks and the CBN as agents of the government
ought to combine efforts to facilitate the desired increase in
the pool of available skilled manpower for the industry. Overall
the supply situation is unsatisfactory (see Otiti, 1978). Yet
the demand is urgent in view of the rapid growth in the industry
(s e Otiti, 1976); In addition to widening the scope of the
present facilities for producing skilled manpower for the
industry, it will be helpful to establish an institution along the
lines of the Indian Institute of Management. This institution
can design and carry out short, medium and long-range programmes
to accelerate manpower training for the industry. It might
also be assigned the responsibility for co-ordinating manpower
development strategies for the industry so that the efforts of
the universities, the Nigerian Institute of Bankers and the CBN
can be streamlined. Finally, the Institute should be able to
conduct applied research into the problems of the industry and
make the resulting literature available to all interested persons
and institutions.
It appears clear from this study that the need to change
the lending attitudes of Nigerian bankers is just as urgent as
the need to improve their skills. Therefore an important part of
the training efforts must be directed at helping to re-orient the
approach of the bankers. Among others, their view of collateral
must be drastically altered so that they appreciate its role in
lending decision-taking. There is also need to make the bankers
aware of the economy-wide implications of the lending activities
.so that the need for development financing can be better
appreciated by them.
As is done in the U.K. there is need to organise seminars
for bank customers particularly those in the manufacturing and
agriculture sectors. These will provide the essential fora for
discussing and seeking mutually beneficial solutions to the
numerous lending problems in Nigeria.
.3.3.2 Credit bureau. Another important area of joint effort is
that of the provision of a central credit bureau. The lack of
adequate co-operation between the banks, the tarseness of the
information exchanged and the general paucity of credit information
in economy, make the establishment of this institution an urgent
one (see tableXECI-1 and Wright, 1976).
3.3.3 Co-operatives. The basic units of production in developing
countries like Nigeria are typically small - individual craftsmen
and artisans, small-holder farming. Given all the goodwill on
the side of the banks, and costs and profits considerations
apart, sheer number will make the attempt to extend credit
facilities to these small units impossible and the conception of
such an idea even a joke. The formation of these units into
co-operative organisations with larger resources and increased
credit-worthiness will provide a desirable answer. Thus the
government must give more attention and devote greater resources
to this strategy than hitherto. The banks as a friend and
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financier of the community can also help a great deal as the
example of Shell's "Uboma Development Project" has demonstrated
(see Ijere, 1975).
3.4
Direction of future research. Like many studies of this nature,
this has raised many more questions than it has been able to
answer. It is hoped, however, it has pointed research attention
to a rich and potentially rewarding area of study in Nigeria.
Up to date little is known about the size, the nature and the
structure of the demand and supply of loans and advances in
Nigeria. Comprehensive and government supported studies will be
required to do this. It is only when these demand and supply
functions can be well defined that lasting solutions can be
designed to solve the problems of bank lending in Nigeria.
Some models have been employed for analysis in this
study. These have not performed satisfactorily because of the
non-inclusion of sufficient explanatory and performance variables.
Research efforts aimed at making these models more comprehensive
and powerful in describing lending performance of banks and the.
lending behaviour of bankers will no doubt be very welcome to
academics and policy makers. More incisive studies of the
different aspects of loan management in the banks such as
planning, management and control will contribute immensely towards
improving the efficiency of commercial bank lending in Nigeria.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
THE DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS'
LENDING .PERFORMANCE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
Measuring the performance or the efficiency of the
operations of any socio-economic system is usually a difficult
task. As we have noted in Chapter 2 it is even more so with
commercial banks and other financial institutions. The two
major problems usually are the heterogeneity of the inputs and -
the outputs of the commercial banking system and the unquantifiable
nature of most (and at times the most important) of these inputs
and outputs. The size of these problems has not, however, deterred
some scholarly attempts at commercial banks' performance
evaluation by researchers such as Kaufman (1966), Fraser and
Rose (1972), and Soyode and Oyejide (1975). (See also Edwards,
1979 and Greenbaum, 1967 for reviews). These attempts have been
geared, in general, to the evaluation of the "total" bank rather
than specific aspects of its operations. Given the scope of
this study, we will be restricting this evaluation to the lending
function of the commercial banks. By focusing on this identifiable
and important aspect of the banks' operations, it is hoped we will
be enabled to select, with some measure of confidence, those
. factors most likely to influence the efficiency of the lending
function.
The purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to test
the ability of some selected variables to influence the lending
performance of commercial banks. The results will, hopefully,
help us identify which variables are important determinants of
bank lending efficiency, as well as provide some quantitative
measure of their importance.
Sections II and III, respectively, examine the
determinants and the measures of performance used in this
analysis. The data of the analysis are discussed in Section IV.
In Section V the results of the analysis arepresented. Finally
Section VI deals with the concluding remarks.
II
TFE EETERMI NAM'S
Empirically tested economic theories suggest a number
of factors that are statistically related to bank performance
(Fraser and Rose, 1971 p. 602). These factors, some of which
are endogenous and some of which are exogenous to the banking
firm, include market struciure, demand for bank services,
importance of non-bank financial services, bank costs, loan
composition and bank size. Data availability and the specific
orientation of this analysis dictate that we employ the following
particular factors as determinants of bank lending efficiency in
this exercise:
Total Assets
Ratio of Time Plus Savings Deposits-to-
Total Deposits
Ratio of Capital Funds-to-Total Deposits
Ratio of Interest Paid-to-Total Deposis, and
Number of Branches.
2X21 asseis (size) is- undoubtedly an important factor in the operational
efficiency of any economic unit (in the particular case of banks,
see Haslem, 1968, pp. 172-173). This is because of the theoretic-
ally possible and often available economies of scale (see
McCall, 1980). A priori, it appears reasonable to suggest that
bigger banks are more likely to be able to employ comparatively
more capable personnel who will enhance the efficient operation
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of their lending function (see Sinkey, 1975) than are smaller
banks. With the sophistication of production activities in
all sectors of the world economy, lending to these activities has
itself become specialised. Efficient lending to the agricultural
and manufacturing sectors, in particular, today requires the
technical support of specialists in these areas of production
activities (see Wilson, 1979). Because of the scarcity of such
specialised staff, particularly in a developing country like
Nigeria, the personnel are expensive to obtain and retain even
for the big, resource-rich banks. If we add this element to
that of the ability of bigger institutions to diversify their
loan portfolio, one can then state that, all things equal, size
is most likely to determine, considerably, not only the volume
but also the efficiency of lending.
Ratio of time plus savings-to-total deposits (deposit mix)
In the main, banks lend out the deposits available to
them. The longer the term of these deposits, the longer the
banks should be confident and willing to part with them by way of
loans. Since a large part of time and savings deposits represents
the resources that can, in crisis-free business periods, be lent
on a long-term basis (Morrison and Selden, 1965) the bigger these
deposits are as a proportion of total deposits, the better placed
are the banks to make term loans. Because of the long-term nature
of agricultural and manufacturing production, and given the
paucity of alternative sources of long-term finance in a typical
developing economy, the longer-term the commercial banks' lending
to these sectors the more efficient. Thus given the right
development-conscious and risk-accepting attitude to lending on
behalf of these bankers, it can be hypothesized that the bigger
the time and savings deposit resources available to them, the more
efficient lending they will make.
Ratio of capital funds-to-total deposits (capital ratio)
After providing for the fixed assets of a bank, little if
any, is left of the share capital for the lending activity. Over
time the capital fund is increased by the transfer of undistributed
profits, which, in any case, are usually unavailable in cash. It
can be seen, therefore, that the capital fund does not provide
spendable resources to enhance the lending operation. It does,.
however, provide an intangible but invalliable resource-confidence.
This is because generally the size of the capital base of a firm
measures the level of owners' commitment and confidence in the
business. In the case of a bank this in turn provides confidence
to all outsiders including depositors, the monetary authorities
and the business community (Gardener, 1980).
It is not only the absolute size of the capital fund that
matters to these outsiders. The ratio of capital fund-to-total
deposits is also of considerable importance.. In general, the higher
this ratio, the more stable and financially resilient these
watchers' have come to think the bank is (1) . Much more than
any other thing, it is this public confidence that helps maintain
a bank as a going-concern. Once this confidence is merely dented,
it is only the direct or indirect intervention of the monetary
authorities as in the case of the U.K. fringe bank crisis in
(1) In the light of the limitations of this ratio, "it has become
common practice to compute the ratio of "free capital" to depositd
(CLCB, p. 54). But because "the public at large is not privy
to sufficiently detailed information about the degree of risks
of the banks' assets to compute sophisticated capital/asset
ratios" (CLCB, p. 63), this "crude" measure is still widely
monitored by banks as well as the interested outsiders.
1973/74, that can save it from collapsing. Banks in turn,
should partly, at least, derive their confidence to lend from
the position of this ratio. As this ratio increases, otter things
being equal, the confidence of banks to lend, and the volume
and term of bank lending should increase.
Ratio of interest paid-to-total deposits (interest paid ratio)
Interest rate structures are normally now specified
for commercial banks in Nigeria by the Central Bank. Within
this broad structure, rates payable on different types of
deposits are stipulated. As deposits provide the main resource
for lending, the cost of this resource will influence the
volume and type of lending activities (see Fraser and Rose,
1974). This is particularly so in the case of Nigeria where•
the Central Bank specifies the rates to be charged on loans to
important sectors of the economy such as agriculture and
manufacturing. All these, however, do not mean that banks are
entirely strait-jacketed. Given the situation as it is, an
efficiently managed bank can positively influence its lending
activities in one major way. It can minimize its total resource
cost by a clever combination of cost-effective sources of
deposits.
Ceteris paribus, the higher this ratio the more reluctant
banks are to acquire deposits and the less loans they will make
both to the development-inducing sectors and in the aggregate.
There are other aspects of lending to be affected also. The
higher this ratio, the greater will be the tendency for banks
to charge the maximum allowable rate and to increase their
profit margin by inflating uncontrolled service charges. These
in turn will inevitably lead to high bad debts and high ratios
of interest received plus fees-to-total loans.
Number of branches (branching networks).
The branches of the banks are the outlets for the majority
of loans in value and number. Given this fact, a priori
thinking will suggest that the more numerous a bank's branches,
the more loans it will be able to make (for some empirical
evidence see Soyode and Oyejide, 1975). Similarly the more
representation a bank has in the rural areas the more
agricultural loans it will be able to make. To a large extent.
this will also be true for urban branching and manufacturing
loans. Provided the branching networks are spread over a wide
area of the country, the more diversified the loan portfolio
will be in terms of the regional elements of risk; and
consequently the less the impact of total loss through bad loans.
On the whole it seems plausible to suggest that the number of
branches will affect the efficiency of bank lending.
III
1HE PERFORMANCE VEASURES
The choice of the lending efficiency measures is also
dictated largely by the focus of this study. Whilst we include
the now popular performance measures such as the ratio of total
loans-to-total deposits, and the loan loss ratio, proxied here
by the ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts-to-total
loans, (for a review see Edwards, 1979, pp. 449-490), we also
include measures not commonly used in this kind of analysis but
most relevant for the situation under consideration. These
measures are the ratio of agricultural plus manufacturing loans-
to-total deposits, and the ratio of interest received on loans-to-
total loans. Because these banks operate in a developing
environment, it is appropriate that they should be evaluated
in this frame. It is also this consideration that influenced
the non-selection of the most commonly used measure of
efficiency - profitability.
The ratio of total loans-to-total assets Measures broadly
the ability and the willingness of banks to convert their idle
cash deposits into productive resources. It is in this way that
they act as effective agents of capital formation (Moulton, 1918,
p. 869). For a developing economy there can hardly be rendered
a better service by a financial intermediary than that of
helping to organise capital resources internally. Because loans
are of different types - some desirable others not - one can
only say in broad terms that a higher ratio of total loans-to-
total assets is welcome.
The best available measure of loan quality is the ratio
of net loan losses-to-total loans. However, because of their
sensitivity, figures for loan losses are hardly ever published.
If the public are ever enabled to keep track of banks' loan
losses, so the authorities apparently believe, they may unwittingly
decide to withdraw their confidence in banks and cause a fliqht
of deposits when such an action may be neither warranted nor
desirable. This measure of loan function efficiency is thus
very rarely used. It is, however, appropriate in the circumstance,
to proxy it by the ratio of provision for bad and doubtful
debts-to-total loans. These provisions are proximates to net
(1) From a joint study (0jo and Adewunmi, 1980 a),conducted by this
researcher, it was found that Nigerian commercial banks are
favourable contenders for the place of the most profitable
banking system in the world (see also table .6.1).
losses because the tax authorities often have explicit rules
concerning the total amount of provisions that may count as
deduction from current profits (Revell, 1975 p. 84). All
things being equal, a well managed bank's loan function should
produce a lower ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts-
to-total loans.
It was noted in the last but one paragraph that the
ratio of total loans-to-total assets is not an entirely
satisfactory measure of the efficiency of resource use in a
bank. This is because it reveals nothing of the nature of the
loans. To provide further insight into this aspect of bank
activity for present purposes, the ratio of agricultural plus
manufacturing loans-to-total loans can be examined. This ratio
m asures the extent to which banks' lending activities are
longer-term in nature and developmental in orientation. It is
most probably safe to state that these two sectors hold the key
to the growth and development of any developing economy. The
contribution of commercial banks to these sectors should thus
properly be seen as a measure of the efficiency with which they
discharge their obligation to their business environment.
Lending to the agricultural and manufacturing sectors
to be growth-and-development-inducing must necessarily be
long-term, given the nature of the production activities in
these sectors. Long-term resources in the form of time and
savings deposits will be needed to support such lending activities.
But to what extent are these resources so employed by Nigerian
commercial bankers? The answer to this question should provide
another measure of the performance of these institutions. It
follows logically that, in this study and in general, the higher
the ratio of agricultural plus manufacturing loans-to-time
plus savings deposits, the more efficient a bank will be
considered.
In a developed economy where the commercial banks are
only one of the numerous agents of capital formation, it is
understandable why the institutions are often evaluated largely
on the. basis of profitability. The more profitable a commercial
bank is, the better. But this is not entirely true of a devel-
oping society where a proper balance must be struck between
commercial and developmental efficiency. It is in the light of
these that the ratio of interest received on loans-to-total loans
(loan rate) is an important measure of lending efficiency
and bank performance (see Sinkey, 1975). Ideally, banks in a
developing environment must stimulate demand for their loans by
deliberate policies on core factors of demand such as the interest
rate. The lower the loan rate, the more efficient a bank is
likely to be in this developing environment. Indeed, given the
Central Bank's ceiling on charges for loans to these "preferred
sectors" of the economy, we should expect to observe that returns.
to commercial banking are inversely associated with the levels
of economic development (see Macesich, 1965).
IV
THE DATA
The data of this analysis, (obtained from the Central Bank
of Nigeria), derive from the end of year returns of the commercial.
banks. As it is normal practice, the data were supplied
anonymously, that is without revealing the identity of the
relevant institutions. This analysis relates to 18 of the 19
individual commercial banks in operation in 1979. The 19th
bank-was excluded because complete data on it were unavailable.
This is not, however, a very significant omission as the bank'
accounts for only 3.5% of the total assets of the commercial
banking sector 15ee table I.1(Ag
V
THE RESULTS
In addition to the regressions for the 18 banks, separate
regressions were run using data relating to the foreign banks
and the indigenous banks. This was done to enable us to
examine if there are variations between these two main subsectors
of the commercial banking system. The regression results and
the mean ratios and the standard deviations for the variables of
the analysis are shown in tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.
Ratio of total loans-to-total assets
The coefficient of multiple determination, R 2 , between
the five independent variables and this dependent variable is
significant at the 10% level. With R2 equal to 0.64518, the
independent variables pertormed very well in explaining the
variations in this ratio.
The coefficients of relationship between this ratio and
deposit mix and the interest paid ratios are significant; the
one at the 5% level, the other at the 1% level. The relationship
between deposit mix and this dependent variable, though positive
as expected, is surprisingly weak. More surprising, however,
is the negative and, at the same time, very weak relationships
between size and capital variables and this ratio. Given the
fact that the branches are the main outlets for loans and
advances, the relationship between the number of branches and
the ratio of total loans-to-total assets is not nearly as strong
Sources:
Elx TA
TSTD
CTD
IDTD
ILTA
PBDTL
AMTL
AMTS
ILTL
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Table I.1(10 Cross-sectional data for the analysis of the
determinants of Commercial Banks' lending
per
TA
Dependent variables
TSTD	 CTD
	 Imp ILTA
Independent variables
PBITEL	 AMIL	 AMTS . ILTL No.of
lxanct
1 1,617 49 5- 2.1 59.0 1.2 45.8 54.8 8.5 108
2 2,269 50 5 1.5 48.2 0.8 41.2 19.9 9.7 111
3 2,621 56 4 1.9 61.9 1.0 36.3 40.0 8.9 54
4 674 57 3 2.5 98.2 4.2 28.0 48.3 6.3 50
5 482 39 4 1.5 81.9 17.3 30.3 63.5 5.4 63
6 299 59 8 1.8 104.3 1.4 44.1 78.0 9.6 7
7 271 67 5 2.4 106.7 1.4 43.0 67.5 6.3 . 20
8 159 54 2 0.5 55.1 5.0 15.0 15.3 6.8 24
9 256 38 4 1.2 59.3 0.8 50.8 78.9 9.3 23
10 745 71 7 1.3 81.7 0.1 38.5 44.1 3.7 20
11 54 58 17 2.2 67.0 7.2 31.9 37.0 16.2 5
12 156 45 5 2.6 90.2 3.1 25.6 51.8 10.8 13
13 129 46 10 3.2 90.2 1.5 32.1 63.0 10.0 13
14 835 52 4 1.5 56.6 1.5 26.2 29.3 10.2 36
15 104 33 15 2.3 57.6 4.5 61.9 107.6 13.4 7
16 32 53 20 0.8 62.5 1.0 23.4 27.6 7.8 5
17 37 48 11 1.3 32.6 2.4 23.1 15.7 15.5 3
18 104 56 7 1.4 70.5 4.6 24.6 31.0 7.5 :19
Tables VI-5 and la-6.
= Total assets (in N m)	 .
= Ratio of time plus savings deposits/total deposits
= Ratio of capital funds/total deposits
= Ratio of interest paid on deposits/total deposits
= Ratio of total loans/total assets
= Ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts/total loans
= Ratio of agriculture plus manufacturing loans/total loans
= Ratio of agriculture plus manufacturing loans/time plus
savings deposits
= Ratio of interest paid on loans/total loans
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as expected, having a coefficient of 0.39338 only.
A breakdown of the commercial banking system into
sub-systems of foreign and indigenous banks reveals there are
little variations between these two. The R2s of the
relationships between this ratio and the independent variables
are substantially higher for both the foreign and indigenous
banks than it is for the system. Only one of these R 2s, that
of the indigenous banks is, however, significant at the 10%
level.
None of the coefficients of the relationships between
the independent variables and this dependent variable is
significant for the foreign banks sub-sector. In addition to
the negative relationships between the size and capital ratio
variables and this dependent variable, the results also reveal
a weak and negative relationship between it and the number of
branches. On a priarithinking, this is most unexpected. This
will be less surprising, however, if it is appreciated that
these foreign banks came on the heels of, and mainly serve/the
big expatriate businesses, situated in a few urban spots in the
country. In this kind of scenario, size rather than number of
loans (and therefore branches) is the influencing factor.
The reverse appears to be true of the indigenous banks.
The coefficient of relationship between the number of branches
and this ratio is positive, very strong and also significant
at the 10% level. So also is the relationship of interest paid
ratio to this dependent variable, with a coefficient significant
at the 5% level. Although the relationship between the size
variable and this dependent variable is stronger (-0.40287)
than it is for either the "all banks" or foreign banks group,
it . 1s, as in the other two cases, surprisingly negative. The
relationshipsof deposit mix and capital ratio variables to this
dependent variable are very weak. But unlike the position in
the other two groups, the coefficient of relationship between
the capital ratio and this dependent variable is positive as
will be expected.
Finally, it is noteworthy that it is the foreign banks
analysis that reveals anything close to the expected strong
relationship between the deposit mix Variable and this dependent
variable. As evidenced by the sizesof the coefficients for the
three analyses, the interest paid ratio is the most important
of the five independent variables in explaining the variations
in this dependent variable.
Ratio of provision for bad and doubtful debts-to-total loans
The five independent variables explain only a little over-
one-quarter of the variations in this variable. The coefficient
of multiple determination, which is 0.27113, is not significant
even at the 10% level.
Of the five independent variables, only the number of
branches is positively related to this variable. The coefficient
of this relationship (0.65739) is both strong and positive. To
the extent that this coefficient is positive, it is "surprising".
This is because increased branching networks, ceteris paribus,
should provide opportunities for diversification of loan
portfolio, which should spread total risk and thus cut provisions
for bad debts.
The coefficient of relationship between the interest paid
ratio and this variable has a negative sign. This is contrary
to what one will expect as noted earlier above. The other
three independent variables are negatively and "correctly"
related to this variable.
Contrary to the results obtained for the "all banks"
group, the R2s for the foreign and indigenous classes of banks
indicate that a substantially high proportion of the variations
in the dependent variable is explained by the five independent
variables. For the indigenous banks, the R2 is additionally
significant at the 10% level. Interest paid ratio is the most
important of all the independent variables in explaining the
variations in this dependent variable. With a value of 2.39013
this coefficient indicates the expected strong positive
relationship between these two variables (i.e. interest paid
ratio and the provisions ratio). Although the relationships
between the other four independent variables and the dependent
variable for foreign banks are strong (ranging from 0.60299 to
0.96453), the signs being positive are not "correct".
In the indigenous banks class, the coefficients of the
relationship between the size and the number of branches on the
one hand and the dependent variable on the other are significant,
respectively, at the 10 and 5% levels. The other three
coefficients are not significant. The capital ratio is positively,
though very weakly, related to this dependent variable.
Ratio of agricultural plus manufacturing loans-to-total loans
The independent variables explain only a small proportion
of the variations in this variable. The R2 of 0.23029 means
that less than a quarter of the explanations is provided.
Two of the independent variables (deposit mix ratio and
number of branches) are negatively related to this dependent
variable. Contrary to expectation this result means that these
most important factors do not account for variations in the
volume of agricultural plus manufacturing loans relative to
total loans. Apparently, interpreting these results technically,
higher deposit costs do not adversely affect the allocation of
resources to agriculture and manufacturing as the coefficient
of the relationship of these variables (0.48462) carries a positive
sign. The size variable, rather than deposit mix or capital
ratio, is the most important explanatory variable of the five.
As willbe expected, both the size and the capital ratio variables
are positively related to this dependent variable.
Ninety-five per cent of the variations in the dependent
variable are explained by the independent variables considering
the foreign banks group analysis. Although the R2 is very large
it is nevertheless not significant. Individually, all the
independent variables of the foreign banks analysis are negatively
related to the dependent variable. Except in the case of interest
paid ratio, all these signs are "incorrect", that is to say,
contrary to a priori thinking.
The sign of the coefficient of the relationship between
the capital ratio and this dependent variable for the indigenous
banks analysis is negative and "incorrect". As in the "all
banks" analysis reported above, the signs of the coefficient of
the relationship of the other four independent variables and this
dependent variable carry similar signs and the comments made in
those cases are equally valid here. Overall the most surprising
result here is that of the relationship between deposit mix ratio
and this dependent variable. For the three separate analyses
this relationship is both weak and negative. The inference
here is that more stable deposit resources exact negative rather
than positive influence on the levels of agricultural and
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manufacturing loans. This is surprising considering the fact
that lending to these sectors is more likely to be long-term in
nature. The inference of course, might well be that the banks
in spite of the long-term nature of the resources available to
them and of the activities in these sectors, only offer short-
term advances to the entrepreneurs.
Ratio of agricultural plus manufacturing loans-to-tine plus savings dwcsits
Forty per cent of the explanation for the variations in
this variable is provided by the five independent variables.
The coefficient of the relationship of the independent variables.
and this dependent variable is not, however, significant.
Interest paid ratio is the most important of the five
explanatory variables. The coefficient of the relationship of
this ratio and the dependent variable carries a positive sign
and is signilicant-at-the 10% level. The positive direction of
this relationship suggests that resource cost does not adversely
influence the use of deposits for medium-to-long-term lending'.
This also seems to lend support to the widely-held view that
commercial banks, after all, pool all deposits and allocate funds
to different uses without immediate concern for costs and sources;
provided, of course, that the statutory and prudent levelsoof
liquidity are maintained.
All the other independent variables are negatively
related to this variable. These results are contrary to
expectation. For instance, more branches and increased size
(total assets) should, ceteris paribus, lead to increases in
this ratio. As expected, however, the relationship between this
ratio and the number of branches is positive in the indigenous
banks group's analysis. The nature of the other four coefficients
for this class of bank and those of the coefficients for the
foreign banks analysis are very akin to what was observed in
the "all banks" analysis.. The comments made in those respects
above apply with equal validity here as well.
	 •
Ratio of interest received on loans-to-total loans
The five independent variables were able to provide
explanations for 47% of the variations in this ratio. As may
be expected, interest paid ratio is strongly and positively
related to this dependent variable, having a coefficient of
0.86401. It is also the most important of the five independent
variables in explaining variations in the loan rate. Two other
independent variables - deposit mix and capital ratio - though
w akly related to the loan rate have coefficients of relationship
that are significant at the 10% level.
It appears reasonable, from the point of view of tile often-
discussed theoretical economies of scale, to expect that the bigger
the size of a bank, the lower, we should .expect to observe, the
loan rate. The result of this analysis does not appear to support
this proposition as the relationship between total assets and
loan rate is positive as well as weak.
The coefficient of relationship between deposit mix and
loan rate is negative as well as significant at the 10% level.
This result is welcome if the inference is that banks do not pass
all increases in costs of their resources to their clients in
the form of higher loan rates. Economies of scale and benefits
of increased diversification may be the explanations for the
observed negative relationship between number of branches and
loan rate.
Although the coefficient of the relationship between the
loan rate and capital ratio is significant at the 10% level and
positive too, knowledge about the link between these variables
is poor. We, therefore, do not draw any conclusions from this
result.
The five independent variables in the foreign banks
analysis are positively related to the loan rate. Together the
independent variables explain 86% of the variations in loan rate
for this group of banks.
On the other hand, size and interest paid ratios are
the only two independent variables positively related to the
loan rate in the case of indigenous banks. As in the foreign
banks analysis, however, the independent variables perform very
well (69%) in explaining variations in the loan rate. There
is also a significant and negative relationship between number
of branches and loan rate as was found for the 'all banks' analysis.
VI
SIMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Overall the independent variables performed reasonably
well in explaining the variations in the dependent variables.
They provide between 40 and 65% of the explanations for the
variations in three of the five dependent variables. In the
remaining two they offer in one case 23% and in the other 27%
of the explanations. The result is not unexpected as it ought
to be appreciated that there are important explanatory variables,
such as management, inevitably left out of the model, as noted
at the outset. Unlike hitherto, however, we now have an
appreciably good idea of the determinants of bank lending
performance in a developing environment like Nigeria. The
analyses have helped-to identify some of the relevant factors to
consider in evaluating and/or attempting to improve the efficiency
of the lending function in this environment.
IA
A division of the banking system into the foreign and
indigenous banks' sub-sectors for separate analyses has not been
a "wild goose chase". For from these analyses we know there
exist some variations, wide at times, between these two main
classes of Nigerian banks. This fact is reinforced by the
evidence revealed by the Means and the Standard deviations of
the variables in table 1.2. In 1979, the indigenous banks
invested a greater proportion of their resources in loans
(73.07%) than the foreign banks (68.50%).
The contrary, however, would have been expected in view
of the availability to foreign banks of long experience (both
in Nigeria and abroad) and imported expertise in the form of
personnel, procedures and practices. That this result might be
due to attitude more than expertise is, however, evidenced by
the groups' relative provisions for bad and doubtful debts - a
measure of loan quality. Whilst the foreign banks provided 2.31%
on the average with a standard deviation of 2.57%, the indigenous
banks made average provisions of 3.89% with a standard deviation
of 4.69%. As Olieh (1979 p. 45) frankly admits:
while the expatriate banks have advantage
of age and experience and a reservoir of qualified
personnel and are consequently able to set up systems
and procedures that make for great operating efficiency,
most indigenous banks rely on local manpower, who because
of insufficient exposure cannot match the level of
expertise of their expatriate competitors."
The foreign banks had on the average higher ratios of agricultural
plus manufacturing loans-to-total loans, and-to-timeplus savings
deposits. In another analysis (Appendix II) , permitting
anticipation, it will be found that whilst, relatively, foreign
banks invested more in manufacturing, the indigenous banks more
than matched their performance in agriculture.
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Table 1.2 The means and standard deviations of independent and dependent
variables
Variables StandardMean Deviation
1 Total assets: All banks 6.02	 7.80
Foreign banks 11.01	 10.65
Indigenous banks 2.85	 2.66
2 Time plus savings deposits: All banks 51.72	 9.61
Total deposits Foreign banks 53.71	 11.66
Indigenous banks 50.45	 8.43
3 Capital funds: All banks 7.55	 5.12
Total deposits Foreign banks 8.71	 5.19
Indigenous banks 6.82	 5.19
4 Interest paid on deposits: All banks 1.78	 0.68
Total deposits Foreign banks 1.87	 0.37
Indigenous banks 1.72	 0.84
5 Number of branches: All banks 32.27	 33.14
Foreign banks 44.57	 47.46
Indigenous banks 24.45-	 17.64
6 Total loans: All banks 7.16	 2.05
'Dotal assets Foreign banks 6.85	 1.88
Indigenous banks 7.31	 2.23
7 Provision for B.D. & D: All banks 3.28	 3.99
Total loans Foreign banks 27ar--------2.57
Indigenous banks 3.89	 4.69
8 Agric. plus manufacturing loans: All banks 3.45	 1.17
Total loans Foreign banks 4.28	 0.96
Indigenous banks 2.93	 0.99
9 Agric. plus manufacturing loans: All banks 4.85	 2.48
Time plus savings deposits Foreign banks	 • 5.45	 2.94
Indigenous banks 4.47	 2.21
10 Interest received on loans: All banks 9.22	 3.29
Total loans Foreign banks 10.00	 3.94
Indigenous banks 8.72	 2.88
Source: Computer print-out
For all loans, the foreign banks charged more on the
average (10%) than the indigenous banks (8.72%). There are
two main factors that could account for this. One, the indigen-
ous banks, as we have found, lend relatively more to the
agricultural sector. Since the rate for lending to this sector
is pegged at 6%, their loan rate will, overall, be lower than
that of the foreign banks with comparatively more lending to
the manufacturing sector attracting higher interest charge. Two,
the indigenous banks were established to serve specific states or
group customers. A good example is the Co-operative Bank Limited
for co-operators in Western Nigeria. One way in which these
institutions fulfil the objective of serving these customers is
by charging concessionary interest rates on loans and advances
(0j0 and Adewunmi, 1980b).
It is noteworthy that none of the independent variables
emerged as consistently the most important factor in explaining
variations in the dependent variables. Interest paid ratio was
found more important than others in explaining variations in
three out of the five independent variables. Deposit mix and
size variables shared the pride of place, one each, in the other
two cases. With one exception each, total assets and number
of branches were rather surprisingly weak in their ability to
explain variations in the dependent variables. A plausible
deduction from this result is that banks do not efficiently employ
increased resources (assets) and facilities (branches).
Admittedly, in practice the relationships between the
specified performance measures and their determinants as in this
model are more unlikely to be linear. Therefore, for operational
purposes a doubling of total assets, say,. may not guarantee a
25% increase in loans and advances. The functional importance
and usefulness of the results of these analyses will appear to
lie in their implications for commercial banks' broad policy
formulation and performance monitoring. The above analyses
provide information for management on some quantifiable factors
•
determining bank performance. More importantly, however, the
analyses indicate the basic nature of the relationship between
•these performance variables and their determinants- Like the
product of all quantitative analyses, a knowledge of these
relationships can only serve as an input to the decision-making
process.
Furthermore, the analyses offer a caution. Because only
part of the total explanations for the variations in the
performance variables is provided by these selected independent
variables, management is made, subtly, aware of the fact that
more factors than those employed in the analysis (probably more
important in their explanatory power) must still be identified.
and accounted for before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.
The usefulness of these results to the whole study is that
they will aid a better appreciation of an analysis of the lending
activities of the banks; particularly in Chapter 6. With this
information about the determinants of the lending performance
of the banks, one is better placed to appraise their operational
results.
Finally the weakness of the abOve analysis may be
noted. For lack of relevant data i.e. cross-section data for
one or more other years, the stability of these results has not
been tested.
APPENDIX II
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF
NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS' ATTITUDE TO RISK
INTRODUCTION
Commercial banks in all parts of the world operate under
differing degrees of control exercised by the monetary authorities
in their community. Because of the commercial-business nature
of these banks, these controls necessarily provide room for
initiative and considerable flexibility of actions. The
Nigerian commercial banks, as can be gauged from the analysis in
Chapter 5 are not an exception to the rule in this regard.
Thus they operate with sufficient latitude for the employment
of initiative in resource management. In determining whether
these institutions are effective and efficient in their lending
and other operations, it will be useful , to examine how they
function in their regulated environment. In the ultimate,
however, it is the individual manager's attitude or willingness
to take risk that will determine the level of efficiency attained.
This disposition will also, broadly, determine to what extent
those risk assets, such as loans, are acquired and the way the
asset portfolios are structured (see Carleton, 1962).
Undoubtedly, the determinants of a bank's attitude to
risk are many and vary in number and influence from bank to
bank. Many, and unfortunately the potentially more influential,
of these variables are still largely unquantifiable given the
present state of management science (see Carson and Scott Jr 1963,
pp. 420-33). The cultural, the sociological and the psychological
make-up of a manager will, for instance, contribute immensely
to his attitude to risk taking (Phelan, 1962). Yet this is still
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difficult to express numerically for incorporation into
quantitative models. Given this state of affairs and the
statistical nature of this analysis, we shall inevitably be
confined to those factors that are quantifiable and for which
data are also available. In the following analyses, we shall
try to find out the measure of the contribution of the selected
factors in the determination of the bankers' willingness to
assume risk.
As Revell (1975, P. 80) asserts:
there is a special relationship between risk
and the operations of financial institutions,
because a large part of the functions of these
institutions is to reduce the risk of financial
transactions for both savers who plate funds
with them and the borrowers who are enabled to
have the use of these funds."
It is the fact of this relationship that makes the present
analysis relevant to this study. There are, of course, different
types of risks arising from different sources (Revell, 1975,
p. 80). We are in this analysis using risk in a general sense
to refer to that all-important factor that permeates the whole
operation of commercial banking. Although confined, in the
main, in these analyses to the lending function, one is wary of
restricting the definition of risk to, say, credit risk. This
is because of the belief that the classification of risk is
easier in theory than in practice. Even though bankers recognise
and identify types of risk, the final portfolio structure
decision is the result of trade-offs between, and a proper
balancing of, all risks.
The next section presents the data for the analyres in
this chapter. Section III discusses the variables of the model.
The' resultsof the statistical tests are presented in Section IV.
In the final section some of the implications of the results of
these analyses for Nigeria's economic development are examined.
II
1HE DATA
Two sets of data are used in these analyses! 1) The first
consists of cross-sectional data for all the individual
institutions of the Nigerian commercial banking system. Because
of the well-known Central Bank's practice of not supplying
individual data with institutional identification, these data,
obtained from the First and Second Schedule of returns of the
banks for December 1979, were given anonymously. The second set
consists of a time-series of quarterly data for the period
starting from the first quarter of 1965 and ending with the
fourth quarter of 1978. The source of this second set of data
is the CBN's Economic and Financial Review for various years.
For further, and hopefully more insightful, analysis, the
commercial banking system is divided into two groups of eleven
indigenous and eight foreign banks. As only the 1979 data provide
scope for this breakdown, it is the only set so used. The hope
is that the time-series and cross-sectional analyses will reveal
(if any) the time and intra-industry dimension of the phenomenon
being examined (i.e.banker's attitude to risk).
III
THE VARIABLES OF THE ME..
Two broadly similar models were developed for fitting
these data. The more comprehensive of the two is that for which
the cross-sectional data are fitted. Three independent variables
and five dependent variables are used in a multiple regression
model for analysing the cross-sectional data. The model using
the time series data is the same in all respects except for the
(1) See Tables II-1(A) and II-2(A)
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Table II-.1(A) Cross-sectional data for the analysis of the
determinants of Commercial Bankers' attitude
to risk
Dependent variables
Size	 TSTD	 CTD CATA
Independent variables
TLTA ALL	 117:1, MLTL
1 1617 49 5 33 44 10 24 36
2 2269 50 5 31 34 5 17 37
3 2621 56 4 18 31 5 8 31
4 674 57 3 21 70 9 8 19
5 482 39 4 27 50 8 10 22
6 299 59 8 16 48 4 7 40
7 271 67 5 17 70 12 6 31
8 159 54 2 37 37 5 8 10
9 256 38 4 32 43 11 4 41
10 745 71 7 9 35 7 4 31
11 54 58 17 26 32 2 6 30
12 156 45 5 19 67 9 4 17
13 129 46 10 26 47 6 10 26
14 835 52 4 29 39 4 8 22
15 104 33 15 33 21 3 4 59
16 32 53 20 49 47 14 3 9
17 37 48 11 13 26 8 17 15
18 104 56 7 35 50 3 0.02 22
19 378 75 3 24 41 3 8 26
Sources: Tables VI-6 and VI-7
Key:	 Size = Total assets (in N
TSTD = Ratio of time plus savings deposits/total deposits
CID = Ratio of capital funds/total deposits
CATA = Ratio of current assets/total assets
TLIA = Ratio of total loans/total assets
ALTL = Ratio of agriculture loans/total loans
131.TL = Ratio of unsecured loans/total loans
MLTL = Ratio of manufacturing loans/total loans
34 7
Table II-20Q Time-series data for the analysis of the
determinants of Commercial Bankers' attitude
to risk
Dependent variables
TSTD	 CTD
398,566 50.7 12.4
381,506 54.4 12.9
384,728 54.5 12.0
434,286 53.2 11.2
429,074 54.6 10.8
442,092 56.4 11.0
447,512 60.0 11.1
482,558 55.3 11.2
497,692 54.3 10.3
412,492 54.8 9.3
419,722 56.5 9.5
449,012 54.3 8.9
490,016 52.3 9.9
490,490 56.9 10.0
483,126 57.6 9.7
560,070 55.5 8.1
614,478 57.5 7.4
645,424 56.7 11.0
665,448 57.8 15.8
761,814 53.7 13.5
844,664 50.8 11.8
897,670 55.6 11.1
977,540 53.6 10.2
1,152,034 51.6 8.8
1,267,934 54.1 9.1
1,237,052 56.6 10.1
1,259,726 58.9 11.1
1,275,884 56.5 10.7
1,247,428 55.8 10.5
1,319,064 58.4 10.6
1,362,912 57.5 10.1
1,437,466 57.6 9.7
1,571,614 54.4 9.0
1,699,303 56.2 9.2
1,765,571 60.8 9.2
1,771,969 57.5 8.5
1,847,991 57.0 7.8
2,109,145 58.3 7.1
2,488,788 57.2 6.2
2,811,156 57.5 5.9
CAM
Independent variables
'ILTA	 ML	 MLTL
9.6 68.6 34.0 10.5
10.4 57.8 25.8 13.7
14.4 54.6 18.7 14.8
9.6 62.2 39.6 10.7
7.7 60.7 1.9 12.3
10.0 55.7 1.9 -14.0
14.1 52.5 2.0 16.2
11.0 62.5	
_
1.6 12.8
11.9 58.2 1.5 13.5
12.9 53.1 1.5 14.3
15.6 54.5 1.5 16.8
11.0 61.2 1.3 14.4
26.7 48.9 1.4 15.8
34.0 42.0 1.6 19.2
38.9 41.9 1.7 20.2,
40.2 40.3 1.7 16.4
50.2 30.6 1.6 19.1
48.8 30.9 1.7 20.5
49.8 30.0 1.8 22.1
48.5 31.8 1.8 17.3
51.2 27.0 2.1 19.4
52.6 27.1 2:2 19.2
50.1 29.1 2.1 21.9
48.8 30.5 '2.0 21.7
48.1 31.2 2.9 23.8
33.2 35.4 2.4 28.1
28.9 36.5 2.2 27.2
28.0 39.3 1.8 23.8
31.5 40.4 2.1 26.8
29.5 40.4 2.3 26.6
32.1 40.2 2.6 26.6
31.0 43.1 3.1 23.2
33.9 36.9 2.8 23.8
34.8 35.7 3.0 24.4
32.8 36.3 3.2 2.0
26.8 42.5 2.9 0.8
31.8 40.8 3.3 25.7
38.0 37.1 3.1 28.9
31.1 33.6 3.1 28.7
30.1 34.4 2.9 27.6
Dependent variables
TSTD CTD CATA
Independent variables
TLTA	 maL MLTZ
3,222,332 52.1 5.2 26.5 30.3 2.7 27.7
3,618,758 53.4 5.2 25.5 31.0 2.8 28.0
3,879,395 54.4 5.0 24.1 34.0 2.2 26.7
4,307,986 55.4 4.5 22.2 35.7 2.6 28.6
4,917,402 46.4 3.8 18.4 31.8 3.3 27.7
5,222,476 51.4 4.0 17.1 32.5 4.0 30.0
5,891,963 50.0 4.0 15.1 31.9 3.7 29.1
6,371,366 47.5 3.8 24.2 33.3 3.8 28.7
7,168,780 41.7 3.4 31.4 31.1 3.9 28.1
7,335,455 43.8 3.9 25.7 34.5 3.7 28.4
8,125,853 41.7 3.8 23.2 33.6 3.7 27.6
8,530,947 43.1 3.9 22.6 36.0 4.5 272
8,920,706 41.3 3.9 22.0 36.1 4.6 30.5
8,669,461 46.2 4.7 18.9 41.9 4.7 27.7
8,918,915 48.1 4.9 18.7 42.8 5.0 27.7
9,105,681 49.1 5.0 16.7 45.1 5.6 27.7
Sources: CBN Economic and Financial Reviews (various
issues - 1960-1976)
Key:
	
See Table II-1(A)
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fact that it has four dependent variables rather than five.
1EI.1 The explanatory variables
These are: (a) Total assets
(b) Ratio of time plus savings-to-total
deposits, and
(c) Ratio of capital funds-to-total deposits.
Total assets represent an important (and generally used)
dimension in which the size of banks is measured (see Kaufman,
1966, and Tulasne, 1981). More importantly the size of total
assets should, to some extent, indicate the ability or
capacity of a bank to assume risk. Thus it can be hypothesised
that ceteris paribus the bigger a bank is, the greater should
be its propensity for risk-taking. A big bank, because of the
sheer size of its assets, is better cushioned for, and can better
absorb, 'shocks' resulting from the risks inherent in portfolio
management. This confidence-giving attribute should thus make
the big bank more risk-accepting and less-risk averting than
a smaller bank.
An important advantage of economies of scale can also be
mentioned here. Because of its large size, a big bank will
invariably be more able to employ and maintain well-informed and
experienced management staff. So in addition to being willing
to take risks, the bigger bank will also be able to do so because
it has the know-how, the expertise and other relevant resources
(Benston, 1968).
Finally it is more rewarding to spread risk by diversific-
ation if the portfolio is large than when it is small. This
indeed is the principle on which Unit Trusts operate. It can be
hypothesised, therefore, that, ceteris paribus, the bigger a bank
is, the bigger should be its propensity for risk-taking.
The second explanatory variable of the analyses is
the ratio of time plus savings deposits-to-total deposits.
This ratio, to some extent and in 'normal' times, measures the
volatility of a bank's deposit base. Morrison and Selden (1965
p. 13) have found that "there is support for the view that savings
deposits are less volatile than demand deposits." However, "in
the great depression, savings depositors proved to be as
vulnerable to panic as demand depositors." Banks grant loans
and invest on the strength of their deposits. The more volatile
or unstable, the less confidence the bank will have in employing
them on a long-term basis. Besen's (1965, p. 97) conclusion that
"the degree of stability of sources of funds of a bank had an
important bearing on the portfolio selection" will appear to
lend credence to this line of thinking. In a branch-banking
system as in Nigeria, deposit volatility may not be a strong
alibi for not lending long. This is because the statement that
"the clearing banks with their large branch networks can be
confident that a substantial proportion of the deposits will
remain with them ...." (Wilson Report, p.43) is also true for
Nigerian banks. In essence, time and savings deposits represent
the more stable and reliable portion of bank deposits.
Properly viewed, a large share of the time and savings deposits
shOuld thus be seen as constituting the core deposits in the
banks. This being so it will appear logical to expect that the
higher the ratio of time plus savings deposits to total deposits,
(1) This is particularly so in the case of Nigeria where a large
proportion of these are retail rather than wholesale deposits
and CDs account for less than 2% of total deposits.
the greater the ability and willingness of banks to take risks
should be. One point must be noted here, however. It is that
whilst it is less controversial to assume that deposit stability
enhances the ability of banks to make risky investments, it is
debatablawhIltharthey will thus be more risk-accepting.
The ratio of capital funds-to-total deposits is the
last explanatory variable being employed in these analyses. The
reason for selecting this variable is perhaps apparent. "The
ultimate strength of a bank lies in its capital funds." (Crosse
and Hempel, 1973, p. 69). This is not, however, so much because
of the usefulness of capital funds in meeting the liabilities of
the bank in a financial crisis but "rather as a factor, perhaps
the most important factor, in maintaining the 'confidence a bank
must enjoy to continue business and prosper" (Crosse and
Hempel, 1973, p. 70).
Thus depositors and the supervisory authorities are likely
to favour "the maximum amount of capital as protection against
risks inherent in banking business" (Crosse and Hempel, 1973,
p. 67). From this point of view it seems a reasonable hypothesis
to state that the more capital a bank has in relation to its
total deposits, the higher should be the proportion of risk
assets in its portfolio. This will be so because the more
capital it has the more "protection" it is likely to be able to
provide for the risks inherent in the investment of depositors'
funds. Ceteris paribus, the more of this "protection" the
greater the degree of confidence reposed in the bank by its
' depositors and the financial community and, therefore, the more
willing such a bank should be in increasing the share of risk
assets in its portfolio. This statement must be particularly
true in the Nigerian case where capital adequacy is still assessed
by the monetary authorities in terms of capital-to-deposit and
capital-to-loans and advances ratios. For example;
"A commercial bank may not• apply its funds for
payment of dividends to its shareholders unless
such a bank maintains a ratio of not less than
one to ten (1:10) between its adjusted capital
funds and its total loans and advances." (CBN,
Monetary Policy Circular No. 12 for 1980 Fiscal Year).
Given this restriction, the more capital funds a bank has,
absolutely and in relation to its total deposits, the more
loans and advances it is able to make. In Nigeria this ratio
does not only provide the necessary incentive in the form of .
confidence to lend but also the legal capacity to do so. The
v riables total assets, ratio of time plus savings deposits-
to-total deposits and ratio of capital funds-to-total deposits
will, respectively, be referred to in the rest of these analyses
as size, deposit mix and capital variables for convenience of
reference.
121.2 The dependent variables
These are the variables chosen to serve as indicators of
the risk-averting propensities of Nigerian commercial bankers.
In a developing environment like Nigeria's where the majority
(in number, at least) of borrowers are new, growing and struggling
borrowers, no banker can be efficient if excessively risk-
averse. Lending to this group of borrowers is inherently risky
and a banker must be risk-accepting to be able to perform
efficiently.
Although there are five variables in all here, the first
two are the most important. The last three are included with
the hope that the results will provide further knowledge about
the second variable. The variables, which are in ratios, are:
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Current Assets-to-Total Assets
Total Loans-to-Total Assets
Agricultural Loans-to-Total Loans
Unsecured Loans-to-Total Loans
Manufacturing Loans-to-Total Loans
In the case of Nigeria, much more than in advanced countries'
financial environments, current assets held by banks consist
mainly of virtually risk-free government securities. This is so,
because, as is noted in Chapter 5, the money Market in Nigeria
is still very nariow in terms of variety and volume of financial
assets available for investment of funds. The ratio of current
a sets-to-total assets, if high reflects the reluctance of banks
to take on riskier assets. The higher this ratio is, the more
risk-averse a bank is and the lower, the more risk-accepting.
The obverse of this variable is the ratio of total Zoans-
t -total assets. This is the second dependent variable of the
model. Federal Government Development Loan Stocks issued by the
CBN on their behalf are the other major investment assets, apart
from loans and advances, competing for the long-term funds of
commercial banks in Nigeria. Since these stocks are relatively
riskless, at least, in terms of "default or delay in fulfilment
of obligations" and "changes in interest rates" (Revell, 1975,
p. 80), this ratio (total loans-to-total assets) will appear to
measure appropriately the banks' propensity to assume risk.
In essence, the ratio of total loans-to-total assets
will not reveal satisfactorily the risk attitude of banks. A
loan portfolio will ordinarily consist of short-term commercial
advances as well as longer-term lending to agriculture and
industry. The ratio of agricultural loans-to-total loans; of
manufacturing loans-to-total loans; and of unsecured loans-to-
' total loans will help reveal the true dimension of the risks
associated with the loans. These ratios have thus been chosen
for their potential ability to provide supporting evidence for
the second dependent variable (i.e. ratio of total loans-to-total
assets).
It is noted in Chapter 5 that the indigenisation of
the Nigerian commercial banks has made the dichotomy between
indigenous and foreign banks less meaningful. This is true and
valid for the analysis of the structure of the Nigerian
commercial banking system. In- an evaluation of banking practices
and behaviour, this may not be wholly true. Individual bank's
calture, policies, and, therefore, behaviour are much too deep-
r oted to be blurred by the mere wave of an "indigenisation wand."
T e indigenous and foreign banks are more likely to continue to
b have true to traditions and well-internalized practices. These
attributes more than any change in the bank's name and share-
holders are what dominate the attitudes, the motives and the
policies of these institutions. In the light of these, in
addition to analysing the behaviour of the banks as a.system,
indigenous and foreign banks have been isolated for analysis as
well. It is hoped that these further analyses will enrich the
understanding of the different sub-groups of the commercial
banking sector.
IV
THE REUSS
In this section the results of the analyses are presented.
As table II.1 shows, the multiple correlation coefficients, Rs,
indicate some strong measures of correlation between the
selected independent and dependent variables. For the 'all banks'
class, the correlation is not so strong generally and particularly
between the ratio of agricultural loans-to-total loans and the
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independent variables.
The foreign banks analysis exhibits a much stronger
relationship, with the Rs ranging between 58.56 and 94.37%.
On the other hand the indigenous banks indicate a much less strong
relationship with four of the Rs having values ranging between
41 and 46% and the fifth as . low as 22%. All the coefficients of
multiple determination (R 2s) are, with only one exception, not
significant. Although the values of the R2s are generally low,
it is noteworthy that in the foreign banks analysis, the
independent variables provide better explanations for the
variations in the dependent variables. This is particularly
n ticeable in the relationship between the ratio of current assets-
to-total assets and the ratio of manufacturing loans-to-total
1 ans with 49.92 and 89.06%, respectively. The independent
variables are very poor, however, in explaining variations in
the dependent variables in the case of the indigenous banks
analysis. -Less than one-quarter of the explanations is provided
by these variables.
Ratio of current assets to total assets
For all the three groups and all the independent
variables, the beta coefficients were not significant. More
importantly, however, the signs of the beta coefficients were
largely unexpected. Only in the case of foreign banks class
(for all variables) and the ratio of time and savings deposits-
to-total deposit (for all groups) were the signs "correct"; that
is negative. Given the fact that an increase in size as
measured by total assets creates opportunities for diversification
and other scale economies advantages, it is to be expected that
more assets should increase risk-acceptance propensities of
banks as noted earlier. The results of these analyses
indicate the contrary for the banking system and the indigenous
banks group. The exception to the rule here is the foreign
banks group.
Ceteria paribus, higher capital funds-to-total deposits
should give banks needed confidence to assume more risks. That
this is true is confirmed only by the foreign banks analysis.
The signs of the beta coefficients for the other two groups of
banks are "incorrect".
The sign of the beta coefficients of the ratio of time-
plus savings deposits-to-total deposits, for all groups of
banks, are negative and "correct". The sizes of these betas are
also worthy of note. As can be observed, the beta coefficients
for this ratio are larger than the corresponding betas for the
other two independent variables in all the three groups of banks.
This result reinforces the belief that time and savings deposits
considerably influence portfolio decisions.
Ratio of total loans-to-total assets
Ideally, the relationship between the independent
variables and this dependent variable should be the opposite of
what it was for the ratio of current assets to total assets. For,
whereas the ratio of total loans to total assets reflects the
bankers' propensity to assume risk, the ratio of current assets
to total assets measures their degree of risk-aversion.
The beta coefficient of the capital-to-total deposits
ratio is the only one that is significant, and only at the 10%
level. Of the nine beta coefficients for the three groups of
banks' analyses, five have the unexpected negative signs. In
the 'all banks' class, the beta coefficient of the time plus
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savings deposits-to-total deposits indicate a positive
relationship with this dependent variable. The other two
independent variables have beta coefficients with the negative
signs indicating inverse relationships. All the beta co-
efficients for the foreign banks class are similar in signs
• to the "all banks'". The above comments thus apply. On the
other hand, the beta coefficients for the total assets and time
plus savings deposits-to-total deposits variables have positive
signs in the indigenous banks analysis. The sign for the beta
coefficient of the third independent variable is, however,
negative.
Time and savings deposits constitute the core resource
for loans and advances. This being so, it appears reasonable
to expect that the ratio of time plus savings deposits-to-total
deposits should mostly explain variations in loans and advances.
This was confirmed to be logical by the sizes of the beta
coefficients for this ratio in the case of foreign banks and
indigenous banks but not 'all banks'.
Ratio of agricultural loans to total loans.
None of the beta coefficients of the relationships
between this dependent variable and all the independent variables
is significant. Once again, however, the deposit mix variable
is more important than others in its explanatory power as
measured by the size of its beta coefficients for all groups.
Contrary to expectation the signs of all the beta
coefficients in the 'all banks' class are negative. Except for
the size variable, the same is true for the foreign banks class.
The indigenous banks differ here. The signs of the beta
coefficients of the independent variables are all positive. To
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the extent that the results here follow largely the pattern
witnessed in the relationship between the ratio of total loans
to total assets and the independent variables, the addition of
the present variable is providing the hoped-for corroborative
evidence. The fact that Nigerian commercial banks, in general,
shy away from agricultural loans comes out clearly in this
.result. Total assets, the ratio of time plus savings deposits-
to-total deposits and the ratio of capital-to-total deposits
are all inversely related to the ratio of agricultural loans-to-
total loans.
Ratio of unsecured loans-to-total loans
The beta coefficient of the relationship between this
variable and the size variable is significant at the 10% level.
None of the other beta coefficients is significant at any of the
chosen levels. For all the three groups, the beta coefficient
of the relationship between size and this dependent variable is
positive as will be expected. The bigger in size the more
confident a bank shOuld be in making unsecured advances.
Surprisingly, the reverse is the case with the deposit mix
variable., which for all the groups has beta coefficients with
the negative sign. Except for the indigenous banks class, this
picture is also repeated for the relationship between the
capital-to-total deposit variable and this dependent variable.
In the 'all banks' analysis, deposit mix seems to explain, more
than any other independent variable, the variations in the ratio
of unsecured loans-to-total loans. Considering the indigenous
and the foreign banks separately, the capital-to-total deposit
ratio emerges as the most important explanatory variable.
Ratio of manufacturing loans-to-total loans
None of the beta coefficients of the relationships
between this variable and the independent variables is
significant. It is less cleai here than in the preceding cases,
which of the three independent variables can most explain
variations in this dependent variable. The separate analyses
of the three groups of banks, by size of the beta coefficients,
indicate different variables for each group.
Surprising but consistent with the last two dependent
ariables' analyses, the deposit mix variable for all the groups
carry negative signs. With one exception - the deposit mix -
the beta coefficients of the 'all banks' class are positive and
"correct". All the beta coefficients of the foreign banks
. class are negative. This is, however, very surprising in view
of the well-known relationship between the largely foreign
manufacturing sector and these banks. Because indigenous banks
do not relate so much to the manufacturing sector, the results
of the analysis here is not unexpected.
Table II.2presents the results of the analyses using .
time-series data. Three of the four coefficients of multiple
determination (R2s ) are significant, two at the 5% level and the
third at the 10% level. In both analyses the R 2s of the
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent
variable - ratio of manufacturing loans-to-total loans - are
significant. More important corroborative evidence is, however,
provided by the size of the R 2 s. As in the previous analyses,
the R2s here are relatively small, indicating that the independent
variables do not explain, in most cases, a large part of the
variations in the dependent variables. The Rs, with values betwee
0.31151 and 0.59769, however, confirm that there are strong
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relationships between these sets of variables.
The beta coefficients of the relationship between
current assets-to-tbtal assets as dependent variable and the
three independent variables are all significant. Of the three
independent variables, the highest explanatory power belongs
to the size variable. This differs from the result-of the
previous analyses of cross-sectional data. The signs of these
beta coefficients are negative and 'correct' for the size
variable but positive and rather unexpected, on a priori grounds,
for the other two dependent variables.
The beta coefficients of the relationship between the
capital variable and total loans-to-total assets ratio is
significant as it was in the previous analyses. The other
two betas are not. Only the deposit mix variable deviates from
expectation in its relationship with the total loans-to-total
assets ratio. The sign of the beta coefficient of this
relationship is negative. The capital variable explains most
the variations in this dependent variable. In all aspects, these
results are similar for the 'all banks' Class in the previous
analyses.
All the beta coefficients of the relationship between
the independent variables and the ratio of agricultural loans-to-
total loans are significant. Two of these betas (for the size
and capital variables) are significant at the 5% level; the third
at the 10% level. Whilst the deposit mix variable was the most of
important explanatory variable in the previous analysis, the
capital variable is in the present. The signs of the beta
coefficients here are positive and 'correct' except in the most
unexpected case of the deposit mix variable.
One only of thebeta coefficients of the relationships
of the independent variables to the dependent variable - the
ratio of manufacturing loans-to-total loans - is significant.
It is that for the capital variable. The sign of the beta
coefficient of the relationship of size variable to this dependent
variable is positive as will be expected on a priori grounds.
In the other cases, the signs are unexpectedly negative. The
capital variable, as in two of the other three dependent variable
cases considered already, is the most important explanatory
variable of all the independent variables. In the previous
analysis it was the size variable.
V
SLM41RY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above analyses represent an attempt to examine the
relationship between some selected commercial bank characteristics
and their risk-accepting or risk-averting propensities. The
explanatory variables are those quantifiable factors which on
a priori grounds are thought most likely to influence the
portfolio structuring decisions of banks. The dependent
variables are those factors that areindicative of the attitudes
of the bankers to risk.
It was found from these analyses that the selected
explanatory variables are largely correlated to the dependent
variables. The independent variables, however, did not explain
a NSufficiently. large proportion of the variations in the
dependent variables.
The beta coefficients of the relationship between the
size variable and the ratio of current assets-to-total assets
are positive for the 'all banks' and the indigenous banks
groups. These indicate that the banks are risk shy even when
their ability to be risk-accepting is increased. On the other
hand the foreign banks will tend to reduce their liquidity
when their resource base widens. The coefficient of relation-
ship of the deposit mix variable with the dependent variables
supports the a priori reasoning that the less volatile the
deposit base of banks, the less liquid or more risk-accepting
they are likely to be. In general one can expect that a higher
deposit mix will encourage Nigerian commercial banks to be less
•risk-averse. This expectation is proved right by the observed
relationship in these analyses between the deposit mix and the
ratio of total loans-to-total assets. But these results also'
question some a priori reasoning. The beta coefficients of
the relationships between the size and capital variables and
the ratio of total loans-to-total assets, for the 'all banks'
and foreign banks groups are negative. These indicate that in-
creases in resources (size) and confidence (capital) do not
make these banks more risk-accepting.
One of the most important inferences to be drawn from
these analyses is that the greater the ability of banks in terms
of increased resource base, less volatile deposit mix, and
higher capital-to-deposit ratio, the less is the proportion of
total loans going to agriculture. This can be gauged from the
signs (negative) of the beta coefficients of the relationships
between the independent variables and the ratio of agricultural
loans-to-total loans. Though this is generally true for the
entire banking system, the indigenous banks deviate from this
general behaviour significantly. The foreign banks on the
other hand, conform to the attitude observed for the system.
Total assets (or size) positively influence the banks'
attitude to unsecured lending. On the other hand, the deposit
mix- 'exerts' negative influence on the ratio of unsecured loans-
to-total loans. The negative sign of the beta coefficient of
the relationship between these variables can be interpreted to
mean that the tendency for banks to make unsecured loans is
negatively influenced by deposit volatility.
Deposit mix variable is inversely related to the ratio
of manufacturing loans-to-total loans for all the three groups
of banks. This again underlines the near irrelevance of the
stability of deposits in the banks' decision to allocate loan
resources to the manufacturing sector. The 'all banks' analysis
reveals that the banking system is influenced in this decision
by variations in the resource and capital bases of the
institutions. The foreign banks as a group are not positively
influenced, however, by any of the independent variables in
he aggregate manufacturing lending decision. The size factor
is the only one of the three explanatory variables that
positively influences the indigenous banks in the aggregate
manufacturing lending decision.
The mean ratios of the dependent variables are relatively
close for the indigenous and foreign banks in all cases but one
(see table
	
Foreign banks with a mean current assets-to-
total assets ratio of 23.75% put proportionately less of their
assets in low-risk, low-yielding assets than the indigenous
banks with 27.73%. This position is reversed, however, when
we consider the ratio of total loans-to-total assets. The
indigenous banks have a mean ratio of 49.64% whilst the foreign
banks have 35.75%. These indicate that proportionately more
of the resources of the indigenous banks are in high risk assets .
than are those of the foreign banks. Put differently, the
indigenous banks are more risk-accepting. Although the foreign
banks prudently avoid excess liquidity by keeping as low
TableII.3 The means and standard deviations of the independent and
dependent variables for the cross-section analysis
Variables Me an
Standard
deviation
1 Total assets: All banks 590.6315 760.4068
Foreign banks 1,010.875 1,018.317
Indigenous banks. 285.000 253.842
2 Time plus savings deposits: All banks 52.947 10.7624
Total deposits Foreign banks 56.375 13.1577
Indigenous banks 50.454 8.0381
3 Capital funds: All banks 7.3157 5.0886
Total deposits Foreign banks 8.0 5.20988
Indigenous banks 6.8181 4.9509
4 Current assets: All banks 26.05 9.406
Total assets Foreign , banks 23.75 8.779
Indigenous banks 27.73 9.854
5 Total loans: All banks 43.79 13.411
Foreign banks 35.75 8.481
Indigenous banks 49.64 13.553
6 Agricultural loans: All banks 6.740 3.338
Total loans Foreign banks 4.875 2.5877
Indigenous banks 8.09 3.260
7 Unsecured loans All banks 8.22 5.551
Total loans Foreign banks 9.75 7.066
Indigenous banks 7.10 4.301
8 Manufacturing loans All banks 27.58 11.740
Total loans Foreign banks 36.25 9.562
Indigenous banks 21.27 8.781
Source: Computer print-out
current assets-to-total assets ratios as practicable, they
shy away from risk by keeping a low loans-to-total assets
ratio as well.
The indigenous banks lend proportionately twice as
much as the foreign banks to the agricultural sector; the mean
ratios being 8.09 and 4.88%,respectively. This may be a
reflection of the level of the groups' commitments to the
•
development of this important sector. 'It may also be the'
result of the 'nearness' of the indigenous banks to the farming
community. Whilst their nearness to and knowledge of, the fanning
ommunity provides confidence for this risky investment, the
commitment to aid this sector enhances the propensity to do so.
Overall only 8.22% of the lending by Nigerian commercial
banks is unsecured. The foreign banks with a 9.75% ratio do
more unsecured lending than the 'average' bank and the
indigenous bank with 7.1%. This result may reflect the kinds
of customers the two groups of banks deal with mainly. The
customers of the foreign banks are invariably the big foreign
multinational subsidiaries. With an eye on the total resources
of the borrower, it is easier to make unsecured lending.
Additionally these big foreign firms' links with household names
abroad provide further intangible but invaluable security. This
is because it is expected that support will 'normally' come from
these mother firms in times of need.
Even with indigenisation, the manufacturing sector is still
largely foreign. This may well explain the lending operations
of the two banking groups to this sector. As can be observed
from their mean ratios, the foreign banks lend proportionately
more to this sector than do the indigenous banks.
The analysis of the time series data supports substantially
the results of the cross-sectional data. Three of the four R 2 s
are significant at the 5 or 10% levels. However, the smallness
of the R 2 s indicates, as in the previous analysis, that not a
large proportion of the variations in the dependent variables
are explained by the selected independent variables.
Undoubtedly, the above analyses have not provided all
the explanations for the risk attitude of Nigerian bankers. They
have, however, beeti able to indicate pointedly some of the
factors influencing these attitudes. Some measures of the
influences exerted on these bankers' attitudes to risk by the
selected explanatory variables have also been revealed. For
the purposes of lending performance evaluation, policy and
decision-making some valuable parameters have been identified.
All these, more importantly, should provide a viable plank for
further research in this important aspect of Nigerian banking
and finance.
The results of these analyses are laden with potential
policy implications. The clear indication is that Nigerian
commercial bankers are risk-shy. Given the place of commercial
banks in the Nigerian financial system, the fact that the
country cannot accommodate an unaggressive and risk-averse
banking system can not be overemphasised. Whilst co-operation
is needed from the borrowers and infrastructural support and a
'conducive' operating environment from the authorities, there is
need for significant re-orientation towards development-
consciousness from the banks. The business environment in a
developing economy is a growing, and risky one and the banker
must be willing to accept risk and deviate from orthodoxy in
order to operate efficiently therein.
APPENDIX III
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE "LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE"
OF NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKERS
1, I NTROEUCTI ON
The size of a bank's loan portfolio depends on the
aggregate resource allocation to the lending function as one
of the activities competing for the total bank resource. More
importantly, the overall composition of the assets portfolio
reflects the 'attitude' of bank management. One important .
aspect of this attitude, that has significant implications for
the profitability, safety and the efficiency of the bank, is
dhat might be called their "liquidity preference".
It has been suggested that "the whole rationale of alloc-
ative and efficiency features of the financial intermediation
process hinges critically on the asset management policies of
the financial intermediaries in less developed countries."
(Bhatia and Khatkhate, 1975, p. 135). Thus banks at all times
have the unenviable task of striving to strike a balance between
profitability on the one hand and liquidity and safety on the
other in the course of portfolio management. A banker with very
high preference for liquidity, however, forgoes profits through
this attitude. In a developing economy, even more is lost by
this attitude - the economic process is slowed down if not
outriOtlyAmpedul. On the other hand, "when a bank makes a loan
to an individual or business in its community, it is helping the
community to prosper and grow and this prosperity and growth
cannot but help the bank prosper too." (Nadler, 1979, p. 75).
In default, the banker "would be derelict in carrying out the
principal function of commercial banking - namely, the
'production of loans" (Macesich, 1965, pp. 96-97).
In this chapter both the time series and cross sectional
data of the asset portfolios of Nigerian commercial banks are
analysed for the purpose of examining the hypothesis that
Nigerian bankers have a high preference for liquidity with
consequent effect on their contribution to economic development.
The next section presents the theoretical framework of
this analysis, the methodology and the data. Section 3 discusses
the results of the analyses. Section 4 summarizes the foregoing
and notes the implications of the results for the Nigerian
economy.
2. THEORETICAL FRAIEWOM NETHODOLOGY AND DATA
"Liquidity in a bank and elsewhere may be defined as the
possession of those assets, which can be converted into cash
easily, quickly and without significant loss." (Macesich, 1965,
p. 97). As noted above, the issue of liquidity is of central
importance to bank management. The banker needs to be suffic-
iently liquid in order to meet the anticipated and sometimes
unanticipated deposit withdrawals and loan demands of his
customers and the community in general. In practice the
secondary reserve element of the Investment account is usually
employed for this task. This is so because, ideally the resources
put into cash, and balances held with the central bank and other
banks are those optimum for the day-to-day operations (including
the requirements of the monetary authority). On the other hand,
the resources allocated to loans cannot be relied upon in
emergency as their conversion will be considered too costly,
particularly, in terms of customer relations. As Nadler (1979,
p.-75) states:
••.. the investments of an aggressive bank other than
the investment part of secondary reserves are truly
considered a residual account, receiving funds only
when loan demands are not strong enough to use up
all the money not tied up in reserves."
From experience and aided by meticulous forecasting, a banker
should be able to predict the levels of liquidity appropriate
for the needs of depositors and loan customers. Excess liquidity
will, therefore, reflect misallocation of resources and Ineffic-L
ient management, with unpleasant cOnsequences for both the
profitability of the bank and the development and growth of its
community.
"The relative mixture of assets in a bank's portfolio
goes far .... in indicating the bank's liquidity preference and
degree of risk aversion." (Hooker, Jr, 1970, p. 12). Thus in
this analysis, the 'liquidity preference' of the commercial bankers
was measured in terms of the allocation of resources to "cash",
"cash items", "balances with other banks", and "treasury
securities". The appropriateness of this was considered to
derive from the fact that these assets represent the list of
"eligible" assets for the purpose of calculating the liquidity
ratio of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
Given. the "narrowness" of the Nigerian capital market,
loans and advances are the main long-term investment assets
available to the commercial bankers. The higher, therefore, the
ratio of loans-to-total assets, certeris paribus, the less
conservative and the more efficient and aggressive these bankers.
For the above-stated hypothesis to stand it should be observable
that the Nigerian bankers in structuring their assets portfolios
give undeserved attention to liquidity. In other words, one
should expect to . see from these analyses that the bankers hold
a significantly high proportion of their resources in the
form of the above listed liquid assets. Alternatively for it to
be rejected one should expect the obverse of the 'liquidity
preference' attitude to be profound, that is to find a
comparatively high proportion of the assets of the banks in loans
and advances.
In testing the hypothesis an attempt was made to
examine whether there are differences in the allocation of
resources to the available assets by bankers of various categories
and by the banking system as an entity over time. More explicitly
stated the null hypotheses are that
"there are no significant differences in the
liquidity preference of banks as defined by the
structure of their assets with reference to
(a) the banking system over-time,
(b) all individual banks in the system,
(c) all foreign banks,
(d) all indigenous banks, and
(e) banks of Varying deposit sizes."
The statistical method of analysis used in this exercise was the
analysis of variance. The choice of the method of analysis has
been dictated largely by the 'poorness' of the data, in
particular, the lack Of sufficient replicates.
The data used for these analyses were basically of two
types. The first consists of cross-sectional data for the
entire banking system (19 individual banks) for the year end
1979; while the second consists of aggregate time series data
for the period 1960-1978 (a total of 19 years).
Again, the 'quality' of the data defined the criterion
of classification used in the analysis, namely:
all banks (cross-section);
all banks (time-series);
type of bank (foreign);
type of bank (indigenous); and
deposit size.
(See table III-1).
	
The categorization of -
assets used here is similar to CBN's except that an item "other
advances" (which are mainly investments in long-term government
loan stocks) has been merged with the "other assets". (see table
111-4). These are, namely,
Cash and cash items
Balance with other banks
Treasury securities
Loans and advances
Other assets
3. rnE RESULTS
TableIrr-lpresents the results of the analysis of
variance. With P = 0.05 and for n l = 4 and n2 = 90, 50, 35 or
20, the critical F-values are, respectively, 2.47, 2.56, 2.64
and 2.87; thus all the obtained F-values of this analysis are
significant. Generally, therefore, it can be stated that there
are differences among banks in their allocation of resources to
different categories of assets. Similarly for the banking
system there are temporal differences in its resource allocation.
The F-value for the 'all banks' (time series) is 51.5
This indicates that there have occurred significant changes in
the way all bankers distributed their assets between 1960 and
1978. It is observable that when banks are classified by
deposit size, there also exist significant differences among
them in the way they allocate their resources over available
assets. That is to say that banks of varying sizes allocate
resources to different categories of assets in different ways.
The F-value for the 'all banks' (cross-section) classification
-Table III-1 Nigerian bankers' "liquidity preference":
analysis of variance
Criterion of Cl csification Degrees
of
freed=
Sum
of
squares
an
square
F
I All hanks (cross-section) 94 29,698.2
4 19,766.2 4,942.0 44.8
90 9,931.9 110.4
II All banks (time series) 94 25,114.1
4 17,481.4 4,370.0 51.5
90 7,632.7 84.8
III Type of bank (indigenous 54 20,120.3
4 14,306.7 3,5770.0 30.8
50 5,813.6 116.3
IV Type of bank (foreign) 39 9,577.9
4 7,597.8 1,899.0 33.6
35 1,980.1 56.6
V Deposit size 24 5,578.3
4 5,026.8 1,257.0 45.6
20 551.4 27.6
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Table III-2 Individual commercial banks' portfolio of
assets:1979 (in percentages)
Cash &	 Balance	 Treasury Loans & Other Total
Banks	 cash	 with other securit- adVan-
	 assets assets
items	 banks	 ies	 ces
1 7.5 10.2 9.1 50.3 22.9 100
2 4.0 13.0 0.0 70.0 13.0 100
3 9.0 8.5 14.8 43.2 24.5 100
4 5.2 12.2 1.6 67.2 , 13.8 100
5 4.0 10.1 11.8 46.6 27.5 100
6 6.6 19.8 11.0 37.1 25.5 100
7 2.7 14.2 12.4 38.7 32.0 100
8 2.4 10.9 0.0 26.4 60.3 100
9 2.7. 44.5 1.3 47.4 4.1 100
10 16.7 17.1 1.2 50.2 14.8 100
11 7.2 13.2 0.0 69.6 10.0 100
12 18.7 7.0 13.0 43.6 17.7 100
13 3.0 8.6 4.8 48.3 35.3 100
14 5.0 4.0 21.8 33.8 35.4 100
15 1.0 18.9 6.5 35.4 38.2 100
16 2.0 17.9 12.9 20.9 46.3 100
17 1.5 4.0 12.5 31.0 51.0 100
18 4.0 19.5 2.7 32.3 41.5 100
19 5.4 9.3 9.3 41.1 34.9 100
•
	All banks	 Mean (%)	 5.71	 13.84
	
7.72	 43.85	 28.88(1-19)	 S.D. (%)	 (4.62)	 (8.64)	 (6.13)	 (13.37)
	 (14.50)
Foreign
	
banks	 an (%)	 5.08	 11.15	 10.44	 35.80	 37.54(12-19)	 S.D. (%)	 (5.73)	 (6.60)	 (6.03)	 (8.51)	 (9.89)
Indigenous
	
banks
	 Mean (%)
	 6.18
	 15.79	 5.75	 49.70	 22.58(1-11)	 S.D. (%)	 (4.13)	 (10.06)	 (5.99)	 (14.12)	 (15.09)
Source: Canputed fran Appendix table vn-3.
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Table III-3 Average percentage distribution of assets on bank
size for the Nigerian banking system: 1979
Bank size	 Relative Cash iand
category*	 frequen-	 cash
cy	 items
Balance
with other
banks
Treasury
secur-
ities
Loans
and
advances
Other
assets
1 .16 8.40 5.00 15.77 36.13 34.70
2 .06 2.70 14.20 12.40 38.70 32.00
3 .16 5.23 -14.10 5.20 51.77 25.30
4 .31 5.53 11.90 6.92 51.15 24.45
5 .31 5.30 20.03 5.00 37.30 32.42
Total 1.00
* Bank size category:
1 = N1,000 million and above in deposits
2 = N500-1,000 million in deposits
3 = N300-500 million in deposits
4 = N100-300 million in deposits
5 = N100 million and less in deposits
Table n1-4 Nigerian commercial banking system portfolio of assets:
1960-1978 (in percentages)
Year
(December)
Cash &
cash
items
Balance .
with other
banks
Treasury
secur-
ities
Loans
and
advances
Other
assets
CT3tal
assets
1960L- 8.0 20.5 1.5 47.8 22.2 100
1961 7.5 25.6 2.0 40.7. 24.2 100
1962 8.6 17.1 2.3 54.0 18.0 100
1963 7.2 19.3 0.7 55.0 17.8 100
1964 7.3 10.5 2.7 61.8 17.7 100
1965 5.9 11.7 3.0 62.2 17.2 100
1966 5.9 11.5 4.6 60.5 17.5 100
1967 5.6 8.3 6.3 61.2 18.6 100
1968 4.8 2.0 35.0 40.3 17.9 100
1969 4.9 1.9 44.0 31.8 17.4 100
1970 6.5 1.8 43.4 30.5 17.8 100
1971 4.9 3.0 22.8 39.3 30.0 100
1972 5.3 2.2 26.2 43.1 23.2 100
1973 5.7 3.4 21.5 42.5 26.9 100
1974 11.8 3.9 26.9 33.4 24.0 100
1975 19.2 4.3 18.4 35.7 22.4 100
1976 17.2 4.6 16.5 33.3 28.4 100
1977 10.0 5.2 13.5 36.0 35.3 100
1978 8.1 4.3 10.5 45.1 32.0 100
Source: Adapted from Twenty Years of Central Banking in Nigeria (Lagos
Nigeria, Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 1979)
p.12
is 44.8. The size of this F-value evidences the fact that .
when banks are considered individually rather than in groups
by deposit size or as an entity, they differ significantly in
the way they invest their resources. Considering either the
indigenous or foreign banks as a group, we find there are
differences in their use of resources for financial assets. This
is evidenced by the large values of the F-ratios resulting from
this analysis: 30.8 and 33.6, respectively, for the indigenous
and foreign banks. In this respect there is evidence here that
neither the indigenous banks nor the foreign banks are homogenous
in their behaviour.
The above results are useful to the extent that one
ran infer from them some evidence.3 of variations in bankers'
iortfolios structuring approaches. One, however, should be
interested in other relevant issues such as the direction of
these changes over time. Have the banks become more conservative
or aggressive, for instance? Tables 11I-2, 111-3 and III-4
have been presented to provide some answers to this kind of
question. A comparison of the means in table 111-2 shows that
indigenous banks on the average allocated a higher proportion
of their total resources (49.70%) to loans and advances than
their foreign counterparts with an average of 35.80% during
1979. Foreign banks invested a total of 26.67% of their resources
in liquid assets whilst their indigenous opposites allocated
27.72% to these assets. Although there appears to be little
difference in these percentage allocations, a breakdown reveals
more variations between these groups of banks. The indigenous
banks carry relatively higher proportions of cash and balances
than the foreign banks. These might be explained by the size
of the indigenous banks and the limited distribution of their
branches and nearness to money centres, which leads to inevitable
holding of liquidity that makes individual branches self-
sufficient and independent of the system, in a way.
The difference in the 'liquidity preference' attitudes of
these groups of banks is probably more clearly manifest in their
holdings of treasury securities. As noted above, any excess
liquidity not immediately required to meet the liquidity ratio
prescription of the CBN, can either be put in treasury securities
or in loans. The risk-shy banker will, therefore, hold excesses
of these securities rather than venture aggressively into the
lo ns market. During 1979, the foreign banks invested nearly twice
as large a percentage of their total assets in treasury securities,
as did their indigenous counterparts (see table III-2).
The rest of the differences in the percentage allocations
to loans and advances by foreign and indigenous banks not accounted
for by their allocations to liquid assets is made up in the
category of 'other assets'. Indigenous banks had 22.58% of their
assets under this heading in 1979 and the foreign banks had 37.54%.
Apparently what is not invested by foreign banks in loans and
advances is put in loan stocks of the Federal Government which
are considerably more liquid than loans. This is because of the
rediscounting facility for these assets available at the CBN. It
can be argued, therefore, that the foreign banks prefer, much more
than the indigenous banks, the low-yielding liquid assets to the
highly remunerative but less liquid loans and advances.
In tableIII-3 banks are grouped according to the size of
their deposits in a descending order of magnitude. Although it was
shown in the analysis of variance that these groups differ in
resource allocation', not much more was learnt. Are the big banks
more-liquidity-conscious than the small ones? The first two big
classes of banks, can be seen to invest an average of 37% of
their resources in loans and advances. This compares poorly
with the next two groups which allocate to the same category
of assets 51% of their resources. Up till this point, it could
be considered, albeit prematurely, that the smaller the size of
banks the less the bankers' preference for liquidity. This would
have been erroneous, for the smallest sized group of banks with
37.30% of their resources in loans and advances are more akin to
the biggest bank-size groups in their investment behairiour.
However, if the investment of resources in loans and advances is
a measure of the efficiency of banking operations, as indeed it is
generally acknowledged to be, neither the very big nor the very
small banks are efficient going by the evidence here revealed.
Fir ally it is noteworthy that the biggest sized banks allocate
comparatively more resources to 'cash' and 'cash items' and
'treasury securities' than the other classes of banks. This indeed
is contrary to a priori expectation in the light of the experienced
management at their disposal.
It is observable from the results of the analysis of
variance that, over time, the 'liquidity preference' attitude
of Nigerian bankers has changed. An examination of table III-4
sheds some light on the direction of the changes. At the beginning
of the review period, 47.8% of the banking system's assets were in
loans and advances. Except for the drop in 1961, there was a
general upward trend in this percentage allocation up till 1967
when 61.2% was recorded. Thereafter, a decline commenced reaching
a low of 30.5% in 1970. Between 1971 and 1978, resource allocation
to this asset averaged between 33.3% in 1976 and45.1% in 1978. The
banks may undoubtedly be excused for their poor performance on
thii score during the 1967-70 civil war. At this time, the 'war
sector' was the priority sector and the economy's resources
were allocated first thereto via the instruments of treasury
securities. But the banks have failed in their function of
'producing' loans for economic development generally during the
1960-1978 period as evidenced here. To that extent they have
been inefficient in their operations. It is to be expected that
bankers become 'wiser', gain more expertise and experience in loan
granting in an environment with the passage of time. , These
acquired qualities should enable banks to become more 'efficient'
in their use of resources. The available evidence in table III-4"
ho ever, does not appear to support this assumption. Corroborative
evidence is also available in tableIEI-5 where it can be observed
th t the commercial banks have had excess liquidity during most of
the last two decades. In other words, these banks have not
performed up to realistic expectations. (See also table IV-1).
There have been fluctuations in resource allocation to
treasury securities between 1960 and 1978.. From 1.5% in 1960 it
reached a peak of 44% in 1969. By 1978 year end it had fallen as
low as 10.5%. In view of the fact that this asset is the •
'fountain' and 'reservoir' of liquidity for banks, some remarks
are in order here. The size of allocations to this asset in the
early 1960s was dictated by the size of the issues available for
sale. As can be gauged from tableI11.4 there were noticeable
increases in total resource allocation to this asset during the
war years, when treasury securities were employed to mobilize
funds for war financing. However, the end of the civil war in
1970 coincided with the opening up of new oil wells (as well as
old ones) and a huge inflow of 'petro-naira' into the government
purse. This soon turned the government from a net debtor to a
net creditor to the banking system. It also inevitably led to the
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Table	 Aggregate liquidity ratios of commercial banks(1)
(in per cent)
Year	 Ratio	 Excess (2)
.
1966 38.4 13.4
1967 30.8 5.8
1968 72.8 47.8
1969 91.7 66.7
1970 89.5 64.5
1971 55.9 30.9
1972 58.0 33.0
1973 47.3 22.3
1974 65.4 40.4
1975 56.4 31.4
1976 47.7 22.7
1977 38.2 13.2
1978 38.4 13.4
1979 45.5 20.5
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria "Economic and
Financial Review" (various issues)
(1) Computed according to statutory requirements
(2) Excess over the statutory requirement of 25%
"thinning" down of the treasury securities market. The observed
decline in the percentage allocations of resources to this asset
since 1971 can thus be seen in their true perspective - as not
the result of the bankers' willingness to 'eschew' liquidity but
that of unavailability of these assets. This general attitude
was noted by the CBN in its 1979 Annual Report (p. 35) thus:
060* the upsurge in commercial bank liquidity in
1979 reflected a reduced pace of expansion in loans
and advances, the suspension of new issues of
stabilization securities since 1st April and the
subsequent redemption of the banks' holdings of these •
securities."
4, SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
It appears clear from the results of the above analyses
that Nigerian commercial bankers differ in their preference for
liquidity as manifested in their resource allocation to different
categories of assets over time. By itself, this is not very
important. What seems more important is that they have become
more and more liquidity-oriented. That is to say that they
prefer the orthodox, self-liquidating type of assets to medium-
and-long-term loans and advances even though the latter have
higher margins of profit, and are more beneficial to the community.
The institutions have not, therefore, made the most efficient use
of their resources.
Although Nigeria has had her own share of the traumatic
experience of bank failures in the past (Ejiofor, 1977), a claim that
the present unaggressive, and. 'liquidity preference' attitude of
the bankers might be due to either the 'shock' and/or 'inertia'
effects of these experiences cannot be easily sustained. After all,
few, if any, of today's bankers were a part of these experiences of
the 1940s and 50s.
The bankers' attitude cannot be explained by a lack of
loan demand either. The Nigerian economy has been truly "booming"
particularly since the end of the civil war in 1970. The
tremendous growth in the assets of banks bears clear testimony to
this (see table III-4). In this kind of situation, when the
economy is on the upswing it is unlikely that there can be a
shortage of loan demand. Besides, however, the findingsof
Friedman and Schwatz (1963) appear to refute the hypothesis "that
shifts in relative credit demands of various classes of borrowers
camexplain the changes in the relative composition of bank earning
asset' portfolios (Morrison, 1967, p. 115).
With the commercial banks constituting the main
financial intermediaries in Nigeria, the implications of these
revealed "liquidity preference" attitudes of the bankers
must be obvious. These institutions hold the key to the
economy's development and growth. And given the onerous respon-
sibility their position imposes on them, the bankers cannot fail in
their functions (most importantly-lending) without inviting
unpalatable intervention from the authorities. For these bankers
to be efficient in their lending operations in particular, and
resource use in general, they must improve on their 'liquidity
preference' attitude. They must become more forward looking,
aggressive and risk-accepting.
APPENDIX IVA
QUESTIONNAIRES
384	 IX—A
(20) What are the usual conditions under which your enterprise obtains
loans and advances from the bank? e.g. rate of interest,
guarantee, compensating balance, etc.
••• •
Which of these do you find most difficult to meet or even
repugnant?
(21) Have you ever failed to get a loan because of a lack of the
right quality and/or quantity of collateral? What kinds of
securities do you have to offer for a loan but which are
unacceptable to the bank?
What amount of loan and for what purpose?
•	 •	 "
For agricultural businesses wily 
(22) Have you ever heard of the Agriovttural Credit Guarantee Scheme?
'Yc=-
(23) Have you ever tried to obtain a loan under the scheme?
Did you succeed?
If not, what was the cause of the failure? 	 •
(24) In whit ways can the banks best make money more readily available
to farmers of all grades?
41 A PIZ- 6 4146 IS .
Enterprise statistics 
Name:  J • O'S • I .g0,44
Total Assets/Liabilities (as per 1978 Balance sheet)
Type of buRiness:	 AN0/466-01 iv 
Bankers: .t.
	
441 44 
PART I: LOAN PROPOSAL I 
THE PEASANT FARMER
Mt Sanni Fasasi is a farmer at Ikorodu. He is the son of
a farmer and has been farming with his father all his life
until the father died ten years ago. Sanni, who is now 45 has
no education at all. He is, however, a successful farmer by
local standards having built himself a house and acquired a fleet
of 5 taxi cabs out of the proceeds of his fresh tomato and
vegetable farming. Up till now he has been doing his farm work
single-handedly as he has turned his children to UPE schools. .
In view of the growing demand for his produce and urged on
by the cheering news and prospects of the Agricultural Credit
Guarantee Scheme, he has approached your bank for an advance of
N5,000. This loan is to be used for the purposes of acquiring
more land (N3,000); acquiring farm tools and inputs such as
fertilizers (N1,500) and hiring labour (N500).
Mr Fasasi has never held a bank account. In addition to
the house and taxi cabs, the land on which he farms belongs to
him by inheritance although this right is unregistered as there
is no conveyance.
QUESTIONS 
. (1) Would you make the type of loan requested by this applicant?
(2) Would you make any other type of loan to the applicant? If
yes, what type?
If you answer-NO to questions 1 and 2, please go directly to
question 7 1 omitting questions 3 - 6.
(3) What is the maximum amount you would lend?
(4) What is the maximum maturity you would require?
(5) What terms would you require on the loans
(a) Interest Rate
(b) Repayment Schedule
(c) Unsecured or Secured
If secured, type of collateral
(d) Compensating Balance
; of loan
(e) Special charges
(f) Personal guarantee
(g) Others
(6) What additional condition not mentioned above would you
require for ensuring the security and safety of the loan
(e.g. a position on the board of directors)
(7) Estimate the relative extent to which the following categories
of factors influenced your decision to say you would or would
not grant a loan to the applicant.
of percentages totalling 100% for all
example:
(a) The applicant's financial position
(b) The applicant's management
(c) The potential growth of the industry
(d) The potential place of the applicant's
business in the ccmmunity
(e) Established bank loan policies
(f) The bank's financial position
( g) Security offered
Total
Please estimate
categories.
10%
5%
5%
10%
20%
10%
40%
in terms
For an
100% 100%
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LOAN PROPOSAL II 
THE SMALL-SCALE MANUFACTURER
Mr Christopher Adebiyi is the sole proprietor of Alowonle
Trading Company, a wholesaler of candles. He has been a customer
of your branch for over 20 years. His business, as far as the
account can reflect, has been growing steadily over the recent
past recording an average annual turnover of N25,000 in the last
3 years. Like most Nigerian traders of his class he has not ever
asked his bank for a loan all these years of his business life,
for whatever reason.
In the last year or so he has been finding it increasingly
difficult to meet the demands of his cusomers for supplies. He
approaches your bank with a proposal involving an investment of -
N50,000 for the establishment of a small-scale .plant for the
production of candles and having prospect for future expansion
that could quadruple this initial size. From his personal savings
and loans from relatives, half of this sum could-be raised. He •
will want your bank to finance the remaining half of N25,000.00.
The production process requires no skills and can be under-
taken by operators after only a few days induction.
OUR
(1) Would you make the type of loan requested by this applicant?
(2) Would you make any other type of loan to the applicant? If
yes, what type?
If you answer NO to questions 1 and 2, please go directly to
question 7, omitting questions 3 - 6.
(3) What is the maximum amount you would lend?
(4) What is the maximum maturity you would require?
(5) What terms would you require on the loans
(a) Interest Rate
(b) Repayment Schedule
(c) Unsecured or Secured
If secured, type of collateral
(d) Compensating Balance
% of loan
(e) Special charges
(f) Personal guarantee
(g) Others
(6) What additional condition not mentioned above would you require
for ensuring the security and safety of the loan (e.g. a
position on the board of directors).
(7) Estimate the relative extent to which the following categories
of factors influenced your decision to say you would or would
not grant A loan to the applicant. Please estimate in terms
of percentages totalling 100% for all categories. For an
example:
(a)	 The applicant's financial position
(b)	 The applicant's management
(c)	 The potential growth of the industry
(d)	 The potential place of the applicant's
business in the ccmmunity
(e)	 Established bank loan policies
(f)	 The bank's financial position
(g)	 Security offered
Total
10%
5%
5%
10%
20%
10%
40%
100% 100%
LOAN PROPOSAL III
THE INDUSTRIAL FARMER
Nigerian Agricola Limited is a mixed farming private company.
It was established by Mr Solomon Johnson, an alien, ten years ago,
but to meet the requirements of the 1977 Indigenisation Decree,
the company has recently gone public. The founder of the farming
business, Mr Johnson, is an agriculture graduate. He has in the
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last few years, through prudent ploughing back of profit,
expanded the business. To cope with the increased business he
employed Dr Doyin Aileme, a veterinary surgeon, two years ago;
Miss Funlola Sokunbi, an agricultural economist and Mr Robinson
Nwankwo, an agriculturist, a year ago.
Below is the company's latest fife year  Financial Summary.
The company is applying for a loan of N100,000 for the purchase
of fixed assets including machinery, and land and building.
Mr Johnson reckons the company will, from its resources, be able
to meet the cost of increased need for working capital.
FIVE YEAR FINANCIAL SMEARY 1975 - 1979 
Year ended 31st MARCH 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975
N'003 N'000 N'000 N'000 N'003
13a1ance Sheet
Cash 2,800 3,000 1,400 1, 3)0 503
Debtors 3,900 4,CO3 3,500 2,900 2,000
Stock 4,000 4,000 4,200 3,400 3,100
Of fice furniture 2,250 2,500 1,000 1,100 1,200
Plant and Machinery 7,000 8 ,000 4,00o 4,500 5,000
La-id and Buildings 5,300 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,203
Total Assets 25,250 25,700 18,300 17,400 15,030
Shareholders funds 19,900 17,600 13,500 12,000 10,000
Current Liabilities 5,350 8,100 4,800 5,400 5,000
25,250 25,703 18,300 17,400 15,030
•
Profit and Loss Account
Gross Earnings 19,000 20,003 16,003 12 ,00) 10,000
Net Earnings (After tax) 4,300 4,700 4,000 4,000 3,000
Dividends Paid 2,000 2,603 2,500 2,003 1,000
Transfer to Reserve 2,300 2,100 1,500 2,00) 2,000
QUESTIONS 
(1) Would you make the type of loan requested by this applicant?
(2) Would you make any other type of loan to the applicant? If
yes, what type?
If you answer NO to question:: 1 and 2, please go dircctly to
cucstion 7, omitting caufi. :::toll;4 3 - C.
(3) What is the maximum amount you would lend?
(4) What is the maximum maturity you would require?
(5) What terms would you require on the loans
(a) Interest Rate
(b) Repayment Schedule
(c) Unsecured or Secured
If secured, type of collateral
(d) Compensating Balance
% of loan
(e) Special charges
(f) Personal guarantee
(g) Others
(6) What additional condition not mentioned . above would you require
for ensuring the security and safety of the loan (e.g. a
position on the board of directors)
(7) Estimate the relative extent to which the following categories
of factors influenced your decision to say you would or would
not grant a loan to the applicant. Please estimate in terms
of percentages totalling 100% for all categories. For an
example:
(a) The applicant's financial position 10%
ao The applicant's management 5%
(c) The potential growth of the industry 5% •••nn•••nnnnnnn
(d) The potential place of the applicant's
business in the ccumunity 10%
(e) Established bank loan policies 20%
(f) The bank's financial position 10% 11nn•••••n•n•
(g) Security offered 40%
100%	 100%
LOAN PROPOSAL IV
NUTS AND BOLTS (NIGERIA) LIMITED
Nuts and Bolts (Nigeria) Ltd was incorporated as a limited
liability company in January, 1978. It is engaged in the
manufacture of nuts and bolts for use in the car assembly industry.
Presently its small factory employs a labour force of 60 semi-
skilled workers. The directors of the company are a . group of 3
friends, former colleagues and graduates of the Yaba College of
Technology. Mr Josiah Iyamu, a professional engineer, is the .
chief executive with responsibility for overall management and
adffinistration; Mr Christian Onwufuju, also an engineer is the
Technical Works Director; and-Maram Sule Mohammed, a Cost and
Management accountant, is the financial and sales Director.
The company's first two years of operations can be described
as successful. The directors are of the view that their present
scale of operation can be expanded to great advantage. They are,
therefore, proposing a rather ambitious investment of N250,000.
They are looking forward to raising this sum from three sources -
N100,000 from the issue of new share capital; N100,000 from the
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB); and N50,000 from your
bank. The sum of N200,000 is what is estimated to be the cost of
fixed assets that will include extension to their existing factory
and the cost of plant and machinery and office furniture. The
advance from your bank is required in the form of an overdraft and
will be employed to meet the needs of increased working capital.
surniy
The financial statements / kror -the company for the first two
full years of operation is presented below:
SUMMARY 1978 1979FINANCIAL STATEMENTS	 FOR	 &
Year Ended 31st DECEMBER 1978 1979
N'000 N'000
Balance Sheet
Cash 10,000 14,000
Debtors 9,000 12,000
Stock 4,000 6,000
Office Furniture 5,000 4,500
Plant and Machinery 66,000 60,000
Land and Building 22,0CX) 22,000
116,000 118,500
Shareholders Funds 60,000 68,500
Other Liabilities 56,000 50,000
116,000 118,500
Profit and Loss Account
Gross Earnings 130,000 155,000
Net Earnings (After Tax) 20,000 23,500
Divtimlds Pald 14,000 15,000
Transfer to Re-rve 6,000 8,500
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QUESTIONS 
tl) Would you make the type of loan requested by this applicant?
(2) Would you make any other type of loan to the applicant? If
yes, what type?
If you answer NO to questions 1 and 2, please go directly to
question 7, omitting questions 3 - 6.
(3) What is the maximum amount you would lend?
(4) What is the maximum maturity you would require?
(5) What terms would you require on the loans
(a) Interest Rate
(b) Repayment Schedule
(c) Unsecured or Secured
Total 100%	 100%
If secured, type of collateral
(d) Compensating Balance
% of loan
(e) Special charges
(f) Personal guarantee
(g) Others
(6) What additional condition not mentioned above would you
require for ensuring the security and safety of the loan
(e.g. a position on the board of directors)
(7) Estimate the relative extent to which the following categories
of factors influenced your decision to say you would or would
not grant a loan to the applicant. Please estimate in terms
of percentages totalling 100% for all categories. For an
example:
(a) The applicant's financial position 	 10%
(b) The applicant's management 	 ' 5%
(0 The potential growth of the industry 	 5%
(d) The potential place of the applicant's
business in the community	 10%
(e) Established bank loan policies 	 20%
(f) The bank's financial position 	 10%(0 Security offered	 40%
Assets
Distribution
of 11100,000
(in percentages)
100%
100%
100%
100%
PART 2: INVESTMENT PREFERENCE TEST 
Assume that you have, over the years, been able to
accumulate cash savings of your own totalling N100,000 and
that you consider investing all of it now.
Please indicate how you would allocate this sum amongst the
investments in each of the following sets of options, assuming
that you do not intend to change your investment decisions for,
at least, one year.
Show your apportionment by placing percentages in the
space provided such that each set of 5 types of assets
+B+C+D+ E) add up to 100%
SFr I
	
A. 4% Treasury Bills.
B. 4% Commercial Bank Deposit
C. 7% Federal Government Development Loan Stood( 1996
D. 9% Guineas Nigeria Ltd- Debentures 1990
E. BATA (Nigeria) Ltd- Ordinary Shares
SET II A. 4% Treasury Bills
B. 41/2% Treasury Certificates
C. 7% Federal GOvernment Development Loan Stock 1996
D. 9% Eentworth Finance (Nigeria) Ltd Debentures 1983
E. BERM (Nigeria) Ltd Ordinary Shares
SET III A. 4% Treasury Bills
B. 5% Federal Mbrtgage Bank Deposit
C. 7% Federal Government Development Loan Stock 1996
D. 9% Thomas Wyatt Debentures 1981/92
E. ROAD (Nigeria) Ltd Ordinary Shares
SET IV A. 4% Treasury Bills
B. 41 % Treasury Certificates
C. 7% Federal Government Development Loan Stock 1996
D. 9% WA. Portland Cement Debentures 1985/89
E. Taylor Woodrow Ordinary Shares
PART 3: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE INTERVIEW
(1) How long have you been a branch manager?
(2) How long have you been in your present branch?
(3) How long, on the average, do you stay in a branch?
(4) Do you operate with a written loan policy?
(5) What do you feel are the advantages and disadvantages of
written loan policies?
(6) In what ways does your bank market its loan services?
( ) What is your role in this marketing activity?
(8) What in your view are the benefits to the bank and the clients
of the marketing of lending services?
(9) How often do your customers call for your expert advice?
If not at all, why, do you think?
04 What kind of information do you give to your loan customer e.g.
(a) knowledge of general economic conditions
(b) knowledge of specific industry or business
(c) advice on expansion, reconstruction etc.
(d) advice on investment of surplus funds
(e) credit information
(f) others
(11) In providing advisory services to clients, what support is
provided by the Area, Regional and Head Office?
(12) Do you make business calls on new and potential customers?
(13) What, do you think, is the usefulness of business calls
by banks on their clients (new, old and potential)?
(14) In what various ways do you get to know intimately your
customers? e.g. contacts at social clubs, visits to work
sites, etc.
(15) Do you generally answer yes or no to loan applications for
the agricultural or manufacturing sector? How do you help
improve the credit-worthiness of loan proposals from these
sub-sectors?
(16) What kinds of collateral are routinely acceptable to the
bank? Do customers offer other types not acceptable to you?
(Please list).
(17) Where securities are called for by the bank on a loan, what
percentages of the loan do such securities usually represent?
(18) What do you think are the main reasons for the bank's demand
for securities on making a loan?
(19) Should banks act as advisers to business?
(20) What signals do you use in identifying problem loans? How
are they supervised?
(21) What, in your view, are the factors responsible for loan
default by agricultural and manufacturing sector borrowers?
(22) What are the special problems of lending to agriculture and
manufacturing? How can these problems be solved and what
should be the role of the bank in this exercise?
BRANCH STATISTICS 
(a) Bank 	
(b) Branch
	
(c) Size (No. of staff) 	
(d) Number of accounts 	
(e) Percentage of manufacturing sector accounts 	
(f) Percentage of agricultural sector accounts 	
(g) -Types of services provided 	
(h) Method of business promotion 	
BRANCH MANAGER STATISTICS 
(a) Age 	
(b) Banking and Financial Experience 
Financial Institution	 Location	 Position	 No. of Years 
1 	
2 	
3 	
(c) Other Working Experiences 
COTT
_ jp_a_Zn	 Location	 Type of Business 	 Position No. of Years 
1 	
2 	• 
3 	
(d) Education (Post-secondary)
Institution	 Field of Study	 Qualification	 nutta To 
1 	
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS
QUESTIONNAIRE I 
(1) Do you operate a planning department in your bank?
When was it established and what is its existing strength?
(2) How do you plan for your loans and advances given the central
bank directives in this regard? .
And for how long ahead?
(3) To what extent do bank officers outside the planning depart-
ment participate in the planning exercise?
.(4) Does your bank operate its loan function with a written loan
policy? Any loan policies specifically for agricultural .
and manufacturing lending?
(5) To what extent do these policy guidelines aid or constrain
lending at the operational levels of management?
(6) What are the objectives of your bank's lending function?
(7) What are the main kinds of information required for your
lending function and activities of planning, control and
operations?
(8) How do you presently obtain this information?
(9) Does lack of information ever constrain your lending activities?
(10) To what extent, do you think, a central credit bureau would
help improve the information resource of the banking system,
and in particular your bank?
(11) To what extent do commercial banks presently co-operate in
the exchange of credit information?
(12) Does your bank maintain customer credit files?
What kinds of information are available therein?
(13) How does management in your bank control the quality and the
quantity of advances?
And how successfully do you think?
(14) How often do you review the credit limits of your credit
officers, mainly the branch managers?
(15) How long, on the average, do your branch managers stay working
in a branch?
Do they stay long enough, do you think, to get to know their
customers?
(16) What in your view, are the Oauses of loan losses particularly
in the agricultural and manufacturing lending sectors?
(17) Does your bank routinely review the loans and advances
granted by its loan officers?
What form does this review take?
(18) What is your bank's defaulted loan collection procedure?
How effective is this procedure in recovering defaulted
loans as well as discouraging loan default by customers?
(19) Does the bank request its lending officers to submit
periodical age analysis of loans?
Any other periodic reports on loan portfolio?
(20) What kinds of lending related services do you offer your
customers?
(21) Do you have a Business Advisory Service Unit?
When was it established and what is the staff strength? .
(22) What services does this unit offer especially to your
agricultural and manufacturing sector customers?
(23) Do your bank's business promotion officers (if any) make
business calls on new and old customers?
Of what benefit do you think, are these calls to the bank
as well as to the customers?
(24) Do customers call on your bank for advice?
If yes, what types of advice?
(25) What kinds of support services are provided by the bank's
advisory services unit to the branch managers?
(26) In what positive and concrete ways do you feel your bank
helps to increase the volume of credit worthy projects in
the economy?
(27) In what ways does your bank help to improve the credit
worthiness of your clients?
(28) How does your bank positively market its loans and advances
services especially to the important agricultural and
manufacturing sectors?
(29) What are the special problems of lending to the agricultural
and manufacturing sectors?
How could these problems be alleviated or completely
eliminated and what, do you think, should be the role of
the commercial banks in the exercise?
How much more could you have lent, say, last year without
these problems?
(30) What do you think, should be the role of commercial banks
in development financing?
(31) Would more incentives from the government induce your bank to
lend more to the strategic sectors of agriculture and
manufacturing
If yes, what kinds of incentives do you have in mind?
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IVA-5
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS
QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
(1) How many banks in Nigeria do you bank with?
(2) How long is your average relationship with each bank?
• (3) How do you evaluate, originally, the banks with which you
want to do business?
•
(4) What considerations influence your choice of, or decision to
change to a bank? (i) Do operating services play a role?
(ii) How about credit extended to you
(ill) How about advice received?
(iv) How about personal friendship?
(5) Would you say that Nigerian banks are more or less alike so
that it does not really matter which one deals with or that
there. are great differences among banks?
What do you have in mind?
(6) Would you say that the Nigerian Commercial banks as they now
operate, satisfactorily provide all services business firms
can expect from them? Or can you suggest some areas that
are not fully satisfactory?
(7) What kinds of services do you seek from your bank(s)?
(i) Information on general economic conditions:
(ii) Information on specific industry or
business?
(iii)Advice on foreign business?
(iv) Credit information?
(v) Advice on investments?
401'
(vi) Others (please list)
•(8) Do you get all the services and advances you would like to
have from your bank(s)?
If not, what do you have in mind?
(9) Does your business regularly or usually borrow money from the
commercial banks?
If not, why not?
If yes, for what purpose and maturity?
(10) Would you say there is much difference in the lending
facilities of the various banks with particular regard to
(i) access to credit 	
•
(ii) duration of credit
(iii) charges for loans
(iv) security required
(v) time to negotiate
(vi) compensatory balance
(11) How doesyour bank rate in your view, on the following factors
in bank lending? (Please underline your assessment)
(i) Access to credit - Liberal, or restrictive
(ii) Duration of credit - Too short or long enough
(iii) Charges for loan - Comparatively inexpensive or
expensive
(iv) Security required - Excessive or inexcessive
. (v) Time to negotiate - Long or short
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(vi) Compensating balance - Liberal or restrictive
(12) Before deciding on important financial matters, do you turn
to your bankers for advice?
If yes, do you get satisfactory response on such a request?
If no, why?
(13) In your opinion, is giving information and advice to business
firms and individual customers an important function of
commercial banks?
(14) Some bank users feel that Nigerian banks are too conservative
and safety minded, whilst others feel that the banks try to
encourage expansion and innovation in enterprises. What do
you think?
(15) Would you say there is much competition or rivalry among
banks in trying to get new business?
(16) Have you ever had business promotion visits from your
bankers and/or other bankers soliciting business?
(17) Have you ever obtained funds from sources other than
commercial banks such as through issues of additional share
capital or Insurance Company?
Why were these other sources chosen?
(18) How beneficial to your firm are business calls by commercial
banks?
(19) Is credit inavailability a constraint on your enterprise's
development and growth?
If not, what is?
(20) What are the usual conditions under which your enterprise
obtains loans and advances from the bank? e.g. rate of
interest, guarantee, compensating balance, etc.
Which of these do you find most difficult to meet or even
repugnant?
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(21) Have you ever failed to get a loan because of a lack of .
the right quality and/or quantity of collateral? What
kinds of securities do you have to offer for a loan but
which are unacceptable to the bank?
What amount of loan and for what purpose?
For agricultural businesses only 
(22) Have you ever heard of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme?
(23) Have you ever tried to obtain a loan under the scheme?.
Did you succeed?
If not, what was the cause of the failure?
(24) In what ways can the banks best make money more readily
available to farmers of All grades?
Enterprise statistics 
Name:
Total Assets/Liabilities (as per 1978 Balance Sheet)
Type of business: 	
Bankers:
QUESTIONNAIRE RE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEME
(1) What concrete evidences exist of the nature and size of
agricultural	 credit gap in Nigeria?
(2) What is the rationale for the choice of the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme as a means of improving agricul-
tural finance and development?
(3) Some people feel that an agricultural credit refinance
scheme will be a better means of motivating the
commercial banks to expand credit to the agricultural
sector. What is your view?
(4) Do you think that the commercial banks are doing enough
to promote agricultural development in Nigeria? If
yes, in what ways?
(5) Agricultural credit is of the nature of development
finance; do you think commercial banks in Nigeria should
be actively involved in this kind of business?
(6) In what other ways, do you think, commercial banks can
be encouraged to increase their commitments to the
agricultural sector?
(7) The provision of collateral is the most stringent
condition of credit-worthiness small borrowers find
hard to meet in most developing countries like Nigeria.
Given the financial weakness of the average Nigerian
farmer how can he raise a loan from the bank today in
spite of the guarantee scheme?
(8) Everything considered, it appears that under the present
arrangements in the scheme only the 'big' farmers can
benefit from the operations of the Agricultural credit
guarantee scheme. What can be done to extend the
benefits of the scheme more widely to cover the large
number of needy farmers who in the end hold the key to
the country's agricultural development?
mip
(9) To what extent would you say the Agricultural Credit
Guarantee Scheme has begun to achieve its aims?
(10) What can you suggest as a bank aid for the development
of agriculture in Nigeria?
INVESTMENT PREFERENCE TEST
Department of Economics,
University College of North Wale
Bangor	 LL57 2DS
North Wales,
United Kingdom.
Dear Sir,
INVESTMENT PREFERENCE GAME
I will be grateful if you can help my study by participating
in an Investment Preference Test I am Oonducting among Nigerian
Commercial Bank Executives. If you will, kindly complete the
attached. To enable me to group participants in the Test, I shall
be glad if you can complete the short questionnaire below as much
as you are willing to disclose.
(a) Am: 	
(b) Banking & Financial Experience:
Financial Institution 	 Location	 Position
	
No. of Years
1.
2.
3.
(c) Other Working Experience:
Company	 Location 
1.
TYPe of Business Position No. of Years
2.
3.
(d) Income: (Please tick the relevant range)
1. Up to N15,000
2. N15,000 - 20,000
3. N20,000 - 25,000
4. Above N25,000
APPENDIX IV-B
LETTERS OF REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW
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IVB -1
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Your reason
	
Our reforms	 Extension 372/373
UP1G/JEB
12th May, 1980
Dear
One of our Ph.D. students, Mr. 0. Adewunmi, is currently conducting research
into the lending practices of the U.K. clearing banks, with special reference
to the industrial and agricultural sectors. He wishes to use this information
ina comparative study of the respective practices in the Nigerian banking
system. Any information and data obtained from your bank would, of course,
be treated with the utmost confidentiality.
We wondered if you mould be good enough to put Mr. Adewumni in contact with
the appropriate manager? A questionnaire is enclosed to provide details on
the kind of ground Mr. Adewunmi would like to cover in an interview.
Our apologies for any inconvenience and we look forward to your reply.
Dr. E.P.M. Gardener
Postgraduate Director of Studies 
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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
	
IVB-2
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. B. REVELL	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Yoe: reference
	
Our reference
	
Extension
Dear Manager,
A STUDY OF LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS
I am currently undertaking a study of Loan Management in Nigerian
Commercial banks as the main part of my Ph.D. programme. In this
connection I am 'requesting the assistance of a randomly selected number
of commercial. bank managers in responding to a number of questions, and
hypothetical lending and investment situations.
Specifically your help is required in the evaluation of the four
Wan proposals presented in part I of this document. You are, of course,
free to make all the assumptions you need to enable you to .reach a decision
on 	 loan proposals as well as to answer the accompanying questions.
In part II of this document you are kindly requested to indiOate
your investment preferences against the sets of assets presented to you
therei .
Finally I would very much like to discuss the questionnaire which
constitutes the part III of this document with you when I return to collect
it. It is enclosed here to enable you to get informed ahead of the issues
to be discussed.
As one of the few managers randomly selected for this exercise, your
assistance is VERY IMPORTANT and, if kindly given, will be highly appreciated.
Thanks in advance for your co-operation,
Yours sincerely,
vir6L.AvAbyt,A.
0. Adewunmi
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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
	
IVB-3
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL -	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Yootrehrenee
	 Ourrefsman	 Dmmskm
Dear Sir,
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS
As the attached letter from my Supervisor states, I am conducting the above
titled study in connection with my Ph.D. Programme. In this regard, I
should be grateful if you would help urge on a few of your Branch Managers
to respond to the enclosed Questionnaires. All I am seeking is their
motions to these theoretical but typical loan decision-making situations.
The participation of the nominated Managers is considered crucial to the
succe s of my study and for this reason, I should be glad to have an early
response from them.
A stamped addressed envelope is sent along with each Questionnaire for the
nmpo dents' replies.
I thaRk you very much in advance for your cooperation.
Yours faithfully,
vvv%
0. ADEWUNMI
••n••••n••	 •••••••
41K F N GtRIA LIMITED
IVB-4
UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LIMITED
Staff Training Centre, P.M Bag 2027, Lagos
Telephone 44918
7i• r r -, T T	 T.,/ t N_CC
s
_
,„..s.	 , N
409
13th October, 1980
Kr. Ogunsulire,
Union Bank of Nig. Ltd.,
Dear Hr. Ogunsulire,
Bearer of this note is hr. O. Adewunmi, currently pursuing a full—time research
for his PHD at the University College of North Wales.
apart from being an old staff of our Bank, the area into which he is researching
is of interest to us at this Training Centre. Hopefully, when he is back. in
Lagos, we expect to benefit from his work.
Keanwhile, he requires your co—operation in completing some of his questionnaires
to the very best of your ability and strictly on the basis of what you will do
if faced with those hypothetical situations.
kr Adewunmi realises how busy you are and will a2rreciate any hel p
 you render.
Please assist him as best as you can.
Yours sincerely,
O.	 AUNBALa
Lu:AGER
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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
	 1113 -5
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Your racism
	
Our reference
	 Extension
Dear Sir,
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN
COMMERICAL BANKS - QUESTIONNAIRE 
I am conducting a study on the above subject as the main
put of my Ph.D. programme. As this study focuses on Manufacturing
(amongst other issues) I am requesting your kind assistance in
the completion of the attached questionnaire.
Your response will be very important to this exercise and, if
given, will be highly appreciated. Of course, your reply and
comments will be treated with the strictest confidentiality.
Yours sincerely,
O. Adewunmi
411
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
	 IVB-6
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL •	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Yaw reference
	 Our reference	 Extension
Dear Sir,
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS - QUESTIONNAIRE 
I am conducting a study on the above subject as a core of
my Ph.D. programme. As this study focuses on Agriculture (among
other issues), I am requesting your kind assistance in the
completion of the attached questionnaire. In view of the
uniqueness of the Fund and its expected role in agricultural
finance and development, your response will be very important
to this exercise and, if given, will be highly appreciated. Of
course, your reply and comments will be treated with the
strictest confidentiality.
Yours sincerely,
wetwt.31.4vir.41.
0. Adewunmi
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IVB-7
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL 	 BANGOR (0248) 51151
Yow rohrence
	
Our reforms 
OA/SAP	 Extsaskm 381
Nor Sir,
Wan Management in Nigerian .Commercial Banks - Questionnaire 
I an conducting a study on the above subject as the main part of my Ph.D programme.
The purpose of this part of the study is to collect comparative statistics and
information for British banks. I am requesting your kind assistance in the com-
pletion of the attached questionnaire. I note that your response will be very
important and useful to this exercise and, if given, will be highly appreciated..
Yours sincerely,
yolk w‘Tvuovv•k
0. Adewunmi 
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IVB— 8
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES
BANGOR LL57 2DG
PROFESSOR J. R. S. REVELL
	
BANGOR (0248) 51151
Your reference
	 ourromma OA/JA
	 Extension 381
LOAN MANAGEMENT IN COMMERCIAL BANKS 
I write to say a big thank you for the interview you gave me on the above
subject recently. Your time, patience and willingness to inform me on this
subject of my study and related banking issues are greatly appreciated and
will be remembered for a long time. Without any doubt your assistance shall
make good contribution to the success of my research and I hope I can always
count on your support in the future.
Wilmy best regards,
Yours sincerely,
0. ADEWUNMI 
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Table 1,7-1	 Interest rates structure 1980/81
Rate (%)
(i) Minimum Rediscount Rate
	 6
(ii) Treasury Bill issue rate	 5
(iii) Treasury Certificate (1 year) • 	 51/2
(iv) Treasury Certificate (2 years)	 6
(v) Federal Government Stock:	 6-8
	
4- 9 years maturity
	 6
	
10-17	 n	 11	 61/4-61/2
	
18-25	 11
	 61/2-7
	
4-8	 n	 n	 7
	
9-14	 II	 II	 71/2.
	
15-20	 n	 II	 73/4-
	
21-25	 n	 to	 8
vi) Deposit Rates (Commercial Banks)
Savings Deposits	 6
Time Deposits with 7 days' notice	 5
for one month
	 51/2
▪ for 1-3 months	 54*
• for 3-6 months
	 6
▪ for 6-12 months	 61/2
• for over 12 months	 61/2
	
ii) Lending Rates: Minimum 	 61/2
	
Maximum	 111/2
(a) Preferred sectors maximum
	 91/2
(b) Less preferred sectors maximum
	 111/2
(c) Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
	 5-6
(d) Residential Housing Costing not more than
W100,000	 6
(e) Agricultural Production
	 6
ii) Specialised Institutions:
(a) Federal Savings Bank - Savings Deposit Rate
	 6
(b) Nigerian Industrial Development Bank
	 81/2-11
(c) Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
(Lending Rates) 	 81/2-11
(d) Nigerian Agricultural Bank (Lending Rates)
For Agricultural Production
	 6
For Agricultural Commodities Marketing
	 8 -11
(e) Federal Mortgage Bank - Savings Rate
	 6 - 7
Lending Rates
	 6 -11
(i) Residential Housing
	 6
(ii)Commercial Property	 7 -11
Source: CBN Monetary Policy Circular No. 12: Central Bank Credit
Guidelines for 1980 Fiscal Year  (Lagos, April 1980).
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Table VI-3 An analysis of Commercial Banks' deposits, 1960-1978
Year
(Ehd	 of
Deoater)
Amount
(N million)
Percentage
DenEmd
(1)
Savings
(2)
Tine
(3)
matzo.
DaEOSitS
(4)
Dammd
(5)
SMAYVS
(6)
Tine
(7)
Savings &
'Dimas %
of Tata].
(6 + 7)
1960 82.2 36.8 18.0 137.0 60.0 26.9 13.1 40.0
1961 83.4 42.4 28.2 153.8 54.2 27.5 18.3 45.8
1962 90.6 48.4 34.8 173.8 52.2 27.8 20.0 47.8
1963 97.6 56.4 37.8 191.8 50.9 29.4 19.7 49.1
1964 115.6 70.2 46.2 232.0 49.8 30.3 19.9 51.2
965 124.0 80.4 60.6 265.0 46.8 30.3 22.9 53.2
1966 134.6 89.4 73.2 297.0 45.3 30.1 24.6 54.7
967 110.4 51.8 79.4 241.6 45.7 21.4 32.9 54.3
968 147.0 74.8 108.8 330.4 44.5 22.6 32.9 55.5
1969 185.6 94.6 120.8 401.0 46.3 23.6 30.1 53.7
970 289.0 129.8 207.0 625.8 46.2 20.7 33.1 53.8
1971 285.4 160.4 211.4 657.2 43.4 24,4 32.2 56.6
972 315.0 205.2 256.0 776.2 40.6 26.4 33.0 59.4
973 430.7 224.5 357.8 1,013.0 43.0 22.0 35.0 57.0
974 720.7 286.7 686.5 1,693.9 42.5 16.9 40.5 57.4
1975 1,266.8 521.3 1,051.0 •2,839.1 44.6 18.4 37.0 55.4
1976 2,185.1 709.1 1,270.0 4,164.3 52.5 17.0 30.5 47.5
1977 2,980.1 930.1 1,325.0 5,235.2 56.9 17.8 25.3 43.1
1978 2,700.9 1,075.7 1,526,0 5,302.6 50.9 20.3 28.8 49.1
Source: CBN, Econcmic and Financial Review (various issues 1960-1978).
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Table VI-5 Number of operating Commercial Banks and their
branches in Nigeria, 1960 - 1978
Year End No.of Banks NO.	 of
Branches
Growth
Rate of
Branching
Average	 Popul-
Branclaper ation
Bank
No. of Persons
per Branch
1960 12 190 - 15.8 51.598 271,568
1961 13 195 2.6 15.0 52.921 271,390
1962 17 210 7.7 12.3 54.278 258,467
1963 17 218 3.8 12.8 55.670 255,367
1964 17 226 3.7 13.3 57.062 252.487
1965 15 240 6.2 16.0 58.489 247.704
1966 15 253 5.4 16.9 59.951 236.960
1967 14 281 11.1 20.1 61.450 218,683
1968 14 298 6.0 21.3 62.986 211,362
1969 13 302 1.3 23.2 64.561 213,778
1970 13 273 -9.6 21.0 66.175 242.399
1971 16 318 16.5 19.9 68.160 214,340
1972 16 367 15.4 22.9 70.205 191,294
1973 16 385 4.9 24.1 72.311 187,821
1974 17 403 4.7 23.7 74.480 184,814
1975 17 436 8.2 25.6 76.714 175,950
1976 18 464 6.4 25.8 76.800 165,517
1977 19 508 9.5 26.7 78.700 154,921
1978 19 618 21.6 32.5 80.700 120,089
•
Sources: (1) CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts  (various years
1960-1978).
(2) Clayide, S.O. ed. "Economic Survey of Nigeria, 1960-1975"
Ibadan, Nigeria; Arcmolaram Publishing Co. Ltd, 1976.
(3) cm, Research Department. Nigeria's Principal Economic & 
Financial Indicators: 1970-1978.
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Table 171-6 Individual commercial bank's portfolio of assets:1979
(N million)
Banks Cash & Cash
Items
Balance with
other hanks
Treasury
securitips
Loans &
advances
Other
assets
Total
assets
A 36.4 49.0 44.0 242.18 110.07 481.65
B 10.92 35.35 0.13 189.65 35.33 271.38
C 23.02 21.80 37.90 110.91 62.87 256.50
D 8.14 19.04 2.46 104.96 21.55 156.15
E 5.11 13.08 15.25 60.30 35.58 129.32
F 10.45 31.53 17.45 58.98 40.45 158.86
G 23.03 117.70 103.84 323.13 266.99 834.69
H 0.76 3.45 - 8.39 19.2 31.81
I 1.01 16.64 0.50 17.72 1.51 37.38
J 17.40 17.76 1.26 52.20 15.42 104.04
K 48.54 89.02 0.49 468.2 67.25 673.50
L 302.18 112.75 210.11 706.11 286.22 1,617.37
M	 . 8.92 25.58 14.41 144.34 105.29 298.54
N 114.53 83.93 494.97 769.33 805.95 2,268.76
P 7.63 140.95 48.21 263.68 284.80 745.27
Q 2.14 18.62 13.39 21.71 48.11 103.97
R 38.47 106.38 327.47 813.82 1,335.28 2,621.42
S 2.12 10.44 1.43 17.28 22.24 53.51
T 20.46 35.27 35.25 155.38 132.01 378.37
Total 681.23 948.3 1,368.52 4,528.32 3,696.12 11,222.49
Source: CBN, Research Department.
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Table VII-2 Investment preference test: operations- level
Lending officers' responses
Respond-	 Financial Assets
ent	 (percentage distribution)
A
1 20.0 22.5 5.0 20.0 32.5
2 2.5 10.0 12.5 42.5 32.5
3 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 50.0
4 27.5 23.75 18.75 18.75 11.25
5 55.0 22.5 6.25 7.5 8.75
6 23.75 30.0 8.75 11.25 26.25
7 22.5 36.25 18.75 8.75 13.75
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 75.0
9 26.25 34.0 10.5 1.75 25.0
10 38.75 20.0 20.0 13.75 7.5
11 8.75 13.75 12.50 35.0 30.0
12 10.0 70.0 5.0 10.0 5.0
13 20.0 30.0 10.0 20.0 20.0
14 20.0 20.0 6.25 22.5 31.25
15 16.25 18.75 25.0 22.5 17.5
16 37.5 32.5 7.5 15.0 7.5
17 25.0 27.5 20.0 16.25 11.25
18 45.0 30.0 10.0 7.5 7.5
19 1.25 1.25 7.5 62.5 27.5
20 31.25 31.25 10.0 21.25 6.25
21 20.0 25.0 16.25 21.25 17.5
22 27.5 21.25 20.0 23.75 7.5
23 33.75 26.25 1.25 17.5 21.25
24 37.5 35.0 7.5 10.0 12.5
25 30.0 47.5 6.25 6.25 10.0
26 7.5 18.75 32.5 21.25 20.0
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires
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Table VII-3 Simulated loan request questionnaire : factors
in lending decisions (summary of responses)
Respond-
ent	 A
1	 27.5	 30.0	 15.0	 _	 17.5	 _	 10.0
2	 12.5	 10.0	 10.0	 5.0	 27.5	 12.5	 22.5
3	 22.5	 16.25 12.50	 -	 13.75 16.25	 18.75
4	 23.75	 7.5	 16.25	 _	 11.25 15.0	 26.25
5	 23.75	 6.25	 3.75	 1.25	 -	 -	 65.0
	
6	 27.5	 23.75 12.50 11.25	 5.0	 10.0	 10.0
	
7	 22.5	 22.5	 8.75	 5.0	 15.0	 11.25 15.0
	
8	 8.75	 10.0	 8.75	 3.75	 18.75	 23.75 25.0
	
9	 21.25	 10.0	 8.75	 7.0	 17.5	 4.5	 31.0
	
10	 20.0	 20.0	 25.0	 10.0	 10.0	 2.5	 12.5
_
	11	 17.5	 7.5	 15.0	 _	 20.0	 12.5	 27.5
	
12	 _	 _	 _	 _	 _	 _
	13	 15.0	 7.5	 7.5	 _	 43.75	 _	 26.25
	
14	 24.0	 25.0	 27.5	 9.0	 14.5
	
15	 40.0	 26.25	 6.25	 1.25	 3.75	 11.25 11.25
16	 10.0	 12.5	 18.75	 _	 10.0	 16.25 32.5
17	 16.25	 7.5	 8.75	 6.25	 22.5	 10.0	 28.75
18	 8.75	 38.75 10.0	 16.25 10.0	 11.25	 5.0
19	 11.25	 27.5	 8.75	 2.5	 15.0	 20.0	 15.0
20	 12.5	 20.0	 18.75	 _	 18.75 15.0	 15.0
21	 17.5	 21.25 21.25 11.25 11.25 	 6.25	 11.25
22	 17.5	 7.5	 6.25	 8.75	 30.0	 12.5	 17.5
23	 27.5	 26.25 11.25	 1.25	 6.875 5.625 21.25
24	 5.25	 10.0	 5.5	 5.0	 5.0	 40.0	 30.0
25	 _	 _	 _	 _	 -	 _	 _
26	 30.0	 70.0	 _	 _	 _	 _	 _
27	 18.3	 13.3	 17.3	 1.7	 21.7	 8.4	 19.3
28	 31.25	 27.5	 10.0	 7.5	 7.5	 6.25 10.0
29	 17.5	 28.75	 8.75	 12.5	 7.0	 3.75	 21.75
30	 13.75	 17.5	 38.75	 1.5	 11.0	 9.75	 7.75
31	 13.75	 15.0	 5.0	 3.75	 32.5	 12.5	 17.5
32	 11.25	 25.0	 18.75 12.5	 26.25	 1.25	 5.0
33	 8.75	 11.25 13.75 11.25 20.0	 22.5	 12.5
34	 33.75	 17.5	 16.25	 13.75	 11.25	 2.5	 5.0
35	 _	 -	 -	 -	 _	 -	 -
36	 20.0	 10.0	 5.0	 5.0	 46.25	 -	 13.75
37	 20.0	 15.0	 10.0	 25.0	 30.0
38	 31.25	 17.5	 6.25	 6.25	 8.75	 2.5	 27.5 
N 35	 35	 35	 35	 35	 35	 35	 35
an	 19.5%	 18.8%	 12.7%	 5.8%	 16.3%	 9.3%	 17.6%
S.D.	 8.2	 12.1	 7.4	 5.8	 11.0	 8.6	 12.4
Source: Computed from collected questionnaires
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Table VII-5. Investment preference test: top level management
staff responses
Financial Assets
Respondent A (Percentage distribution)
1 16.25 28.75 55.0
2 40.0 17.5 30.0 12.5
3 20.0 13.0 36.25 21.0 9.75
4 3.75 10.0 10.0 22.5 53.75
5 5.0 9.5 14.25 28.75 42.5
6 - - - - 100.0
7 - - - 25.0 75.0
8 30.0 23.75 16.25 18.75 11.25
9 - - 100.0 -
10 - 25.0 25.0 37.5 12.5
11 5.0 40.0 20.0 25.0 10.0
12 90.0 2.5 - 5.0 2.5
13 37.5 35.0 - 15.0 12.5
14 40.0 - - 45.0 15.0
15 33.0 27.0 8.5 15.0 16.5
16 21.25 16.25 21.25 25.0 16.25
17 17.5 22.5 15.0 32.5 12.5
18 10.0 15.0 27.5 25.0 22.5
19 8.75 11.25 30.0 25.0 25.0
20 62.5 21.25 5.0 6.25 5.0
21 23.75 46.25 13.75 7.5 8.75
22 57.5 31.25 6.25 5.0 -
23 10.0 17.5 27.5 7.5 37.5
24 - - - 50.0 50.0
25 58.75 12.5 - 27.5 1.25
26 13.75 16.25 23.75 26.25 20.0
27 13.75 13.75 21.25 30.0 21.25
28 16.25 25.0 20.0 22.5 16.25
Source: Computed from collected Questionnaires
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Table •X-1:	 Balance sheet categories
Assets
Mmmnonic
	
Transfer	 Portfolio	 Description
category	 category
YES	 Cash
YES	 Mbney at call
YES	 Treasury bills
YES	 Other bills
YES	 CDs purchased - fixed rate
YES	 Government securities
YES
	
Marketable securities
YES	 Non-marketable securities
YES	 Amortized loans
YES	 Loans - ind. - fixed rate
YES	 Loans - corp.- fixed rate
YES	 Loans - ind. - var. rate
YES	 Loans - corp.- var. rate
YES	 Overdrafts
YES	 Items in course of collection
Debtors
Special deposits
Other assets
Trade investments
Fixed assets
Contingent assets (1)
Individual large loans
(1) footnote to balance Sheet only
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Liabilities
Transfer	 Portfolio	 Description
category
	
category
MAR	 YES	 Paid up share capital
CBES	 YES	 Capital Reserves
RATS	 YES	 Revenue reserves
PAW	 YES	 Provisions
DEPN
	
YES	 Depreciation of fixed assets
CDBT	 YES	 Debt capital
TAXN	 YES	 Taxation payable
DIVI	 Dividends payable
DDIN	 Demand deposits - individuals
DDCP	 Demand deposits - corporate
TDVR
	
Time deposits- variable rate
TDFX
	
Time deposits- fixed rate
CDFX
	
YES	 CDs issued - fixed rate
CDTR	 Creditors
CTLI	 Other liabilities
LIFE	 YES	 Life fund net liability
GENL
	
YES	 General insurance liabifity.
CCNL
	
Contingent liabilities"4
(1) footnote to balance sheet only
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Table X-2:	 Modes available in SOFI
AMODE	 Assumption files: initialization, listing,
modifications and copying
DMODE	 Decision files: initialization, listing, modifications
and copying
FMODE	 Faults: collection of faults reports and user
comments
GMODE .	Graphics mode: display of data as pictures
IMODE
	
Balance sheet files: initialization, listing,
modifications and copying
LMODE	 Listing of data files or library catalogues on the
line printer, the computer's fast printing device
QMODE	 Queries mode: retrieval and presentation in tabular
format of any information stored in data files
SMODE	 Simulation mode
TMODE	 Transfers of files between a user's library and
the SOFI library
UMODE	 Update mode: produces an Update Report to bring
a user up to date with new developments to SOFI
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Table XI-1	 Sample of detailed loans portfolio array
	
Maturity	 Outstanding Balance	 Interest Pate
	
(years)	 (N million)	 (%)
2	 9.625045	 7.5
4	 2.048953	 9.0
1	 93.900000	 6.0
3	 17.100000	 8.0
4	 23.550000	 9.0
5	 25.6C0000	 10.0
TOtal	 171.824
Table XI-2	 Sample of detailed investments portfolio array
Maturity Par Original Issue Book
(years) (NI million) yield rate value
(%) (%) (N million)
2 75.60 4.625 4.625 75.60
9 28.20 5.25 5.25 28.20
1 70.50 3.0 3.0 70.50
1 2.75 3.0 3.0 2.75
2 2.00 4.625 4.625 2.00
3 44.00 3.125 3.125 44.00
10 16.20 4.0 4.0 16.20
239.25 239.25
Ratio No.
1
Table XI-3	 Profile of ratios to be tracked in the analysis
Description
Liquidity ratio
Definition 
Cash + primary reserve assets 
Total assets
2	 Loan/deposit ratio
3	 Loan/asset ratio
4	 Term loans/deposits ratio
5	 iIrm loans/assets ratio
6	 'It= loans/term deposits ratio
7	 Deposit ccmposition_ratio
8	 Capital fund ratio
Total loans and advances 
Total deposits
Total loans and advances 
Total assets
Term loans 
Total deposits
'Irm loans 
Total assets
Term loans 
Time + savings deposits
Time + savings deposits 
Total deposits
Capital funds 
Total deposits
Table XI-4 Bank 1:	 Ratios report
(in percentages)
1975 1976 1978 1980
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 37.7 35.3 50.5 50.8
Ratio 3 36.1 33.4 45.2 44.9
Ratio 4 9.3 7.8 10.6 13.9
Ratio 5 8.9 7.4 9.5 12.3
Ratio 6 24.8 16.9 29.3 32.1
Ratio 7 37.7 46.2 36.1 43.4
Ratio 8 3.8 3.7 6.6 6.6
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(1)Table Bank 1(A): Summarised balance sheet positions
Liabilities 1975	 1976	 1978	 1980
Issued	 Share capital	 15.0
	 20.3
	 35.2	 45.3
Capital reserves	 10.0	 14.3	 32.0	 52.0
Revenue reserves	 8.4	 19.5	 38.5	 62.5
Provisions	 0.0	 12.4	 32.3	 69.7
Taxation	 6.9	 22.3
	 59.0	 103.0
Demand deposits 	 548.3
	 690.3
	 881.1	 1196.7
Time deposits	 110.6	 228.0	 167.4	 484.2
Savings deposits
	 220.6	 365.6	 331.2	 432.0
Totals	 919.8	 1,372.6	 1,576.8	 2,445.5
Assets
Cash	 20.0	 113.2	 161.5	 199.4
Primary reserve assets 	 211.0	 230.0	 230.0	 410.0
Other investments 	 340.0	 239.2	 331.8	 537.2
Term loans	 82.0	 170.8	 174.4	 348.8
Overdrafts	 249.8	 599.4	 653.9	 919.8
Fixed assets	 17.0	 20.0	 25.1	 30.2
Totals	 919.8	 1,372.6	 1,576.8	 2,445.5
Note; (1) Differences in balance sheet footings are a result of increased
profitability of bank 1(A) after the increase in loan deposit ratio to
601.
Table	 XI-6 Bank 1(A):	 Ratios report
1975 1976 1978 1980
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 37.7 60.0 60.0 60.0
Ratio 3 36.1 56.1 52.5 51.9
Ratio 4 9.3 13.3 12.6 16.5
Ratio 5 8.9 12.4 11.1 14.3
Ratio 6 24.8 28.8 35.0 38.1
Ratio 7 37.7 46.2 36.1 43.4
Ratio 8 3.8 4.2 7.7 7.6
XI-5
4 35
Table XI-7	 Bank 1(A): Performance indices
Index (1) 1976 1978 1980
Net	 income/equity (%) 46.1 34.0 20.8
Net income/Assets (%) 1.1 1.2 0.9
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 7.7 7.6
Earnings per Share (EPS) 1.02 910K 62K
Loans/deposits (%) 60.0 •	 60.0 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 14.9 15.3
Loans/Assets (%) 56.1 52.5 51.9
Term loans/deposits (%) 13.3 12.6 16.5
Term loans/term deposits (%) 28.8 35.0 38.1
Note: (1)	 All ratios are annualized
Table XI-8 Bank 1(A)-1:
	
Performance indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net incane/equity (%) 46.1 35.8 21.8
Net inaxne/assets (%) 1.1 1.2 1.0
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 7.8 7.8
Earnings per share (EPS) 1.02 95K 66K
Loans/depcsits (%) 60.1 60.2 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 14.7 14.9
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 52.4 51.5
•
Table XI-9 Bank 1(A)-2:	 Performance indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%) 37.0 34.4 18.5
Net income/assets (%) 0.9 1.1 0.8
Equity/deposits (%) 4.0 7.3 7.0
Earnings per share (EPS) 82K 86K 52K
Loans/deposits (%) 60.1 60.2 60.0
Assets/equity 26.9 15.7 16.6
Loans/assets (%) 56.2 52.4 51.5
Table XII-1	 Bank 1: Contingency test (1) - Performance indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%) 15.6 23.4 13.5
Net income/assets (%) 0.4 0.7 0.4
Equity/deposits (%) 3.4 5.8 5.3
Earnings per share (EPS) 34K 50K 30K
Loans/deposits (%) 35.3 50.5 50.8
Assets/equity 30.9 19.4 21.5
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 45.2 44.9
Table XII-2	 Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test (1) - Performance indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%)
tkit income/assets	 (%)
Equity/deposits (%)
Earnings per share (EPS)
L ans/deposits (%)
A sets/equity
L ans/assets (%)
• 27.5
0.7
3.7
61K
60.0
28.67
56.1
28.0
0.9
6.5
66K
60.0
17.6
52.5
14.1
0.5
5.9
35K
60.0
19.58
51.9
T ble XII-3 Bank 1: Contingency test (2) - Summarised balance sheet
positions
.Liabilities 1975 1976 1978 1980
Issued share capital 15.0 20.3 35.2 45.3
Capital reserves 10.0 14.3 32.0 52.0
Revenue reserves 8.4 12.2 35.1 67.9
Provisions 0.0 10.6 32.8 75.2
Taxation 6.9 14.9 55.6 108.4
Demand deposits 548.3 836.2 1,077.8 1,467.4
Time deposits 110.6 276.1 204.8 593.7
Savings deposits 220.6 442.7 405.1 529.0
Totals 919.8 1,627.3 1,878.4 2,938.9
Assets
Cash 20.0 132.2 193.9 243.2
Primary reserve assets 211.0 275.8 275.8 491.5
Other investments 340.0 543.2 456.1 742.5
Term loans 82.0 145.5 194.9 392.8
Overdrafts 249.8 510.6 732.6 1,038.7
Fixed assets 17.0 20.0 25.1 30.2
Totals 919.8 1,627.3 1,878.4 2,938.9
Table XII-4 Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test (2) - Summarised balance
sheet positions
Liabilities 1976 1976 1978 1980
Issued share capital
Capital reserves
Revenue reserves
15.0
10.0
8.4
20.3
14.3
17.7
35.2
32.0
52.9
45.3
52.0
98.1
Provisions 0.0 15.6 43.6 94.6
Taxation 6.9 20.5 73.5 138.6
Demand deposits 548.3 837.9 1,083.2 1,475.2
Time deposits 110.6 276.7 205.8 596.9
Savings deposits 220.6 443.8 407.2 532.5
Totals	 . 919.8 1,646.8 1,933.4 3,033.2
Assets
Cash 20.0 134.7 206.5 301.5
Primary reserve assets 211.0 276.7 276.7 456.7
Other investments 340.0 239.2 357.8 599.2
Term loans 82.0 217.5 226.4 450.8
Overdrafts 249.8 758.7 840.9 1,194.8
Fixed assets 17.0 20.0 25.1 30.2
Totals 919.8 1,646.8 1,933.4 3,033.2
rable xII -5 Contingency test. (2): Income/expenses levels
Operating expenses
Miscellaneous expenses
Miscellaneous income
1976	 1978	 1980
29.5	 50.3	 81.5
2.9
	
12.2	 16.1
21.6	 28.2	 62.4
Table XII-6	 Bank 1: Contingency test	 (2) - performance indices
Index 1976	 1978	 1980
Net income/equity (%) 24.1	 43.5 =	 25.8
Net income/assets
	 (%) 0.5	 1.1	 0.9
Equity/deposits (%) 3.0	 6.1	 6.4
Earnings per share (EPS) 53K	 100K	 75K
Loans/deposits	 (%) 42.2	 55.0	 55.3
Assets/equity 34.8	 18.4	 17.8
Loans/assets	 (%) 40.3
	
49.4	 48.7
Table xII -7
	
Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test(2)
indices
- performance
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%) 40.8 50.6 27.1
Net income/assets (%) 0.8 1.4 1.1
Equity/deposits (%) 3.4 7.1 7.5
Earnings per share (EPS) 90K 1.30 92K
Loans/deposits (%) 62.6 62.9 63.2
As 31.48 16.09 15.52
Loans/assets (%) 59.3 55.2 54.3
Table XII-8 Bank 1: Contingency test (3) - summarised balance•
sheet positions
Liabilities 1975 1976 1978 .1980
Issued share capital
Capital reserves
15.0
10.0
20.3
14.3
35.2
32.0
45.3
52.0
Revenue reserves 8.4 13.0 25.4 -	 39.4
Provisions 0.0 7.5 24.1 55.8
Taxation 6.9 15.8 46.0 79.9
Demand deposits 548.3 690.3 793.0 1,196.7
Time deposits 110.6 228.0 150.7 484.2
Savings deposits 220.6 365.6 298.1 432.0
Totals 919.8 1,354.8 1,404.5 2,385.3
Assets
Cash 20.0 109.0 121.2 186.6
Primary Reserve Assets 211.0 230.0 230.0 410.0
Other investments 340.0 543.2 331.8 686.0
Term loans 82.0 100.4 146.3 294.3
Overdrafts 249.8 352.2 550.1 778.2
Fixed assets 17.0 20.0 25.1 30.2
Totals 919.8 1,354.8 1,404.5 2,385.3
Table x11-9 Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test (3) - summarised
balance sheet positions
Liabilities 1975 1976 1978 1980
Issued share capital 15.0 20.3 35.2 45.3
Capital reserves 10.0 14.3 32.0 52.0
Revenue reserves 8.4 19.5 41.8 65.2
Provisions 0.0 12.4 34.2 73.5
Taxation 6.9 22.3 62.2 105.7
Demand deposits 548.3 690.3 793.0 1196.7
Time deposits 110.6 228.0 150.7 484.2
Savings deposits 220.6 365.6 298.1 432.0
Totals 919.8 1,372.7 1,447.2 2,454.6
Assets
Cash 20.0 112.2 132.3 204.4
Primary reserve assets 211.0 230.0 230.0 410.0
Other investments 340.0 239.3 229.8 543.2
Term loans 82.0 171.8 176.1 347.0
Overdrafts 249.8 599.4 653.9 919.8
Fixed assets 17.0 20.0 25.1 30.2
Totals 919.8 1,372.7 1,447.2 2,454.6	
_
Table XEI-10	 Bank 1: Contingency test (3) - ratios report
1975 1976 1978 1980
Ratio 1 250 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 37.7 35.3 56.1 50.8
Ratio 3 36.1 33.4 49.6 45.0
Ratio 4 9.3 7.8 11.8 13.9
Ratio 5 8.9 7.4 10.4 12.3
Ratio 6 24.8 16.9 32.6 32.1
Ratio 7 37.7 46.2 36.1 43.4
Ratio 8 3.8 3.7 7.5 6.5
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Table XII-11 Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test (3) - ratios report
1975 1976 1978 1980
Ratio 1 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Ratio 2 37.7 60.1 66.8 60.0
Ratio 3 36.1 56.2 57.4 51.6
Ratio 4 9.3 13.4 14.2 16.4
Ratio 5 8.9 12.5 12.2 14.1
Ratio 6 24.8 28.9 39.2 37.9
Ratio 7 37.7 46.2 36.1 43.4
Ratio 8 3.8 4.2 8.8 7.7
Table XII-12 Bank "1: Contingency test (3) - performance indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%) 26.7 31.6 18.3
Net income/assets (%) 0.7 1.1 0.7
Equity/deposits (%) 3.7 7.5 6.5
Earnings per share (EPS) 59K 74K 48K
Loans/deposits 	 (%) 35.3 56.1 50.8
Assets/equity 28.45 15.16 17.45
Loans/assets (%) 33.4 49.6 45.0
Table XII-13 Bank 1(A)-1: Contingency test (3) - performance
indices
Index 1976 1978 1980
Net income/equity (%) 46.1 37.0 19.9
Net income/assets (%) 1.1 1.4 0.9
Equity/deposits (%) 4.2 8.8 7.7
Earnings per share (EPS) 1.02K 98K 61K
Loans/deposits (%) 60.1 66.8 60.0
Assets/equity 25.4 13.3 15.1
Loans/assets 56.2 57.4 51.6
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Table ma-1	 Reasons for loans becoming uncollectable
(1) Whereabouts of customer unknown
(2) Speculative investment
(3) Security was not perfected
(4) Company hampered by importation of
obsolete machinery
(5) Dormant. Now dealing with another
bank
(6) Drawing against post-dated cheques
(7) Judgement debt. Proprietor has left
the country.
(8) Balance in dispute
(9) Customer denied liability. Balance
in dispute
(10) Obtained credit on false information
(11) Diverting funds to other sources
(12) Unwilling to pay
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Figure X-1
	
SOFI Data Presentation
Exhibit 7D.1
MPx.S.S22E2
MIN n -47G=741
This three-dimensional picture portrays the entire balance sheet of a financial
Institution broken down according to the maturity of the assets and liabilities. The three
rows of columns which run from left to right show the liabilities, assets, and cumulative
mismatch. The heights of the columns give the amounts of each asset, liability, or
Cumulative mismatch. in each maturity band. An Idea of the scale is obtained from the
min/max figures at the top right hand side of the picture, and me zero level is defined by
the height of the "floor" separating the three rows (i.e. between liabilities and assets.
and between assets arid mismatch).
Source: Gardener, E.P.M. 'A Study on Capital Adequacy Criteria
for Commercial Banks'. Ph.D. Thesis (unpublished)
University of Wales, 1979.
Exhibit 7D.2
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Figure X-2 SOFI Data Presentation
In this three-dimensional picture, the assets side of the portfolio array is broken
down by maturity and yield, with the heights of the columns showing the amount in each
maturity/yield cell. Again, an idea of the scale is given by the min/max figures in the too
right•hand corner of the picture.
Source: Gardener, E.P.M. 'A Study on Capital Adequacy Criteria
for Commercial pahks'. Ph.D. Thesis funpublished)
University of Wales, 1979.
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